In re P.M.N

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-431
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 16 September 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

P.M.N. Randolph County
A Minor Child No. 10 JA 56

Appeal by Respondent from order entered 22 January 2014 by

Judge Scott C. Etheridge in Randolph County District Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2014.

Erica Glass for Petitioner-Appellee Randolph County
Department of Social Services.

Rebekah W. Davis for Respondent-Appellant mother.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel
Tawanda N. Foster, for guardian ad litem.

DILLON, Judge.

Respondent, mother of the minor child P.M.N. (“Penny”),1

appeals from the district court’s “Permanency Planning Review

Order” awarding guardianship of the child to her foster parents

(hereinafter “Mr. and Mrs. M.”) and granting to Respondent a

1
The parties stipulated to the use of this pseudonym to protect
the child’s privacy.
 -2-
minimum of two, two-hour periods of supervised visitation per

month. We affirm.

I. Background

The Randolph County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)

obtained non-secure custody of six-month-old Penny on 5 May

2010, after filing a juvenile petition alleging she was abused,

neglected, and dependent. By consent of the parties, the

district court entered an adjudication of dependency on 19 April

2011, based on the parents’ inability to care for Penny and lack

of an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. In

support of the adjudication, Respondent stipulated that she and

Penny’s father lacked stable housing and had “issues of domestic

violence” in their relationship; that she had violated a safety

plan with DSS by moving with Penny from a safety resource into

an unapproved home; and that she and the father “receive

disability benefits based upon their mental limitations[.]”

At the time it became involved with Penny, DSS was

providing adult protective services (“APS”) to Respondent and

was her disability benefits payee. A psychologist from Carolina

Piedmont Psychological Associates evaluated Respondent in June

2012 and diagnosed her as mildly mentally retarded with a Full

Scale IQ of 62. Respondent had moderate impairments in
 -3-
attention, concentration, and functional living skills, which

required “some assistance” to allow her to live independently.

The psychologist found Respondent’s judgment to be “immature and

impaired” and her general intellectual ability to fall within

the first percentile for persons of her age cohort. He also

noted that “three previous evaluations going back to 1997 have

all resulted in similar scores.”

In September 2011, the district court ceased reunification

efforts as to Penny’s father and established a permanent plan of

reunification with Respondent. On 7 March 2012, the court

ceased all reunification efforts and changed Penny’s permanent

plan from reunification with Respondent to adoption.

DSS moved to terminate the parental rights of Respondent

and Penny’s father on 26 March 2012. After a lengthy hearing,

the district court entered an order on 26 September 2013,

finding no grounds for termination as to Respondent. While

acknowledging “the Mother’[s] limitations and cognitive

impairment[,]” the court noted that she had “shown progress and

made efforts.” The court did adjudicate grounds to terminate

the parental rights of Penny’s father but concluded that

termination would not be in the child’s best interests, because

it would foreclose the ability of DSS or Respondent “to obtain
 -4-
support or any assistance” from him. The court denied DSS’s

motion, but continued Penny in DSS custody. At the next review

hearing, the court established concurrent permanent plans of

reunification with Respondent or guardianship and ordered DSS to

resume reunification efforts.

Following a subsequent permanency planning hearing held 23

October 2013,2 the district court changed Penny’s permanent plan

to guardianship, finding, inter alia, that Respondent’s “well

documented mental limitations” rendered her “barely able to take

care of herself and . . . unable to adequately provide for the

physical and mental well-being of [Penny,]” who was then four

years old. Despite the “myriad of services . . . provided to

assist [Respondent] in developing [parenting] skills[,]” the

court found that she “has not benefitted, as would be required,

to entrust the care of the minor child to her once again.”

Respondent’s therapist had seen “no progress” by Respondent

since January 2012, and had “greater concerns now than at the

onset of the case in regards to the [Respondent’s] judgment and

decision making.” “Three and one-half years after the child was

2
Effective 1 October 2013, all review hearings after the initial
permanency planning hearing are designated “subsequent
permanency planning hearings” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
906.1(a) (2013). See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25-26, 41
(June 19, 2013).
 -5-
removed,” the court found, Respondent “continues to need[]

supervision during her weekly visitation[,]” is “unable to set

boundaries[,]” and “is often at a loss as to how to proceed”

with Penny, who “has made it very clear to [Respondent] that she

believes her parents to be the foster parents.”

The district court held a subsequent permanency planning

hearing on 4 December 2013 and entered an order ceasing

reunification efforts and granting guardianship of Penny to Mr.

and Mrs. M. on 22 January 2014. Respondent filed timely notice

of appeal from the order.

II. Respondent’s Appeal

“‘Appellate review of a permanency planning order is

limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to

support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of

law.’” In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. 52, 57-58, 641 S.E.2d 404,

408 (2007) (quoting In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. 96, 106, 595

S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004)). Findings not specifically challenged

on appeal are presumed to be supported by evidence and are

binding. See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d

729, 731 (1991).

In selecting an appropriate disposition for a juvenile

adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent, the district court
 -6-
“solely considers the best interests of the child.” In re

Pittman, 149 N.C. App. 756, 766, 561 S.E.2d 560, 567 (2002). We

review the district court’s assessment of the child’s best

interests for abuse of discretion. In re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App.

715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007). “An abuse of discretion

occurs when the trial court's ruling is so arbitrary that it

could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re

Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002)

(internal marks omitted).

A. Visitation Schedule

Respondent first claims the district court abused its

discretion by awarding her just two hours of supervised

visitation with Penny twice per month. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §

7B-905.1, “[a]n order that . . . continues the juvenile’s

placement outside the home shall provide for appropriate

visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile

consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) (2013). Where the court establishes a

guardianship, its order “shall specify the minimum frequency and

length of the visits and whether the visits shall be

supervised.” Id. § 7B-905.1(c). The order may also provide for

“additional visitation as agreed upon by the respondent and . .
 -7-
. guardian.” Id. Moreover, if the court retains jurisdiction

in the cause, it must inform the parties of their right to file

a motion for review of the visitation plan. Id. § 7B-905.1(d).

Respondent argues that the district court based its

visitation plan upon “logistics and a desire to end the case

rather than Penny’s best interest.” We disagree.

The court received evidence and made findings regarding

Penny’s increasingly adverse reactions to her visits with

Respondent. Supplementing DSS’s written report, the DSS social

worker described Respondent’s most recent visit with Penny,

during which “the minor child was very difficult with the

mother.” Atypically for the child, Penny had rebuffed the

social worker’s attempt to redirect her and had “kicked [the

social worker] as she had been kicking the mother[.]” The

social worker discussed the visit with Penny’s therapist, who

had observed “similar behaviors in [Penny] and believes that

this is her way of expressing her not understanding what’s going

on with . . . these community visits that [Respondent] has been

getting, with [Penny] being brought over to [Respondent’s]

house, and not really understanding what’s going on and why.”

The social worker also noted that Respondent had “told [Penny]

that she would be living at her home with [Respondent] and
 -8-
showed [Penny] her bedroom. And that has further confused the

minor child.” In light of these circumstances, DSS recommended

reducing Respondent’s visitation with Penny to “a minimum of

once per month for one hour arranged between [Respondent] and

the legal guardians and supervised by the legal guardians.”

Penny’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and Mr. and Mrs. M. concurred

in this recommendation.

The social worker did remind the court that DSS would no

longer facilitate Respondent’s visitation if a guardianship was

established. Because Mr. and Mrs. M. “both work outside of the

home” and “have two other children [who] are actively engaged in

community activities[,]” the social worker referred to the

difficulty “[l]ogistically for them scheduling visits[.]”

However, when asked whether this difficulty was “the reason for

the recommendation to go from a minimum of four times a month to

once a month[,]” Gillespie responded, “No, that is not the only

reason. That is just one piece of it.”

Penny’s co-GAL testified that the GAL recommended reducing

Respondent’s visitation with Penny to one hour per month because

of “the angst that the child is clearly exhibiting” as a result

of the visits, not issues of scheduling convenience. “Given the

escalation in [Penny’s] behavior currently[,]” the co-GAL
 -9-
explained, “I think [Penny] needs some time to work with the

therapist to be able to resolve some of the conflict that she’s

dealing with.”

Mr. M. explained that he and his wife “feel that [] once a

month visitation at this point would be reasonable . . . mostly

due to the fact that we want to make sure that [Penny] is very

clear as to what her situation is and not confuse the situation

in her mind.” Mr. M. specifically noted concern about “comments

by [Respondent] in regards to [Penny] returning home or sleeping

in [her] bed or residence[.]” Mr. M. also expressed a

reluctance to allow “someone other than ourselves to supervise

the visits.”

In its order, the district court expressly concluded that

“[t]he best interest of the minor child will be served by” the

following visitation plan:

Supervised visitation between the Mother and
the minor child shall occur a minimum of two
hours twice per month. The legal guardians
may allow individuals other than themselves
to supervise visits between the Mother and
the minor child in the community if the
legal guardians believe such identified
individuals to be appropriate . . . . It
should be noted that it is the Court’s
preference that visitation by the Mother be
expanded as the minor child becomes older.
 -10-
The court did not foreclose additional community visits or

visits of a duration longer than the prescribed two-hour

minimum. Indeed, the order contemplates expanding Respondent’s

visitation in the future. The court further found that

Respondent was “aware that the matter may be brought before the

Court for review [at] anytime by the filing of a motion for

review” by a party. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(n)(4)

(2013). Because the order plainly reflects the court’s proper

exercise of discretion based on its assessment of Penny’s best

interests, Respondent’s assignment of error is overruled.

Respondent also contends that the court abdicated its fact-

finding duty under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1 by adopting

“verbatim” the version of facts contained in the written reports

submitted by DSS and the GAL. She characterizes the court’s

order as “resembl[ing] a rubber stamp of the opinion of DSS.”

Citing our decision in In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 598 S.E.2d

658 (2004), Respondent suggests that the court’s findings do not

evince a proper exercise of discretion.

The purpose of a permanency planning hearing is to

establish “the best plan of care to achieve a safe, permanent

home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.” N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(g) (2013). Following the hearing, “[t]he
 -11-
court may maintain the juvenile’s placement . . . or order a

different placement, appoint a guardian of the person for the

juvenile pursuant to G.S. 7B-600, or order any disposition

authorized by G.S. 7B-903[.]” Id. § 7B-906.1(i). The court

must consider the seven criteria set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. §

7B-906.1(d) and “make written findings regarding those that are

relevant[.]” If the court elects not to place the juvenile with

a parent, it must also enter findings as to any of the six

“relevant” factors in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e).

Although she refers to the district court’s duty to make

findings under the statutes, Respondent does not contend that

the court failed to address any particular criterion set forth

therein. Respondent instead argues, based on In re J.S., that

the court improperly delegated its fact-finding responsibility

by relying so heavily on the written report submitted by DSS.

We disagree.

In In re J.S., this Court reviewed “a cursory two page”

permanency planning review order in which the district court

merely “incorporated [by reference] a court report from DSS and

a mental health report on the oldest boy as a finding of fact.”

165 N.C. App. at 511, 598 S.E.2d at 660. While affirming that

“it is permissible for trial courts to consider all written
 -12-
reports and materials submitted” at a dispositional hearing, we

also stated that a “court should not broadly incorporate these

written reports from outside sources as its findings of fact.”

Id. Because the court’s few findings were “not sufficiently

specific to allow this Court to review its decision and . . .

also fail[ed] to comply with the statutory requirements” for a

permanency planning review order, we remanded for additional

findings. Id. at 513, 598 S.E.2d at 661.

Unlike the “cursory two page order” at issue in In re J.S.,

the order sub judice includes forty paragraphs of detailed,

single-spaced findings of fact covering almost eight full pages.

See In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 593

(2007) (“In this case, the trial court considered the written

reports, incorporated the written reports, and made findings

based upon the reports.”); In re J.W., K.W., 173 N.C. App. 450,

455-56, 619 S.E.2d 534, 539-40 (2005). Rather than merely

reciting allegations or broadly incorporating other sources, the

district court made specific, affirmative findings regarding

Respondent’s history of abusive relationships, her hiding of

these from DSS, her inability to recognize situations that were

unsafe to herself or her child, and her persistent inability to

benefit from services and apply learned information to new
 -13-
situations. The court also made findings regarding Penny’s

three and one-half years in foster care and her bond with Mr.

and Mrs. M., her escalating misbehavior during and after visits

with Respondent, and her difficulties coping with and

understanding “the current situation regarding the Mother and

foster parents.” We thus find In re J.S. to be easily

distinguishable.

For purposes of appellate review, it is immaterial that

many of the district court’s findings of fact are copied from

the DSS or GAL reports. See In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60,

641 S.E.2d at 409. “The standard of review that applies to an

assignment challenging a dispositional finding is whether the

finding is supported by competent evidence.” In re C.M., 183

N.C. App. at 212, 644 S.E.2d at 593. Inasmuch as “[s]uch

reports constitute competent evidence,” the court is free to

“rel[y] upon them in reaching its finding of fact.” In re

R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60, 641 S.E.2d at 409. Moreover,

Respondent’s assertion that the court merely “rubber stamped”

the DSS report ignores the fact that the court awarded

Respondent substantially more visitation than was unanimously

recommended by DSS, the GAL, and Mr. and Mrs. M. Cf. In re

K.S., 183 N.C. App. 315, 323-24, 646 S.E.2d 541, 545-46 (2007)
 -14-
(“[C]ontrary to respondent’s contentions, the trial court did

not adopt lock-stock-and-barrel DSS’s summary and

recommendations. Indeed, the trial court declined to follow

DSS’s recommendation[.]”).

Respondent further notes that many of the court’s findings

concern events that occurred during the course of the case,

rather than “current” information. She then faults the court

for failing to incorporate any findings from its 26 September

2013 order denying DSS’s motion to terminate her parental

rights. Neither of these objections has merit. It is entirely

proper, if not imperative, for the court to consider the history

of the case when determining the appropriate disposition for a

juvenile. Furthermore, we find no indication that the court

disregarded its 26 September 2013 order in its account of the

case history. The findings describe Respondent’s active

participation in parenting classes, a domestic violence support

group, and individual therapy, as well as her consistent

visitation with Penny. They credit Respondent’s “progress in

caring for herself,” including her transition from APS payee

services to managing her own finances in October 2012. However,

the court found that Respondent’s “judgment and ability to

benefit from supports has waxed and waned over the time that the
 -15-
minor child has been in the custody of RCDSS, since May 3,

2010[,]” but that she “has not benefitted, as would be required,

to entrust the care of the minor child to her once again.”

Respondent also suggests that the district court should

have ordered additional “community visits during which

[Respondent] was the parent instead of visits during which [Mr.

or Mrs. M.] remained the parent in charge” and should have

required that Respondent be included in Penny’s therapy.

However, the court heard no evidence that Penny’s best interests

demanded these activities. To the contrary, the evidence

indicated that Penny was struggling with the uncertainty created

by three and one-half years in foster care and by the ambiguity

of her relationships with Respondent and Mr. and Mrs. M. The

terms of Respondent’s visitation reflect the court’s thoughtful

balancing of her rights as a parent with Penny’s need for a

“safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time.” N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-100(5) (2013). Accordingly, we find no abuse of

discretion.

B. Waiver of Review Hearings
 -16-
Respondent next claims the district court erred by waiving

further review hearings in this cause pursuant to N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-906.1(n).3 Subsection (n) provides:

[T]he court may waive the holding of
hearings required by this section . . . if
the court finds by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence each of the following:

(1) The juvenile has resided in the
placement for a period of at least one year.

(2) The placement is stable and continuation
of the placement is in the juvenile's best
interests.

(3) Neither the juvenile's best interests
nor the rights of any party require that
review hearings be held every six months.

(4) All parties are aware that the matter
may be brought before the court for review
at any time by the filing of a motion for
review or on the court's own motion.

(5) The court order has designated the
relative or other suitable person as the
juvenile's permanent custodian or guardian
of the person.

Id.

We find no error here. Paragraph 40(a)-(e) of the order

includes all of the necessary findings required by N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-906.1(n)(1)-(5). The district court explicitly made

3
Subsection 7B-906.1(n) differs only slightly from former N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-906(b) (2011), which was repealed effective 1
October 2013. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25, 41.
 -17-
these findings “[b]y clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,” as

prescribed by subsection (n). Of these findings, Respondent

challenges only the determination that Penny’s best interests

did not “require that review hearings be held every six

months[.]” See id. § 7B-906.1(n)(3). Given the lengthy history

of this case, the stability of Penny’s placement with Mr. and

Mrs. M., and the minor child’s obvious need for permanence, we

find ample support for the finding that Penny’s best interests

no longer required regular review hearings. Nor does Respondent

assert that her rights as a parent required additional hearings,

inasmuch as she retained the right to file motions for review.

We thus find no basis for Respondent’s claim that the court

should have conducted “at least one more review.”

C. Guardianship

Respondent next claims that the district court abused its

discretion in awarding guardianship of Penny to Mr. and Mrs. M.

Respondent repeats her prior assertion that the court failed to

make independent findings of fact when it copied language from

the report filed by DSS. She also asserts that the court failed

to consider her “growth and progress” in avoiding abusive

relationships, managing her finances, and improving her

parenting skills. Respondent notes she “was never given a
 -18-
chance to care for Penny” during “a trial placement or even

overnight visits.”

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-600(a) (2013), the

district court may “appoint a guardian at any time during the

juvenile proceedings . . . when it finds such appointment to be

in the juvenile’s best interests.” In re E.C., 174 N.C. App.

517, 520, 621 S.E.2d 647, 650-51 (2005). Appointment of a

guardian at a permanency planning review hearing is explicitly

authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(j).4 The court has

broad discretion to determine a juvenile’s best interests, In re

D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007), and an

authorized disposition based thereon “will not be disturbed

absent clear evidence that the decision was manifestly

unsupported by reason.” In re N.B., 167 N.C. App. 305, 311, 605

S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004).

Initially, we note that Respondent appeared to consent to

the guardianship at the conclusion of the hearing. In urging

the court to grant her visitation beyond the one hour per month

recommended by DSS, her counsel stated as follows:

[Respondent] understands that guardianship
is coming. I mean we’re not – we’re beyond

4
Subsection 7B-906.1(j) is identical to former N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-907(f), which was repealed effective 1 October 2013. See
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 129, §§ 25, 41.
 -19-
contesting that. It’s something actually
that we attempted to discuss before we went
through six days in a termination hearing.
I’m just asking for the Court to put in
place enough structure that will provide
[Respondent] the opportunity to stay
involved with her child.

(emphasis added).

Assuming, arguendo, that Respondent did not waive this

issue or invite the alleged error, we find no abuse of

discretion. As noted above, the fact that the court’s findings

of fact quote from the DSS report does not undermine their

validity. See In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. at 60, 641 S.E.2d at

409. The findings describe Respondent’s persistent struggles

with life skills, judgment, and decision-making. They further

underscore the stability and success of Penny’s foster placement

as well as the bond Penny developed with Mr. and Mrs. M. after

three and one-half years in their care. The court expressly

found and concluded that Penny’s best interests would be served

by her continued placement with Mr. and Mrs. M. and by their

appointment as her guardians. Both DSS and the GAL agreed with

the court’s assessment.

Finally, Respondent claims the district court awarded

guardianship to Mr. and Mrs. M. without properly verifying that

they “understand[] the legal significance of the appointment and
 -20-
will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the

juvenile[,]” under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-600(c) and 7B-906.1(j).

We have previously held these provisions do not “require that

the court make any specific findings in order to make the

verification.” In re J.E., 182 N.C. App. 612, 616-17, 643

S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007). We conclude that the court’s findings

were sufficient.

The order includes the following language addressing the

verification requirement:

The Court has verified that [Mr. and Mrs.
M.] understand the legal significance of the
appointment of guardianship regarding the
minor child. The[y] have adequate resources
to care appropriately for the minor child.
[Mrs. M.] is employed and receives
compensation for her employment, and though
at this time [Mr. M.] has been laid off from
his previous employment, he receives
unemployment compensation.

Respondent challenges these findings as unsupported by the

evidence and otherwise inadequate. Specifically, she argues the

evidence did not show that Mr. and Mrs. M. understood their

obligation to honor any future expansion of visitation ordered

by the court. Respondent characterizes the court’s assessment

of the guardians’ financial resources as “perfunctory[.]”

Competent evidence supports the challenged findings. Mr.

M. testified that he and Mrs. M. had served as Penny’s foster
 -21-
parents since 3 May 2010, that they understood the guardianship

arrangement recommended by DSS, and that they wished to have

guardianship of the child. In addition to expressing his

understanding of and willingness to comply with the visitation

schedule recommended by DSS, Mr. M. testified as follows

regarding Respondent’s ongoing right to visitation:

Q. Are you willing to continue to make that
type of visitation available between [Penny]
and her mother, visitation that would be
well beyond a simple hour a month?

A. Well, if it were consistent with the
court order at the – anywhere from – if they
were as to an hour or two to four hours,
we’d be willing to provide access for those
visits.

(emphasis added). While Mr. M. balked at the suggestion of

“having someone other than ourselves supervise the visits[,]”

particularly a person the guardians had never met, he agreed to

“possibly increasing visitation if that was something that was

left available.” In its report to the court, DSS noted that it

had discussed the legal guardianship with Mr. and Mrs. M.,

including the issue of “continued visitation . . . should the

court accept the Department’s recommendation regarding

Guardianship.” The DSS social worker testified that Mr. and

Mrs. M. had generally “gone above and beyond what the minimum of

the court order has said in regards to visits.”
 -22-
Insofar as Respondent suggests the court erroneously found

that Mr. and Mrs. M. were aware of her right to file a motion

seeking additional visitation, we note the following exchange

between the court and their counsel:

THE COURT: My understanding is is once I've
deemed them guardians, if that's what I
choose to do, then the only hearing that
gets done after that is if someone files a
motion to have them removed for acting
inconsistent with their responsibilities as
guardian.

[COUNSEL FOR MR. AND MRS. M.]: Right, and
certainly i[f] visitation is an issue, they
can bring that issue forward as well as the
mother.

Though Respondent also posits several hypothetical scenarios in

her brief to this Court, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-600 and 7B-

906.1(j) do not require the court to review every possible

future contingency with the guardians to ensure their

understanding of the legal ramifications thereof.

The district court properly verified that Mr. and Mrs. M.

had adequate resources to care for Penny. The court’s findings

about the guardians’ income accurately reflect the testimony of

Mr. M., who also affirmed that he and his wife had “the

financial means to care for [Penny.]” The court was also aware

that Mr. and Mrs. M. had cared for Penny since May 2010, and had

previously been recommended as an adoptive placement by DSS and
 -23-
the GAL. Cf. In re J.E., 182 N.C. App. at 617, 643 S.E.2d at 73

(allowing verification based on pre-existing evidence such as a

DSS home study). The GAL reported to the court that Mr. and

Mrs. M. had “properly attended to” any issues that arose with

Penny during the placement. The evidence and the court’s

findings were sufficient to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-600(c)

and 7B-906.1(j).

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

Respondent two hours of supervised visitation twice per month,

awarding guardianship to Mr. and Mrs. M., and waiving future

review hearings. The court made sufficient findings of fact

supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the

order.

Affirmed.

Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).