Present: All the Justices
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, ET AL.
v. Record No. 971083 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
February 27, 1998
TRACY LEE RANDOLPH, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Carleton Penn, Judge Designate
In this appeal, we consider a procedural challenge to the
use of a declaratory judgment proceeding for resolving the issue
whether an employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of
his employment.
In October 1995, Kevin Martin was working as a truck driver
for Southern States Cooperative, Inc., t/a Southern States
Leesburg Petroleum Services (Southern States). Martin’s job
required him to be “on call” to respond to customer requests for
service during the weekend beginning Friday, October 13, 1995.
Pursuant to company policy, Martin planned to use a company-
owned truck for the period he was “on call.”
At the end of his regular work shift on October 13, Martin
began to transfer his personal belongings from his car, which
was in Southern States’ employee parking lot, to the company-
owned truck. During this process, Martin noticed that his
hunting rifle was in the trunk of his car and that the rifle
case was open. When Martin attempted to close the rifle case,
the rifle discharged a bullet which traveled through the wall of
the trunk and struck Tracy Lee Randolph, another Southern States
employee, in the left leg. There is no allegation that this
shooting was intentional.
At the time of the shooting, Martin’s car was insured by a
motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by USAA Casualty
Insurance Company (USAA), which provided coverage for injuries
caused by Martin’s negligent or reckless use of the car.
Martin’s homeowner’s liability insurance policy, also issued by
USAA, provided coverage for injuries resulting from Martin’s
negligent or reckless acts. USAA denied liability under each
policy for Randolph’s injury on the ground that Randolph was
injured on Southern States’ property while Martin was in the
course of his employment. Southern States’ workers’
compensation carrier, Southern States Underwriters, Inc., t/a
Southern States Insurance Exchange (Underwriters), also denied
liability for Randolph’s injury, stating that the injury did not
arise out of or in the course of Randolph’s employment.
Randolph filed a bill of complaint for declaratory judgment
in the trial court against several defendants, including USAA,
Southern States, Underwriters, and Kevin Martin. The bill of
complaint requested a declaration that USAA was liable for
Randolph’s injury under either or both of the insurance policies
issued by USAA.
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At a bench trial, Randolph’s counsel informed the
chancellor that the sole issue he was asking the chancellor to
decide was “whether the Workers’ Compensation bar applies.”
Randolph’s counsel further stated that he “was not going to get
into which one of the various USAA policies might apply.” USAA
and Martin (collectively, USAA) objected to Randolph’s use of a
declaratory judgment proceeding to resolve the issue concerning
the workers’ compensation bar.
After hearing the evidence, the chancellor ruled that the
request for declaratory relief was appropriate because the suit
involved an “antagonistic assertion and denial of right.” The
chancellor then held that the injury did not arise out of
Randolph’s employment and, thus, that the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Act, Code §§ 65.2-100 through -1310, did not bar
Randolph from filing a tort action.
On appeal, USAA contends that the chancellor erred in
entering a declaratory judgment on the issue whether Randolph’s
injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. USAA
argues that declaratory judgment did not lie in this case
because the suit raised an issue to be decided in a future tort
action and did not involve a determination of Randolph’s rights
under a written instrument.
Southern States and Randolph (collectively, Randolph)
contend that the trial court did not err in entering a
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declaratory judgment because the bill of complaint requested a
determination whether Randolph had a right to file a workers’
compensation claim or a right to institute a personal injury
action. Randolph also asserts that the declaratory judgment
suit was an appropriate and efficient mechanism for joining all
parties in interest for the conclusive determination of these
rights. We disagree with Randolph.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Code §§ 8.01-184
through –191, circuit courts have the authority to make “binding
adjudications of right” in cases of “actual controversy” when
there is “antagonistic assertion and denial of right.” Code §
8.01-184; Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 245 Va.
24, 35, 426 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1993); Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes,
240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990); Reisen v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 225 Va. 327, 331, 302 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1983).
The purpose of this enactment is to provide relief from the
uncertainty arising out of controversies over legal rights.
Code § 8.01-191; Erie, 240 Va. at 170, 393 S.E.2d at 212;
Reisen, 225 Va. at 331, 302 S.E.2d at 531.
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not give trial courts the
authority to render advisory opinions, to decide moot questions,
or to answer inquiries that are merely speculative. St. Mary’s,
245 Va. at 35, 426 S.E.2d at 123; Hughes, 240 Va. at 170, 393
S.E.2d at 212; Reisen, 225 Va. at 331, 302 S.E.2d at 531. The
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Act also is not to be used as an instrument of procedural
fencing, either to secure delay or to choose a forum. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 419, 177 S.E.2d 519, 522
(1970); Williams v. Southern Bank, 203 Va. 657, 662, 125 S.E.2d
803, 807 (1962).
The authority to enter a declaratory judgment is
discretionary and must be exercised with great care and caution.
Bishop, 211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524. As a rule, this
authority will not be exercised when some other mode of
proceeding is provided. Id.
The fact that multiple actions may be avoided if a
declaratory judgment is entered is not always a ground for the
trial court to exercise its jurisdiction. There must also be
some real necessity for the exercise of jurisdiction on this
basis. Id. at 419, 177 S.E.2d at 522-23; Williams, 203 Va. at
663, 125 S.E.2d at 807. Further, when a declaratory judgment
regarding a disputed fact would be determinative of issues,
rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, or
other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, the
case is not appropriate for declaratory judgment. Bishop, 211
Va. at 420, 177 S.E.2d at 523; Williams, 203 Va. at 663, 125
S.E.2d at 807.
Our decisions in Bishop and Williams illustrate some of
these basic principles. In Bishop, two insurers which had
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defended and settled a wrongful death action requested entry of
a declaratory judgment against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
(Liberty Mutual). The two insurers effectively contended that
Liberty Mutual was liable to them because they defended,
settled, and paid under their policies a claim that should have
been defended, settled, and paid by Liberty Mutual. The trial
court entered a declaratory judgment decreeing recovery in favor
of the two insurers.
On appeal, Liberty Mutual maintained that the disputed
claim was not appropriate for resolution by means of declaratory
judgment. We agreed because, when the petition for declaratory
judgment was filed, the various claims and rights asserted had
accrued and matured, and the wrongs alleged had been suffered.
211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524. Thus, no rights between the
parties remained unsettled and other modes of proceeding were
available for resolution of the dispute. See id.
In Williams, a former customer of a bank threatened to file
eleven actions for malicious prosecution against the bank, based
on information the bank gave to a prosecutor that led to the
indictment of the customer on eleven charges of larceny. When
the customer was acquitted on two of the larceny charges, the
remaining indictments were terminated by nolle prosequi on
motion by the prosecutor. The bank filed a petition for
declaratory judgment requesting a determination whether the bank
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could be held liable in a civil suit for the alleged malicious
prosecution. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment
decreeing that the bank had made a full disclosure of all
material facts to the prosecutor, and the court permanently
enjoined the customer from instituting any malicious prosecution
actions based on the bank’s conduct. 203 Va. at 658-59, 125
S.E.2d at 804-05.
We reversed the trial court’s decree, holding that
declaratory judgment did not lie because the only controversy in
the suit involved a disputed issue, namely, whether the bank
made a full disclosure of the facts to the prosecutor. 203 Va.
at 663, 125 S.E.2d at 807. The determination of that issue,
rather than an adjudication of any rights of the parties, was
the true object of the proceeding. Id. We also noted that the
trial court’s decree improperly allowed the bank to choose its
own forum in equity. Id. at 663, 125 S.E.2d at 808.
The present case suffers from many of the same defects that
required reversal of the decrees in Bishop and Williams. Like
Bishop, the present case involves claims and rights that had
accrued and matured when the bill of complaint was filed. Thus,
declaratory judgment did not lie because other remedies were
available to Randolph, namely, a claim for workers’ compensation
benefits or an action at law. See Bishop, 211 Va. at 421, 177
S.E.2d at 524.
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Like Williams, the present case is inappropriate for
declaratory judgment because the case does not involve a
determination of rights, but only involves a disputed issue to
be determined in future litigation between the parties, namely,
whether Randolph’s injuries arose out of and in the course of
his employment. The chancellor’s entry of a declaratory
judgment also improperly allowed Randolph to choose a forum for
the determination of this issue. See Williams, 203 Va. at 663,
125 S.E.2d at 808.
We find no merit in Randolph’s contention that the present
case is similar to our decision in Reisen. There, we were
presented with an actual controversy requiring the
interpretation of rights under an insurance policy. The
controversy involved the insurer’s duty to defend a pending tort
action. We held that the determination of this coverage
question was appropriate for declaratory judgment because the
determination guided the parties in their future conduct in
relation to each other, and saved them from jeopardizing their
interests by taking undirected action incident to their rights.
225 Va. at 335, 302 S.E.2d at 533. The present case is
dissimilar to Reisen because Randolph did not seek any
adjudication of rights but only requested a determination of the
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issue whether his injuries arose out of and in the course of his
employment. *
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court’s decree
and dismiss the bill of complaint for declaratory judgment.
Reversed and dismissed.
*
Based on our decision, we do not reach USAA’s remaining
assignment of error challenging the merits of the chancellor’s
decision.
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