An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
NO. COA13-1435
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 October 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Guilford County
Nos. 13 CRS 71104
13 CRS 71106
MARTIN DELGADO RAZO
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 24 July 2013 by
Judge Lindsay R. Davis, Jr. in Guilford County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2014.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Brent D. Kiziah, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.
Sharon L. Smith for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Martin Delgado Razo (“Defendant”) appeals from his
convictions of assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting
serious injury and simple assault. On appeal, he contends that
the trial court (1) erred in denying his motion to dismiss; and
(2) abused its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on
-2-
self-defense. After careful review, we find no error in part
and vacate and remand for a new trial in part.
Factual Background
The State’s evidence at trial tended to establish the
following facts: On 7 March 2013, Defendant, who was 23 years
old, was at his parents’ house in Greensboro, North Carolina
where he lived with his mother, father, and 13-year-old brother.
Defendant made several disparaging comments towards his younger
brother which ultimately led to a heated argument between
Defendant and his parents. Defendant’s brother placed a 911
call to the Greensboro Police Department reporting the
disturbance.
Officer Sean Patterson (“Officer Patterson”) with the
Greensboro Police Department was the first officer to respond to
the call. Upon arrival at the home, Officer Patterson saw
Defendant standing outside the front door. Officer Patterson,
who was uniformed and driving a marked patrol car, identified
himself to Defendant as an officer with the Greensboro Police
Department and informed Defendant that he was responding to a
report of a domestic disturbance. Defendant invited Officer
Patterson inside and began explaining the nature of the argument
to him.
While Defendant was speaking with Officer Patterson,
Officers Christopher Feliciano (“Officer Feliciano”) and M.R.
-3-
Leahey (“Officer Leahey”) also arrived and entered the
residence. The three officers separated the family members,
moving Defendant’s parents to one side of the room while keeping
Defendant at the other side of the room near the front door.
Defendant’s parents began discussing with the officers
their legal options with regard to Defendant — specifically,
whether they could “kick him out, [or] if [the officers] could
arrest him[.]” However, when the officers tried to explain
their options to them, Defendant loudly interrupted them,
yelling out profanities. The officers waited for Defendant to
stop yelling and then tried again to speak with his parents.
However, Defendant interrupted them a second time, once again
screaming profanities. After waiting once more for Defendant to
quiet down, the officers attempted for a third time to speak
with Defendant’s parents, and Defendant again loudly
interrupted, using more profanity. During the course of this
exchange, another officer, Adam Snyder (“Officer Snyder”),
arrived at the residence.
After Defendant’s third interruption, Officer Leahey told
him that if he interrupted the officers again before they could
finish speaking with Defendant’s parents, he would be arrested
for obstruction of justice. Defendant responded to Officer
Leahey by yelling “f--- you. Take me to jail.” Officer Leahey
then moved to grab Defendant’s wrist so as to restrain him and
-4-
place him in handcuffs. When Officer Leahey seized Defendant’s
wrist, Defendant threw a closed-fist punch at him with his free
hand, striking Officer Leahey in the mouth.
Officer Patterson, upon seeing Defendant punch Officer
Leahey, grabbed Defendant from behind in a bear hug in order to
restrain him, and Officer Leahey proceeded to take hold of
Defendant in a similar manner from the front. Officer Leahey’s
foot then came in contact with the leg of a couch, causing him
to fall backwards onto the couch and Defendant to fall on top of
him. Defendant began grabbing at Officer Leahey’s belt, and
Officers Patterson and Feliciano — believing Defendant to be
reaching for Officer Leahey’s weapon — took hold of Defendant’s
hands and placed him in handcuffs. Throughout the struggle,
Defendant was yelling and using profanity.
After Defendant had been handcuffed, Officers Feliciano and
Snyder began escorting him out of the house toward Officer
Patterson’s patrol car with each officer holding one of his
arms. Officers Patterson and Leahey were following
approximately 10 to 15 feet behind them.
As they approached Officer Patterson’s patrol car,
Defendant jumped up in the air and kicked Officer Feliciano in
his left leg. He then jumped again and kicked Officer Snyder,
making contact with Officer Snyder’s right shin. At that point,
Officer Leahey moved forward and delivered a front-thrust kick
-5-
to Defendant’s back, causing Defendant to fall to the ground.
The officers then placed a restraint device around Defendant’s
feet while Defendant continued to curse and yell at the
officers. Once Defendant was restrained, the officers placed
him in the back of Officer Patterson’s patrol car. As a result
of the altercation, Officer Leahey suffered a one-and-a-half
inch gash on his lip and was transported to the emergency room
for treatment.
On 20 May 2013, Defendant was indicted for assault on a law
enforcement officer inflicting serious injury based on his
punching of Officer Leahey. Defendant was also charged with one
count of misdemeanor assault on an officer with regard to his
kicking of Officer Snyder and one count of misdemeanor assault
on an officer with regard to his kicking of Officer Feliciano.
Defendant moved to join these offenses for trial, and the trial
court granted Defendant’s motion. A jury trial was held in
Guilford County Superior Court on 23 July 2013.
Defendant testified in his own defense at trial, giving the
following account of the events taking place on 7 March 2013
upon the officers’ arrival at his parents’ home: After stating
his explanation for the family argument to the officers,
Defendant interrupted the officers while they were speaking with
his parents because his mother had a “speech impairment, so she
couldn’t exactly, um, explain everything correctly as to the way
-6-
it happened.” Upon the officers asking his father if he wanted
Defendant arrested, Defendant interrupted to say that the
officers could not arrest him as he had “not broken any laws.”
Officer Leahey told Defendant “in a very loud voice, I am
the law — um — I am allowed to locate you or relocate you from
location to location as needed.” Officer Leahey then violently
shoved him and grabbed his wrist. Defendant stated that Officer
Leahey’s actions “kind of scared me and put me in a fright, and
it caused for me to react in a way of self-defense, which then I
struck the officer to the upper lip.”
After he had been handcuffed and was being escorted to
Officer Patterson’s patrol car, he turned around to look back at
Officer Leahey who was behind him. Officer Leahey called
Defendant a “F---ing mutt” at which point Officer Snyder gave
Defendant’s arm “a large tug or pull” as if he was “trying to
dislocate [Defendant’s] arm.” As an act of self-defense, he
kicked Officer Snyder in the back of the leg.
The jury found Defendant guilty of (1) assault on a law
enforcement officer inflicting serious injury as to Officer
Leahey in case number 13 CRS 71106; and (2) simple assault on
Officer Snyder — as a lesser included offense of the charge of
assault on an officer — in case number 13 CRS 71104. Defendant
was found not guilty of assault on an officer and not guilty of
the lesser included offense of simple assault as to Officer
-7-
Feliciano. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a
consolidated term of 6–17 months imprisonment, suspended the
sentence, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 36
months. As a term of special probation, Defendant was ordered
to attend an anger management program. Defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal.
Analysis
I. Denial of Motion to Dismiss
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss all charges against him based on
the insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Defendant
claims that he had a right to resist the officers’ attempts to
take him into custody because they lacked probable cause to
arrest him pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 in that he did
not willfully resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in
discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office.
A trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss
is reviewed de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). On appeal, this Court must determine
“whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential
element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included
therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such
offense.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451,
455 (internal citation omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148
-8-
L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265
S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). Evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the State with every reasonable inference
drawn in the State's favor. State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192,
451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132
L.Ed.2d 818 (1995).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 provides that “[i]f any person
shall willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a
public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty
of his office, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2013). The elements of this offense
are as follows:
1) that the victim was a public
officer;
2) that the defendant knew or had
reasonable grounds to believe that the
victim was a public officer;
3) that the victim was discharging or
attempting to discharge a duty of his
office;
4) that the defendant resisted,
delayed, or obstructed the victim in
discharging or attempting to discharge
a duty of his office; and
5) that the defendant acted willfully
and unlawfully, that is intentionally
and without justification or excuse.
-9-
State v. Cornell, __ N.C. App. __, __, 729 S.E.2d 703, 705
(2012) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Defendant does not offer any argument as to the first
three elements of the offense. Our inquiry is therefore limited
to the fourth and fifth elements — that is, whether Defendant
resisted, delayed, or obstructed the officers in discharging or
attempting to discharge a duty of their office, and if so,
whether Defendant acted willfully and unlawfully.
[T]he fourth element establishes the right
to be free from arrest for violating N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-223 when merely
remonstrating with an officer or criticizing
or questioning an officer while he is
performing his duty when done in an orderly
manner. The touchstone of the inquiry is
orderliness, even where no actual violence
or force was used by defendant.
Id. at __, 729 S.E.2d at 705-06 (internal citations, quotation
marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
What constitutes an “orderly manner” of remonstration in
the context of this offense is illustrated by several of our
prior cases. In Cornell, an officer at a bluegrass festival
noticed that two rival gangs appeared to be squaring off and
about to fight. Id. at __, 729 S.E.2d at 704-05. The officer
attempted to instruct one of the gangs to disperse and move away
from the other gang. Id. The defendant, a member of one of the
gangs, stepped in between his gang and the officer and told the
-10-
officer to speak to him instead, refusing to get out of the
officer’s way for 10 to 15 seconds despite the officer’s
repeated orders for him to step aside. Id. This Court held
that the defendant’s actions went beyond merely arguing with the
officer and amounted to the obstruction of a public officer in
the course of discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of
his office. Id. at __, 729 S.E.2d at 706.
In State v. Leigh, 10 N.C. App. 202, 178 S.E.2d 85 (1970),
rev’d on other grounds, 278 N.C. 243, 179 S.E.2d 708 (1971),
while a deputy sheriff was attempting to question a suspect in
an ongoing investigation, the defendant repeatedly yelled to the
suspect: “You don't have to go with that Gestapo Pig.” Id. at
204-05, 178 S.E.2d at 86-87. We held that the defendant
did not have the right, by the continued use
of loud and abusive language, to prevent the
officer from talking to [the suspect]. . . .
The deputy sheriff was unable to talk to
[the suspect] because of the loud and
abusive language of the defendant over a
period of several minutes. He had to drive
away from the scene in order to talk to [the
suspect], and this constituted a delay in
the performance of his duty as an officer.
Id. at 205, 178 S.E.2d at 807; see also State v. Burton, 108
N.C. App. 219, 226, 423 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1992) (holding that
willful obstruction was established where defendant’s yelling at
officer who had pulled over defendant’s vehicle prevented that
officer from calling in to check on vehicle’s registration),
-11-
appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 576, 429
S.E.2d 574 (1993).
In the present case, the State presented evidence tending
to show that while officers were attempting to talk with
Defendant’s parents in furtherance of their investigation into a
reported family disturbance, Defendant interrupted the officers
three separate times by yelling loudly and profanely over his
parents’ answers to the officers’ questions. The officers were
forced to wait for him to finish yelling each time so that they
could attempt to obtain the parents’ information. This led to
Officer Leahey warning Defendant that if he did not remain quiet
and allow the officers to speak to his parents, he would be
arrested for obstruction. Defendant responded to this warning
by yelling: “[F]--- you. Take me to jail.” We conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-223.
With regard to the willfulness element, we believe that
issue was likewise a question of fact for the jury to decide
given that “willfulness [is] a state of mind which is seldom
capable of direct proof, but which must be inferred from the
circumstances of the particular case.” Cornell, __ N.C. App. at
__, 729 S.E.2d at 706 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
-12-
While Defendant relies heavily on State v. Allen, 14 N.C.
App. 485, 188 S.E.2d 568 (1972), his reliance is misplaced. In
Allen, the driver of a car in which the defendant was a
passenger was arrested for driving under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor. The arresting officer seized a sealed,
unopened bottle of whiskey from the back seat of the car as
evidence and took it back to his patrol car. The defendant
followed the officer back to the officer’s car and argued that
the whiskey was his property, not the driver’s, and that the
officer had no right to confiscate it. The officer told the
defendant that if he did not stop arguing he would be arrested.
The defendant did not stop arguing and was ultimately arrested.
Id. at 487, 188 S.E.2d at 570. This Court held that
mere remonstrances or even criticisms of an
officer are not usually held to be the
equivalent of unlawful interference. . . .
[The defendant] was merely arguing with the
officer and protesting the confiscation of
his liquor. He had committed no offense and
the officer had no authority to arrest him.
Id. at 492, 188 S.E.2d at 573 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
Allen is distinguishable from the present case. The
defendant in Allen was calm and deliberate in his argument with
the arresting officer. He “followed the officer back to the
patrol car insisting that the officer return the liquor. He
-13-
made no attempt to interfere with the officer and did not
threaten to do so. There was no threat of physical violence.
[The defendant] offered no resistance to the officer until he
was placed under arrest.” Id. at 491, 188 S.E.2d at 573.
Conversely, the repeated interruptions and profane yelling
by Defendant directly interfered with the officers’ attempts to
discharge their duties. Therefore, because Defendant’s argument
regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
hinges on his mistaken contention that the officers lacked a
legal basis for placing him under arrest, we hold that the trial
court did not err in denying his motion.
II. Self-Defense Instruction
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in failing to expressly instruct the jury on self-
defense as to the assault on a law enforcement officer
inflicting serious injury charge regarding Defendant’s punching
of Officer Leahey. We agree.
It is well established that “[i]n certain circumstances,
the theory of self-defense entitles an individual to use such
force as is necessary or apparently necessary to save himself
from death or great bodily harm. A person may exercise such
force if he believes it to be necessary and has reasonable
grounds for such belief.” State v. Whetstone, 212 N.C. App.
-14-
551, 557, 711 S.E.2d 778, 783 (2011) (internal citation,
quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
[W]hen there is sufficient evidence to
present the question of self-defense the
trial court must instruct the jury on that
defense even in the absence of a request to
do so.
Similarly, there is no question that where
there is evidence tending to show the use of
excessive force by [a] law [enforcement]
officer, the trial court should instruct the
jury that the assault by the defendant upon
the law officer was justified or excused if
the assault was limited to the use of
reasonable force by the defendant in
defending himself from that excessive force.
State v. Robinson, 40 N.C. App. 514, 519, 253 S.E.2d 311, 314,
(1979) (internal citations, quotation marks, and ellipses
omitted). Furthermore, we have held that
[w]here there is evidence that defendant
acted in self-defense, the court must charge
on this aspect even though there is
contradictory evidence by the State or
discrepancies in defendant's evidence.
Thus, if the defendant's evidence, taken as
true, is sufficient to support an
instruction for self-defense, it must be
given even though the State's evidence is
contradictory. The evidence is to be viewed
in the light most favorable to the
defendant.
Whetstone, 212 N.C. App. at 555, 711 S.E.2d at 781-82 (internal
citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
During the charge conference, the trial court stated that
while it believed an instruction on self-defense was warranted
-15-
as to the charges relating to Defendant’s assaults on Officers
Feliciano and Snyder, it did not believe such an instruction was
warranted as to the charge stemming from Defendant’s assault on
Officer Leahey.
This Court reviews jury instructions
contextually and in its entirety. The
charge will be held to be sufficient if it
presents the law of the case in such manner
as to leave no reasonable cause to believe
the jury was misled or misinformed. Under
such a standard of review, it is not enough
for the appealing party to show that error
occurred in the jury instructions; rather,
it must be demonstrated that such error was
likely, in light of the entire charge, to
mislead the jury. If a party requests a
jury instruction which is a correct
statement of the law and which is supported
by the evidence, the trial judge must give
the instruction at least in substance.
Cornell, __ N.C. App. at __, 729 S.E.2d at 708 (internal
citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
The trial court instructed the jury on the law of self-
defense jointly as to the assault charges regarding Officers
Snyder and Feliciano but did not extend this instruction to
apply to the charge relating to the assault on Officer Leahey.
In Case Nos. 13CRS71103 and 13CRS71104 the
defendant is charged with assault on a
government officer, Greensboro Police
Officers Christopher Feliciano and A.L.
Snyder, respectively, while each officer was
performing or attempting to perform a duty
of his office.
In each case your duty is to return one of
the following verdict [sic]: Guilty of
-16-
assault on a government officer while the
officer was discharging or attempting to
discharge a duty of his office; guilty of
simple assault; or not guilty.
. . . .
In addition, if the state has satisfied you
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
assaulted the alleged victim, then you would
consider whether the defendant's actions are
excused and the defendant is not guilty
because the defendant acted in self-defense.
The state has the burden of proving from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant's action was not in self-
defense. Even if you find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant
assaulted the alleged victim, the assault
would be justified by self-defense under the
following circumstances:
1. If the circumstances at the time the
defendant acted would cause a person of
ordinary firmness to — reasonably to believe
that such action was necessary or apparently
necessary to protect that person from bodily
injury or offensive physical contact.
2. The circumstances created such belief in
the defendant's mind.
You determine the reasonableness of the
defendant's belief from the circumstances
appearing to the defendant at the time.
If you find that the defendant intentionally
kicked an officer escorting him after the
arrest and the arrest was unlawful, or if
you do not find that the defendant's assault
was justified by self-defense, then you will
not find the defendant guilty[.]
-17-
The trial court reiterated the self-defense doctrine
separately as to the charge relating to Defendant’s kicking of
Officer Feliciano:
In addition, if the state has satisfied you,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant assaulted the alleged victim, then
you would consider whether the defendant's
action — actions are excused and the
defendant is not guilty because the
defendant acted in self-defense.
The state has the burden of proving from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant's action was not in self-
defense.
The instructions previously given regarding
self-defense apply as well here.
If you do not so find at least one of these
elements of justification or excuse, or that
the defendant's assault was not justified by
self-defense, or if you have a reasonable
doubt as to any of these things, then it
would be your duty to return a verdict of
not guilty[.]
The trial court then gave an essentially identical
additional instruction on self-defense as to the charge
concerning Defendant’s kicking of Officer Snyder. With regard
to the charge relating to Officer Leahey, however, the trial
court’s instructions merely stated, in pertinent part, as
follows:
If Officer Leahey was making or attempting
to make a lawful arrest, then the defendant
had the duty to submit to that arrest. If
the defendant struck Officer Leahey in the
face with his fist while Officer Leahey was
-18-
making or attempting to make such arrest,
then the defendant's striking of Officer
Leahey would not be justified or excused.
If the arrest was not a lawful arrest, then
the defendant had a right to resist the
unlawful arrest. In doing so, he was
justified in using such force as reasonably
appeared to him to be necessary, under the
circumstances, to prevent the unlawful
restraint of his liberty. The resisting
force by the defendant cannot have been
excessive.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, Defendant failed to receive an overt self-defense
instruction as to the charge relating to his assault on Officer
Leahey despite receiving such an instruction as to the charges
relating to Officers Feliciano and Snyder. Moreover, the trial
court’s instructions regarding the charge relating to Officer
Leahey suggested that Defendant was not entitled to defend
himself against any excessive force used by Officer Leahey if
Officer Leahey’s arrest of Defendant was lawful. In our view,
the refusal to give such a self-defense instruction was
erroneous given Defendant’s testimony that he punched Officer
Leahey in the face because Officer Leahey had shoved him
violently moments before and that, as a result, Defendant was in
fear for his safety.
The right to defend oneself from the
excessive use of force by a police officer
must be carefully distinguished from the
well-guarded right to resist an arrest which
is unlawful. One resisting an illegal
arrest is not resisting an officer within
-19-
the discharge of his official duties.
However, the right to use force to defend
oneself against the excessive use of force
during an arrest may arise despite the
lawfulness of the arrest, and the use of
excessive force does not render the arrest
illegal.
State v. Anderson, 40 N.C. App. 318, 322, 253 S.E.2d 48, 51
(1979) (internal citations omitted).
We further believe that Defendant was prejudiced by the
trial court’s failure to give a self-defense instruction as to
the charge relating to Officer Leahey. Because a clear self-
defense instruction was given as to the charges relating to
Defendant’s assaults on Officers Feliciano and Snyder, a
reasonable juror would have been left with the impression that
Defendant’s right of self-defense was significantly greater as
to the charges relating to these officers than as to the charge
involving Officer Leahey. Moreover, the jury was likely also
left with the erroneous impression that Defendant did not have
any right of self-defense at all as to Officer Leahey if it
found that Officer Leahey’s arrest of Defendant was lawful.
Accordingly, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to a new
trial on the charge of assault on a law enforcement officer
inflicting serious injury (13 CRS 71106).1
Conclusion
1
Because Defendant’s conviction on this offense was consolidated
for judgment with his conviction on the charge of simple assault
on Officer Snyder (13 CRS 71104), we remand for resentencing.
-20-
For the reasons stated above, we vacate Defendant’s
conviction on the charge of assault on a law enforcement officer
inflicting serious injury (13 CRS 71106) and remand for a new
trial solely as to that charge. As to Defendant’s conviction
for simple assault (13 CRS 71104), we find no error.
NO ERROR IN PART; NEW TRIAL IN PART; AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.
Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).