COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
SHERRY WRIGHT
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1513-00-4 PER CURIAM
DECEMBER 5, 2000
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
John E. Kloch, Judge
(Janell M. Wolfe; Law Office of Janell M.
Wolfe, on brief), for appellant.
(Ignacio B. Pessoa, City Attorney; Jill R.
Applebaum, Assistant City Attorney; Office
of the City Attorney, on brief), for
appellee.
Sherry Wright appeals the decision of the circuit court
terminating her parental rights to her infant son. She contends
the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirements under the clear and convincing standard of proof.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development, 13 Va. App.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies
'the statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual
parental rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides
detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents
and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to
preserve the family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456
S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) (citations omitted). "'In matters of a
child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in
making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's
best interests.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463
(citation omitted). The trial judge's findings, "'when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
The trial court ruled that DSS presented clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to meet the statutory requirements of Code
§ 16.1-283(B). Under that section, the parental rights of a
parent of a child found to be neglected or abused may be
terminated if the trial court finds that the neglect suffered by
the child "presented a serious and substantial threat to his life,
health or development" and that, notwithstanding appropriate
rehabilitative efforts made by the agencies, "[i]t is not
reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such
neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so
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as to allow the child's safe return to his parent . . . within a
reasonable period of time." Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) and (2).
It is prima facie evidence of the conditions set out in Code
§ 16.1-283(B)(2) if there is evidence that:
a. The parent or parents are suffering from
a mental or emotional illness or mental
deficiency of such severity that there is no
reasonable expectation that such parent will
be able to undertake responsibility for the
care needed by the child in accordance with
his age and stage of development; . . . or
* * * * * * *
c. The parent or parents, without good
cause, have not responded to or followed
through with appropriate, available and
reasonable rehabilitative efforts on the
part of social, medical, mental health or
other rehabilitative agencies designed to
reduce, eliminate or prevent the neglect or
abuse of the child.
Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a) and (c).
The evidence supports the trial court's finding. Despite the
extensive efforts and services provided to Wright through DSS and
other agencies, there was no indication that the conditions
resulting in the neglect and abuse "can be substantially corrected
or eliminated so as to allow the safe return to his parent . . .
within a reasonable period of time." Specifically, every
diagnosis revealed that Wright suffered from chronic paranoid
schizophrenia, yet she refused to accept the diagnoses and failed
to maintain a long-term relationship with or comply with a course
of treatment from one psychiatrist. She insisted on procuring and
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taking Xanax and resisted efforts at treating her condition with
less risky alternatives. During the one and one-half year period
that DSS attempted to assist and help Wright control her chronic
mental illness and safely maintain custody of her child, Wright
failed to demonstrate the ability or desire to cooperate or comply
with the mental health professionals or with DSS workers who
needed to monitor her progress.
The trial court also ruled that DSS presented clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to meet the statutory requirements
of Code § 16.1-283(C). That section provides that a parent's
rights to a child placed in foster care may be terminated if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the
child's best interests and that the parent "without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time
not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in
foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or
required continuation of the child's foster care placement"
despite the agencies' efforts to provide rehabilitative services.
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
The evidence supports the trial court's finding. Despite the
services provided, Wright failed to comply with the terms of a
protective order by refusing to cooperate with DSS case workers so
they could conduct home visits. Moreover, she failed to cooperate
with mental health professionals and comply with a continued plan
of treatment in order to control her chronic mental condition.
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Wright's refusal to allow home visits prevented DSS case workers
from monitoring her progress, observing and evaluating the home
environment and providing assistance in remedying the conditions
that led to the child's foster care placement. In addition,
Wright lacks a stable and responsible support system of friends or
relatives that could assist her and assure the child's safety.
DSS presented clear and convincing evidence satisfying the
statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283 and proving that it was
in the best interests of the child to terminate Wright's parental
rights. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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