MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 14 2015, 10:01 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey Elftman Gregory F. Zoeller
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Kokomo, Indiana
Brian Reitz
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stephen A. Jones April 14, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
34A05-1412-CR-551
v. Appeal from the Howard County
Superior Court 1
Honorable William C. Menges,
State of Indiana, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Cause No. 34D01-1008-FB-698
Friedlander, Judge.
[1] Stephen A. Jones presents a single issue on appeal, whether the trial court erred
in its determination of credit time.
[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.
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[3] On August 19, 2010 Jones was charged in Howard County with three counts of
dealing in a schedule I controlled substance as a class B felony, possession of a
controlled substance as a class D felony, neglect of a dependent as class D
felony, and two counts of dealing in marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. On
January 19, 2011, Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of dealing in a schedule I
controlled substance as a class B felony and one count of possession of
marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. Jones was sentenced to an aggregate
term of ten years in the Department of Correction (DOC), with four years
suspended to supervised probation. At the time of sentencing Jones was given
one hundred credit days.
[4] On October 25, 2011, Jones filed a petition to modify his sentence to supervised
probation or home detention. The petition was granted on December 21, 2011,
and Jones was ordered to complete the Howard County Community Transition
Program (CTP) before serving 499 executed days on home detention. While
participating in the CTP and on home detention, Jones was on GPS
monitoring. He received 2 sanctions resulting in incarceration for 6 actual days
and a total of 12 credit days. On July 2, 2014 the State filed a petition to
revoke Jones’s suspended sentence because he was terminated from the CTP.
Jones admitted the alleged violations on October 9, 2014, and the court
imposed the remaining 2866 days of his suspended sentence, to be served in the
DOC. Jones received credit time for 282 days spent awaiting the disposition of
the termination and probation revocation and for the 12 days of jail sanctions.
The trial court determined, “he’s not entitled to credit time on CTP, and
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number two, to the extent that he was on a bracelet as a condition of probation,
he’s not entitled to credit time for that either.” Transcript at 12, 3. As a result,
the trial court did not award him any credit time for time spent on home
detention and GPS monitoring. On October 29, 2014, Jones filed a motion to
correct errors, which the trial court denied. Jones now appeals.
[5] Jones argues that the trial court erred in not awarding him credit time for the
time he spent on home detention and GPS monitoring. We agree. We review
the trial court’s factual determinations for an abuse of discretion, and its legal
conclusions de novo. Strowmatt v. State, 779 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the trial court erred
in calculating the credit time. Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997).
[6] With respect to credit for time spent in a community corrections program—
here, in-home detention—a person who is serving a criminal sentence and
placed in such a program is entitled to earn one day of credit time for each day
the person is on home detention, plus any earned credit time. See I.C. § 35–38-
2.6-6(b); Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). That person,
however, may be deprived of earned credit time as provided by rules adopted by
the DOC. See I.C. § 35–38–2.6–6(d). Only the DOC may deprive a community
corrections participant of earned credit time. Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 10, 12
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “the statutes do not authorize trial courts to
deprive offenders of credit time while in a community corrections program”
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and instead the trial court is “authorized only to determine the credit time
earned” by a defendant in such a program).
[7] The State and Jones agree that Jones is entitled to credit time for his time on
home detention and under GPS monitoring. Jones and the State disagree,
however, as to the number of credit-time days to which he is entitled and
whether he is eligible for good-time credit. Jones argues he is eligible for 1028
actual days and 1028 good-time credit days spent on electronic monitoring for
an aggregate of 2056 credit days. The State argues he spent only 875 actual
days on electronic monitoring and home detention and that we must remand
for a determination by the DOC as to whether he is entitled to good-time credit,
and, if so, how many days should be awarded.
[8] Two critical pieces of information are ambiguous in the record. First, it is
unclear whether the DOC made a determination as to whether Jones was
entitled to good-time credit. Second, it is unclear from the record whether the
Howard County Superior Court supervises Community Corrections in Howard
County and thus is entitled to make a determination of good-time credit. If that
were the case, then the trial court would, in theory, be authorized to determine
whether Jones is entitled to good-time credit. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783
(Ind. 2004). We note that Jones admitted to a violation of his in-home
detention and, as such, is subject to a loss of good-time credit. But it is unclear
whether the entity that made the determination to deny Jones credit time in this
case was authorized to do so. Therefore, we remand with instructions to
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identify the entity statutorily authorized to make a credit-time determination
with respect to Jones’s sentence and that said entity make that determination.
[9] We conclude that Jones is entitled to credit for actual time served on in-home
detention and electronic monitoring. We remand with instructions to
determine how much time he actually served and to include any good-time
credit that the appropriate entity determines Jones should receive.
[10] Judgment reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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