COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
TOMMIE LEE TUCKER, S/K/A
TOMMIE LEE TUCKER, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1594-01-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
MAY 28, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY
William L. Wellons, Judge
Michael L. Freshour, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Tommie Lee Tucker, Jr. (defendant) was convicted in a bench
trial of eluding a police officer in violation of Code
§ 46.2-817(B), a felony. On appeal, defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove his conduct "interfere[d]
with or endanger[ed] the operation of the law-enforcement vehicle
or endanger[ed] a person." Finding no error, we affirm the
conviction.
I.
The evidence is uncontroverted. At approximately 10:40 p.m.
on the evening of October 27, 2000, State Trooper David Cooper was
operating mobile radar while traveling westbound on a two-lane
highway in Halifax County. An eastbound red Mustang driven by
defendant was detected traveling "seventy-three in a fifty-five
mile per hour zone," and Cooper "immediately turned around and
began to overtake" the car. When "it looked like [defendant] was
fixing to" cross a "double solid line" and "pass a van," Cooper
activated his "blue lights and siren." "[S]imultaneously,"
defendant entered the westbound lane, passed the van and continued
east, "passing two other vehicles," with Cooper in pursuit.
When defendant reached the controlled intersection with "US
360," a four-lane highway, the "light in his direction of travel
was red," but defendant "continued on through without stopping."
Cooper slowed as he approached the intersection, the traffic
signal "turned green," and he continued to follow defendant along
State Route 344, reaching speeds "in excess of a hundred and five
[m.p.h.] trying to catch him." The chase continued through
Scottsburg, where Cooper again slowed his vehicle, only to resume
speeds of "eighty, eighty-five [m.p.h.]" in pursuit of defendant.
Beyond Scottsburg, "approximately three-quarters of a mile"
from the intersection with US 360, the Mustang "slid off" the road
and into a tree. Before Cooper could reach the vehicle, defendant
"came out from the driver's seat," "jumped into the woods and
ran." Apprehended and arrested at "approximately 4:09 a.m." the
following morning, defendant explained he fled because "he had
just gotten out of jail . . . and didn't want to go back."
At the conclusion of all the evidence, defendant moved the
court to "strike the felony." Conceding "there's no question
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. . . [he] didn't stop" for Cooper's "audible and visual sign,"
admittedly conduct sufficient to establish "misdemeanor eluding"
and "reckless driving," defendant maintained that such evidence
was insufficient to prove a felonious violation of Code
§ 46.2-817(B). The court overruled the motion and convicted
defendant of feloniously eluding Cooper, resulting in the instant
appeal.
II.
Code § 46.2-817 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Any person who, having received a
visible or audible signal from any
law-enforcement officer to bring his motor
vehicle to a stop, drives such motor vehicle
in a willful and wanton disregard of such
signal or who attempts to escape or elude
such law-enforcement officer, shall be
guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. . . .
B. Any person who, having received a
visible or audible signal from any
law-enforcement officer to bring his motor
vehicle to a stop, drives such motor vehicle
in a willful and wanton disregard of such
signal so as to interfere with or endanger
the operation of the law-enforcement vehicle
or endanger a person shall be guilty of a
Class 6 felony. . . .
C. When any person is convicted of a
misdemeanor under this section, in addition
to the other penalties provided in this
section, the driver's license of such person
may be suspended by the court for a period
of not less than thirty days nor more than
one year. However, in any case where the
speed of such person is determined to have
exceeded the maximum allowed by twenty miles
per hour, his driver's license shall be
suspended by the court trying the case for a
period of not less than ninety days. . . .
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Contending the legislature did not intend "reckless driving,
without more," sufficient "to convict a person eluding the police
of a felony," defendant urges us to construe Code § 46.2-817(B) to
require proof that the "driving actually endangered a person."
In support of his argument, defendant points to Code
§ 46.2-817(C), which provides an enhanced punishment for a
violation of Code § 46.2-817(A), "a misdemeanor," when the offense
is accompanied by speed in excess of "the maximum allowed by
twenty miles per hour." Code § 46.2-817(C) (emphasis added).
Because such conduct is deemed reckless driving by Code
§ 46.2-862, defendant reasons reckless driving gives rise only to
a violation of Code § 46.2-817(A), a misdemeanor.
Well established "principles of statutory construction
require us to ascertain and give effect to the legislative
intent." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d
422, 424 (1992) (citations omitted). "The plain, obvious, and
rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious,
narrow or strained construction; a statute should never be
construed so that it leads to absurd results." Id. "Although
penal laws are to be construed strictly [against the
Commonwealth], they 'ought not to be construed so strictly as to
defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.'" Willis v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 430, 441, 393 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1990)
(citation omitted).
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Viewed accordingly, Code § 46.2-817(C) is clearly intended to
enhance punishment for a violation of Code § 46.2-817(A) when such
offense is aggravated by specified conduct, coincidentally a
species of reckless driving. Code § 46.2-817(C); see Shaw v.
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 331, 334, 387 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1990)
(finding violations of Code § 46.2-817 do not "constitute a
reckless driving offense"). Thus, application of the provision
is expressly limited to "person[s] . . . convicted of a
misdemeanor under [Code § 46.2-817(A)] . . . ." Code
§ 46.2-817(C) (emphasis added).
With respect to the endangerment of persons sufficient to
constitute a felonious violation of Code § 46.2-817(B), a
manifest purpose of the statute is to protect the public against
a driver eluding police "so as to . . . endanger a person." Id.
Hence, conduct that raises the specter of endangerment is the
evil contemplated and proscribed by the statute. To require the
threat to be imminent would engraft an element to the offense,
thereby permitting the dangerous operation of motor vehicles
until a person is actually imperiled, an absurd result that
subverts the salutary purposes of the statute.
Here, when defendant, ignoring Cooper's signal to stop,
operated a vehicle at a high rate of speed in gross violation of
posted limits, passed three cars, crossing a "double solid line"
in the first instance, disregarded a red traffic signal at an
intersection with a four-lane highway and, moments thereafter,
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lost control and crashed into a tree, he clearly endangered both
Trooper Cooper in the discharge of his duties and others on or
about the highway, a felony in violation of Code § 46.2-817(B).
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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