An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedu re.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-348
Filed: 20 October 2015
Ashe County, Nos. 14 JA 6–9
IN THE MATTER OF: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., and S.J.
Appeal by respondent-parents from Orders filed 30 October 2014 and 13
January 2015 by Judge Jeanie Houston in Ashe County District Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 5 October 2015.
Grier J. Hurley for petitioner-appellee Ashe County Department of Social
Services.
Assistant Appellate Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek for respondent-appellant
mother.
Michael E. Casterline for respondent-appellant father.
EVERETT GASKINS HANCOCK LLP, by James M. Hash, for guardian ad
litem.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent-parents appeal from adjudication and disposition orders
adjudicating their children, T.W.B. (Tommy), S.J.B. (Susan), T.J.B. (Teddy), and S.J.
IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
(Sammy), to be neglected juveniles.1 The court also adjudicated Tommy, Susan, and
Teddy to be abused juveniles and ceased reunification efforts with both respondents.
We find no error.
I. Background
The Ashe County Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved with
respondents and their children after receiving a report on 19 January 2014 of
domestic violence in the home, for which respondent-father was arrested.
Subsequent investigation by DSS uncovered a history of physical violence between
respondents in the presence of their children, and that respondent-father physically
and sexually abused Tommy, Susan, and Teddy. While in jail awaiting trial,
respondent-father contacted respondent-mother and told her to have the children
recant their accusations. Respondent-mother attempted to get the children to change
their stories and allowed respondent-father to talk to the children in an effort to have
them recant. Respondent-mother was subsequently arrested and charged with
intimidating a witness and obstruction of justice. After allegations surfaced that
respondent-mother was involved in the sexual abuse of the children, she was also
charged with child abuse and committing a sexual offense with a child.
On 31 January 2014, DSS filed petitions alleging all four children were
neglected and abused juveniles and obtained non-secure custody of the children.
1
Respondent-father is the stepfather of Tommy, Susan, and Teddy, and the biological father
of Sammy.
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
After a hearing on 26 September 2014, the trial court entered an adjudication order
in which it concluded that all four children were neglected juveniles and that Tommy,
Susan, and Teddy were abused juveniles. The court continued the matter and held a
dispositional hearing on 17 December 2014. In its subsequent disposition order, filed
13 January 2015, the trial court continued custody of the children with DSS and
ceased further efforts toward reunification of the children with respondents. The
court further found that both respondents had been incarcerated for several months
and should not be permitted visitation with the children. Respondents appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Respondent-Father’s Appeal
Respondent-father’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
concluding that Tommy, Susan, and Teddy were abused juveniles under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-101(1)(d). Specifically, respondent-father maintains that the court failed
to find sufficient ultimate facts to establish that he committed, permitted, or
encouraged the commission of one of the twenty different sexual offenses listed in
section 7B-101(1)(d). Respondent-father concedes that the trial court’s findings of
fact would support “charges” for some of the offenses listed in section 7B-101(1)(d),
but argues that without an ultimate finding of fact as to which of the offenses he
committed, this Court cannot determine whether the trial court’s findings support its
conclusion of abuse. We disagree.
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
An “abused juvenile” is defined to include
[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker:
....
d. Commits, permits, or encourages the commission of a
violation of the following laws by, with, or upon the
juvenile: first-degree rape, as provided in G.S. 14-27.2; rape
of a child by an adult offender, as provided in G.S. 14-
27.2A; second degree rape as provided in G.S. 14-27.3; first-
degree sexual offense, as provided in G.S. 14-27.4; sexual
offense with a child by an adult offender, as provided in
G.S. 14-27.4A; second degree sexual offense, as provided in
G.S. 14-27.5; sexual act by a custodian, as provided in G.S.
14-27.7; unlawful sale, surrender, or purchase of a minor,
as provided in G.S. 14-43.14; crime against nature, as
provided in G.S. 14-177; incest, as provided in G.S. 14-178;
preparation of obscene photographs, slides, or motion
pictures of the juvenile, as provided in G.S. 14-190.5;
employing or permitting the juvenile to assist in a violation
of the obscenity laws as provided in G.S. 14-190.6;
dissemination of obscene material to the juvenile as
provided in G.S. 14-190.7 and G.S. 14-190.8; displaying or
disseminating material harmful to the juvenile as provided
in G.S. 14-190.14 and G.S. 14-190.15; first and second
degree sexual exploitation of the juvenile as provided in
G.S. 14-190.16 and G.S. 14-190.17; promoting the
prostitution of the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-205.3(b);
and taking indecent liberties with the juvenile, as provided
in G.S. 14-202.1;
....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)(d) (2013). Contrary to respondent-father’s argument, this
Court is capable of determining whether his acts, as found by the trial court,
constitute sexual abuse on Tommy, Susan, and Teddy as defined by section 7B-
101(d)(1). Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s findings of fact
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
in juvenile orders need only “embrace the substance” of the statutory provisions at
issue, and that the court need not make ultimate findings of fact that align with the
specific language used in the statute. In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 169, 752 S.E.2d
453, 456 (2013).
Here, the trial court’s findings of fact detail numerous instances of sexual
abuse of the three children that, as respondent-father does not contest, constitute
violations of offenses listed in section 7B-101(1)(d). Respondent-father does not
challenge any of the court’s findings of fact, and they are binding on appeal. Koufman
v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Accordingly, we hold the
trial court’s failure to specifically state which offenses listed in section 7B-101(1)(d)
it found were committed by respondent-father in its adjudication of abuse is not
reversible error. The court’s findings of fact are sufficient to support its conclusion
that Tommy, Susan, and Teddy are abused juveniles pursuant to section 7B-
101(1)(d).
B. Respondent-Mother’s Appeal
Respondent-mother first argues that the trial court erred in ceasing
reunification efforts because it failed to make the necessary ultimate findings of fact
to support its conclusion. Respondent-mother also argues that the court erred in
finding reunification efforts would be futile and inconsistent with the children’s
health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable time.
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
The North Carolina Juvenile Code provides that a trial court
may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for
placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall
cease if the court makes written findings of fact that:
(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be
inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and
need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable
period of time;
....
N.C. Gen. Stat § 7B-507(b)(1) (2013). When the court ceases reasonable efforts
toward reunification of the juveniles with their parents,
[its] order must make clear that the trial court considered
the evidence in light of whether reunification would be
futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health,
safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a
reasonable period of time. The trial court’s written
findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not
quote its exact language.
In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 167–68, 752 S.E.2d at 455 (quotation marks omitted). Our
review of an order ceasing reunification efforts “is limited to whether there is
competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether the
findings support the conclusions of law.” Id. at 168, 752 S.E.2d at 455.
In its order, the trial court made the following findings of fact in support of its
decision to cease reunification efforts with respondent-mother:
9. [Respondent-mother] is currently incarcerated in the
Ashe County Jail awaiting trial. She has been in jail since
May 2014 and does not expect to have her trial prior to
March 2015.
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
10. Prior to going to jail [respondent-mother] entered a
Family Service Case Plan to participate in parenting
classes to improve her parenting skills, have a mental
health assessment, gain employment and stable housing.
[Respondent-mother] made progress on her Case Plan—
she participated in parenting classes, had a mental health
assessment and began counseling as recommended,
obtained employment at Hardees’s [sic] restaurant, and
was living at the safe home due to threats from
[respondent-father’s] family.
11. The children have had two visits with [respondent-
mother] since January 31, 2014. The children’s therapists
and Dr. Nancy Joyce who conducted the psychological
evaluations of the children recommended there be no visits
with [respondent-mother].
12. [Respondent-mother] has written letters, sent
guidelines for the children’s teachers and drawn pictures
for the younger children.
....
17. Reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement
would clearly be futile and would be inconsistent with the
children’s health, safety and need for a safe permanent
home within a reasonable time. The children will have
been in non-secure custody and foster care for 12 months
as of January 31, 2015 . . . and [respondent-mother] is not
expected to have her trial nor be released from jail until
March 2015 at the earliest. The children are in need of a
permanent home.
Respondent-mother does not challenge these findings, and they are binding on
appeal. Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731. Additionally, the trial court
considered and incorporated into its order reports prepared by DSS and the children’s
guardian ad litem.
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
Respondent-mother’s argument that the trial court failed to make sufficient
ultimate findings of fact regarding reunification efforts with her children ignores our
Supreme Court’s holding that the trial court’s findings need only “embrace the
substance” of the statutory provisions. In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 169, 752 S.E.2d at
456. Similarly, we cannot agree with respondent-mother that her initial progress on
her Family Services Case Plan shows that reunification efforts would not be futile or
inconsistent with the children’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home
within a reasonable time. While respondent-mother initially made some efforts
toward fulfilling her Family Services Case Plan, her efforts are overshadowed by her
actions that led to her arrest for multiple criminal offenses against her children.
Respondent-mother attempted to convince the children to recant their accusations
regarding their sexual abuse by respondent-father so that he could be released from
jail, causing her to be arrested on charges of intimidating witnesses and obstruction
of justice. Further investigation into the sexual abuse of the children revealed
evidence that respondent-mother was involved in the abuse. Moreover, the evidence
before the trial court established that her next court date regarding her criminal
charges was in March 2015, but there is no evidence that her charges would be
resolved at that hearing, or that any resolution of the charges would not lead to
further time in prison.
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
The trial court made specific findings concerning respondent-mother’s acts
against her children, her support for respondent-father to the detriment of her
children, and the lack of certainty that her criminal charges would be resolved in the
near future. The trial court also incorporated into its order the information from the
DSS and guardian ad litem reports. The findings of fact make clear that the court
considered the evidence before it determined that reunification would be futile or
inconsistent with the children’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home
within a reasonable period of time. We conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact
in its disposition order support its conclusion that reunification efforts should cease.
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that visits with her were contrary to the children’s best interests. The
court’s unchallenged findings, however, establish that the children’s therapists and
the doctor who conducted psychological evaluations of the children all recommended
that there be no visits with respondent-mother. These recommendations, coupled
with respondent-mother’s incarceration on charges of intimidating a witness,
obstruction of justice, child abuse, and for committing a sexual offense with a child,
fully support the court’s decision to not permit respondent-mother visitation with the
children. We find no abuse of discretion.
III. Conclusion
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IN RE: T.W.B., S.J.B., T.J.B., AND S.J.
Opinion of the Court
The trial court’s findings of fact in its adjudication order support its conclusion
that Tommy, Susan, and Teddy are abused juveniles. The trial court’s findings of fact
in its disposition order also fully support its conclusion to cease reunification efforts
with respondent-parents, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to
not permit respondent-parents visitation with the children. The trial court’s
adjudication and disposition orders are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges DILLON and DIETZ concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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