United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2247
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOSÉ GONZÁLEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Raymond L. Sánchez-Maceira for appellant.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Guillermo Gil, former United States Attorney, and Jorge E. Vega-
Pacheco, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for
appellee.
November 22, 2002
BOUDIN, Chief Judge. On this appeal, we face a narrow
set of issues arising from a recent amendment of the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act ("Maritime Act"), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901 et
seq. (2000), intended by Congress to facilitate the prosecution of
high-seas drug smuggling on U.S. or stateless vessels. In a
nutshell, the issue is whether, by pleading guilty unconditionally
to a drug trafficking charge (possession of drugs on a stateless
vessel with intent to distribute) the defendant Jose Alberto
Gonzalez forfeited any claim that the boat in question was a
foreign (rather than a stateless) vessel.
The pertinent facts, derived from the plea agreement, can
be stated briefly. On April 27, 1999, Gonzalez and another
individual were rescued from a speed boat that was two-thirds
submerged on the high seas off the coast of the British Virgin
Islands. Summoned by the rescuing vessel, the U.S. Coast Guard
responded and on inspection found that the speed boat carried
numerous bales of cocaine. Defendant and his companion were
indicted for possessing the cocaine, with intent to distribute it,
aboard "a vessel without nationality" in violation of 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1903(a).
That statute makes possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute a federal crime where possession occurs either on board
a "vessel of the United States" or on board a "vessel subject to
jurisdiction of the United States"; id. § 1903(a); and the statute
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places "a vessel without nationality" (sometimes called a stateless
vessel) in the latter category. Id. § 1903(c)(1)(A). "Vessel
without nationality" is further defined to include:
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or person in
charge makes a claim of registry, which claim is denied
by the flag nation whose registry is claimed;
(B) any vessel aboard which the master or person in
charge fails, upon request of an officer of the United
States empowered to enforce applicable provisions of
United States law, to make a claim of nationality or
registry for that vessel; and
(C) a vessel aboard which the master or person in
charge makes a claim of registry and the claimed nation
of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally
assert that the vessel is of its nationality.
Id. § 1903(c)(2)(A)-(C).
Gonzalez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that the speed boat was not a "vessel without nationality" because,
inter alia, no claim of registry was requested by an officer of the
United States. The United States resisted the motion on various
grounds directed to showing that the speed boat was a stateless
vessel. In due course, a magistrate judge recommended denial of
the motion and the district court agreed. Suffice it to say that
the issue is complicated.
Faced with an adverse ruling by the district court,
Gonzalez negotiated a guilty plea. On February 23, 2001, a plea
agreement was filed, with an agreed-upon sentence of 72 months, in
which Gonzalez admitted the offense with which he was charged. In
a change of plea proceeding, Gonzalez then expressly pled to the
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offense of possessing cocaine on board a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States with intent to distribute.
Thereafter, Gonzalez was sentenced to 72 months. No issues were
reserved for appeal. Nevertheless, after sentencing, Gonzalez did
file an appeal asserting that the vessel was not in fact a
stateless vessel.
Ordinarily a guilty plea, entered unconditionally--that
is, without reserving an issue or issues for appeal--establishes
guilt and forfeits all objections and defenses. United States v.
Cordero, 42 F.3d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1994). There are a few
exceptions to this principle. One applies where the claim on
appeal is that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, that is to say, where the defendant
says that the subject matter of the case falls outside the category
of cases that the court is authorized to try. E.g., Cordero, 42
F.3d at 99; United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir.
1965) (Friendly, J.).
One may ask why this exception exists when so many other
objections and defenses in criminal cases, including constitutional
issues and prior professions of innocence, are readily forfeited
through a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty. The answer is that
courts treat their responsibility to stay within their grant of
authority as a matter of extreme importance. United States
Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72,
-4-
77 (1988). In fact, a court is expected to raise the subject-
matter jurisdiction objection on its own motion at any stage and
even if no party objects. Fed R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ.
P.12(h)(3).
Article III gives to the federal judicial branch
authority--that is, subject matter jurisdiction--over all cases
arising under the laws of the United States; and by statute
Congress has given the federal district courts this authority over
federal criminal cases in the first instance. 18 U.S.C. § 3231
(2000). Conventionally, a federal criminal case is within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court if the indictment
charges, as the Gonzalez indictment certainly did, that the
defendant committed a crime described in Title 18 or in one of the
other statutes defining federal crimes. See 13B Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3575, at 244-45 (2d ed. 1984). In
such a case subject matter jurisdiction, that is to say, authority
to decide all other issues presented within the framework of the
case, exists.
Thus, unless Congress provided otherwise, subject matter
jurisdiction existed in the present case because Gonzalez was
charged in district court under section 1903, which is a federal
criminal statute. By the same token, the stateless vessel issue was
forfeited by an unconditional guilty plea--again, unless Congress
provided otherwise. This was certainly this court's view prior to
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the amendment of the statute.1 And if a defendant did seek to
preserve an issue, he might easily find the prosecutor refusing to
bargain.
In 1996, Congress amended the Maritime Act. It did so
among other things by expanding the definition of what constitutes
a stateless vessel, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(2)(C), and also by
adding a provision reading in pertinent part as follows:
Jurisdiction of the United States with
respect to vessels subject to this chapter is
not an element of any offense. All
jurisdictional issues arising under this
chapter are preliminary questions of law to be
determined solely by the trial judge.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f). The key question is whether this terse
provision converted the stateless vessel issue into one implicating
the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court and prevented
it from being forfeited in connection with a plea of guilty.
Nothing in the wording of the statute suggests such an
intention. The term "jurisdiction" is notoriously malleable and is
used in a variety of contexts (e.g., personal jurisdiction) that
have nothing whatever to do with the court's subject matter
1
Valencia v. United States, 923 F.2d 917, 921 (1st Cir. 1991).
But see United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 256-261 (2d
Cir. 1983). In accord with Valencia are numerous other cases
holding that threshold or nexus elements may be forfeited through
a guilty plea. See Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380-381
(7th Cir. 1999) (interstate commerce requirement); Mack v. United
States, 853 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1988) (bank federally insured).
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jurisdiction. See Hugi, 164 F.3d at 380-81. In very general terms,
"jurisdiction" means something akin to "authority over." Black's
Law Dictionary 855 (7th ed. 1999). Here, the word evidently refers
to the substantive reach of the statute--applying to some vessels
but not others--and not to the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court.
In other words, Congress asserted its own authority to
regulate drug trafficking on some ships but not all ships and, in
this context, used the word "jurisdiction" loosely to describe its
own assertion of authority to regulate; it does the same thing
whenever it fixes an "affects interstate commerce" or "involved a
federally insured bank" as a condition of the crime. See note 1
above. But such conditions have nothing whatever to do with the
subject matter of the federal district court; they are routine
questions as to the reach and application of a criminal statute.
Nor does legislative history suggest that Congress had in
mind the court's subject matter jurisdiction or that it meant to
prevent a guilty plea from being given its normal effect. The
legislative history does not refer to subject matter jurisdiction
or reveal any purpose to limit guilty pleas. On the contrary, the
general purpose of the amendments was to facilitate prosecutions or,
as the President's signing statement put it, to "strengthen[] the
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hand of prosecutors in drug smuggling cases." 32 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 2212 (Oct. 28, 1996).2
One way in which the statute did this was to remove from
the jury and confide to the judge an issue that had nothing to do
with whether the defendant did possess drugs with an intent to
distribute. To make the vessel's status an issue that could never
be the subject of an effective and binding guilty plea would greatly
complicate proceedings rather than facilitate the enforcement of the
drug laws. It would mean in practical terms that the district judge
would have to try the issue every time in order to put it completely
to rest.
Admittedly two circuits have treated the amendment as
making vessel status an issue of district court subject matter
jurisdiction, although only one involved the forfeiture issue. See
United States v. Bustos-Usche, 273 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1105 (llth Cir. 2002). But
neither decision made a detailed examination of the problem; both
leapt, we think too quickly, from the bare reference to jurisdiction
to the assumption that Congress was talking about the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court.
2
Similarly, the House Conference Report stated: "The
Conference substitute establishes new law enforcement provisions
which expand the Government's prosecutorial effectiveness in drug
smuggling cases . . . . Jurisdictional issues would always be
issues of law to be decided by the trial judge, not issues of fact
to be decided by the jury." H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-854, at 142
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4292, 4337.
-8-
Certainly by providing for a judge to decide the vessel
issue rather than jury, Congress has introduced a possible Sixth
Amendment objection to the statute. See United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 512-16 (1995). A defendant might claim, if the issue
were tried, that he was entitled to a jury trial on whether the boat
was a stateless vessel; on the other hand there are lots of issues
(e.g., recusal of the judge, suppression of evidence, standing to
assert a defense, constitutional challenge to a statute) normally
not tried to the jury. In all events, Gonzalez' guilty plea made
the mode of trial here a moot issue.
To sum up, the unconditional guilty plea forfeited
Gonzalez' claim that the speed boat was other than a stateless
vessel. Although the result would likely be the same even if we
reached the merits (as the concurring opinion forcefully suggests)
the question whether such a claim can be forfeited is an important
recurring issue that needs to be resolved. Having resolved it in
favor of forfeiture, it is enough to hold that Gonzalez had no more
than an arguable claim which he bargained away in favor of an
agreed-upon sentence.
Affirmed.
- Concurring opinion follows -
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring in the judgment).
I respect the majority's effort to discern and follow the intent of
Congress's 1996 amendment to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
("MDLEA"). However, I believe that a plain reading of the statute,
supported by rules of interpretation, legislative history and case
law, clearly make the statelessness of a vessel a jurisdictional
matter that is not waived by an unconditional guilty plea. I would
reach the merits of González's claim, and concur in the judgment of
the court.
I. Background
On April 27, 1999, the captain of a sailing vessel
rescued González and Manuel Polanco, both Dominican Republic
nationals, from a go-fast boat3 that was two-thirds submerged on the
high seas approximately eighteen nautical miles southwest of the
British Virgin Islands. González requested a hammer from his
rescuer and used it to attempt to make holes in the hull of the
boat. Noting this suspicious behavior, the captain videotaped
González and reported the incident to the Coast Guard. González and
Polanco claimed that two English citizens had also been aboard the
vessel when it began to sink.
The Coast Guard arrived at the partially submerged vessel
to conduct a search and rescue mission for the reportedly missing
3
This is a small boat, customized with additional engines and
fuel tanks for added speed and range. Experience tells us that
such boats play a large role in the drug trade.
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men.4 No one was found in the immediate vicinity. Additionally, a
team of three Coast Guardsmen approached the vessel and reported
that it was a go-fast vessel, with no identifying marks or numbers
on the bow. No further evidence of registration or nationality was
found when Coast Guard personnel dove into the water to survey the
vessel. This initial inspection did not reveal any contraband.
Having determined that the vessel was a hazard to
navigation, the Coast Guard obtained permission to sink it. After
about fifteen minutes of firing at the boat, Coast Guard personnel
returned to the vessel. At this time, a hatch that had previously
been inaccessible was open, and a package of cocaine was discovered.
In all, Coast Guard personnel confiscated 233 kilograms of cocaine
before the vessel sank.
On April 30, 1999, González and Polanco were deported
from the British Virgin Islands and were arrested, and subsequently
indicted, upon arrival in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
On November 29, 1999, González and Polanco moved to
dismiss their indictment for lack of jurisdiction. The district
court denied the motion, to which defendants timely objected.
González entered an unconditional guilty plea, from which he now
appeals.
4
The record is unclear as to whether there actually were other
passengers, but the search and rescue mission was abandoned later
that evening.
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II. González's Jurisdictional Claim
A. Availability of Appeal
The MDLEA makes it a crime for any person on board "a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to
knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess
with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance."
46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a) (emphasis added). A "vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" includes "a vessel without
nationality," or a stateless vessel. 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1903(c)(1)(A). González asserts that the vessel in this case was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because it was
not a stateless vessel.
The majority holds that González's unconditional guilty
plea has waived this challenge. I disagree. González's
unconditional guilty plea admitted only the elements of the charged
offense. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989). As
such, he waived all appeals other than jurisdictional defects. See
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States v.
Cordero, 42 F.3d 697, 698-99 (1st Cir. 1994). A jurisdictional
defect "calls into doubt a court's power to entertain a matter,"
Cordero, 42 F.3d at 699, thus depriving the federal court of
jurisdiction. A jurisdictional defect may be raised by the party
or sua sponte by the court at any point in the litigation. See
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 896-97 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
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concurring). In this case, González argues that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea because the United
States did not have jurisdiction over the vessel from which he was
rescued. The issue is therefore whether the requirement that the
vessel be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is a
factual predicate for federal jurisdiction. If so, then González
has not waived this issue. However, if it is a substantive element
of the crime, then the issue has been waived.
Although determining whether an issue is jurisdictional
and thus appealable is not always easy, here, the plain language of
the statute provides the answer. In 1996, Congress added the
following to the MDLEA: "Jurisdiction of the United States with
respect to vessels subject to this chapter is not an element of any
offense. All jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are
preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial
judge." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f). The legislature is responsible
for identifying the elements of an offense, see Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985), and it clearly removed
jurisdiction as an element of the MDLEA. See United States v.
Tinoco, No. 01-11012, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18479, at *46 (11th Cir.
Sept. 4, 2002) ("The statutory language of the MDLEA now
unambiguously mandates that the jurisdictional requirement be
treated only as a question of subject matter jurisdiction for the
court to decide."). The text of the statute is unambiguous: Whether
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or not the vessel was stateless, and therefore "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," is not an element of the
offense. It has been made jurisdictional and, as such, is
appealable.5
The word "jurisdiction" can be confusing, but there is
support for the reading that jurisdiction over the vessel is a
subject matter jurisdiction determination. First, while it is true
that the district courts have jurisdiction, "exclusive of the courts
of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States," 18 U.S.C. § 3231, Congress can attach additional
jurisdictional requirements in substantive criminal statutes, and
did so here. Tinoco, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18479, at *42 n.18.
Under the MDLEA, the district court’s jurisdiction extends only so
far as a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903. If a defendant is apprehended on a
vessel not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the
5
Appellees rely heavily on Valencia v. United States, 923 F.2d
917 (1st Cir. 1991), our only previous decision to discuss the
issue of whether statelessness, specifically, is a jurisdictional
determination. There, we noted that "the issue is not free from
doubt," but opined that statelessness should not be appealable
following a valid guilty plea. Id. at 921. These comments are
mere dicta, as our decision was based on other grounds. Id. at 922
(vacating petitioner's guilty plea because it was not knowing and
intelligent). Of critical importance is the date of Valencia,
which was decided five years before Congress amended the MDLEA,
removing jurisdiction as an element of the crime. Therefore,
Valencia is neither controlling nor persuasive on this issue.
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MDLEA does not apply, and the defendant clearly may not be charged
under the MDLEA in district court.
This differs from laws where Congress attaches a
"jurisdictional" element to enable it to act under its enumerated
powers. For example, in many cases, Congress can only criminalize
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, so
statutes often include a statement limiting their reach as such.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (criminalizing only conduct which
"obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce"). In those cases, the
jurisdictional element is critical to Congress's ability to
legislate, and therefore is likely an element of the crime. In
contrast, Congress obtains authority to regulate drug trafficking
on the high seas under the "protective principle" of international
law, which permits a nation "'to assert jurisdiction over a person
whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's
security.'" United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir.
1999) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1988)). Congress invoked the protective principle in the MDLEA,
finding that "trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels
is a serious international problem and is universally condemned
[and] . . . presents a specific threat to the security . . . of the
United States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902; accord Cardales, 168 F.3d
at 553. Because of this authority, the MDLEA does not require a
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jurisdictional statement to place it within Congress's regulatory
power. The jurisdictional statement of the MDLEA is therefore not
an essential element of the crime, as it may be in other statutes
that lack outside authority.
Second, the "elements" of a crime traditionally include
the actus reus, causation, and mens rea. See Black's Law Dictionary
520 (6th ed. 1990). Whether or not a vessel is "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" does not go to any of these
traditional elements. For example, in Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593 (1927), the defendants were charged with carrying liquor
during the Prohibition era on the high seas, in violation of a
treaty between the United States and Great Britain. Id. at 601.
The defendants contended that they were not within the zone of the
treaty. Id. at 604. The Court held this was a jurisdictional issue
for the judge to decide because "[t]he issue whether the ship was
seized within the prescribed limit did not affect the question of
the defendants' guilt or innocence. It only affected the right of
the court to hold their persons for trial." Id. at 606. Similarly,
whether a vessel is within the jurisdiction of the United States for
purposes of the MDLEA is a proper question for the judge, as it
bears upon the right of the court to entertain the claim. See
Tinoco, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18479, at *59 ("[T]he § 1903
jurisdictional requirement is not an essential ingredient or an
essential element of the MDLEA substantive offense"); see also
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United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758, 766 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that § 1903(f) empowers the court to determine "whether the United
States had jurisdiction over the place where the vessel was
allegedly intercepted," while the jury determines "whether the
vessel was actually intercepted at that place").
Third, the legislative history of the 1996 MDLEA
amendments does not conflict with my interpretation. The limited
legislative history suggests that the 1996 amendments were made to
"expand the Government's prosecutorial effectiveness in drug
smuggling cases." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-854, at 142 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4337; accord Statement by
President William J. Clinton, October 19, 1996, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4341, 4341 (stating that the amendments "strengthen[]
the hand of prosecutors in drug smuggling cases," and clarify United
States jurisdiction over vessels in international waters.).
Removing jurisdiction as an element of the crime may ease
prosecution under the MDLEA. For example, in Smith, 282 F.3d at
758, the defendant appealed his conviction under the MDLEA because
the jury was not required to find that he was on a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 765. The court
held that the district court properly determined that the United
States had jurisdiction over the area where the vessel was found,
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pursuant to § 1903(f). Id. at 766.6 The issue was therefore
properly removed from the jury and not available as an avenue of
appeal to the defendant. So, while the amendment might allow a
defendant to attack the jurisdiction of the United States following
a guilty plea, at trial it eases prosecution by permitting the
Government to establish, as a matter of law, that the area was
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Finally, I note that this is not the first time we have
considered this issue, although we have never conclusively decided
it. See Cardales, 168 F.3d at 554 n.3 (noting that jurisdiction is
no longer an element of the MDLEA); United States v. Guerrero, 114
F.3d 332, 340 n.9 (1st Cir. 1997) (same).7 Also, two other circuits
6
The court further held that whether or not the vessel was
found in that location was a jury question. Id. Whether this
factual inquiry is a jury question is disputed, see Tinoco, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 18479, at *61 n.22 (holding that the judge should
determine both whether the area was within the jurisdiction of the
United States and whether the vessel was discovered in that area),
but need not be resolved here.
7
Our decision in United States v. Valdez-Santana, 279 F.3d 143
(1st Cir. 2002) is not at odds with my position. In Valdez-
Santana, appellants pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), which
prohibits the importation of controlled substances. Id. at 145-
46. The United States claimed authority to board appellants' boat
as a "hovering vessel," as defined by 19 U.S.C. § 1401(k)(1). Id.
at 145. Appellants argued that the boat was not a "hovering
vessel," and the evidence seized during this boarding was therefore
obtained in violation of federal laws. Id. at 146. We held that
the issue of whether a vessel was a "hovering vessel" under 19
U.S.C. § 1401(k)(1) is not appealable as a jurisdictional element,
because it is an element of the offense. Id. The instant case is
different because the statute González was charged under applies
only to "vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"
a requirement which the statute specifically states is not an
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which have considered this issue have reached the same result as I
have. See Tinoco, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18479, at *46; United States
v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
2002 U.S. LEXIS 3486 (May 13, 2002) (finding jurisdiction over a
vessel under the MDLEA subject to appeal following a guilty plea).
The only case to the contrary is United States v. Ramos, No. 01-
50356, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20369, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2002),
an unpublished, three paragraph opinion which lacks any analysis of
the issue.
To summarize, I believe that by the 1996 amendment,
whether or not a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States is not an element of the offense under the MDLEA, but a
question of subject matter jurisdiction for the court to decide.
It goes to the power of the court to hear the case, and such a
jurisdictional determination cannot be waived by a guilty plea.
B. Statelessness Analysis
Since I believe the statelessness of the vessel is a
jurisdictional determination, I review González's challenge de novo.
Seahorse Marine Supplies, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 295 F.3d
68, 73 (1st Cir. 2002). Reviewing this issue on appeal is not
complicated, as the record contains all facts relevant to whether
or not the vessel was stateless.
element of the offense. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 (a), (f). González
has therefore not waived his right to appeal the statelessness of
the vessel.
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González is neither a citizen nor a resident alien of the
United States, and the vessel involved was not a vessel of the
United States. Thus, for González to be prosecuted under the MDLEA,
the vessel must be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). On our facts, his vessel could
only be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States if it is
"a vessel without nationality," also known as a stateless vessel.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c). According to the MDLEA,
a "vessel without nationality" includes:
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or person
in charge makes a claim of registry,8 which
claim is denied by the flag nation whose
registry is claimed;
(B) any vessel aboard which the master or
person in charge fails, upon request of an
officer of the United States empowered to
enforce applicable provisions of United States
law, to make a claim of nationality or
registry for that vessel; and
(C) a vessel aboard which the master or person
in charge makes a claim of registry and the
claimed nation of registry does not
affirmatively and unequivocally assert that
the vessel is of its nationality.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(2). González argues that the requirement
of statelessness can only be satisfied in one of two ways, neither
of which was satisfied in this case: when the master makes a claim
of registry which is denied (or not assented to) by the flag nation,
8
A claim of registry only includes documentation of a vessel's
nationality, flying a nation's flag, or a verbal claim of
nationality or registry by the master or person in charge. 46
U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(3). It is undisputed that there was no claim
of registry made in this case.
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or when the master fails, upon request, to make a claim of registry.
González asserts that the vessel cannot be deemed "stateless"
because the master did not make a claim of registry or fail to make
a claim of registry.
González's argument must fail. The statute does not
provide an exhaustive list of the ways that a vessel can be
determined to be stateless, but uses the word "includes," and lists
three examples. An expansive reading furthers the Congressional
intent of reaching the widest range of drug smuggling cases possible
under international law. If Congress had intended to provide an
exclusive list, it could have used the phrase "only includes," as
it did in the following subsection. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(3);
see also United States v. Rosero, 42 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Valdez, 84 F. Supp. 2d 237, 238 (D.P.R. 1999).
Although I have not found any cases with facts similar to
the present case, that is, where no one was aboard the vessel when
it was approached, I do not think it is a stretch to say that an
unoccupied vessel completely lacking in evidence of registry or
nationality is a stateless vessel. See L. Oppenheim, 1
International Law, 595-96 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) (noting that
a stateless vessel is one sailing under the flags of two or more
states, or under no flag at all). The United States is a party to
the Convention on the High Seas, a codification of the customary
laws of the high seas, which requires all ships to sail under a
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nation's flag. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6,
13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 ("Ships shall sail under the flag
of one State only . . . ." (emphasis added)).9 González has not
claimed that the vessel is authorized to fly under the flag of any
nation. More importantly, at the time it was boarded by the Coast
Guard, the vessel was not flying any flag.
González argues that the Coast Guard, knowing he was
being treated in the British Virgin Islands, should have attempted
to question him or Polanco about the vessel's nationality and/or
registry. González insists that a vessel can only be deemed
stateless following such an inquiry. I disagree. The MDLEA's
examples of when a vessel is without nationality all presume the
presence of a master or person in charge. See 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1903(c)(2). Appellant, who had indisputably occupied a drug-
ridden boat that had no master or evidence of registry, should not
have immunity from seizure and federal prosecution simply because
he was rescued before the Coast Guard arrived. Cf. United States
v. Rosero, 42 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Under [46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1903(c)(2)(B)], if the master or person in charge fails, upon
request, to make any claim of nationality or registry, the vessel
may be regarded as stateless. By clear implication, we believe,
this provision applies when the master of a ship flees and leaves
9
Congress was aware of international law principles, and the
Convention on the High Seas in particular, when enacting the MDLEA.
See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(b)(2) and (c)(3)(A).
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no one in charge . . . ."). An unoccupied boat, completely lacking
in identifying markers, is a stateless vessel. As such, the
district court properly asserted its jurisdiction in this case.
III. González's Other Claims
González challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and
raises a Fourth Amendment challenge. Because these are not
jurisdictional attacks, they are clearly foreclosed by González's
unconditional guilty plea. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)
("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that
he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may
not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea."); see also Cordero, 42 F.3d at 698 ("[A]n
unconditional guilty plea effectuates a waiver of any and all
independent non-jurisdictional lapses that may have marred the
case's progress up to that point . . . .").
IV. Conclusion
I believe that González's only viable claim on appeal is
whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept
his guilty plea. I find that jurisdiction was present because
González was aboard a "vessel without nationality" for purposes of
the MDLEA, and therefore concur in the judgment of the court.
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