Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify
the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made
before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Filed July 20, 2004
Division No. 94-1
IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN
(LIVINGSTONE FEE APPLICATION)
Division for the Purpose of
Appointing Independent Counsels
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended
–————
Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
ORDER
This matter coming to be heard and being heard before the
Special Division of the Court upon the application of D. Craig
Livingstone for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs
pursuant to section 593(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq. (2000), and it
appearing to the court for the reasons set forth more fully in
the opinion filed contemporaneously herewith that the peti-
tion is in part well taken, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Unit-
ed States reimburse D. Craig Livingstone for attorneys’ fees
2
and expenses he incurred during the investigation by the
Independent Counsel in the amount of $33,921.94.
PER CURIAM
For the Court:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
By:
Marilyn R. Sargent, Chief Deputy Clerk
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify
the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made
before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Filed July 20, 2004
Division No. 94-1
IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN
(LIVINGSTONE FEE APPLICATION)
Division for the Purpose of
Appointing Independent Counsels
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, As Amended
–————
Before: SENTELLE, Presiding, FAY and REAVLEY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
ON APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Opinion for the Special Court filed PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM: D. Craig Livingstone (‘‘Livingstone’’) petitions
this court under section 593(f) of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (2000) (‘‘the
Act’’), for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$235,299.60 that he claims were incurred during and as a
result of the investigation conducted by the Independent
Counsel. Because we find that Livingstone has established
his entitlement under the statutory criteria for reimburse-
ment of a portion of the fees we will, for the reasons set forth
more fully below, allow recovery of $33,921.94.
2
I. Background
In early 1994, Robert B. Fiske, Jr. (‘‘Fiske’’) was appointed
regulatory independent counsel by the Attorney General to
investigate, inter alia, President William Jefferson Clinton’s
and Hillary Rodham Clinton’s involvement in matters con-
cerning the Whitewater Development Company.1 Previously,
in July of 1993, Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W.
Foster (‘‘Foster’’) was found dead of a gun shot wound in a
secluded park in suburban Washington, D.C. Special counsel
Fiske, upon his appointment, opened an investigation into the
circumstances surrounding Foster’s death. One facet of this
investigation concerned whether any Whitewater-related doc-
uments were removed from Foster’s White House office soon
after his death. In particular, it was alleged that D. Craig
Livingstone, the fee petitioner here, who was Director of the
Office of Personnel Security (‘‘OPS’’) at the White House
from 1993 to 1996, and in that capacity reported to the White
House Counsel’s Office, had taken documents from Foster’s
office in the early morning hours of the day following Foster’s
death.
In August of 1994, soon after reauthorization of the Act, a
statutory independent counsel (hereinafter ‘‘IC’’ or ‘‘OIC’’)
was appointed to assume the investigation being conducted by
regulatory counsel Fiske. Before termination of his office,
Fiske issued a report stating his conclusions on the circum-
stances surrounding Foster’s death, but transferred to the IC
the investigation of the allegations concerning the removal of
documents from Foster’s White House office. Because of
these allegations and his involvement in them, Livingstone
became a subject of the OIC’s investigation.
The OIC also investigated what became known as the ‘‘FBI
Files’’ matter. In early 1995, during a congressional investi-
gation into the firings of White House Travel Office employ-
ees, it was discovered that the Clinton administration had
requested confidential FBI background reports on a large
1 Further background information on these matters can be found
in In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan (Clinton Fee Applica-
tion), 334 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2003) (per curiam).
3
number of persons. ‘‘Access’’ to the White House was provid-
ed as the reason for the request. Many of these persons,
however, did not work for the Clinton administration; in-
stead, they were staff members from both President Ronald
W. Reagan’s and President George H.W. Bush’s administra-
tions who would have no need for access to the White House
grounds.
After becoming aware of the request for the FBI files, the
OIC, which previously had its jurisdiction expanded to include
the Travel Office firings, issued subpoenas to appear before
the grand jury to two White House employees involved in the
requests. One of these employees was Anthony Marceca
(‘‘Marceca’’), who had apparently requested the reports. He
was an employee of OPS who had been hired by, and then
reported to, Livingstone, and whose duty it was to assemble
background information on persons in need of White House
access.
Following these grand jury appearances, the OIC informed
the Attorney General (‘‘AG’’) that it would not be conducting
an investigation into the matter, as it was not within the
OIC’s current jurisdiction. The AG immediately commenced
a preliminary investigation pursuant to the Act to determine
whether further investigation was warranted. Two days later
the AG sought and obtained an expansion of the OIC’s
jurisdiction to include the FBI files matter. Livingstone was
subsequently subpoenaed by the OIC to appear before the
grand jury.
After conducting extensive investigations, the IC deter-
mined that no charges would be brought against Livingstone
for either the Foster documents matter or the FBI files
matter. Livingstone now petitions the court for reimburse-
ment of attorneys’ fees that he allegedly incurred in defense
of the IC’s investigations, in the amount of $235,299.60. As
directed by section 593(f)(2) of the Act, we forwarded copies
of Livingstone’s fee petition to the Attorney General and the
IC and requested written evaluations of the petition. The
court expresses its appreciation to the IC and the Attorney
General for submitting these evaluations, which we have
4
given due consideration in arriving at the decision announced
herein.
II. Discussion
The Independent Counsel statute provides:
Upon the request of an individual who is the subject of
an investigation conducted by an independent counsel
pursuant to this chapter, the division of the court may, if
no indictment is brought against such individual pursuant
to that investigation, award reimbursement for those
reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by that individual
during that investigation which would not have been
incurred but for the requirements of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1). Accordingly, in order to obtain an
attorneys’ fees award under the statute, a petitioner must
show that all of the following requirements are met: 1) the
petitioner is a ‘‘subject’’ of the investigation; 2) the fees were
incurred ‘‘during’’ the investigation; 3) the fees would not
have been incurred ‘‘but for’’ the requirements of the Act;
and, 4) the fees are ‘‘reasonable.’’ See In re North (Dutton
Fee Application), 11 F.3d 1075, 1077–82 (D.C. Cir., Spec.
Div., 1993) (per curiam). The petitioner ‘‘bears the burden of
establishing all elements of his entitlement.’’ In re North
(Reagan Fee Application), 94 F.3d 685, 690 (D.C. Cir., Spec.
Div., 1996) (per curiam).
A. The Foster Documents Matter
Concerning the matter of the alleged removal of documents
from Foster’s office following his death, the only dispute
among the parties appears to be whether Livingstone has
satisfied the ‘‘but for’’ requirement.
Livingstone argues that he fulfils the ‘‘but for’’ requirement
in this particular matter under three circumstances previous-
ly recognized by the court. First, he invokes the duplication
of investigations. Livingstone acknowledges that this circum-
stance, as previously decided by the court, must involve the
IC’s duplication of the Department of Justice’s (‘‘DOJ’’) pre-
5
liminary investigation. Livingstone nevertheless claims that
he meets the ‘‘but for’’ requirement because the IC’s investi-
gation ‘‘substantially duplicated Mr. Fiske’s investigation of
th[e] issue.’’ He attempts to equate Fiske’s investigation
with that of a DOJ preliminary investigation by arguing that
Fiske’s investigation was conducted ‘‘at the request of the
Justice Department.’’
The second ‘‘but for’’ circumstance which Livingstone
claims he satisfies is when, absent the Act, the case would
have been disposed of at an earlier stage of the investigation.
His argument is premised on ‘‘the seven years the Indepen-
dent Counsel kept the matter open,’’ versus the ‘‘less than six
months’’ that Fiske took to make his conclusions concerning
Foster’s death. He asserts that ‘‘no ordinary prosecutor’’
would have spent the time or money that the IC spent
investigating the Foster documents matter absent any evi-
dence that documents were in fact missing.
Third, Livingstone claims that he was investigated under
circumstances in which a private citizen would not have been
investigated. According to Livingstone, these circumstances
involved only his ‘‘leaving the building in which he works
carrying a briefcase TTT at an unusual hour.’’ He further
argues that there was an ‘‘absence of any evidence that
documents were, in fact, missing;’’ and that in any event
there was ‘‘irrefutable proof that he was not there at [the
stated] hour.’’ Such circumstances, according to Livingstone,
‘‘would not likely give rise to a criminal investigation’’ of a
private citizen.
In her evaluation, the IC argues that Livingstone’s circum-
stances do not fit into any of those found by the court to fulfill
the ‘‘but for’’ requirement. With respect to Livingstone’s
claim that the IC’s investigation duplicated that of special
counsel Fiske, the IC first notes that Fiske’s investigation
with respect to the Foster documents matter was not com-
pleted before the investigation was transferred to the IC.
Therefore, the IC did not duplicate Fiske’s investigation, but
rather completed it. The IC further notes that, in any event,
the ‘‘but for’’ requirement is met under this circumstance only
6
when there is duplication by the IC of the DOJ’s preliminary
investigation, and that that was not the situation here.
With respect to Livingstone’s argument that, absent the
Act, the case could have been disposed of at an earlier stage
of the investigation, the IC asserts that although the OIC was
conducting various investigations for seven years, Living-
stone’s attorneys’ billing records show that the time period he
was billed for totaled only 13 months. Furthermore, concern-
ing Livingstone’s claim that he was investigated under cir-
cumstances that a private citizen would not have been, the IC
argues that this investigation involved ‘‘the question of wheth-
er a White House employee had tried to remove documents
that were potentially incriminating to the President, the First
Lady, and the Deputy White House Counsel from the office
of the latter,’’ and that a rigorous investigation would have
resulted regardless of who had conducted it. Finally, the IC
argues that Livingstone cannot show that this matter would
not have been investigated in the absence of the Act, because
special counsel Fiske did exactly that.
In its evaluation, the DOJ also argues that Livingstone
does not meet the ‘‘but for’’ requirement concerning the
Foster documents matter. First, as did the IC, the DOJ
disputes Livingstone’s argument that the ‘‘but for’’ require-
ment is met because the IC duplicated Fiske’s investigation.
The DOJ also claims that any such duplication must be of the
DOJ’s preliminary investigation pursuant to the Act, and that
here ‘‘Mr. Fiske’s investigation was not a preliminary investi-
gation under the Act.’’ The DOJ further contends that
Livingstone invokes an incorrect legal standard when he
argues that he fulfils the ‘‘but for’’ test because he would not
have been investigated had he been a private citizen. For its
part, the DOJ states that the correct legal standard is wheth-
er someone similarly situated would have been investigated in
the absence of the Act. Here, according to the DOJ, the
preceding investigation of the matter conducted by special
counsel Fiske proves Livingstone fails to satisfy the correct
standard.
7
We agree with the IC and the DOJ that in this instance
Livingstone has not passed the ‘‘but for’’ test. As noted
above, Livingstone argues that he passes the test because
duplicate investigations were conducted; because in the ab-
sence of the Act the case could have been disposed of sooner;
and because he would not have been investigated if he had
been a private citizen. The duplicate investigations argument
is without merit, as we have consistently stated that for the
‘‘but for’’ test to be met the IC’s investigation must be a
duplication of the Attorney General’s preliminary investiga-
tion. See, e.g., In re Babbitt (Babbitt Fee Application), 290
F.3d 386, 393 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam).
Livingstone puts forth no argument that such duplication
occurred.
His argument that in the absence of the Act the case could
have been disposed of sooner is also without merit. The
circumstances surrounding this matter, i.e., the suspicious
death of the deputy White House counsel and the alleged
immediate removal from his office of documents potentially
incriminating to the President and First Lady, would in all
likelihood have been vigorously investigated by any ‘‘ordinary
prosecutor.’’ In In re Pierce (Kisner Fee Application), 178
F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam),
the fee petitioner made the similar claim that the IC’s investi-
gation far exceeded anything that would have been undertak-
en by the DOJ. In rejecting this argument, we noted that
the nature of the allegations and the prominence of those
involved ‘‘would no doubt have resulted in a complex and
lengthy investigation with or without the appointment of an
independent counsel.’’ Id. at 1361. Here, Livingstone is in
the same situation.
As for Livingstone’s ‘‘private citizen’’ argument, the fee
applicants in In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan
(Clinton Fee Application) also made this claim. In rejecting
the claim, we noted that the test is not what would have
happened if the fee applicant had been a private citizen, but
‘‘rather what would have happened if there had been no
independent counsel statute.’’ In re Madison Guaranty Sav-
ings & Loan (Clinton Fee Application), 334 F.3d at 1126.
8
Here, when indeed there was no independent counsel statute,
the matter was nevertheless investigated by regulatory coun-
sel Fiske, who at the end of his investigation transferred the
matter to the OIC. As such, in the absence of the Act, a
similar investigation of the matter would likely have been
conducted.
As the ‘‘but for’’ requirement has not been met, no reim-
bursement for fees incurred in the Foster documents matter
will be awarded.
B. The FBI files matter
In dispute here is whether the ‘‘but for’’ requirement has
been met, and whether Livingstone was a ‘‘subject’’ of the
IC’s investigation.
1. The ‘‘but for’’ requirement. As he did concerning the
Foster documents matter, Livingstone argues that he satis-
fies the ‘‘but for’’ requirement under several different circum-
stances previously recognized by the Court. His first claim
concerns the Attorney General’s conclusion of the preliminary
investigation of the matter in just two days. According to
Livingstone, the AG cut short the preliminary investigation in
order ‘‘to try to stem the adverse publicity the Clinton White
House was suffering after public disclosure of the existence of
the files.’’ He claims that if the AG had permitted the
preliminary investigation to run its usual course, then ‘‘the
Attorney General might well have concluded that, given the
obvious errors in the Secret Service list of persons requiring
access to the Clinton White House, no further investigation in
fact was warranted.’’ (Emphasis supplied by Livingstone.)
Livingstone’s second claim is that even if the AG had used
the full amount of time for the preliminary investigation, the
only basis upon which she would have referred it to the IC
would be the requirement in the Act that ‘‘[t]he Attorney
General shall not base a determination TTT that there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted TTT unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that the person lacked [the state of mind required for the
violation of criminal law involved].’’ 28 U.S.C. § 592
9
(a)(2)(B)(ii). Livingstone argues that if that were the case,
‘‘the ‘but for’ test still would be satisfied, because the Attor-
ney General would by definition be prolonging the investiga-
tion solely because of the Independent Counsel statute’s
requirements.’’
Third, Livingstone contends that absent the Act, the IC’s
investigation of the FBI files matter ‘‘would have been dis-
posed of at a much earlier stage of the investigation than the
four years the Independent Counsel kept the matter open’’
and that ‘‘any other investigative body or authority’’ would
not have taken nearly as long. Similarly, Livingstone claims
that it is doubtful that, ‘‘given the obvious bureaucratic mis-
take that had been committed, [he] or Mr. Marceca would
have been criminally investigated in these circumstances had
they been private citizens rather than employees of the White
House.’’
In her evaluation, the IC disputes Livingstone’s claim that
the AG conducted an exceptionally brief preliminary investi-
gation in order to prevent any further bad publicity to the
White House. She notes that this claim is nothing more than
Livingstone’s conclusion about the AG’s motive, and that in
any event, it is not a logical claim because the referral of a
matter to an IC ‘‘generates substantial media attention.’’
As for Livingstone’s argument that had the AG conducted a
full-term preliminary investigation, she would have only re-
ferred the case to the IC because of the Act’s strict ‘‘clear and
convincing’’ mens rea requirement, the IC notes that Living-
stone points to no facts to support this argument. Further-
more, she notes that in any event ‘‘[t]here would have had to
have been convincing evidence that none of those involved
had the requisite state of mind before no investigation would
have been conducted.’’ The IC goes on to note that, at the
time of the preliminary investigation, there was substantial
evidence that over 300 FBI reports on staff members of
previous administrations had been improperly received at the
OPS; that the White House admitted there was no legitimate
reason to have the reports; that the Secret Service contra-
dicted OPS’s testimony as to how the files came to be
10
requested; and that Marceca, who had requested the files,
admitted to utilizing them even after realizing that they had
been improperly requested. Such evidence, according to the
IC, ‘‘was clearly sufficient to satisfy the probable cause
standard required of prosecutors in conducting further crimi-
nal investigation’’ and that no type of investigation substan-
tially shorter than the IC’s would have resolved the matter.
As such, the IC argues that Livingstone’s state of mind
argument must fail.
In its evaluation, the DOJ argues, as it did concerning the
Foster documents matter, that Livingstone invokes an incor-
rect legal standard when he argues that he fulfils the ‘‘but
for’’ test because he would not have been investigated had he
been a private citizen. Rather, asserts the DOJ, the correct
standard is whether someone similarly situated would have
been investigated in the absence of the Act. Here, the DOJ
argues that the answer is in the affirmative, because the FBI
was investigating the matter even before the decision was
made to refer the matter to the IC, and the allegations
concerning the matter were ‘‘credible claims of serious wrong-
doing.’’
With respect to Livingstone’s claim that he meets the ‘‘but
for’’ test because the AG did not take the full 90 days to
conduct her preliminary investigation, the DOJ argues that in
light of the circumstances surrounding the allegations ‘‘a
more extensive preliminary investigation was unnecessary.’’
Although the IC and the DOJ argue otherwise, it appears
to us that with respect to the FBI files matter Livingstone
has passed the ‘‘but for’’ test. In our recent opinion concern-
ing the fee application of Marceca, we found the ‘‘but for’’
requirement fulfilled because a full length preliminary investi-
gation by the DOJ, in contrast to the two-day investigation
actually conducted, would in all probability have revealed that
the list provided to Marceca by the Secret Service was in fact
outdated; and this would have lead to a curtailed investiga-
tion. In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan (Marceca Fee
Application), 366 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2004)
(per curiam). Since Livingstone was involved in the same
11
investigation, he fulfills the ‘‘but for’’ requirement under the
same reasoning.
2. ‘‘Subject.’’ While acknowledging that Marceca was the
principal focus of the IC’s investigation in the FBI files
matter, Livingstone argues that he was also a subject because
he requested Marceca be detailed to OPS and assigned
Marceca to the files project. He buttresses this argument by
claiming that he ‘‘was specifically denominated a subject of
the Independent Counsel’s investigation in communications
between the Office of Independent Counsel and [his] counsel.’’
The IC, however, disputes Livingstone’s ‘‘subject’’ claim.
First, the IC contends that Livingstone’s assertion that he
was denominated a subject by the IC is incorrect, because in
fact the IC made no such designation. Furthermore, the IC
notes that Livingstone was subpoenaed to appear before the
grand jury only as a witness, and was questioned by the OIC
specifically with respect to who hired him for the position at
OPS. Under these circumstances, according to the IC, ‘‘there
is nothing to suggest that there was a realistic possibility that
[Livingstone] would become a defendant.’’
Although there is some dispute as to whether or not
Livingstone was informed by the IC that he was considered a
subject, it appears that the circumstances were such that it
was reasonable for him ‘‘to believe that there was a realistic
possibility that he would become a defendant.’’ Dutton, 11
F.3d at 1079. First, Livingstone was Marceca’s boss, and it
was Marceca who was the named subject of this part of the
IC’s investigation. Furthermore, as Livingstone’s fee appli-
cation points out, it was he who requested Marceca’s detail to
the White House and assigned Marceca the task of updating
the White House passholder files. Under such conditions, it
was reasonable for him to expect that the IC would ‘‘point the
finger of accusation’’ at him. Id. at 1078 (holding fee appli-
cant had subject status because of his involvement in same
enterprise as his supervisor who was a defendant in an
independent counsel’s investigation); In re North (Gadd Fee
Application), 12 F.3d 252, 256 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1994)
(per curiam) (same).
12
Consequently, we find that Livingstone is entitled to reim-
bursement of the attorneys’ fees he incurred during the time
he defended against the IC’s investigation of his involvement
in the FBI files matter. From the billings submitted, this
appears to be approximately June 25, 1996 to September 25,
1997. He is further entitled to reimbursement of fees in-
curred for reviewing and replying to the IC’s Final Report.
His award is subject to certain reductions set forth below.
* * * * * * *
As pointed out by both the IC and the DOJ, a significant
portion of the billings concern work done for congressional
investigations of the matter, as well as a civil suit brought by
Judicial Watch. Livingstone argues that in order ‘‘to protect
his interests in the grand jury investigation’’ he required
‘‘protective representation by criminal defense counsel in
parallel Congressional investigations and the civil litigation
filed by Judicial Watch covering the exact same issues.’’ He
contends that such circumstances render these fees reimburs-
able. But as we noted in Marceca, 366 F.3d at 928–29, our
rule in past decisions has been that fees related to parallel
Congressional investigations are not recoverable under the
Act. See, e.g., In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30
F.3d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1994) (per curiam); In re
North (Gadd Fee Application), 12 F.3d at 257. We see no
reason for straying from that rule here. Likewise, the fees
incurred as a result of the civil suit brought by Judicial Watch
are also not reimbursable.
We will also not allow reimbursement for $1200.00 that has
been submitted for an attorney listed only as ‘‘HJM,’’ with no
information of any kind supplying the identity of this attorney
or the reasonableness of the rates charged.
Finally, as both the IC and the DOJ point out, many of the
billing entries submitted do not state with sufficient specifici-
ty the task worked on. As we have held previously, adequate
13
documentation of legal work performed is a necessary ingre-
dient for the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees, see In re
Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1990) (per
curiam), and inadequate documentation ‘‘makes it impossible
for the court to verify the reasonableness of the billings,
either as to the necessity of the particular service or the
amount of time expended on a given legal task.’’ In re Sealed
Case, 890 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1989) (per
curiam). In prior cases, we have imposed a ten percent
reduction of the final fee award for similar insufficiencies, see,
e.g., In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d at 147–
48; In re Meese, 907 F.2d at 1204, and we will impose the
same reduction here.
Expenses. Livingstone seeks reimbursement for expenses
in the amount of $2,274.78 for the time period at issue. This
figure includes $672 for ‘‘Inside Copy’’ that is not otherwise
explained. In the past we have made deductions for compa-
rable fees because of a lack of supporting documentation, and
we will do so here, reducing the amount by $300.00. See In
re North (Gregg Fee Application), 57 F.3d 1115, 1117 (D.C.
Cir., Spec. Div., 1995) (per curiam); In re Meese, 907 F.2d at
1204. Similarly, Livingstone claims a total of $449.60 for
computer research, which also lacks any supporting documen-
tation, and we therefore will reduce this amount by $200.00.
Id. Finally, we will make a deduction of $540.00 for ‘‘Local
Travel’’ that is not otherwise explained. See In re North
(Shultz Fee Application), 8 F.3d 847, 852–853 (D.C. Cir.,
Spec. Div., 1993) (per curiam).
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing discussion, Livingstone shall be
reimbursed for attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of
$33,921.94. The final calculations are set out in the appendix.
14
APPENDIX
Total attorneys’ fees requested 6/25/96–9/25/97: $77,969.00
Reduction of fees for Congressional
investigation: w$35,346.54
$42,622.46
Reduction of fees for civil case: w$14,434.50
$28,187.96
Reduction of fees for unidentified attorney: w$ 1200.00
$26,987.96
Ten percent reduction for insufficient
billing descriptions: w$ 2,698.80
$24,289.16
Fees for review of Final Report: v$ 8,398.00
Total award for attorneys’ fees: $32,687.16
Total expenses requested 6/25/96–9/25/97: $ 2,274.78
Reductions from opinion: w$ 1,040.00
Total award for expenses: $ 1,234.78
TOTAL AWARD: $33,921.94