Richard Tabler v. William Stephens, Director

Case: 12-70013 Document: 00512915853 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/27/2015 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 12-70013 United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED RICHARD LEE TABLER, January 27, 2015 Lyle W. Cayce Petitioner - Appellant Clerk v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, Respondent - Appellee Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC 6:10-CV-34 Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Christeson v. Roper, 574 U.S. ___ (2015) (per curiam), we VACATE IN PART our previous opinion denying Richard Tabler’s petition for a Certificate of Appealability, Tabler v. Stephens, 2014 WL 4954294 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). We now hold that the equitable rule established in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 12-70013 Document: 00512915853 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/27/2015 No. 12-70013 that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,” logically extends to ineffective assistance of habeas counsel that prevents an initial-review collateral proceeding from ever taking place. Because Tabler’s attorneys for his state habeas proceedings were also his attorneys for his federal habeas proceedings, they faced a conflict of interest that could have prevented them from arguing that their performance in Tabler’s competency hearing was deficient, and, accordingly, Tabler’s statutory right to counsel was violated. See Christeson, 574 U.S. at ___. We hereby VACATE IN PART the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case to the district court solely to consider in the first instance whether Tabler, represented by his new counsel Widder or other unconflicted counsel, can establish cause for the procedural default of any ineffective-assistance-of-trial- counsel claims pursuant to Martinez that he may raise, and, if so, whether those claims merit relief. 2