Present: All the Justices
AMOCO FOAM PRODUCTS
COMPANY
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON
v. Record No. 980139 January 8, 1999
ESSIE L. JOHNSON
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal of an award under the Workers' Compensation
Act, we review the Court of Appeals' application of the doctrine
of compensable consequences.
In July 1992, appellee Essie L. Johnson, the claimant,
sustained a compensable left ankle injury that arose out of and
in the course of her employment with appellant Amoco Foam
Products Company, the employer. Following lengthy treatment and
June 1994 surgery on the ankle, the claimant fell at home in
August 1994 while recovering from the surgery when the ankle
gave way, causing injury to her right knee.
In a September 1995 opinion, the Workers' Compensation
Commission affirmed a deputy commissioner's ruling that the 1994
right knee injury was a compensable consequence of the July 1992
industrial accident, and awarded compensation accordingly. The
self-insured employer did not appeal this award.
The present case arises from the claimant's application
seeking payment of compensation as a result of a further right
knee injury that occurred in November 1995 when her right knee
"gave out" at home causing her to fall. The claimant sought
permanent disability benefits as a result of a 20% loss of use
to the right leg caused by the August 1994 compensable
consequence injury. The claimant also sought compensation for a
period of total work incapacity of about 30 days during
November-December 1995 as a result of the further right knee
injury occurring in November 1995.
In a January 1997 opinion, the Commission affirmed a deputy
commissioner's decision awarding benefits. The deputy found
that the claimant's November 1995 fall was a compensable
consequence of her August 1994 accident, which, in the
Commission's words, "was previously adjudged to be a compensable
consequence of the claimant's original industrial injury."
Following the employer's appeal, a panel of the Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the Commission. Amoco Foam Prod.
Co. v. Johnson, 26 Va. App. 267, 494 S.E.2d 169 (1997). In
framing the issue, the Court of Appeals said: "The
determination that the 1994 knee injury was a compensable
consequence of claimant's ankle injury is res judicata. It is
undisputed that claimant's original 1992 injury was not the
immediate cause of her 1995 injury. Consequently, the issue
before us is whether as a matter of law the commission may award
benefits for an injury caused by a compensable consequence, or,
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in other words, whether a claimant may recover for a compensable
consequence of a compensable consequence." Id. at 273, 494
S.E.2d at 172.
Answering the question in the affirmative, the Court of
Appeals stated: "In the instant case, the evidence established
that claimant's 1995 knee injury was causally related to her
1994 knee injury which was causally related to her initial ankle
injury. This chain of causation is direct and natural, and
there is no evidence of any intervening cause attributable to
claimant's conduct. Furthermore, claimant's 1994 compensable
consequence knee injury becomes a primary injury, and the injury
it caused in 1995 is clearly a compensable consequence of it.
We hold that claimant's November 1995 knee injury is a
compensable consequence of her 1994 knee injury and of her 1992
ankle injury." Id. at 275-76, 494 S.E.2d at 173-74. The
employer appeals.
The question is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in
answering the foregoing question affirmatively. We hold that
the court erred.
Any discussion of the doctrine of compensable consequences
must recognize the basic concept that a disputed accidental
injury must arise out of and be in the course of employment in
order to be compensable. See Code § 65.2-101 (defining
"Injury").
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This Court first addressed the compensable consequences
idea in Immer and Co. v. Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254
(1967). There, the question presented was "whether an employee
who suffers a compensable injury may be awarded compensation for
additional injuries suffered in an automobile accident occurring
while the employee is en route from his place of employment to a
doctor's office for further treatment of the original injury."
Id. at 721, 152 S.E.2d at 255. The Court stated, regarding the
second injury, "[t]he struggle seems to be with determining
whether such an additional injury 'arises out of the
employment.' The eternal search in making the . . .
determination is to find the presence or absence of a 'causal
connection' between the incidents of employment and the
additional injuries." Id. at 722, 152 S.E.2d at 255-56.
Affirming the employee's award of compensation, the Court said
the evidence in that case established such a causal connection.
Id. at 728, 152 S.E.2d at 259.
Citing Brosnahan, the Court discussed the doctrine of
compensable consequences in Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 210, 237
S.E.2d 97 (1977). There, a claimant was injured in a restaurant
when he fell while on crutches required for treatment of an
initial industrial injury. This Court pointed out that the
"doctrine extends the canopy of the Workman's Compensation Act
to the resulting injury . . . because the second injury is
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treated as if it occurred in the course of and arising out of
the employee's employment." Id. at 214, 237 S.E.2d at 100.
Under the Brosnahan test, the crucial inquiry here is
whether there is a causal connection between the incidents of
employment giving rise to the 1992 ankle injury and the
additional 1995 knee injury. The record in this case clearly
establishes there is not.
The Court of Appeals stated: "It is undisputed that
claimant's original 1992 injury was not an immediate cause of
her 1995 injury." This conclusion is fully supported by the
relevant medical testimony. The claimant's attending physician
reported in April 1996: "Essie Johnson fell originally in
August of 1994. She had another fall in November 1995, but I
tend to think that this was largely due to the injury of August
1994. She was having pain at the time of November 1995
following the injury of August 1994 and her knee 'buckled' on
her. I tend to think that her continued pain is what actually
caused her to buckle, and that this is all causily [sic] related
to the August 1994 injury."
In sum, the record fails to establish a causal connection
between the original injury and the November 1995 injury, a
requirement for compensability of the latter injury. In other
words, the latter injury did not arise out of the employment
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because there is absence of a causal connection between the
incidents of claimant's employment and the 1995 injury.
Under these circumstances, contrary to the Court of
Appeals' ruling, it does not logically follow that merely
because the 1994 injury was causally related to the 1992
accident and the 1995 injury was causally related to the 1994
injury, then the 1995 injury was causally related to the 1992
accident. The link of causation must directly connect the
original accidental injury with the additional injury for which
compensation is sought. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that claimant's November 1995 knee injury was a
compensable consequence of her 1992 ankle injury.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals affirming the award of compensation for total work
incapacity from November 13 through December 12, 1995, and will
enter final judgment here dismissing the application for those
benefits. This judgment, however, does not affect the award of
compensation "for 20% permanent loss of the right leg." Those
permanent disability benefits are not legitimately in question
in this appeal because they were based on the ruling that the
August 1994 injury was a compensable consequence of the 1992
injury, a ruling that was not appealed.
Reversed and final judgment.
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