Jul 01 2014, 8:30 am
FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JAMES BROWN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1312-CR-1023
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable William E. Young, Senior Judge
Cause No. 49F07-1309-CM-58029
July 1, 2014
OPINION–FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
At approximately 2:30 AM on September 2, 2013, James Brown ran into a woman
on the street because he was drunk and seemingly unaware of his surroundings. In this
case, we are asked to determine whether or not his actions violated the Indiana public
intoxication statute.
James Brown appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor public intoxication.1
He contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove public intoxication because the
State cannot demonstrate that he meets one of the four necessary conduct elements set
forth in the statute. More specifically, he argues that he did not breach the peace and was
not in imminent danger of breaching the peace. Notwithstanding his contention, the
evidence demonstrates that Brown showed signs of intoxication, such as glassy and
bloodshot eyes, a staggered walk, and the odor of alcohol. Moreover, he walked directly
into a woman after exiting the combined entrance to Sky Bar/Caps and Dolls/Crackers
Comedy Club in Indianapolis. As a result, the woman began to yell at him and attracted
the attention of a nearby officer. This evidence is sufficient to prove public intoxication
because Brown demonstrated signs of intoxication while he was in a public place, and he
harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another person. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
FACTS
On September 2, 2013, Officer Joseph McAtee was standing on the sidewalk at
the entrance of Sky Bar when he observed Brown exiting the bar. Brown walked out of
1
Ind. Code §7.1-5-1-3(a).
2
the bar at a normal pace and ran directly into a woman who was standing in the middle of
the sidewalk. The woman began to yell at Brown, so Officer McAtee approached them
to stop the woman from yelling. He also told Brown to stop, but Brown ignored him and
kept walking until he was stopped by Officer Jamal Bill approximately fifteen feet north
of Officer McAtee.
When Officer McAtee approached Brown, he observed that Brown’s eyes were
“extremely glassy and bloodshot,” and “[h]e smelled very strongly of alcohol.” Tr. p. 14.
Officer McAtee also noticed that Brown had a staggered walk and was distracted by the
people passing by. As a result, Officer McAtee concluded that Brown was extremely
intoxicated. Officer McAtee asked Brown for identification, but Brown refused to
provide any. Based on his observations of Brown and the fact that Brown was
intoxicated in an area that was crowded with people and subject to the occurrence of
multiple fights late at night, Officer McAtee believed that Brown was endangering
himself and others. Officer McAtee arrested Brown for public intoxication.
The State charged Brown with public intoxication as a class B misdemeanor. On
November 14, 2013, a bench trial was held. The trial court denied Brown’s motion for
involuntary dismissal and found him guilty of public intoxication, concluding that he was
intoxicated in public and in imminent danger of breaching the peace. The trial court
sentenced Brown to two days in jail.
Brown now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
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When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh
the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773,
781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Rather, we consider only the evidence most
favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and we will
affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative
value to support the verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when a reasonable trier of
fact would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
In 2012, the General Assembly amended Indiana’s public intoxication statute,
which now provides that:
[I]t is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to be in a public place or a place of
public resort in a state of intoxication caused by the person’s use of alcohol or a
controlled substance. . . if the person:
(1) endangers the person’s life;
(2) endangers the life of another person;
(3) breaches the peace or is in imminent danger of breaching the peace; or
(4) harasses, annoys, or alarms another person.
Ind. Code §7.1-5-1-3(a). Therefore, in Indiana it is no longer a crime simply to be
intoxicated in public; one of the four additional conduct elements must be proved as well.
Brown argues that the evidence failed to show that he was in imminent danger of
breaching the peace when, without looking, he ran into a woman who was standing
outside the bar. Appellant’s Br. p. 5. He explains that this event occurred on a crowded
sidewalk and that, despite the officers’ efforts to keep the path clear, it was almost
impossible to pass through. Id. Thus, Brown claims that the “unintentional act of
running into a woman in a crowded space, even though she responded by yelling, is not
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indicative of a breach of the peace.” Id. While we agree with Brown that he did not
breach the peace, we affirm the trial court’s conviction based on the fact that he harassed,
annoyed, or alarmed another person under Indiana Code section 7.1-5-1-3(a)(4). 2
We first note that Brown does not argue that he was not in a public place, and the
evidence shows that he was on a sidewalk off Meridian Street in downtown Indianapolis,
a public place, when the officers observed his behavior. Similarly, Brown does not argue
that he was not intoxicated, and the evidence demonstrates that he exhibited signs of
intoxication, such as glassy and bloodshot eyes, a staggered walk, and the odor of
alcohol, when he was apprehended.
Thus, the only element of the public intoxication statute at issue is whether Brown
endangered himself or others, breached the peace or was in imminent danger of breaching
the peace, or harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another person. We conclude that the State
proved this additional conduct element as well. The trial court emphasized the section
(a)(2) conduct element of the public intoxication statute in its decision, but the conviction
is sustainable on section (a)(4), which is also included in the charging information.
Appellant’s App. p. 13.
The trial court decided Brown’s actions constituted an imminent breach of the
peace, explaining that he could have run into a man who would have hit him, not yelled
at him. However, our Supreme Court has concluded that breaching the peace requires
2
Although another panel of this Court declared section (a)(4) of the public intoxication statute
unconstitutionally vague, this decision was vacated when our Supreme Court granted transfer on May 8,
2014. Morgan v. State, 4 N.E.3d 751 (2014), trans. granted.
5
either actual or threatened violence. Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 960 n.6 (Ind. 1993).
See also Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In this case, we
agree with Brown that his actions did not demonstrate violence or the threat of violence.
Although Brown walked into a woman, he did not intentionally hit her or “stir up some
sort of fight with her.” Tr. p. 19.
However, the facts do demonstrate that Brown was harassing, annoying, or
alarming another person per section (a)(4) of the public intoxication statute. According
to Officer McAtee, Brown did not seem attentive to his surroundings. Id. at 14. Brown
walked directly into a woman on the street, and she began yelling at him immediately.
Id. at 10-11. As the trial court described the situation, “[it] was a little more than just a
bumping into. He came out of the bar and ran into her and she went and got very upset
enough to draw this officer’s attention.” Id. at 21. After running into the woman, Brown
continued walking and ignored Officer McAtee’s requests to stop. Id. at 14. The
evidence, which demonstrates that Brown was entirely unaware of his surroundings and
that the woman “start[ed] going berserk” after he walked into her, is enough to allow a
reasonable trier of fact to infer that Brown harassed, annoyed, or alarmed the woman by
bumping into her in his intoxicated state. Id. at 22.
Based on these facts, we cannot say that the evidence presented by the State is
insufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Brown was in a public
place in a state of intoxication and endangered himself or other persons, breached the
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peace, or harassed, annoyed, or alarmed another person. Accordingly, we conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to support Brown’s conviction for public intoxication.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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