FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, No. 13-16123
STATE OF HAWAII,
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00438-LEK-
Plaintiff - Appellee, BMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PATRICK P.; GORDEAN L.-W.;
THOMAS W.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 18, 2015
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: TASHIMA, N.R. SMITH, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Defendants-Appellants Patrick P., Gordean L.-W., and Thomas W.
(Patrick’s mother and step-father, respectively) appeal the district court’s reversal
of the Administrative Hearing Officer’s (“AHO”) decision. The AHO had
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
concluded that Patrick was eligible for special education services under the
Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1450.
Patrick challenges the district court’s decision in two ways. First, Patrick alleges
that the district court did not provide the AHO with the appropriate level of
deference. Second, Patrick contends that the district court erred by determining
that Patrick was not eligible for special education benefits under the IDEA. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. When a district court reviews an AHO’s determination concerning a
student’s eligibility under the IDEA, the district court is to “read the administrative
record, consider the new evidence, and make an independent judgment based on a
preponderance of evidence and giving due weight to the hearing officer’s
determinations.” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 892
(9th Cir. 1995). To give “due weight,” the district court “must consider the
[AHO’s] findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer’s
resolution of each material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to
accept or reject the findings in part or in whole.” Michael P. v. Dep’t of Educ., 656
F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2011). Ultimately, “[h]ow much deference to give state
educational agencies, however, is a matter for the discretion of the courts.” J.W. ex
2
rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving the AHO’s decision
only minimal deference. A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its
decision “on an inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”
C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2015). The
district court applied the correct legal standard and found that the AHO’s decision
was not sufficiently “thorough and careful” to warrant more than minimal
deference. The district court spent a significant portion of its decision responding
to the AHO’s findings and conclusions regarding Ms. Hui’s classroom
observations. After carefully considering the AHO’s findings, the district court
was “free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole.” Michael P., 656
F.3d at 1066. Although the district court could have explained more thoroughly its
finding that the AHO “glosse[d] over considerable factual testimony that
contradicts [its] findings,” the finding is not clearly erroneous. Because the district
court applied the correct law and did not rely on a clearly erroneous finding of fact,
we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the AHO’s
conclusions regarding Ms. Hui’s classroom observations and by providing the
AHO’s decision only minimal deference.
3
2. After finding that the AHO’s decision warranted only minimal deference,
the district court was to “make an independent judgment based on a preponderance
of evidence.” Wartenberg, 59 F.3d at 892. We review a district court’s findings of
fact in IDEA cases for clear error, and review its conclusions of law de novo.
Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56-58 (2005). The
district court did not err by concluding that Patrick was not eligible for special
education benefits under the specific learning disability classification.
[A] child will be deemed eligible for special education under the
“specific learning disability” classification if she satisfies two sets of
criteria. First, the child must demonstrate either (1) inadequate
achievement, or (2) a severe discrepancy between achievement and
ability. Second, the child must demonstrate either (1) insufficient
progress, or (2) a pattern of strengths or weaknesses in performance
consistent with a “specific learning disability.”
Michael P., 656 F.3d at 1069 (citations omitted). In the proceedings before the
district court, the Hawaii Department of Education (“DOE”) bore the burden to
show that Patrick did not meet the eligibility criteria. See L.M. v. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009). To show that Patrick was
achieving adequately and did not demonstrate a severe discrepancy between
achievement and ability (as required by the first set of criteria), the DOE presented
evidence that (1) Patrick performed well in his classroom and was generally
4
engaged with his classes, (2) he was receiving good grades at the private school
and had done so through subsequent semesters, and (3) he was receiving only “tier
one” accommodations (or those accommodations that may be provided to all
students, both general and special education) at his private school. The district
court relied on this evidence and found that Patrick failed to satisfy the first prong
of the eligibility analysis, and was therefore not eligible for special education
benefits under the IDEA. These findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and
the district court did not err in applying those facts to the eligibility requirements.
AFFIRMED.
5