Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res Dec 19 2014, 10:42 am
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JAY RODIA GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CHRISTINA D. PACE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MACK A. JAKE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1406-CR-409
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John Chavis, Judge
Cause No. 49F15-1311-FD-75727
December 19, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Mack Jake appeals his conviction for Class D felony battery on a law enforcement
officer. We affirm.
Issue
Jake raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain his conviction.
Facts
On November 23, 2013, David Truex was working as a paramedic on the east side
of Indianapolis. Truex and his partner, Paul Hess, received a dispatch regarding a man on
the side of the road having a seizure. They discovered Jake and helped him into the
ambulance. Jake appeared to be disoriented, but he was eventually able to “communicate
a little bit.” Tr. p. 15. While they were transporting Jake to the hospital, Jake suddenly
“gave [Truex] a stare” and started “cussing” and “flailing his arms.” Id. at 16. Hess
stopped the ambulance and called for police assistance. Jake was “swinging” and trying
to hit Hess and Truex. Id. at 18. Officer Michael Price with the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department arrived on the scene and assisted Hess and Truex with
restraining Jake. Jake started to calm down but suddenly he looked at Officer Price,
brought his left leg back toward his body, and kicked Officer Price in the chest. They
then wrapped gauze around Jake and the cot to restrain him and transported him to the
hospital.
The State charged Jake with Class D felony battery on a health care provider and
Class D felony battery on a law enforcement officer. After a bench trial, the trial court
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found Jake not guilty of battery on a health care provider but guilty of battery on a law
enforcement officer. The trial court sentenced Jake to 545 days with 180 days served on
home detention and 365 days suspended to probation. Jake now appeals.
Analysis
Jake argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we
neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003,
1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there
is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
At the time of Jake’s offense, Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1 provided that a
“person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner commits battery.” The offense is a Class D felony if it results in bodily
injury to a law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the execution of the
officer’s official duty. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. Jake’s only argument is that his touching
of Officer Price was not knowing or intentional. According to Jake, he was in a state of
confusion, had difficulty communicating with the paramedics, and was afraid of the
medicine that the paramedics were attempting to give him.
A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it
is his conscious objective to do so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). A person engages in conduct
“knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he
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is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the
trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence. Young v. State, 761
N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. 2002); Mitchell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. 1990).
“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from that
evidence which supports the verdict.” Mitchell, 557 N.E.2d at 664.
The State presented evidence that Jake was being transported by ambulance after
having a seizure. Although he was initially disoriented, he eventually started talking to
the paramedics. However, he suddenly became violent and tried to hit the paramedics.
When Officer Price arrived, Jake calmed down. He then broke free from his restraints,
looked directly at Officer Price, brought his left leg back toward his body, and kicked
Officer Price in the chest. Although Jake testified that he did not intentionally kick
Officer Price, the officers and paramedics testified that Jake’s movements seemed
purposeful. Jake’s argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. The State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Jake knowingly or
intentionally kicked Officer Price.
Conclusion
The evidence is sufficient to sustain Jake’s conviction. We affirm.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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