COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Willis and
Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
TRACEY ANNE RICHARDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 3011-99-4 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
FEBRUARY 6, 2001
COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Frank A. Hoss, Jr., Judge
Mark Thomas Crossland for appellant.
D. Scott Bailey, Assistant Commonwealth's
Attorney (Paul B. Ebert, Commonwealth's
Attorney; Mary Grace O'Brien, Assistant
Commonwealth's Attorney, on brief), for
appellee.
Appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated, second
or subsequent offense. On appeal, appellant contends that the
trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Appellant
argues that the officer did not have a reasonable articulable
suspicion to stop her. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 1:05 a.m. on December 17, 1998,
Officer S. Vago observed a vehicle travelling in the right lane of
two westbound travel lanes. Vago observed the right-side tires of
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the vehicle cross the solid white line marking the boundary of the
travel lane, just inside the edge of the road surface, for a
distance of seventy to eighty feet. There was a curve in the road
where the tires crossed the solid white line. Vago, an
experienced officer who had made over one hundred arrests for
driving under the influence of alcohol in the prior year,
suspected that the driver was impaired and stopped the vehicle.
Vago conducted field sobriety tests and arrested appellant for
driving under the influence.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
"In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, 'the burden is upon [the defendant] to show that the
ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the
Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.'" McGee v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997)
(en banc) (citation omitted). While we are bound to review de
novo the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause, we "review findings of historical fact only for clear
error 1 and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those
facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers."
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (footnote
added).
1
"In Virginia, questions of fact are binding on appeal
unless 'plainly wrong.'" McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198 n.1, 487
S.E.2d at 261 n.1 (citations omitted).
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"If a police officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion
that a person is engaging in, or is about to engage in, criminal
activity, the officer may detain the suspect to conduct a brief
investigation without violating the person's Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." McGee,
25 Va. App. at 202, 487 S.E.2d at 263. "When a court reviews
whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop, it must view the totality of the
circumstances and view those facts objectively through the eyes
of a reasonable police officer with the knowledge, training, and
experience of the investigating officer." Murphy v.
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989).
"'[A] trained law enforcement officer may [be able to] identify
criminal behavior which would appear innocent to an untrained
observer.'" Freeman v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 661, 460
S.E.2d 261, 262 (1995) (citation omitted). "[W]eaving within a
single traffic lane is an articulable fact which may give rise
to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity." Neal v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 239, 498 S.E.2d 422, 425 (1998).
In the early morning hours, an experienced police officer
saw the right-side tires of appellant's vehicle cross the solid
white line near the edge of the road surface. The officer saw
the vehicle being driven in this manner for seventy to eighty
feet. Under these circumstances, the officer had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the driver was impaired, which
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justified a stop to investigate further. The trial court did
not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
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