COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Clements
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
JOSEPH GOODWIN, III
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 2006-04-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
JULY 12, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge
Fay F. Spence, Public Defender for the City of Newport News
(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Deana A. Malek, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams
Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The trial judge convicted Joseph Goodwin, III, for carrying a concealed knife in violation of
Code § 18.2-308.2. Goodwin contends the trial judge erred because the knife was not prohibited by
the statute. We agree and reverse the conviction.
I.
The basic facts are undisputed. A police officer went to a restaurant’s parking lot to assist
paramedics who were treating a man bleeding from a head wound. The injured man told the officer
he had been hit with a 2-by-4 board. A person who apparently witnessed the attack upon the injured
man pointed to Joseph Goodwin, III, standing across the street. When the police officer approached
Goodwin, he noticed bloodstains on Goodwin’s pants. As the officer talked to Goodwin and
prepared to frisk him for weapons, he asked Goodwin if he had any sharp objects on his person.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Goodwin said he had a knife in his pocket, which the officer retrieved. The officer learned that
Goodwin was a convicted felon and arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of
Code § 18.2-308.2.
The officer described the knife as follows:
It’s approximately a steak knife, approximately eight to ten
inches long in length, approximately six-inch blade, wooden
handle, non-serrated.
* * * * * * *
The dull side is straight all the way to the point it’s rounded,
kind of convex direction. It’s sharp all the way to the point. The
tip appears to be a little bit broken off.
He further described the blade as having “a pretty sharp point” and identified it when the
prosecutor offered it as an exhibit.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge examined the knife and convicted
Goodwin of possessing a concealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.
II.
Code § 18.2-308.2 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for [a convicted felon] . . . to
knowingly and intentionally carry about his person, hidden from common observation, any
weapon described in subsection A of [Code] § 18.2-308.” Pertinent to this case, Code
§ 18.2-308 describes “any dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, . .
. or . . . any weapon of like kind of those enumerated in this subsection.” Thus, although the
statute designates specific types of knives and knives “of like kind,” it “does not prohibit
generally the carrying of knives hidden from common observation.” Ricks v. Commonwealth,
27 Va. App. 442, 444, 499 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1998).
Interpreting Code § 18.2-308(A), the Supreme Court held that “a pocketknife is neither a
dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, nor a weapon of like kind.” Wood v. Henry
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County Public Schools, 255 Va. 85, 94-95, 495 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1998). The Court reached this
conclusion by applying the following principles of statutory interpretation:
“Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of
persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words
follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a
sense analogous to the less general, particular words. Likewise,
according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when
general and specific words are grouped, the general words are
limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific
words.”
Id. (citations omitted). Interpreting the same statute, we have also held that “the physical
characteristics of the knife determine whether the knife is a weapon contemplated by the statute.”
Ricks, 27 Va. App. at 445, 499 S.E.2d at 576.
The knife entered into the record was measured against a ruler; it is ten inches long, and
has a blade length of five and a half inches. The officer described the knife to be a steak knife.
The prosecutor argued the knife “is of a like kind weapon to a dirk.” The trial judge agreed with
the Commonwealth and found that the knife has a “sharp end on the bottom edge, extremely
sharp on the bottom end and extreme point that would certainly cut straight through flesh if
propelled with any type of force.” This is not a description of physical characteristics that is
sufficient to bring the knife within the statutory definition of prohibited knives or of a “weapon
of like kind of those enumerated” in Code § 18.2-308(A).
A “dirk” is defined as “a long straight-bladed dagger formerly
carried [especially] by the Scottish Highlanders[,] 2. a short sword
formerly worn by British junior naval officers.” Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary, 642 (1981). A “bowie knife” is
defined as “a large hunting knife adapted [especially] for
knife-fighting and common in western frontier regions and having
a guarded handle and a strong single-edge blade typically 10 to 15
inches long with its back straight for most of its length and then
curving concavely and sometimes in a sharpened edge to the
point.” Id. at 262. A “switchblade knife” is defined as “a
pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure on a
release catch causes it to fly open.” Id. at 2314. A “ballistic knife”
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is defined as “any knife with a detachable blade that is propelled
by a spring-operated mechanism.” Code § 18.2-308(N).
Wood, 255 Va. at 95 n.6, 495 S.E.2d at 261 n.6.1
In Ricks, we held that a knife that “has the appearance and characteristics of an ordinary
household steak knife” does not satisfy the definition of the knives prohibited by Code
§ 18.2-308.2. Ricks, 27 Va. App. at 445, 499 S.E.2d at 576. Indeed, in view of the statutory
description of the knives, we noted in Richards v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2,
443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1994), that the legislature “intend[ed] to exclude . . . innocuous
household . . . knives.”
Our decision in Delcid v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 14, 526 S.E.2d 273 (2000), does
not require a different result. It did not involve a common kitchen steak knife, as did Ricks and
this case. Instead, the Delcid decision concerned “a butterfly knife,” which has a blade
concealed within “a two part hinged handle” that can be “flip[ped] . . . open, leaving the blade
exposed and locked, thus creating a straight-bladed knife.” 32 Va. App. at 17, 526 S.E.2d at 274.
1
Consistent with this definition, we earlier had defined the terms as follows:
The terms “dirk” and “bowie knife” are not defined by the statute,
nor has any appellate decision in this Commonwealth clarified the
difference. We assume that the two terms have their usual
meaning. A “dirk” or weapon of like kind is any stabbing weapon
having two sharp edges and a point, including daggers, short
swords and stilettos. A “bowie knife” or weapon of like kind is
any stabbing weapon having a single sharp edge, a dull or serrated
flat edge and a point, such as a hunting knife, a fishing knife or a
survivalist’s knife. It is generally agreed that in using such terms,
legislatures intend to exclude from concealed weapons statutes
innocuous household and industrial knives which may be carried
for legitimate purposes.
Richards v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1994). Given
its ordinary meaning, a dirk is a straight-bladed double-edged knife, historically designed as a
military weapon. Goodwin carried a single-edged steak knife. It would strain the holdings of
Wood and Ricks to define a steak knife as a dirk.
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In addition, the circumstances surrounding Goodwin’s possession of the knife, a factor that
Delcid mentions, id. at 18, 526 S.E.2d at 275, does not support the conclusion that it was in fact
intended as a weapon. The evidence proved the injured man was hit with a 2-by-4 board, and it
does not prove Goodwin used the knife in any manner.
The knife that Goodwin possessed does not fall within the prohibited class of knives.
True, it has a sharp point, a sharp edge, and a sturdy blade. But so do many pocketknives, which
Wood held to be excluded from the coverage of this statute. A properly maintained knife is
sharp and intrinsically is capable of being used for either cutting or stabbing. However, as
explained in Ricks and Wood, simply because a knife is sharp does not mean it is included
within the statutory class prescribed by Code § 18.2-308.2.
For these reasons, we reverse the conviction.
Reversed.
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