COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Baker
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
WILLIE J. GREEN
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2526-97-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
DECEMBER 8, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Willie J. Green (defendant) appeals his convictions of
carjacking, in violation of Code § 18.2-581, and the use of a
firearm in the commission of a carjacking, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-53.1. He contends the trial court erroneously ruled that,
upon conviction, Code § 18.2-53.1 required imposition of a
mandatory three-year sentence. Because we find no error in the
trial court's ruling, we affirm.
The evidence adduced at trial proved that defendant and an
accomplice stopped Josie Majette in the parking lot of the
Sentara Hampton General Hospital on February 22, 1997. Defendant
threatened to use a gun if Ms. Majette did not relinquish her car
keys. When Ms. Majette did so, defendant and his accomplice fled
in her vehicle. They were later stopped for a different offense
and arrested. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the
offense.
Defendant was transferred to the circuit court pursuant to
Code § 16.1-269.1 and tried as an adult for carjacking and use of
a firearm in the commission of a carjacking. Defendant was found
guilty of both offenses. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the
Commonwealth asserted Code § 18.2-53.1 required the trial court
to impose a three-year, unsuspended sentence for the firearm
offense. Defendant's counsel requested that defendant be given a
suspended sentence pursuant to Code § 16.1-272(A)(1).
The trial court ruled that "the firearm section [Code
§ 18.2-53.1] and its mandatory sentence, did take precedence"
over the juvenile code sentencing provisions. The trial court,
therefore, imposed a three-year sentence for that offense.
Code § 18.2-53.1 contains an extremely restrictive
sentencing provision whereby:
Violation of this section shall constitute a
separate and distinct felony and any person
found guilty thereof shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of three years for a
first conviction, and for a term of five
years for a second or subsequent conviction
under the provisions of this section.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the sentence prescribed for a violation of
the provisions of this section shall not be
suspended in whole or in part, nor shall
anyone convicted hereunder be placed on
probation.
(Emphasis added). However, Code § 16.1-272(A)(1) provides that a
juvenile convicted of a violent felony will be sentenced as an
adult "but the sentence may be suspended conditioned upon
successful completion of such terms and conditions as may be
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imposed in a juvenile court upon disposition of a delinquency
case." At first blush, these code sections appear to conflict
because one allows what the other specifically prohibits.
Appellate courts called upon to interpret statutes have
relied upon the following principles:
While in the construction of statutes
the constant endeavor of the courts is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the legislature, that intention must be
gathered from the words used, unless a
literal construction would involve a manifest
absurdity. Where the legislature has used
words of a plain and definite import the
courts cannot put upon them a construction
which amounts to holding the legislature did
not mean what it has actually expressed.
Caprio v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 507, 512, 493 S.E.2d 371, 374
(1997) (citing Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292,
295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990)). When a statute is clear and
unambiguous, "a court may look only to the words of the statute
to determine its meaning." Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership,
255 Va. 335, 339, 497 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1998).
The statutes in question use easily understood terms to
impart an equally clear meaning. Code § 18.2-53.1 states that
courts "shall" sentence one convicted of the use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony to a mandatory sentence
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The word
"notwithstanding" is defined as "without prevention or
obstruction from or by." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1545 (1993). Given that understanding of the word, we
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conclude that the terms of Code § 18.2-53.1 are not limited by
other incongruous laws because the General Assembly intended Code
§ 18.2-53.1 to function "without obstruction" from them. Nothing
in Code § 16.1-272 contradicts this interpretation. Further,
Code § 16.1-272 does not contain mandatory language as does Code
§ 18.2-53.1.
Our interpretation of the statutes is also in concert with
our opinion in Lafleur v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 190, 366
S.E.2d 712 (1988). In Lafleur, we interpreted Code § 18.2-53.1
in light of Code § 19.2-311, which allowed alternate sentencing
for certain youthful offenders. We found that the purpose of
Code § 18.2-53.1 was to "'to deter violent criminal conduct
rather than to reform the most dangerous class of criminals.'"
Id. at 192, 366 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth,
219 Va. 759, 763, 250 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1979)). To apply the
juvenile sentencing provisions in place of the mandatory sentence
in Code § 18.2-53.1 "would substitute a discretionary penalty for
an inflexible one." Id. Because "[t]he General Assembly has
directed a contrary policy which courts must follow," we held a
mandatory sentence was rightfully imposed. Id. We are under no
less a burden to follow the General Assembly's clear mandate in
this case.
We hold that Code § 18.2-53.1 required the trial court to
impose a three-year, unsuspended sentence despite the provisions
of Code § 16.1-272. Because the trial court did not err by
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imposing the sentence, we affirm defendant's convictions.
Affirmed.
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