COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Koontz and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Salem, Virginia
PETER MOORE
v. Record No. 0619-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 16, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
James F. Ingram, Judge
Phyllis Marie Mosby (Office of the Public
Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Robert B. Beasley, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Peter Moore appeals his convictions for possessing cocaine,
possessing a firearm while unlawfully possessing cocaine, and
possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. He
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the cocaine, the firearm, and a statement he made to the
police. Finding no error, we affirm.
In considering a trial court's ruling on a suppression
motion, we view the evidence in the "light most favorable to
. . . the prevailing party below," the Commonwealth in this
instance, and the decision of the trial judge will be disturbed
only if plainly wrong. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App.
1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). To prevail on appeal,
Moore must "show . . . that the denial of [his] motion to
suppress constitute[d] reversible error." Motley v.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233
(1993).
Officer Michael Wallace of the Danville Police Department
testified that he had seen a car with New York license plates "in
the Cardinal Village area for about six months . . . ." On the
night of November 16, 1993, Wallace saw the car being driven in
the City of Danville. Wallace stopped the car "to inquire about
the registration on the vehicle and see when she [the presumed
owner] was going to get it transferred to Virginia tags, and her
driver's license." Wallace stated that "[w]e give them
[nonresidents] thirty days to switch it [the registration] over
[to Virginia registration]."
Upon approaching the car, Wallace recognized Moore in the
passenger seat. Wallace knew that there were warrants
outstanding for Moore's arrest. The police arrested Moore, and
seized cocaine and a firearm in the process.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether Wallace possessed a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal conduct when he
stopped the car. Wallace testified that he stopped the car
because he suspected that it was not properly registered. This
suspicion was reasonable and articulable. Code § 46.2-662
provides:
A resident owner of any passenger car,
pickup or panel truck, or motorcycle, other
than those provided for in § 46.2-652, which
has been duly registered for the current
calendar year in another state or country and
which at all times when operated in the
Commonwealth displays the license plate or
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plates issued for the vehicle in the other
state or country, may operate or permit the
operation of the passenger car, pickup or
panel truck, or motorcycle within or partly
within the Commonwealth for the first thirty
days of his residency in the Commonwealth
without registering the passenger car, pickup
or panel truck, or motorcycle or paying any
fees to the Commonwealth.
(Emphasis added.)
Wallace had observed the car, with New York license plates,
"for about six months." Clearly then, he could reasonably and
objectively conclude that the car was not registered in
accordance with Code § 46.2-662. The Supreme Court of the United
States has specifically sanctioned traffic stops on the ground
that an officer believes the vehicle is not properly registered:
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979),
the Supreme Court detailed the fourth
amendment requirements that must be met in
order to stop an automobile and detain its
occupants. The Court held that "except in
those situations in which there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a
motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile
is not registered, or that either the vehicle
or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law," the fourth
amendment prohibits the stopping of a vehicle
unless it is done pursuant to methods that
restrict the unconstrained exercise of
discretion on the part of the police. Id. at
663 (emphasis added); see Lowe v.
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 349-50, 337 S.E.2d
273, 275 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084
(1986).
Stroud v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 633, 636, 370 S.E.2d 721, 723
(1988) (second emphasis added).
The trial judge, in denying the motion to suppress, stated:
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"The stop was not a sham." Thus, the judge believed Wallace's
testimony to be credible, and accepted his testimony concerning
the reason for the stop of the car. "The weight which should be
given to evidence and whether the testimony of a witness is
credible are questions which the fact finder must decide."
Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598,
601 (1986). We cannot say that Wallace's testimony was
inherently incredible. Given that testimony, and viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
cannot say that the trial judge erred in denying the motion to
suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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