Jun 12 2015, 5:44 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jonathan D. Harwell Gregory F. Zoeller
Harwell Legal Counsel, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
K.S., June 12, 2015
Appellant-Claimant, Court of Appeals Case No.
93A02-1409-EX-630
v. Appeal from the Review Board of the
Department of Workforce
Development
Review Board of the Indiana
The Honorable Steven F. Bier,
Department of Workforce Chairperson
Development,
Case No. 14-R-1477
Appellee.
Mathias, Judge.
[1] K.S. appeals the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Department of
Workforce Development (“the Board”) denying his claim for unemployment
benefits. K.S. argues that he is eligible for unemployment benefits because he
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voluntarily left his employment for medical reasons and to deal with an issue of
domestic violence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] For almost nine years, K.S. was employed by Covance Central Laboratory
Services (“CCLS”). On April 30, 2014, he voluntarily left his employment due
to medical reasons and family issues.
[4] K.S. suffers from low back and hip pain and has periodically sought medical
treatment for his condition. The cause of K.S.’s low back pain is not known.
K.S. believed that CCLS was aware of his low back pain because he requested
and eventually received a new chair. However, K.S.’s physician did not place
him on any medical restrictions while K.S. was employed by CCLS.
[5] In addition, K.S.’s son was incarcerated on felony charges but was released
from jail shortly before K.S. terminated his employment. K.S. believed his son
was dangerous to himself and others. K.S. asked CCLS for a change of shift so
that K.S. could stay at home during the day with his son. CCLS never
responded to K.S.’s request for a shift change.
[6] After voluntarily terminating his employment, K.S. filed a claim for
unemployment benefits. A claims deputy made an initial determination that
K.S. was ineligible for benefits because he left his employment without good
cause. K.S. filed an appeal disputing the claims deputy’s finding. A telephonic
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hearing was held on July 23, 2014, and K.S. appeared pro se. CCLS did not
participate in the hearing.
[7] At the hearing on his unemployment claim, K.S. testified that his medical
condition was his primary reason for voluntarily leaving his employment. Also,
K.S. never informed CCLS that he would have to terminate his employment if
he did not receive his requested shift change.
[8] Two days after the hearing, the administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) issued a
decision affirming the claims deputy’s ineligibility determination. The ALJ
found that K.S. “never provided his employer any medical documentation to
show that he had a medical condition that caused interference with his work
environment” and that K.S.’s physician “did not place [K.S.] on any medical
restrictions during his employment” with CCLS. Appellant’s App. pp. 2-3. The
ALJ also implicitly found that K.S.’s family issue did not fall under the “good
cause” exception. K.S. appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board, and the Board
affirmed the decision on August 15, 2014. K.S. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Decisions made by the Review Board are subject to review for legal error, but
questions of fact determined by the Review Board are conclusive and binding.
Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(a). A challenge to a Review Board decision allows
inquiry into “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision and the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” I.C. § 22-4-17-12(f).
Our standard of review has three layers: “(1) findings of basic fact are reviewed
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for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact—
ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are
reviewed for correctness.” Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 958
N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011). We may neither reweigh the evidence nor
assess witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence most favorable to
the Review Board’s findings. McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev.,
693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind. 1998).
[10] The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to provide
unemployment benefits to individuals who are “unemployed through no fault
of their own.” Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1. Therefore, an individual who voluntarily
leaves his employment without good cause in connection with the work is
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Ind. Code §
22-4-15-1(a) (Emphasis added). However, K.S. argues he is eligible for benefits
under the exception listed in Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(c)(8), which
provides that “[a]n individual shall not be subject to disqualification if the
individual voluntarily left employment or was discharged due to circumstances
directly caused by domestic or family violence (as defined in IC 31-9-2-42).”1
1
Also, “[t]o verify that domestic or family violence has occurred, an individual who applies for benefits
under subsection (c)(8) shall provide one (1) of the following:”
(1) A report of a law enforcement agency (as defined in IC 10-13-3-10).
(2) A protection order issued under IC 34-26-5.
(3) A foreign protection order (as defined in IC 34-6-2-48.5).
(4) An affidavit from a domestic violence service provider verifying services provided to
the individual by the domestic violence service provider.
Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(e). K.S. did not provide a copy of his son’s arrest warrant or charging
information to his employer, and therefore, the ALJ declined to admit the documents into
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[11] At the hearing, K.S. testified that his son had been arrested, was “detoxing and
going through some major stuff.” Tr. p. 11. He stated that he was worried for
himself, his son, people with whom he worked, and “anybody else ‘cause he
had referred that he might be dangerous and I wanted to be around him during
the time he was awake so I could make sure nobody was injured[.]” Tr. p. 12.
[12] This evidence is insufficient to prove that K.S. voluntarily left employment or
was discharged due to circumstances directly caused by domestic or family
violence. K.S. simply speculated that his son might be dangerous to himself or
others, and he did not present any evidence of an act of domestic or family
violence as it is defined in Indiana Code section 31-9-2-42.2 Importantly, K.S.
also testified that his primary reason for termination his employment with
evidence. K.S. argues that the ALJ erred when it refused to admit the documents because his
employer declined to participate in the hearing. We need not address this issue given our
conclusion that K.S. was merely speculating that his son might commit an act of domestic or
family violence. Moreover, we observe that nothing in the record indicates that K.S.’s son was
charged with a “domestic or family violence” crime.
2
Indiana Code section 31-9-2-42 provides that
“Domestic or family violence” means, except for an act of self defense, the occurrence of
one (1) or more of the following acts committed by a family or household member:
(1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or causing physical harm to another family
or household member without legal justification.
(2) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm without legal
justification.
(3) Causing a family or household member to involuntarily engage in sexual activity by
force, threat of force, or duress.
(4) Beating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5(2)), torturing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5(5)),
mutilating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5(3)), or killing a vertebrate animal without
justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or
household member.
For purposes of IC 22-4-15-1 and IC 34-26-5, domestic or family violence also includes
stalking (as defined in IC 35-45-10-1) or a sex offense under IC 35-42-4, whether or not the
stalking or sex offense is committed by a family or household member.
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CCLS was his back and hip pain. K.S. stated he would not have quit his job if
he was only dealing with his family issues. Tr. p. 5. We therefore conclude that
the evidence was insufficient to establish that K.S. voluntarily left employment
“due to circumstances directly caused by domestic or family violence.” See I.C.
§ 22-4-15-1(c)(8).
[13] K.S. also argues that he is eligible for benefits because he voluntarily left his
employment due to a physical disability. Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(c)(2)
provides:
An individual whose unemployment is the result of medically
substantiated physical disability and who is involuntarily
unemployed after having made reasonable efforts to maintain the
employment relationship shall not be subject to disqualification
under this section for such separation.
[14] In other words, an individual will not be disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits if he can show that he is unemployed because of a
medically substantiated physical disability and made reasonable efforts to
maintain the employment relationship. A claimant must satisfy both of these
prongs to be eligible for benefits under Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(c)(2).
[15] K.S. periodically sought medical treatment to alleviate his back pain but did not
know what caused the pain. K.S. did not provide any documentation of a
physical disability to CCLS before he voluntarily terminated his employment.3
3
The ALJ concluded that K.S. failed to demonstrate that his unemployment was a result of a medically
substantiated physical disability because he “never provided his employer any documentation of his physical
medical condition.” Appellant’s App. p.4. However, our court has held that written documentation is not
required to prove a physical disability. See Y.G. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Development, 936 N.E.2d
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Importantly, K.S.’s physician did not impose any medical restrictions on him
during his period of employment with CCLS. Also, K.S. did not present any
evidence that would lead to a reasonable inference that his low back pain
prevented him from performing his job.
[16] K.S. claims that CCLS was aware of his low back pain, and he requested a new
chair because his pain. K.S. also stated that he requested a new shift so that he
could get up to walk more frequently to alleviate his hip and back pain.
However, the written requests K.S. sent to his manager requested shift changes
because of his family issues and made no mention of a medical condition. K.S.
did not inform CCLS that he would need to terminate his employment if his
shift change request was denied, and he did not request a leave of absence
under either CCLS’s leave of absence policy or the Family Medical Leave Act.
[17] Under these facts and circumstances, even if we assume that K.S. proved that
his back and hip pain was a physical disability, the evidence was insufficient to
prove that K.S. was unemployed as the result of a medically substantiated
physical disability or that he made reasonable efforts to maintain the
employment relationship. We therefore affirm the Board’s determination that
K.S. is not eligible for benefits under the exceptions enumerated in Indiana
Code section 22-4-15-1(c)(2).
312, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Goldman v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 440 N.E.2d 734,
736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)). Although a physician’s statement is not necessary to prove a physical disability, it
does protect the employee from “the risk of his employer misunderstanding his problem and limitations or
the risk of inadequately or inaccurately communicating them to the employer.” The ALJ’s error does not
require reversal in this case because nothing in the record indicates that K.S. made reasonable efforts to
maintain the employment relationship.
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[18] Affirmed.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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