MEMORANDUM DECISION Mar 26 2015, 6:15 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Adam Lenkowsky Gregory F. Zoeller
Roberts & Bishop Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Juan Humberto Lara-Molina, March 26, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
12A02-1409-CR-645
v. Appeal from the Clinton Circuit
Court
The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler,
State of Indiana, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 12C01-1311-FA-1101
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On November 20, 2013, Appellant-Defendant Juan Humberto Lara-Molina
was stopped while driving on Interstate 65 in Clinton County. Lara-Molina,
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who initially provided a false name to the Indiana State Trooper who stopped
him, was found to be in possession of approximately 1238 grams of cocaine and
did not have a valid driver’s license. Soon thereafter, Lara-Molina was charged
with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class D felony synthetic identity
deception, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever having
received a license. Lara-Molina subsequently pled guilty as charged. Lara-
Molina’s plea agreement left sentencing to the discretion of the trial court and
did not include a sentence recommendation from Appellee-Plaintiff the State of
Indiana (the “State”).
[2] At sentencing, the State notified the trial court that the parties wished to amend
Lara-Molina’s guilty plea for dealing in cocaine from a Class A felony to a
Class B felony and that the State wished to add a recommendation for a seven-
year executed sentence. Both the State and Lara-Molina conceded that the trial
court would not be bound by this recommended sentence, however, because the
original plea agreement contained no such recommendation. The trial court
ultimately allowed the parties to amend Lara-Molina’s plea to dealing in
cocaine from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, but declined to impose the
seven-year executed sentence recommended by the State. Finding that the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and noting that Lara-
Molina received a substantial benefit from the reduction of his plea from a Class
A felony level to a Class B felony level, the trial court imposed an aggregate
eighteen-year executed sentence. We affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] The factual basis entered during the March 31, 2014 guilty plea hearing
provides as follows: on November 20, 2013, Lara-Molina was stopped by
Indiana State Police Trooper Ryan Winters while driving a vehicle in Clinton
County. At the time he was stopped, Lara-Molina possessed, with the intent to
deliver, more than three grams of cocaine. Lara-Molina, who was driving
without ever receiving a driver’s license, falsely identified himself to Trooper
Winters as Juan Carlos Gomez Esparza.
[4] On November 22, 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State)
charged Lara-Molina with Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Class D felony
synthetic identity deception, and Class C misdemeanor operating a motor
vehicle without ever receiving a license.1 On March 31, 2014, Lara-Molina pled
guilty as charged. According to the terms of Lara-Molina’s guilty plea,
sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court as the State did not make a
sentencing recommendation.
[5] The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 18, 2014, during
which the State informed the trial court that:
the history of this case is that Mr. Lara-Molina pleaded guilty to the
Class A felony … but due to circumstances that have occurred since
1
The State filed an amended charging information on December 2, 2013. The amended charging
information is identical to the original charging information filed on November 22, 2013, except that
it appears to correct a spelling error that was contained in the original charging information.
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the time of the plea, uh, the State now wishes to provide Mr. Lara-
Molina with a consideration uh, that is not possible uh, under the
potential sentencing for the Class A felony to which he -- he pleaded.
And so in order to be able to recommend to the Court uh, the
consideration that we wish him to have uh, we uh, would need to --
and then propose to do so today, amend the uh, Count 1, Dealing in
Cocaine, a Class A felony, to a Class B felony, uh, carrying a range of
penalties of six to twenty years. Uhm, and the recommendation we
would then make is that the executed portion of the sentence be uh,
seven years. Uh, now that recommendation would be non-binding
because we stand here today uh, poised for a sentencing in a situation
in which there was no agreement uh, between the parties at the time
that the plea agreement was entered. So even if we make a
recommendation today at the Class A level, it would not be binding on
the Court and we don’t propose to make it binding on the Court at the
Class B level. But, it is an attempt to uh, be able to make the
recommendation to the Court, the consideration that we think uh, we
would like Mr. Lara-Molina to have. Now we recognize also and we
hope he does that the minute we uh, amend the Class A to a Class B if
the court approves that and he is in agreement with it, he gets a fairly
substantial consideration anyway because the maximum on a Class B
is the minimum on a Class A, and uh, so that -- that’s a meaningful
opportunity for him. But, at any rate, that’s what the State proposes
here uh, if the defense table is in agreement with our proceeding in that
manner.
Tr. pp. 15-16. Defense counsel indicated that the State’s comments were
consistent with counsel’s understanding. In addition, through the aid of an
interpreter, the trial court and Lara-Molina engaged in the following discussion:
The Court: And -- Mr. Lara-Molina, have you been able to
understand the attorney’s summary and outlining of the changes to the
Plea Agreement that they are proposing?
Interpreter: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand that I would not uh, authorize or
accept any changes at this point until accepting a plea pursuant to this
agreement? And what that means is you’ve already pled guilty to a
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Class A felony. We’re scheduled for sentencing on that Class A felony
today. Uh, the attorneys have further negotiated and are proposing
that, that Plea Agreement be modified to a Class -- … So then the Plea
Agreement if accepted, would be modified so that the Dealing in
Cocaine would be a Class B felony as opposed to Class A felony.
Additionally in the portion of that Plea Agreement that originally said
the State would not make a sentencing recommendation, the parties
would be making the recommendation that has just been outlined.
Understand though that the Court is not bound by that
recommendation. As an A felony or as you originally pled and were
originally charged, the penalty range is anywhere from twenty to fifty
years with thirty years being the advisory sentence and the fine
possible from Zero to Ten Thousand Dollars. If the Court would
accept this modification, the penalty would range for a B felony would
be anywhere from six years to twenty years. The advisory sentence
would be ten years and the fine could range from Zero to Ten
Thousand Dollars. Do you understand those possible penalties both
for the charge as it currently stands as an A felony and as a reduced B
felony charge that is contemplated with these amendments?
Interpreter: Yes sir.
The Court: And again, do you understand that any
recommendations to the sentence that would be made either by the
attorneys individually or by the attorneys jointly, would be just that,
only recommendations and the Court would still have the authority to
sentence you within the full range for that [B] felony, which is six to
twenty years of incarceration? Do you understand that?
Interpreter: Yes.
****
The Court: Other than what I have reviewed with you and what has
been outlined by the attorneys, have you been promised anything else,
threatened or forced to get you to plead guilty?
Interpreter: No sir.
The Court: Have you been able to understand everything I’ve said
through the translation provided by Miss Garza?
Interpreter: Yes sir.
****
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The Court: Okay. And again just to make sure you’re aware of this,
if the Court does accept this new plea to a B felony level, the Court has
the full range of possible penalties, which would be six to twenty years
and the attorneys can make arguments and recommendations, but
none of those arguments or recommendations are binding on the
Court and the Court will decide upon the pos -- the actual penalty
within that six to twenty year range. Do you understand that?
Interpreter: Yes sir.
Tr. pp. 16-21. Lara-Molina also again admitted that he possessed cocaine, with
the intent to deliver, on November 20, 2013.
[6] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court allowed Lara-Molina to amend
his guilty plea from a plea of guilty to a Class A felony to a plea of guilty to a
Class B felony. The trial court, however, found that the seven-year sentence
recommended by the State was inadequate, instead sentencing Lara-Molina to
an aggregate eighteen-year term. In arriving at this sentence, the trial court
found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. 2 The trial
court also found that Lara-Molina was a high risk to re-offend and noted that
Lara-Molina received a substantial benefit from the reduction of his conviction
for dealing in cocaine from a Class A felony level to a Class B felony level.
2
Lara-Molina does not challenge the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the trial court on
appeal. The aggravating factors include: Lara-Molina’s criminal history, which includes convictions
for crimes of violence, several weapons charges, and at least one federal conviction for illegal re-
entry; his status as an illegal alien; and the fact that he had previously been deported. The mitigating
factors include: Lara-Molina accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty, cooperated
with law enforcement, and had family obligations.
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Discussion and Decision
[7] On appeal, Lara-Molina contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him. Generally, sentencing decisions rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other
grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if
the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).
[8] Specifically, Lara-Molina argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to give him an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial
court determined that it would not impose the seven-year executed sentence
that was recommended by the State. The record establishes, however, that both
parties understood that the seven-year executed sentence recommendation
presented for the first time by the State at sentencing would not be binding upon
the trial court.
Under a “nonbinding” sentence recommendation, the defendant
extracts a promise from the prosecutor to advocate the imposition of a
particular sentence (or that the prosecutor will remain mute at the
sentencing hearing), but the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently submits to the agreement with the understanding that the
sentence recommendation is “nonbinding” and that he or she is not
entitled to withdraw the guilty plea if the trial court rejects the
recommended sentence. This type of sentence recommendation is
made as another fact relevant to sentencing for the trial court to
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consider when it exercises its sentencing discretion.
Walker v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1374, 1378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); see also Hedger v.
State, 824 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that where the
defendant’s written plea agreement included no specific sentence term, the trial
court was not bound to follow the State’s oral sentence recommendation), trans.
denied.
[9] Again, both the State and Lara-Molina explicitly stated that they understood
that the State’s recommendation of a seven-year executed sentence would not
be binding on the trial court. After both counsel for the State and defense
counsel indicated that the sentence recommendation would not be binding
upon the trial court, the trial court, through the aid of an interpreter, engaged in
a discussion with Lara-Molina in which the trial court repeatedly asked Lara-
Molina whether he understood that the sentence recommendation was
nonbinding and sentencing would be left to the trial court. Each time, Lara-
Molina indicated that he understood. Lara-Molina further indicated that he
had been able to understand everything that the trial court had said through the
translation.
[10] The record clearly demonstrates that all of the relevant parties, including
counsel for the State, defense counsel, and Lara-Molina, understood that the
seven-year sentence recommendation was not binding upon the trial court and
that the trial court retained the discretion to sentence Lara-Molina as the trial
court saw fit. We therefore conclude that the trial court acted within its
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discretion in sentencing Lara-Molina to an aggravated eighteen-year term
without first offering Lara-Molina the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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