COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, McClanahan and Senior Judge Willis
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
EDWARD J. GARABEDIAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1957-08-1 JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN
DECEMBER 22, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Von L. Piersall, Jr., Judge Designate
Harry Dennis Harmon, Jr., for appellant.
Benjamin H. Katz, Assistant Attorney General (William C. Mims,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Edward J. Garabedian was convicted, in a bench trial, of possessing a concealed weapon
by a convicted felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. On appeal, Garabedian argues the
Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because the knife in his
possession for which he was convicted did not meet the definition of a weapon under the statute.
Garabedian’s knife is materially indistinguishable from the knife at issue in our recent decision,
McMillan v. Commonwealth, __Va. App. __, __ S.E.2d __ (Dec. 22, 2009) (en banc), where we
reversed appellant’s conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2. McMillan dictates reversal of
Garabedian’s conviction.
A felon is prohibited from “knowingly and intentionally carry[ing] about his person,
hidden from common observation, any weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2-308.” Code
§ 18.2-308.2(A). Code § 18.2-308(A) enumerates several weapons, including, “any dirk, bowie
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, [or] razor . . . .” This section also prohibits
concealing “any weapon of like kind as those enumerated . . . .” Id. If the bladed item is not one
of the enumerated items under subsection A, the analysis thus turns to whether it is a “weapon of
like kind as those enumerated.” “For an item ‘to be a “weapon” within the definition of “weapon
of like kind,” the item must be designed for fighting purposes or commonly understood to be a
“weapon.”’” McMillan, __ Va. App. at __, __ S.E.2d at __ (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth,
274 Va. 409, 415, 650 S.E.2d 89, 92 (2007) (quoting Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177,
182, 639 S.E.2d 277, 230 (2007))).
In McMillan, we focused on whether McMillan’s knife was either a dirk or a bowie
knife, or a “weapon of like kind” to one of those knives. We concluded that, “[u]like a dirk, the
knife McMillan possessed lacked a ‘long blade’ and a ‘protective guard where the blade meets
the handle’ or a ‘hilt . . . terminating in a pommel.’” Id. at __, __ S.E.2d at __. The blade of
McMillan’s knife was approximately four inches, and the total length of the knife was
approximately eight inches. Id. at __, __ S.E.2d at __. We also concluded that McMillan’s knife
was not a bowie knife, which is “‘a large hunting knife adapted [especially] for knife-fighting’
with a ‘10 to 15 inch [] long’ blade.’” Id. at __, __ S.E.2d at __ (quoting Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 277 Va. 280, 288 n.5, 673 S.E.2d 469, 472 n.5 (2009)). Then concluding that
the record was “devoid of any facts on which one could find that the knife is either designed for
fighting purposes or commonly understood to be a weapon,” we reversed McMillan’s conviction
under Code § 18.2-308.2. Id. at __, __ S.E.2d at __.
Here, in convicting Garabedian under Code § 18.2-308.2, the trial court found that his
knife was either a bowie knife or “a knife very similar in nature to one.” Much like the knife in
McMillan, the blade of Garabedian’s knife was approximately four inches and the total length of
the knife was approximately eight and a half inches. We thus conclude, as a matter of law, that
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Garabedian’s knife was not a bowie knife. Furthermore, as in McMillan, there is no evidence in
the record that Garabedian’s knife was either designed for fighting purposes or commonly
understood to be a weapon. There was, therefore, insufficient evidence to establish that
Garabedian’s knife was a “weapon of like kind” to a bowie knife under Code § 18.2-308.2.
For these reasons, we reverse Garabedian’s conviction.
Reversed.
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