IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0952
Filed February 11, 2015
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF STEPHANIA L. RICKELS
AND JASON LYNN RICKELS
Upon the Petition of
STEPHANIA L. RICKELS,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
JASON LYNN RICKELS,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Sean W.
McPartland, Judge.
Jason Rickels appeals the district court’s dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
Dawn D. Long of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, J.
Jason Lynn Rickels appeals the district court’s dissolution decree granting
physical care of the child, A.R., to Stephania Rickels. Jason requests the decree
be modified to establish joint physical care, or in the alternative, he requests A.R.
be placed in his physical care.1 Jason and Stephania both ask for appellate
attorney fees. We concur in the district court’s decision to grant Stephania
physical care. As Jason has not prevailed on appeal, we award Stephania
appellate attorney fees of $2000.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Stephania and Jason were married in 2004. The parties have one child,
A.R., who was ten years old at the time of trial. Although A.R. was born before
the marriage, the parties agree Jason is the father. During the marriage, the
parties resided at a house, owned by Jason prior to the marriage, located in
Scotch Grove.
Stephania is employed as a special education teacher in the Western
Dubuque School District. She has an undergraduate degree in special education
and communications and is working on obtaining a master’s degree in special
education from Mount Mercy University. She has one other child, who recently
turned eighteen and is a senior in high school. Stephania has had physical care
of this child since her divorce from the father.
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In the event we decide to award Jason joint physical care or physical care, he asks for
an expanded visitation schedule, and for the tax dependency exemption to be alternated
each year. Since we affirm the district court, we decline to alter the established visitation
schedule or tax exemption arrangement.
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Jason worked at Star Building Manufacturing, which later became NCI
Building Systems, where he made parts for buildings. Jason held this position
until 2008, when he became disabled. Jason was diagnosed with restrictive lung
disease leaving him unable to work fulltime. His income is largely derived from
social security disability payments. Jason has two children from a previous
marriage. The children are currently in high school and reside primarily with their
mother, who has physical care.
Stephania filed a petition to dissolve the marriage on November 15, 2012.
The parties separated shortly thereafter. Stephania and the two children moved
out of the marital home into a rented home in nearby Monticello. The district
court entered a temporary order concerning A.R. on January 7, 2013, which
awarded the parties temporary joint legal custody. Stephania received temporary
physical care and Jason’s visitation was set for every other weekend, though the
parties agreed to a broader visitation schedule.
Following trial, the district court entered its dissolution decree on March,
31, 2013. The decree gave Stephania and Jason joint legal custody, with
Stephania receiving physical care. The decree also awarded Stephania the
yearly tax dependency exemption for A.R.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review dissolution of marriage cases do novo. In re Marriage of
McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). We have a duty to examine the
entire record and adjudicate anew the rights on the issues properly presented. In
re Marriage of Williams, 589 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). Generally,
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we give considerable deference to the district court’s credibility determinations
because the court has a firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and view the
witnesses. In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1992).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Joint Physical Care
Jason claims joint physical care is in A.R.’s best interest. He points to the
historical caregiving role he played for A.R., and the parents’ ability to
communicate and agree without conflict.
Iowa’s traditional and statutory child custody standard is “the best interest
of the child.” Iowa Code § 591.41(1)(a) (2011); In re Marriage of Hansen, 733
N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). This standard provides the necessary flexibility to
take the unique facts of each case into consideration. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at
696. A nonexclusive list of factors used to determine the “best interest of the
child” is found in Iowa Code section 598.41(3).
In considering whether to award joint physical care where there are
two suitable parents, stability and continuity of caregiving have
traditionally been primary factors. In re Marriage of Bevers, 326
N.W.2d 896, 898 (Iowa 1982) (noting who during the marriage
provided routine care and questioning desirability of the children’s
nomadic existence for sake of parents); In re Marriage of Decker,
666 N.W.2d 175, 178–80 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003) (past primary
caregiving a factor given heavy weight in custody matters); In re
Marriage of Williams, 589 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998)
(great emphasis placed on achieving emotional stability for
children); [In re Marriage of] Roberts, 545 N.W.2d [340,] 343 [(Iowa
Ct. App. 1996)] (though not controlling, due consideration to
historical primary caregiver); [In re Marriage of] Coulter, 502
N.W.2d [168,] 171 [(Iowa Ct. App. 1993)] (stability “cannot be
overemphasized”). Stability and continuity factors tend to favor a
spouse who, prior to divorce, was primarily responsible for physical
care. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(d)
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Id.
The district court found both Stephania and Jason to be suitable parents
for A.R. However, the court found joint physical care was not in A.R.’s best
interests. Relying on the Hansen factors, the court declined to award joint
physical care and cited multiple reasons for its decision, including: Stephania’s
history of caring for A.R., the disruptive effect a shared custody arrangement may
have on A.R., the communication issues between the parents, and the degree of
conflict between the parents (derived from the parties’ communication issues).
Upon our de novo review, we agree with the district court’s reasoning.
The record shows both Jason and Stephania provided significant care to A.R.,
and they are suitable parents for A.R. However, we find certain events a
troubling indicator making a joint physical care arrangement not in the best
interests of A.R. We find Jason has the tendency to assert his will over
Stephania, in lieu of communicating about issues and reaching amicable
compromise. For example, A.R. has issues with ADHD. Rather than place A.R.
on medication, Stephania preferred they look into other methods for controlling
his ADHD before resorting to medication. Instead, Jason made a doctor’s
appointment to obtain ADHD drugs for A.R. without informing Stephania.
Stephania learned about the appointment and prescription for ADHD medication
only after the appointment. Additionally, Stephania has agreed to liberal and
frequent visitation for Jason, which includes an additional overnight during the
week and a two-week uninterrupted period during the summer. Ultimately, we
agree with the district court’s conclusion:
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In short, based upon the factors discussed above guiding the
Court’s determination of the appropriateness of joint physical care,
and in the total setting presented in this case, the Court concludes
that a joint physical care arrangement here is not in the best
interest of A.R. Based upon the Court’s findings that, prior to the
parties’ separation, Stephania was primarily responsible for
physical care, the Court concludes that the interests of stability and
continuity of care favor continued placement of primary care with
Stephania.
Upon our de novo review, we find Stephania is the more suitable parent
for promoting the relationship between A.R. and Jason than any alternative
arrangement. Pursuant to our findings above, we decline to disturb the district
court’s visitation schedule and tax dependency exemption award. We affirm the
district court’s order, and find the best interests of A.R. are served by a grant of
physical care to Stephania.
B. Appellate Attorney Fees
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. This court has broad
discretion in awarding appellate attorney fees. In re Marriage of Okland, 699
N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). An award of appellate attorney fees is based
upon the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to
pay, and the relative merits of the appeal. In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d
90, 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Since Stephania has prevailed on appeal, we
award her $2000 in appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.