UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4747
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHANCE CHRISTIAN KENNEDY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00127-CCE-1)
Submitted: June 19, 2015 Decided: July 2, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Anand P.
Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chance Christian Kennedy appeals the 240-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to transportation of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012). On
appeal, Kennedy challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a
“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Where, as here, no significant
procedural error is alleged, we examine the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. The sentence must
be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the
goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). We
presume on appeal that a within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d
295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). The
defendant bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by showing
that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Kennedy first asserts that we should not apply the
presumption of reasonableness to sentences for child pornography
offenses, as the child pornography Sentencing Guidelines did not
result from the Sentencing Commission’s typical empirical
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approach, but instead are the result of Congressional
intervention designed to increase penalties applicable to child
pornography offenses. This argument amounts to a policy attack
on the relevant Guidelines, which we have previously rejected.
United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2012);
accord United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 367
(5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, although district courts are
authorized to disagree with Guidelines on policy grounds and to
adjust sentences accordingly, “we will not second-guess their
decisions under a more lenient standard simply because the
particular Guideline is not empirically-based”).
Kennedy also argues that, notwithstanding any presumption
of reasonableness applied to his sentence, the sentence is
greater than necessary to meet the statutory goals of
sentencing. Kennedy focuses on his own youth, developmental and
learning disabilities, and lack of prior criminal history in
asserting that a more lenient sentence was required. However,
the district court considered these factors in fashioning its
sentence, ultimately concluding that a sentence below the
Guidelines range was inappropriate given the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the need to reflect its
seriousness, to provide just punishment, and to protect the
public. The court observed that Kennedy’s offense was
particularly serious given the number of victims and images
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involved, Kennedy’s failure to be deterred by contact with law
enforcement, and his “striking” cruelty and exploitation of his
victims. In view of these valid considerations, we conclude
Kennedy fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his sentence.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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