J-S31017-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.H.M.T., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
v.
APPEAL OF: A.M.H., MOTHER
No. 1971 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered October 20, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County,
Civil Division at No(s): CP-14-DP-0000029-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, and WECHT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2015
A.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s order denying her
motion to transfer dependency proceeding to Ohio. We affirm.
The trial court recounted the pertinent facts and procedural history as
follows:
[Mother] is the biological mother of a minor child,
L.H.M.T., [(“the child”),] who was born on September 18,
2014. W.T. (“Father”) is the biological father of the child.
CYS has a long history with both parties, most recently
involving their daughter T.H.R.M.T. (D.O.B. May 25, 2010)
who was declared dependent in 2012. [Mother]
additionally has two older children, G.E.B. and C.A.B., who
are not in her custody.
CYS most recently became involved with the family on
July 5, 2012 after [Mother] was involved in a car accident
while she was driving with T.H.R.M.T. in her car. [Mother]
was suspected of being under the influence at that time,
which she claimed was related to her use of prescribed
Methadone as a result of her on-going recovery from her
heroin addiction. On July 19, 2012, CYS conducted an
unannounced home visit with [Mother], Father and
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T.H.R.M.T. At the time of the visit, [Mother] was visibly
intoxicated and unable to care for her daughter. [Mother]
indicated that Father had recently used heroin and had
held a gun to her head on the evening of July 18, 2012.
Due to these events, on July 20, 2012, the Court granted
CYS’s dependency petition and ordered that T.H.R.M.T.
remain in foster care until a dependency hearing. A
dependency hearing was held on August 1, 2012 and
T.H.R.M.T. was declared dependent under the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Act at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. On
October 14, 2013, after a review hearing, the Court
ordered that T.H.R.M.T.’s placement goal be changed from
“Return Home” to “Long-Term Foster Care” due to the
parents’ failure to progress toward alleviating the
circumstances that necessitated the original placement.
Reunification services were terminated by the Court on
November 5, 2013, and the Superior Court ultimately
affirmed the decision after Mother appealed.
On June 9, 2014, CYS was informed that [Mother] was
pregnant with her fourth child. The referral source
indicated concerns regarding lack of prenatal care, poor
hygiene, and [Mother’s] long history with CYS. CYS
attempted to contact [Mother] numerous times but was
unable to do so. On July 17, 2014, prior to a visit with
T.H.R.M.T., a CYS caseworker attempted to interview
[Mother] about her pregnancy but she was uncooperative.
On August 20, 2014, CYS obtained information that
[Mother] continued to reside in Centre County and Father
was the biological father of the unborn baby.
On September 17, 2014, CYS received information that
[Mother] was scheduled to be induced at Doctors Hospital
in Columbus, Ohio. At the time of her admission to the
hospital, she confirmed that her address was 316 Park
Avenue, Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, 16823. [The child] was
born on September 18, 2014. Due to [Mother] confirming
her residence at that time as Centre County, the Franklin
County, Ohio, Children and Youth Services Office refused
to accept jurisdiction. CYS then obtained an emergency
custody order for the placement of [the child]. On
September 19, 2014, [Mother] refused to identify [the
child’s] father despite the fact that Father was present for
the birth. On September 20, 2014, [the child] began to
experience symptoms of opiate withdrawal.
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The Court held a hearing on October 2, 2014, at which
time counsel for both parents orally objected to
jurisdiction.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 1-3.
By order entered October 20, 2014, the trial court denied the parties’
oral motion to transfer jurisdiction. After an October 30, 2014 hearing, the
trial court issued an order adjudicating the child to be dependent pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. This timely appeal
followed.1 Both Mother and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
Mother raises a single issue for our review:
I. Did the [trial] court err by refusing to transfer
dependency proceedings to Ohio, where jurisdiction
properly lies?
Mother’s Brief at 4.
Pennsylvania’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) includes dependency proceedings within the
definition of a “child custody proceeding.” See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5402. Our
standard of review is well settled:
A court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.
____________________________________________
1
Although Father also filed a timely appeal, on April 20, 2015, we granted
his request to withdraw and discontinue it. See In the Interest of
L.H.M.T., a Minor, No. 1972 MDA 2014.
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Under Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs
when the court has overridden or misapplied the law, when
its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when there is
insufficient evidence of record to support the court’s
findings. An abuse of discretion requires clear and
convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law
or failed to follow proper procedures.
Wagner v. Wagner, 887 A.2d 282, 285 (Pa. Super. 2005).
In support of her appeal, Mother provides the following single-
paragraph argument:
Pursuant to Section 3130.41(2)(i) of Title 55, 55 Pa.
Code § 3130.41(2)(1), the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children controls in situations of interstate
transfer. Specifically, it is mandated that a county agency
apply for and receive approval from the receiving state
prior to sending a child to placement in another state.
Said approval process is to be initiated through the
Interstate Office of the Department. No such approval
process was completed, or even initiated, in the instant
matter. [CYS] removed [the child] from her home state of
Ohio without any authority to do so. The trial court notes
in its [PA.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion] that “CYS presented
evidence showing that [the child] resides in Pennsylvania.”
[Mother] maintains that [the child] resides in Pennsylvania
due only to an unlawful transfer.
Mother’s Brief at 7.
The trial court rejected Mother’s claim and explained that it properly
exercised jurisdiction:
The Court determined after a hearing that it had
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 6321 of the Juvenile Act.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6321. CYS presented evidence showing
that [the child] resides in Pennsylvania. [The child’s]
address was identified as the Bellefonte, Pennsylvania
address. [Mother] paid for the medical expenses
associated with the birth of her child through [the]
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Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare Benefits. CYS
workers contacted Franklin County, Ohio [CYS], who
confirmed that Centre County [CYS] had jurisdiction over
the child. As of the hearing held October 30, 2014,
[Mother] continued to receive drug addiction treatment in
State College and worked at Denny’s in State College.
Additionally, [Mother] eventually informed CYS that Father
is [the child’s] biological father. He told CYS that they
could use his mother’s address in Ohio for all mail, but
mail that CYS sent to that address was returned.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 3. Our review of the certified record
supports the trial court’s jurisdictional determination.
Mother’s reliance on Section 3130.41(2)(i) of Title 55 of the
Pennsylvania Code section is inapt. Section 761 of the Pennsylvania Public
Code, the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”), is
implemented under the pertinent Pennsylvania Code provisions, including
Section 3130.41. The history leading to the enactment of the ICPC has been
summarized:
In the 1950’s [sic] social service administrators from
several states explored common problems arising from the
interstate care and placement of children in foster care or
adoptive homes. Three difficulties were noted: (1) the
failure of importation and exportation statutes to provide
protection for children moved interstate; (2) the territorial
limitations of a state’s jurisdiction and the powerlessness
of a sending state to ensure proper care and supervision in
the receiving state; [and] (3) the absence of a means to
compel the receiving state to provide services in support of
placement for foster care and adoption.
In 1960 the Council of State Governments proposed
adoption of an Interstate Compact. This vehicle was
recommended because when a child was sent out of state,
that state of origin lost jurisdiction over the child and
supervision became difficult or impossible. Through a
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compact the authority of participating states would be
extended beyond their borders. In outlining the suggested
program, the Council explained, “The compact provides
procedures for the interstate placement of children (either
by public agencies or by a private person or agencies)
when such placement is for foster care or as a preliminary
to possible adoption.”
As drafted, the [ICPC] provides for notification of
appropriate state or local authorities in the receiving state
before placement by out-of-state persons and agencies.
The authorities in the receiving state are given the
opportunity to investigate and, if satisfied, must notify the
sending state that the proposed placement does not
appear to be contrary to the child’s best interest. After a
placement has been made, the sending state continues to
have financial responsibility for support and retains
jurisdiction over the child.
McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479-480 (3d Cir. 1991).
Here, there was no “interstate transfer,” because Ohio – the alleged
“sending state” – refused to exercise jurisdiction over the child based on
evidence of Mother’s Pennsylvania residency. Mother claims that Ohio is the
child’s “home state” because “[the child] was born in Ohio. [Father] had
been living in Ohio for quite some time, and [Mother] recently had moved
there.” Mother’s Brief at 5. The trial court rejected this assertion and
instead credited the ample evidence that refuted Mother’s jurisdictional
claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/14, at 5. Because our review of the
certified record supports the trial court’s factual conclusions, we cannot
disturb this determination. See In the Interest of C.R., 111 A.3d 179,
182 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that the applicable “standard of review in
dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact
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and credibility of the trial court if they are supported by the record”)
(citation omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order regarding
jurisdiction in this dependency proceeding.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/29/2015
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