COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder
Argued at Salem, Virginia
SHIRLEY LOUISE GRAY
OPINION
v. Record No. 2767-95-3 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
NOVEMBER 5, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Diane McQ. Strickland, Judge
Randy V. Cargill (Magee, Foster, Goldstein &
Sayers, on brief), for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Shirley Louise Gray (appellant) appeals from the judgment of
the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke (trial court) that
approved her jury trial conviction of driving while under the
influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266. On appeal,
appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
prove that she was intoxicated but argues that her conviction
must be reversed because Code § 18.2-266 does not apply to
driving on private property in Virginia while under the influence
of alcohol. We disagree.
The facts are not contested. On June 11, 1995, at
approximately 1:15 a.m., in the City of Roanoke, appellant
operated her motor vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol,
upon a privately owned parking lot. Appellant was arrested by
Officer E. J. Barlow of the Roanoke City Police Department.
Code § 18.2-266 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to
drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or
train (i) while such person has a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent . . .
(ii) while such person is under the influence
of alcohol . . . .
For the purposes of this section the term
"motor vehicle" includes mopeds, while
operated on the public highways of this
Commonwealth.
Except for the operation of mopeds, Code § 18.2-266 contains
no language restricting its application to one who "drive[s]" or
"operate[s]" his or her motor vehicle on a public highway. In
Valentine v. Brunswick County, 202 Va. 696, 119 S.E.2d 486
(1961), the Supreme Court interpreted a county ordinance which
prohibited driving in Brunswick County while under the influence
of intoxicants. That ordinance made it illegal to drive under
the influence "anywhere in the county of Brunswick" and contained
no language limiting the offense to driving on the public
highways. In interpreting the ordinance, the Court held that,
an ordinance or statute which provides that
no person shall drive or operate a motor
vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicants, and is silent as to the place
where the offense may be committed, does not
require as an element of the offense that the
driving or operating shall be on a public
highway.
Id. at 698, 119 S.E.2d at 487 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). In so holding, the Court further noted that,
[t]he county ordinance is clear,
unambiguous and means what it says. It
applies to anyone driving or operating a
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motor vehicle . . . while under the influence
of intoxicants anywhere in the county of
Brunswick, whether on a public highway or
private property. It does not specify that
such driving or operating must occur on a
highway.
Id. at 699, 119 S.E.2d at 488.
The reasoning of Valentine applies here. Code § 18.2-266 is
"clear, unambiguous and means what it says." Other than for the
operation of a moped, the statute does not specify that the
driving or operating that it criminalizes must occur on a public
highway, and we decline the invitation to construe the statute to
impose that requirement.
For the reasons stated in Valentine, appellant's reliance
upon Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 100 S.E.2d 4 (1957),
is misplaced. See Valentine, 202 Va. at 698, 119 S.E.2d at 487.
Code § 18.2-266 "is not a highway regulation and cannot be
construed as part of the general codification of the State motor
vehicle laws." Id. Therefore, Prillaman has no application
here.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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