IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
CALVIN EUGENE BAKER, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D14-4110
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
___________________________/
Opinion filed May 15, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
William F. Stone, Judge.
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Matthew Pavese and Jennifer J. Moore,
Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
THOMAS, J.
This appeal involves two consolidated circuit court cases. Appellant was
charged with possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana less than 20 grams,
possession of drug paraphernalia, grand theft of an automobile and grand theft.
Appellant seeks review of an order denying his dispositive motion to suppress. We
affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, as we read the plain
language of section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes (2013), to mean that a license
tag’s alphanumeric designation may not be obstructed by any matter, including a
trailer hitch. We certify conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of
Appeal in Harris v. State, 11 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (Khouzam, J.,
dissenting).
Facts
At the hearing on Appellant’s motion, the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Deputy
testified that he observed a vehicle with an obscured license tag and conducted a
traffic stop, but he could not recall specifically what obscured the tag. Estimating
that he was about 25 feet from the vehicle when trying to read the tag, he recalled
that it was illegible, and he incorrectly called it in to dispatch; he had to call it in a
second time, which is when he discovered the vehicle was stolen. He admitted that
he had since watched his patrol car’s in-car video recording, and there was a trailer
hitch blocking the license tag. The deputy thought the trailer hitch was part of
what was blocking the tag, but also thought it had been altered or damaged and this
contributed to his trouble reading the tag. Appellant was placed under arrest after
it was discovered the vehicle was stolen. In searching Appellant after his arrest,
the deputy discovered marijuana, cocaine and a crack pipe. The deputy
acknowledged that the sole basis for pulling Appellant over was the trailer hitch
obstructing the license tag, but maintained that he still thought something else
obstructed the tag, but he could not recall what it was.
2
While acknowledging the Second District’s decision in Harris, the State
asserted that even if the court found that the trailer hitch was the sole object
obscuring the tag and the stop was illegal, the State should still prevail based on
the inevitable discovery doctrine, citing Carter v. State, 868 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2004), for support. In response, Appellant’s counsel argued that Harris
specifically held that a trailer hitch, in and of itself, is an insufficient basis to
obscure a tag. Appellant then argued against the State’s inevitable discovery
position. Although it rejected the State’s argument that some matter other than the
trailer hitch obscured the tag, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress
based upon Carter and the inevitable discovery doctrine.
While this appeal was pending, the Fifth District issued its opinion in State
v. English, 148 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). There, the court held that an
officer had the authority to conduct a traffic stop under the plain reading of section
316.605, Florida Statutes, where the alphanumeric designation was obstructed by
the license tag’s light and attached wires hanging down in front of it.
Analysis
An appellate court reviews a matter of statutory interpretation de novo.
Germany v. Darby, 157 So.3d 521, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Raymond
James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So.3d 186, 190 (Fla.2013)). Section
316.605, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
3
(1) Every vehicle, at all times while driven, stopped, or parked upon
any highways, roads, or streets of this state, shall be licensed in the
name of the owner thereof in accordance with the laws of this state . . .
[and] display the license plate . . . in such manner . . . [that] the
alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free
from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter,
so that they will be plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet
from the rear or front. Except as provided in s. 316.2085(3), vehicle
license plates shall be affixed and displayed in such a manner that the
letters and numerals shall be read from left to right parallel to the
ground. No vehicle license plate may be displayed in an inverted or
reversed position or in such a manner that the letters and
numbers and their proper sequence are not readily identifiable.
Nothing shall be placed upon the face of a Florida plate except as
permitted by law or by rule or regulation of a governmental agency.
. . . A violation of this subsection is a noncriminal traffic infraction,
punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318.
(Emphasis added.) As noted above, the Second and the Fifth District Courts
currently disagree on how this section is interpreted.
In Harris v. State, the defendant appealed his convictions for possession of
cocaine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. 11 So. 3d at 463. Similar to the facts here, the
trailer hitch on the defendant’s vehicle obstructed the license plate so that it could
not be read within thirty to fifty feet of the vehicle. Id. The officers stopped the
defendant based on the obscured license plate, smelled the odor of fresh marijuana
coming from inside the vehicle, and found marijuana in the defendant’s pocket and
cocaine in the glove box. Id.
4
The Second District found that the relevant portion of the statute was as
follows:
[A]ll letters, numerals, printing, writing, and other
identification marks upon the plates regarding the word
“Florida,” the registration decal, and the alphanumeric
designation shall be clear and distinct and free from
defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring
matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at
all times 100 feet from the rear or front.
Id. (quoting § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis in original). The majority held that
the only language that would apply was the phrase “other obscuring matter,” and
concluded that the doctrine of ejusdem generis caused this language to apply only
to matter on the license plate itself: “Pursuant to the ‘ejusdem generis’ canon of
statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of
the same general class as those enumerated. Black's Law Dictionary 514 (6th ed.
1990).” Id. The court found that “a reading of the language in the statute shows
that the license plate must be free from obscuring matter, be it grease, grime, or
some other material placed over the plate. However, it would not include a trailer
hitch that is properly attached to the truck’s bumper.” Id.
The Second District held that “[m]atters external to the tag, such as trailer
hitches, bicycle racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like are not covered by the
5
statute.” Id. at 463-64. The majority opinion concluded by looking to decisions in
other states, noting that it was adopting the minority view:
Although there are no cases on point in Florida, in State v.
Ronau, 2002 WL 31743012 (Ohio Ct.App.2002), the court held that
the trial court did not err in finding that the stop of a truck was
improperly based on the fact that the trailer hitch was blocking a
portion of the license plate. We recognize that Ronau appears to be
the minority position. See People v. White, 93 Cal.App.4th 1022,
1026, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 (Cal.Ct.App.2001) (holding that license
plate that is partially obstructed from view by a trailer hitch violates
law, which provides that plates must be maintained in a condition so
as to be clearly legible, and such violation provided officer with a
lawful basis to stop vehicle); State v. Hill, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139,
147 (N.M.Ct.App.2001) (where law required plate to be “maintained
free from foreign material and in a condition to be clearly legible,”
truck's plate was in violation of law where truck's trailer hitch
obscured plate's renewal sticker); State v. Smail, 2000 WL 1468543
(Ohio Ct.App.2000) (concluding that pursuant to law, which provided
that “license plates ... shall not be covered by any material that
obstructs their visibility,” the middle numbers of a license plate were
not in “plain view” and stop of truck was lawful where license was
obstructed by a ball hitch).
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Judge Khouzam dissented and concluded that there was no need to resort to
rules of statutory construction, as the plain reading of the statute would require the
alphanumeric designation on license plates to be plainly visible and legible at all
times, 100 feet from the rear or the front of the vehicle, which would include items
placed in front of a license plate like trailer hitches. Id. at 464-65. The dissent
asserted that the majority’s interpretation was unreasonable, as it resulted in a
6
situation where items that clearly obscured the plate would not be in violation of
the statute, if the items were not affixed to the license plate itself. Id. In support of
its interpretation, the dissent pointed to the Third District’s opinion in Wright v.
State, 471 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), as instructive, noting that Wright
involved a license plate obscured by a dirty rag and there the court held that the
officer had the authority and even duty to investigate why the license plate was
obscured. Id. The dissent found the trailer hitch analogous, noting that it appeared
that the rag in Wright was not affixed to the face of the license plate. Id.
In State v. English, 148 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), the Fifth District
adopted a similar view as the dissent in Harris. In English, the defendant was
stopped by two police officers after they noticed that the plate light and its attached
wires were hanging down “in front of” the license plate and obstructing the
officers’ views of the plate, rendering at least one letter unreadable. Id. The plate
only became readable momentarily, when the vehicle turned, causing the wires to
shift, but after the turn became obstructed again. Id. Based on the fact that the
plate was unobstructed during the turn, the trial court concluded that once they
were able to read the actual numbers, it was no longer a violation. Id.
The Fifth District reversed and held:
Based on the plain reading of the statute, the alphanumeric
designation on the license plate must be plainly visible at all times.
Here, according to the testimony of the officers, which the trial court
found reliable, English's tag was not in compliance with the statute.
7
As such, the officers had the authority to conduct a traffic stop in this
case. See Wright v. State, 471 So.2d 155, 156–57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
(finding that officer charged with enforcing motor vehicle laws had
the duty and authority to investigate why a vehicle that was parked in
the roadway had its license tag partially obscured with a dirty rag, in
violation of the law). But see Harris v. State, 11 So.3d 462, 463–64
(Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (finding that police officers who were unable to
read defendant's license plate because of a trailer hitch properly
attached to the vehicle lacked authority to perform a traffic stop,
because matters external to the tag, such as trailer hitches, bicycle
racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like were not “other obscuring
matter”).
Id. at 530.
We agree with the Fifth District that the statute is not ambiguous based on
the plain reading of its text. Thus, in our view, we respectfully conclude that the
majority opinion in Harris incorrectly applied a rule of statutory construction,
when the applicable language from the statute was clear and unambiguous. See
Hobbs v. State, 999 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 2008) (“‘[W]hen the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is
no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction;
the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’” (quoting Holly v. Auld,
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).
Our decision that the statute is plain and unambiguous does not rely solely
on the statute’s language requiring the alphanumeric designation to be “clear and
distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter,
8
so that they will be plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet from the rear or
front.” We also read the statute as a whole, which we are required to do, rather
than a single part of the statute. St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d
961, 967 (Fla. 2000) (“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute
must be construed in its entirety and as a whole.”); Fla. Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake
Howell Water & Reclamation Dist., 274 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1973) (“Legislative
intent should be gathered from consideration of the statute as a whole rather than
from any one part thereof.”).
Here, we look to the portion of the statute that the vehicle’s license tag must
be “display[ed] . . . in such manner . . . [that] the alphanumeric designation shall be
clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other
obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at all times
100 feet from the rear or front.” § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). In
our view, the Legislature’s intent could not be more clear: the tag’s alphanumerical
designation must be displayed and visible within 100 feet. This is reiterated in the
statute’s requirement that prohibits the display of tags such that the “letters and
numbers . . . are not readily identifiable.” Id.
We further note that the statutory catchall phrase “other obscuring matter”
does not distinguish from obscuring matter “on” the license tag versus external
matter obscuring the tag. Had the Legislature wanted to draft a statute that only
9
made it illegal to obscure the license tag’s alphanumeric designation by matter that
was “on” the tag, it could have easily done so, as other states have provided.
Instead, the Legislature’s overarching concern is that the alphanumeric designation
be visible and legible within 100 feet.
Appellant asserts that the notion that a license tag obscured by a trailer hitch
could violate the statute is absurd, as the Legislature could not have intended that
every vehicle with a trailer hitch attached to it would be subject to a stop by law
enforcement officers. We disagree, and hold that this plain reading is reasonable,
as the Legislature has a legitimate public-safety interest in ensuring that license
tags remain unobstructed. The Legislature has an interest in ensuring that law
enforcement officers can readily identify license tag numbers. In addition, the
Legislature could have intended that the general public has the ability to identify
license tags, if necessary, to report criminal activity or other important information.
As such, we do not think such a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd
conclusion.
We also find that Florida Supreme Court case law supports this
interpretation. See State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003). In Diaz, the court
addressed a stop that occurred, because the sheriff’s officer could not read the
temporary license tag on the top of the defendant’s rear window. Id. at 436.
10
Notably, in analyzing the issue, the court outlined the difference between the
temporary license tag statute and the permanent license tag statute, stating:
The Florida statute regulating temporary license tags provided:
“Temporary tags shall be conspicuously displayed in the rear license
plate bracket or attached to the inside of the rear window in an upright
position so as to be clearly visible from the rear of the vehicle.”
§ 320.131(4), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). While the
Legislature has required that permanent license plates must be
“plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet from the rear or
front,” § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2000), the Legislature has failed to
mandate a distance at which temporary tags must be fully legible.
Notably, the temporary tag statute does not specifically require that
the expiration date be legible, and it is the State itself which creates
and issues the temporary license tag. See § 320.131(1), (4), Fla. Stat.
(2000).
Id. at 437. This analysis supports an interpretation that the Legislature intended
permanent license tags to be plainly visible within 100 feet.
Other state legislatures have addressed this issue, consistent with our
analysis. Missouri and Texas have taken two different approaches in addressing
external matter obstructing a license tag. In Missouri, one section of the statute
requires a license tag to be plainly visible, but another section specifically provides
that an additional temporary license or a third license needs to be used to serve as
the visible tag when a bicycle rack or other item obstructs the view.
5. No motor vehicle or trailer shall be operated on any highway of this
state unless it shall have displayed thereon the license plate or set of
license plates issued by the director of revenue or the state highways
and transportation commission and authorized by section 301.140*.
Each such plate shall be securely fastened to the motor vehicle or
11
trailer in a manner so that all parts thereof shall be plainly visible
and reasonably clean so that the reflective qualities thereof are
not impaired. Each such plate may be encased in a transparent cover
so long as the plate is plainly visible and its reflective qualities are not
impaired. . . .
§ 301.130, Miss. Rev. Stat. (2014). Additionally, section 301.140, Missouri
Revised Statutes, provides in relevant part:
9. An additional temporary license plate . . . with a configuration that
matches an existing or newly issued plate may be purchased by a
motor vehicle owner to be placed in the interior of the vehicle’s rear
window such that the driver’s view out of the rear window is not
obstructed and the plate configuration is clearly visible from the
outside of the vehicle to serve as the visible plate when a bicycle
rack or other item obstructs the view of the actual plate. . . . The
newly produced . . . plate may only be used on the vehicle with the
matching plate, and the additional plate shall be clearly recognizable
as a third plate and only used for the purpose specified in this
subsection.
(Emphasis added.)
In Texas, the Legislature specifically provided that trailer hitches, bicycle
racks, wheelchair lifts, and other specifically outlined items do not apply to
language on obscuring the visibility of license tags. In particular, section 504.945,
Texas Transportation Code (2013), states:
(A) A person commits an offense if the person attaches to or
displays on a motor vehicle a license plate that:
...
(7) has a coating, covering, protective substance, or other
material that:
(A) distorts angular visibility or detectability;
12
(B) alters or obscures one-half or more of the name of
the state in which the vehicle is registered; or
(C) alters or obscures the letters or numbers of the
license plate number or the color of the plate.
...
(c) Subsection (a)(7) may not be construed to apply to:
(1) a trailer hitch installed on a vehicle in a normal or
customary manner;
(2) a transponder, as defined by Section 228.057, that is
attached to a vehicle in the manner required by the issuing
authority;
(3) a wheelchair lift or wheelchair carrier that is attached to a
vehicle in a normal or customary manner;
(4) a trailer being towed by a vehicle; or
(5) a bicycle or motorcycle rack that is attached to a vehicle in
a normal or customary manner.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the Texas Legislature specifically exempted trailer
hitches and other similar obstructions.
Both Missouri and Texas recognize that the language in relation to obscuring
in their respective statute or code could clearly be read as including trailer hitches,
bicycle racks and similar items; but both states specifically enacted laws that either
specifically allow such obstructions or require persons to provide additional license
tags on the vehicle.
Here, the deputy had a valid basis for the stop, as the trailer hitch obscured a
portion of the alphanumeric designation; thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Appellant’s motion to suppress. As we conclude that the deputy had a valid basis
for the stop based on our interpretation of the statute, we do not address the trial
13
court’s conclusion that even if the stop was illegal, the inevitable discovery
doctrine would apply. We certify that our decision interpreting this statute is in
conflict with the Second District’s decision in Harris v. State, 11 So. 3d 462 (Fla.
2d DCA 2009).
AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
LEWIS, C.J., and BENTON, J., CONCUR.
14