FOR PUBLICATION FILED
Sep 21 2012, 9:16 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ELLEN M. O’CONNOR GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
MARJORIE LAWYER-SMITH
Special Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JUSTIN TAYLOR, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1201-CR-4
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Reuben B. Hill, Judge
Cause No. 49F18-1109-FD-67104
September 21, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Justin Taylor appeals his conviction of Class D felony failing to register as a sex
offender.1 We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 6, 2008, Taylor pled guilty to Class C felony child molesting. When
released from incarceration on June 18, 2009, he was notified he was required to register
with the Sex and Violent Offender Registry in Marion County for ten years. The registry
requirement mandated Taylor provide his current address, and update his address within three
days or seventy-two hours of relocation to a new residence. Taylor first registered on June
19, 2009 and reregistered with a new address on July 1, 2009.
In May 2011, Taylor was arrested and later convicted of criminal confinement. He
was released to home detention on August 29. The home detention was to be served at 1725
Sloan, which was not listed as one of his addresses on the Sex Offender registry. In
September, a compliance officer in the Sex and Violent Offender Registration Division
learned Taylor was not living at either of the addresses listed as his residence on the Sex
Offender registry.
The compliance officer learned of Taylor’s address from his home detention
supervisor and arrested him there for failing to register as a sex offender. The State charged
Taylor with Class D felony failure to register as a sex offender2 and the trial court found
1
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17.
2
The State first charged Taylor with Class D felony failure to register for “failing to register initially as a sex
offender within seven (7) days after [his] obligation to register[.]” (App. at 36.) However, the State moved
for, and the trial court granted, an amendment to the charging information to allege Taylor did not register or
update his address within seventy-two hours of moving to a new address and/or did not reside at the address he
previously registered.
2
Taylor guilty as charged.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s decision.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder’s role, and not ours, to
assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to
support a conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when we are confronted with conflicting
evidence, we consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm a
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference
reasonably may be drawn from it to support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 147.
To convict Taylor of Class D felony failure to register as a sex offender, the State
must prove he knowingly or intentionally failed to register as a sex offender when his address
changed. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17. Taylor does not dispute he did not update his registry
information when he was placed on house arrest at the Sloan street address, however, he
contends he did not knowingly or intentionally fail to register because he was not aware he
was required to register upon his release from incarceration to home detention: “he assumed
they were closely monitoring him by ankle bracelet and other means. [Tr.*] [sic] He was
unaware he was required to submit himself to double monitoring.” (Br. of Appellant at 9.)
We find his argument/defense without merit.
3
“Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, it may be proved by
circumstantial evidence and inferred from the circumstances of each case.” Wilson v. State,
835 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. At trial, the State presented
evidence Taylor received notice, after his release from incarceration for Class C felony child
molesting, that he was required to register as a sex offender for the next ten years. When
Taylor first registered on June 19, 2009, he received and signed a form that stated:
I hereby certify that I truthfully answered the information requested above. If I
move to a different residential location (home address) within Marion County,
I will provide a newly completed registration to the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department within three (3) days of making such change. Further, if I
move to a different residential location (home address) outside of Marion
County, not more than 72 hours/three (3) days after the address change, I must:
1) provide written notice to the Indianapolis Police Department
Sex Offender Registry of change and
2) register within a new county of residence.
(State’s Exhibit at 5.) Taylor received and signed the same form when he changed his
address on July 1, 2009. In addition, both forms displayed in bold letters, “FAILURE TO
COMPLY IS A CLASS D FELONY.” (Id. at 5 and 6) (emphasis in original).
Taylor’s signature acknowledged he understood that language, and he did comply with
the requirements when he first registered as a sex offender. Any argument Taylor offers to
the contrary is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Drane,
867 N.E.2d at 146. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction of Class D felony failing to
register as a sex offender.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
4