In re S.M.W.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1362
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 20 May 2014

IN RE:

S.M.W. Pasquotank County
No. 13 JT 17

Appeal by Respondent-Father from Order entered 6 September

2013 by Judge C. Christopher Bean in Pasquotank County District

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 May 2014.

Melissa L. Skinner for Petitioner-Mother.

Mark Hayes for Respondent-Father.

STEPHENS, Judge.

Factual Background and Procedural History

This case arises from the termination of Respondent-

Father’s parental rights to the minor child, Sam,1 on the ground

of neglect. Sam was born to Respondent-Father and Petitioner-

Mother (collectively, “the parents”) in April of 2010. The

parents lived together for a short time after Sam’s birth. They

were never married. On 3 December 2010, Respondent-Father

1
A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity.
 -2-
assaulted Petitioner-Mother and tried to prevent her from

calling the police. As a result, Petitioner-Mother obtained a

domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”) against Respondent-

Father and an order giving her temporary custody of Sam. The

DVPO required Respondent-Father not to have any contact with

Petitioner-Mother except “by email or text message and only

regarding the health, safety, welfare, or visitation of [Sam].”

The temporary custody order provided that Respondent-Father

would have supervised visitation with Sam every Saturday from

10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., with supervision provided by Sam’s

maternal grandmother. Petitioner-Mother was ordered not to be

present for Respondent-Father’s visits with Sam.

During a visit on 14 May 2011, the grandmother noticed that

Respondent-Father’s eyes were bloodshot and that his speech was

“odd.” On 26 May 2011, Petitioner-Mother filed a complaint

seeking physical and legal custody of Sam and the cessation of

visitation until Respondent-Father obtained psychological and

drug assessments and followed any recommended treatment. After

an entry of default on the custody complaint on 19 July 2011,

the matter was set for hearing on 7 December 2011. On 12 August

2011, Respondent-Father attempted to attend a Saturday visit

with Sam, but saw that Petitioner-Mother’s car was parked at the
 -3-
grandmother’s home. Respondent-Father contacted the sheriff’s

office and was arrested for violating the DVPO. Petitioner-

Mother renewed the DVPO on 7 December 2011 and was awarded

permanent custody of Sam in an order entered 4 January 2012. The

custody order provided that contact between Respondent-Father

and Sam would be at Petitioner-Mother’s discretion, but that

Respondent-Father could contact the grandmother, or any other

person designated by Petitioner-Mother, “to inquire as to

[Sam’s] welfare and well-being.” Respondent-Father was not

present for the hearing. The record before this Court contains

no indication that Respondent-Father appealed the custody order.

On 26 March 2013, Petitioner-Mother filed a petition to

terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights. Petitioner-Mother

alleged that Respondent-Father had neglected and willfully

abandoned Sam. The matter came on for hearing on 9 July 2013,

and the trial court entered an order terminating Respondent-

Father’s parental rights on 6 September 2013. Therein, the trial

court found that Respondent-Father had failed to provide proper

care, supervision, or discipline for Sam and failed to provide

financial support. Therefore, the court concluded that

Respondent-Father neglected Sam as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. §
 -4-
7B-1111(a)(1) (2013) and that it was likely such neglect would

continue. Respondent-Father appeals.

Discussion

In his sole argument on appeal, Respondent-Father contends

the trial court erred by concluding that the evidence supported

terminating his parental rights on the ground that he neglected

Sam. We disagree.

At the adjudicatory stage of a termination of parental

rights hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by

clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at least one ground

for termination exists. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2013);

In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908

(2001). Review in the appellate courts is limited to determining

whether clear and convincing evidence exists to support the

findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the

conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536

S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547

S.E.2d 9 (2001). A finding of one statutory ground is sufficient

to support the termination of parental rights. In re Humphrey,

156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003).

“When the trial court is the trier of fact, the court is

empowered to assign weight to the evidence presented at the
 -5-
trial as it deems appropriate.” In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C.

App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1996). “[F]indings of fact

made by the trial court . . . are conclusive on appeal if there

is evidence to support them.” In re H.S.F., 182 N.C. App. 739,

742, 645 S.E.2d 383, 384 (2007) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

In pertinent part, a neglected juvenile is defined as “[a]

juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or

discipline from the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or

caretaker . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013); see also

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). “In determining whether neglect

has occurred, the trial judge may consider . . . a parent’s

complete failure to provide the personal contact, love, and

affection that exists in the parental relationship.” In re

Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 198, 204, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403 (citation,

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted), affirmed per

curiam, 357 N.C. 568, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2003).

“Neglect must exist at the time of the termination

hearing[.]” In re C.W., 182 N.C. App. 214, 220, 641 S.E.2d 725,

729 (2007). However, where “the parent has been separated from

the child for an extended period of time, the petitioner must

show that the parent has neglected the child in the past and
 -6-
that the parent is likely to neglect the child in the future.”

Id. (citation omitted). In such cases,

[o]ur Supreme Court has held that evidence
of neglect by a parent prior to losing
custody of a child — including an
adjudication of such neglect — is admissible
in subsequent proceedings to terminate
parental rights. However, termination of
parental rights for neglect may not be based
solely on conditions which existed in the
distant past but no longer exist. The
determinative factors must be the best
interests of the child and the fitness of
the parent to care for the child at the time
of the termination proceeding.

In re Manus, 82 N.C. App. 340, 348, 346 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1986)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in

original).

In this case, the trial court found the following relevant

facts:

17. Respondent[-Father] last visited with
[Sam] on May 14, 2011 at [the grandmother’s]
residence.

. . .

19. [The grandmother] . . . was concerned
about Respondent[-Father]’s behavior and
actions while Respondent[-Father] was at her
house. [She] testified that the visits
between Respondent[-Father] and [Sam] were
awkward.

. . .

21. Respondent[-Father] arrived at [the
 -7-
maternal grandparents’] residence on August
12, 2011. Respondent[-Father] called law
enforcement to the residence as
Petitioner[-Mother]’s car was at the
residence. Respondent[-Father] was
arrested . . . . Respondent[-Father] did not
return to the residence after that date
because he believed he would be arrested for
violating the [DVPO].

. . .

23. Respondent[-Father] has not given
Petitioner[-Mother] any financial support
for [Sam] since 2011. The last item
Respondent[-Father] gave to [Sam] was a
Christmas gift in January 2011.
Respondent[-Father] has not acknowledged
[Sam’s] birthday or holidays since January
2011.

24. In May 2011, Respondent[-Father] called
and texted Petitioner[-Mother] but none of
the telephone calls or text messages had
anything to do [with Sam] and
Respondent[-Father] did not inquire about
[Sam].

25. [The grandparents] continue to reside
at the same residence that the visitations
took place between Respondent[-Father] and
[Sam] and their telephone numbers remained
the same through the hearing date.

. . .

27. Respondent[-Father] has not attempted
any contact with [Sam] for over 2 ½ years
and, during this time, Respondent[-Father]
has not mailed any cards or sent presents to
[Sam].

28. From May 2011 to the present date,
Respondent[-Father] has not made any efforts
 -8-
to file any motions to modify the current
child custody order.

29. Nothing has prohibited
Respondent[-Father] from sending cards,
gifts, financial support[,] or contacting
Petitioner[-Mother] or [the grandparents] to
inquire about [Sam]’s welfare.

. . .

31. Respondent[-Father] has another son
. . . who is eleven years old and with whom
he visits and pays child support.

32. Respondent[-Father] is employed with
his father’s business and works with his
father. Respondent[-Father] works with his
father when he [is] not incarcerated.
Respondent[-Father] had the ability to
financially support [Sam] and did not
support him.

33. Respondent[-Father]’s failure to
perform the natural and legal parental
obligations of care and support and
Respondent[-Father]’s withholding of his
love, presence, care[,] and maintenance have
been willful.

34. Respondent[-Father] has not shown any
likelihood that his behavior would change
and, instead, the Court finds that . . .
Respondent[-Father]’s failure to perform any
natural and legal parental obligations of
care and support towards [Sam] would
continue in the future.

On appeal, Respondent-Father contests the validity of findings

19, 27, 29, 32, and 33 as not supported by the evidence.2 We

2
In his brief, Respondent-Father erroneously labels findings of
 -9-
agree in part with Respondent-Father’s argument as it relates to

finding 27 and disagree as to the remaining findings.

First, Respondent-Father asserts that finding 19 is not

supported by the evidence because there was no awkwardness

between Respondent-Father and his infant child, Sam, just

awkwardness between Respondent-Father and the grandparents. To

the extent that “awkwardness” could possibly be relevant to an

adjudication of neglect,3 we hold that the undisputed fact that

the interaction between Respondent-Father and the grandparents

was “awkward” is sufficient to support finding 19.

Second, Respondent-Father asserts that finding 27 is not

supported by the evidence because he actually visited with Sam

in May of 2011 and “attempted” to visit him in August of 2011,

less than 2 ½ years before the neglect hearing. This is correct.

Respondent-Father’s 12 August 2011 attempted visit, which

resulted in his arrest, occurred approximately one year and

eleven months before the 9 July 2013 hearing on the termination

of his parental rights. Therefore, finding 27 is not supported

by clear and convincing evidence to the extent that it implies

Respondent-Father failed to attempt physical contact with Sam in

fact 29 and 33 as “#33” and “#30,” respectively. The substance
of his argument makes it clear, however, that he is actually
referring to findings 29 and 33, in that order.
3
We do not assert that it is.
 -10-
more than 2 ½ years. The remainder of the finding, which relates

to Respondent-Father’s failure to attempt other forms of

contact, is supported by undisputed evidence.

Third, Respondent-Father asserts that finding 29 is

unsupported by the evidence because it fails to acknowledge

that: (a) Petitioner-Mother prosecuted Respondent-Father for

sending a text message asking “more or less about what [she] was

doing” and (b) the custody order explicitly prohibited

Respondent-Father from sending cards or gifts for Sam to

Petitioner-Mother. This is inapposite. Finding 29 relates to

Respondent-Father’s decision to refrain from taking steps to

ensure Sam’s welfare or inquiring about Sam. Neither the DVPO

nor the custody order prohibited Respondent-Father from sending

cards or gifts to Sam, and both orders explicitly stated that

Respondent-Father was allowed to make contact in order to

inquire about Sam’s welfare. Therefore, Defendant’s argument is

overruled as it relates to finding 29.

Fourth, Respondent-Father asserts that finding 32 is not

supported by the evidence because “no evidence was presented

about what sort of income [Respondent-Father] earned and whether

that [income] provided him with anything beyond the basic
 -11-
necessities.”4 This is incorrect. The evidence shows that

Respondent-Father maintained employment when he was not

incarcerated and provided child support for another child. This

is clear and convincing evidence that “Respondent[-Father] had

the ability to financially support [Sam] and did not support

him.”

Fifth, Respondent-Father asserts that finding 33 — that he

“willfully” withheld love, presence, care, and maintenance — is

not supported by the evidence because Respondent-Father believed

further contact with Sam would result in imprisonment. This

argument is without merit. As discussed above, both the DVPO and

the custody order make clear that Respondent-Father could make

contact to inquire about Sam’s welfare, and neither order

prohibited him from providing maintenance for Sam or expressing

his love to Sam.

Respondent-Father does not contest the trial court’s

remaining findings of fact. Therefore, those findings are

conclusive on appeal. See In re Padgett, 156 N.C. App. 644, 649,

577 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2003) (holding that the trial court’s

findings of fact in a neglect case were deemed supported by the

evidence when the appellant did not argue otherwise). Thus,

4
Respondent-Father does not contest the trial court’s finding
that he did not financially support Sam.
 -12-
pursuant to the trial court’s valid and relevant findings of

fact, Respondent-Father voluntarily declined to: (1) provide

financial support for Sam since 2011; (2) acknowledge Sam’s

birthday or holidays since January of 2011; (3) attempt any non-

physical contact with Sam, i.e., by electronic communication,

mail, or other means, in more than 2 ½ years; (4) send cards or

presents to Sam; or (5) make efforts to modify the current child

custody order. These findings are sufficient to justify the

trial court’s adjudication of neglect, its conclusion that such

neglect is likely to continue, and the termination of

Respondent-Father’s parental rights. Compare In re Yocum, 158

N.C. App. at 198, 580 S.E.2d at 399 (holding that clear and

convincing evidence supported the trial court’s finding of

neglect in support of termination of the father’s parental

rights when the father never paid any child support, did not

send the child a gift or any acknowledgment on her birthday,

visited the child approximately five times, and failed to

participate in a charitable prison program that would have

provided gifts to children at no charge to the inmates), with In

re C.W., 182 N.C. App. at 214, 641 S.E.2d at 725 (holding that

there was insufficient evidence to establish neglect and support

a termination of parental rights when the father wrote to the
 -13-
children; sent them birthday cards, holiday cards, and money;

was initially unaware that the children had been placed in a

care facility; testified that he spent time with and cared for

the children before he was incarcerated; and was prohibited from

having contact with the children upon release from prison).

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is

AFFIRMED.

Judges BRYANT and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).