United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2009-1363
THYSSENKRUPP ACCIAI SPECIALI TERNI S.P.A.
and THYSSENKRUPP AST USA, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Gary Locke, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Ron Kirk, AMBASSADOR and UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
and THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
AK STEEL CORP.,
Defendant,
and
ALLEGHENY LUDLUM CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Lorane F. Hebert, Hogan & Hartson LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for
plaintiffs-appellants. With her on the brief were Lewis E. Leibowitz, T. Clark Weymouth,
Craig A. Lewis, Jonathan T. Stoel, and Brian S. Janovitz.
Claudia Burke, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for
defendants-appellees United States, et al. With her on the brief were Tony West,
Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy,
Assistant Director.
Mary T. Staley, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for
defendant-appellee Allegheny Ludlum Corporation. With her on the brief were David A.
Hartquist and Daniel P. Lessard.
Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade
Senior Judge Richard W. Goldberg
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2009-1363
THYSSENKRUPP ACCIAI SPECIALI TERNI S.P.A.
and THYSSENKRUPP AST USA, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Gary Locke, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
Ron Kirk, AMBASSADOR and UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
and THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
Defendants-Appellees.
and
AK STEEL CORP.,
Defendant,
and
ALLEGHENY LUDLUM CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in Case No.
07-00390, Senior Judge Richard W. Goldberg.
____________________________
DECIDED: April 23, 2010
____________________________
Before LOURIE, GAJARSA, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni SpA and ThyssenKrupp AST USA, Inc.
(collectively “ThyssenKrupp”) appeal from the decision of the United States Court of
International Trade holding that the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) reasonably
interpreted section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”) when it declined
to correct an alleged clerical error in the original investigation that was not raised in the
World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceeding. See ThyssenKrupp Acciai
Speciali, Terni S.P.A. v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009)
(“ThyssenKrupp”) (upholding Commerce’s determination in Implementation of the
Findings of the WTO Panel in US—Zeroing (EC), 72 Fed. Reg. 25,261 (Dep’t
Commerce May 4, 2007) and accompanying Issues and Decision Mem. (Aug. 20, 2007)
(“Section 129 Determination”)). Because the court properly sustained Commerce’s
reasonable interpretation of the statute, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Three adjudicative processes are relevant to this case: (A) Commerce’s original
antidumping determination against ThyssenKrupp, including inter alia, its challenge
before the Court of International Trade and subsequent stipulated-to dismissal; (B) the
successful challenge before the dispute settlement body of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) to the U.S. practice of “zeroing” in antidumping determinations;
and (C) Commerce’s implementation of the WTO determination pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 3538 (“section 129”) and ThyssenKrupp’s challenge to that determination, which is
now before this court. We take them in turn.
2009-1363 2
A. Commerce’s Original Antidumping Determination and Proceedings in the Court
of International Trade
Under the antidumping statute, Commerce imposes antidumping duties on
imported merchandise that “is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less
than its fair value” and that harms domestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Sales at less
than fair value are those where the “normal value” (the price a producer charges in its
home market) exceeds the “export price” (the price of the product in the United States).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B). One methodology for determining the appropriate dumping
margin is “average-to-average” comparison of normal value and export price, according
to which Commerce divides the products under investigation into groups (based on
model and level of trade) and calculates the average export price and average normal
value of each group. 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1). The dumping margin for each group is
calculated as the amount by which the weighted-average normal value exceeds the
weighted-average export price. The dumping margins for the groups are then
aggregated to calculate an overall weighted-average dumping margin for the
transactions being investigated. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B).
In the context of average-to-average comparisons, “zeroing” consists of
aggregating dumping margins greater than zero, while treating “negative” dumping
margins (groups for which the weighted-average export price exceeded the weighted
average normal value) as if they were zero. Commerce’s “zeroing” methodology has
been challenged at various times and upheld as a reasonable construction of the URAA
by the Court of International Trade, Serampore Indus. Pvt. Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 675 F. Supp. 1354, 1360-61 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1987); Bowe Passat
Reinigungs-Und Waschereitechnik GmbH v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1138, 1150
2009-1363 3
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1996)), and by this court, Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334,
1342 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 543 U.S. 976 (2004); Corus Staal BV v. Dep’t of
Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1089 (2006); Corus
Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
In July 1999, Commerce issued an amended final determination in its
antidumping duty investigation of stainless steel sheet and strip in coils (“SSSS”) from
Italy, finding that ThyssenKrupp was dumping at a margin of 11.23%. Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils
from Italy, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,567, 40,570 (Dep’t Commerce July 27, 1999). 1 In making its
original determination that SSSS was being sold at less than fair value, Commerce used
the average-to-average comparison methodology and adhered to its practice of
“zeroing” in comparing aggregate normal value to aggregate export price.
ThyssenKrupp challenged the determination at the Court of International Trade
on various grounds, including a challenge to the figures now at issue, albeit on different
grounds. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the determination
to Commerce. Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 969 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2001).
Before the Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s redetermination,
the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the action, without prejudice and effective
January 23, 2002. ThyssenKrupp states that its agreement to dismiss its challenge to
the original investigation was a result of the publication of Commerce’s final results of its
first administrative review, in which Commerce calculated a dumping margin of 0.66%
1
Final Determination at 64 Fed. Reg. 30,750, 30,757 (Dep’t Commerce
June 8, 1999).
2009-1363 4
for imports between January 1999 and June 2000. ThyssenKrupp explains in its
briefing that its agreement to the dismissal, terminating its challenge to the findings of
dumping of SSSS, was a result of the significantly lower duties and cash deposit rate
calculated for future entries.
B. Proceedings before the World Trade Organization
In February 2004, the European Communities (“EC”) asked the WTO to establish
a dispute settlement panel to determine the legality of the United States’ use of a
zeroing methodology in its determination of antidumping duties. Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States – Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing),
WT/DS294/7/Rev.1 at 1, 11 (Feb. 19, 2004). The EC specifically challenged fifteen
investigations, including Commerce’s investigation of SSSS from Italy. Id. at para. 7.9 &
n.119. The panel found, and on appeal the Appellate Body affirmed, that zeroing was
inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement, and recommended that the United States
bring its actions into conformity with the Agreement. Panel Report, United States –
Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing),
WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005), aff’d by United States – Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), WT/DS294 (May 9, 2006).
C. Proceedings Pursuant to Section 129
The government followed the prescribed statutory process to determine whether
and how to respond. Specifically, following consultation between the legislative and
executive branches of government, the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) instructed
Commerce to issue a determination that would make the investigation “not inconsistent
with the findings of the panel or the Appellate Body.” See 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(2).
2009-1363 5
As a result, Commerce recalculated the margins in the investigations at issue in
order to implement the new margins prospectively on goods entering the country. 2
Commerce issued a preliminary determination with a new margin of 2.11% for
ThyssenKrupp. ThyssenKrupp then challenged Commerce’s underlying calculation of
the average unit value for certain sales, arguing that there was a clerical error in the
original investigation. ThyssenKrupp’s suggested correction, if adopted, would bring the
calculated margin below 2%, thus rendering it de minimis and resulting in the revocation
of the antidumping duty order ab initio. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(3).
Commerce then allowed the parties to comment. In August 2007, Commerce
issued final results that did not consider or correct the alleged error, stating that “the
limited purpose of a section 129 proceeding is to reopen for revision those aspects of
[Commerce’s] original determination found to be inconsistent with the WTO
Agreements,” and that it was therefore inappropriate to consider unrelated clerical or
computational errors. Section 129 Determination at 8. ThyssenKrupp then challenged
Commerce’s determination by filing a complaint in the Court of International Trade.
In considering ThyssenKrupp’s complaint, the court analyzed Commerce’s
interpretation of the requirements of section 129 under the framework laid out in
Chevron. ThyssenKrupp, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1366-67 (applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The court first found that the
intended scope of section 129 is ambiguous. Id. The court specifically found the
statute unclear as to whether Commerce’s determination must amend only those
2
Commerce also stopped using zeroing in new and pending investigations.
See Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin During an Antidumping
Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 20, 2006) (final modification).
2009-1363 6
aspects of the original determination found to violate the WTO agreements, or whether
the proceeding allows for—or requires—other changes to the original determination,
unrelated to the WTO violation. Id. The court then found that it was reasonable for
Commerce to have determined, based on the statutory language and the goals of
finality and fairness, that it would address only those issues affected by the WTO ruling
in the context of a section 129 proceeding. Id. at 1367-68. 3
ThyssenKrupp timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(5).
DISCUSSION
We review the decision of the Court of International Trade de novo, “apply[ing]
anew the same standard used by the court, and [we] will uphold Commerce’s
determination unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States,
548 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
I.
ThyssenKrupp argues that Chevron deference is inapplicable to Commerce’s
determination, which it characterizes as a determination of the legal scope of the
agency’s authority. Regardless of the standard of review, however, ThyssenKrupp
argues that congressional intent as to the scope of section 129 actions is unambiguous.
ThyssenKrupp contends that the Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”)
accompanying the URAA makes clear that a section 129 proceeding is a “new” or
3
The court further found that the USTR’s directions to Commerce were in
accordance with law. Id. at 1368. ThyssenKrupp does not appeal that aspect of the
decision.
2009-1363 7
“second” antidumping determination, and as such, it is subject to comment and review
just as the first proceeding was.
ThyssenKrupp further points out that Congress has shown an interest in having
Commerce correct clerical errors at any time during a proceeding. Refusal to do so,
according to ThyssenKrupp, is inconsistent with the objectives of fairness and accuracy,
and forces the courts to knowingly affirm a determination that includes errors.
ThyssenKrupp argues that section 129 does not preclude fixing errors, and that judicial
review of a section 129 proceeding in the antidumping statute is not limited.
The government responds that Chevron deference is indeed applicable to this
case because an agency has authority to fill in gaps in a statute it is required to
implement. Within that framework, the government next contends that the statute is
ambiguous as to whether Commerce is to consider aspects of an underlying
investigation not related to the section 129 proceeding. Specifically, according to the
government, the statute’s requirement that Commerce issue a new determination
consistent with the WTO’s findings does not specify whether Commerce may address
an issue not raised before the WTO.
The government next argues that Commerce’s interpretation is reasonable
because it comports with the purpose of the statute and the overall statutory scheme.
The statutory language requires the USTR, Congress, and Commerce all to consult on
“the matter,” referring, according to the government, to the limited issue that was before
the WTO. The focus of the consultations should therefore reasonably be considered
the appropriate focus of Commerce’s action.
2009-1363 8
The government states that the Court of International Trade rightly found that the
statute did not compel Commerce to address issues outside the scope of the WTO
decision, and that Commerce’s decision meets the objective of finality in the
antidumping scheme. The government points to the fact that section 129
determinations are implemented prospectively as support for the proposition that
adverse WTO reports were not meant to affect issues otherwise finally decided. The
government argues that other parties to the investigation have the right to expect finality
from a ten-year old Commerce determination. The government emphasizes that
ThyssenKrupp’s argument is based on the same documents it had available to it during
the original investigation and that its inability or unwillingness to formulate a full
challenge during the original investigation is not a reason to grant it a second
opportunity to litigate the claim now.
II.
We agree with the government and affirm the Court of International Trade’s
decision upholding Commerce’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. As a
preliminary matter, we find that the court properly applied the Chevron framework to its
analysis of Commerce’s interpretation of the statute.
Commerce concluded that section 129 determinations “have a limited purpose”
and that “[t]o correct alleged errors that were not raised as part of the WTO dispute and
otherwise became final and conclusive years ago exceeds the scope of this section 129
proceeding.” Section 129 Determination at 9. In contrast to ThyssenKrupp’s
assertions, the scope of Commerce’s authority was not at issue here, as the agency
2009-1363 9
presumably retained the full scope of its authority within the bounds of the section 129
determination. As such, analysis pursuant to the Chevron framework is appropriate.
The first step of Chevron requires a court to determine “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Section 129 provides that Commerce
shall “issue a determination in connection with the particular proceeding that would
render the administering authority’s action described in paragraph (1) not inconsistent
with the findings of the . . . Appellate Body.” 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b)(2). The statute does
not explicitly require—nor does it expressly prohibit—reopening the entirety of an
otherwise closed investigation to consider issues neither raised before nor addressed
by the Appellate Body. If anything, its limited reference to making the action not
inconsistent with the findings of the Appellate Body leans toward precluding the
changes ThyssenKrupp is arguing for. NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 74 F.3d
1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1995), which ThyssenKrupp cites for the proposition that clerical
errors should be corrected when brought to light during the pendency of a
determination, is inapposite. A rule that clerical or ministerial errors within the scope of
non-final determinations may—and sometimes should—be corrected only begs the
question. The appropriate scope of the section 129 determination, however, remains
ambiguous. The SAA’s characterization of section 129 determinations as “new” also
does not answer the question of the contemplated scope of that determination. Lastly,
ThyssenKrupp’s argument that correction of ministerial errors is not precluded by
section 129 serves only to emphasize that the statute is ambiguous and certainly does
2009-1363 10
not mandate such corrections. Having established ambiguity, our analysis proceeds to
an investigation of the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation.
Where a statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the
court considers “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Here, we find persuasive the government’s
argument that the role of section 129 in the statutory scheme lends itself to Commerce’s
interpretation. As discussed above, nothing in the statutory language requires the
reexamination of issues that were not before the WTO. The Court of International
Trade correctly noted that section 129 “provides a procedural mechanism for aligning
inconsistent determinations with the provisions of the WTO agreements,” and that
“allowing Commerce to expand the scope . . . to unlitigated issues” does not have clear
relevance to this purpose. ThyssenKrupp, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. This interpretation
also fits with the balance Congress has struck between finality and accuracy in
antidumping duty determinations. NTN Bearing emphasized the tension inherent in
administrative determinations between finality and accuracy, both generally and in the
context of the correction of ministerial errors in antidumping duty investigations. 74 F.3d
at 1208; see also Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1348 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2008) (emphasizing that late-raised clerical errors may, but are not required to,
be corrected at the discretion of Commerce). Parties to a proceeding have an interest
in relying on final decisions of adjudicatory bodies. Here, ThyssenKrupp voluntarily
withdrew its challenge to Commerce’s original investigation, allowing that determination
to become final, and the only continuing challenge to the determination was on grounds
of zeroing. The parties’ interest in finality is apparent and accounted for by Commerce’s
2009-1363 11
interpretation of the statute. Commerce’s interpretation of section 129 here is thus
based on a permissible construction of the statute and it strikes a reasonable balance
by leaving undisturbed aspects of an investigation that the parties ceased to challenge
years ago, while reopening those necessary to bring its determination into accordance
with the WTO’s ruling.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of International Trade’s summary
judgment decision upholding Commerce’s reasonable interpretation of the scope of a
section 129 proceeding.
AFFIRMED
2009-1363 12