NO. 4-07-0491 Filed 3/11/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: ALFRED H.H., a Person Found ) Appeal from
Subject to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 07MH305
v. )
ALFRED H.H., )
Respondent-Appellant. ) Honorable
) George H. Ray,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a May 2007 hearing, the trial court found
respondent, Alfred H.H., subject to involuntary admission at a
mental-health facility (405 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 2006)).
Respondent appeals, arguing that the following findings
by the trial court were against the manifest weight of the
evidence: (1) his involuntary admission was warranted, and (2)
his hospitalization was the least-restrictive treatment alterna-
tive. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
In early May 2007, respondent was involuntarily admit-
ted to McFarland Mental Health Center. Following a hearing on
the involuntary-admission petition, which was held later in May
2007, the trial court found respondent subject to involuntary
admission at McFarland for a period not to exceed 90 days.
This appeal followed.
II. MOOTNESS
A. The Mootness Doctrine in General
This appeal is moot. The underlying judgment, entered
by the trial court on May 11, 2007, was limited to 90 days, which
have passed.
An issue raised in an otherwise moot appeal may be
addressed when (1) the immediacy or magnitude of the interests
involved in the case warrants the reviewing court's action or (2)
"'the issue is "'likely to recur but unlikely to last long enough
to allow appellate review to take place because of the intrinsi-
cally short-lived nature of the controversies.'"' [Citations.]"
Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 392, 876 N.E.2d 650, 657
(2007).
The first exception to the mootness doctrine, known as
the public-interest exception, applies only if a clear showing
exists that (1) the question at issue is of "a substantial public
nature," (2) an authoritative determination is needed to guide
public officers in the performance of their duties, and (3) the
circumstances are likely to recur in other cases. Felzak, 226
Ill. 2d at 393, 876 N.E.2d at 658; In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338,
350, 851 N.E.2d 1, 8 (2006). The public-interest exception must
be "narrowly construed and requires a clear showing of each
- 2 -
criterion." Felzak, 226 Ill. 2d at 393, 876 N.E.2d at 658.
The second exception to the mootness doctrine (the
capable-of-repetition exception) applies only if (1) the chal-
lenged action is of such short duration that it cannot be fully
litigated prior to its cessation and (2) a reasonable expectation
exists that the same complaining party would be subject to the
same action again. Like the public-interest exception, the
capable-of-repetition exception must be narrowly construed and
requires a clear showing of each criterion. J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at
350, 851 N.E.2d at 8.
Our supreme court has held that "[i]t is a basic tenet
of justiciability that reviewing courts will not decide moot or
abstract questions or render advisory opinions." J.T., 221 Ill.
2d at 349, 851 N.E.2d at 7. In In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d
482, 492, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559-60 (1998), our supreme court
explicitly declined to consider whether an exception to the
mootness doctrine automatically exists in mental-health cases
and, instead, concluded that the case fell into an established
exception to the mootness doctrine. More recently, in a mental-
health case, our supreme court determined whether the case was
moot by analyzing it under established exceptions to the mootness
doctrine, not based simply on the fact that it was a mental-
health case. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45-46, 820 N.E.2d
424, 433-34 (2004). In addition, in the supreme court's latest
- 3 -
word on the mootness doctrine, the court determined whether the
case before it was moot by looking to the traditional exceptions
to the mootness doctrine, again without looking merely to the
specific type of case before it. Felzak, 226 Ill. 2d at 392, 876
N.E.2d at 657.
For the last several years, this court has rather
routinely recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine in
cases involving involuntary mental-health admission and involun-
tary mental-health treatment. However, given the supreme court's
clear, consistent, and recent adherence to the established
exceptions to the mootness doctrine without regard to the type of
cases before it, we conclude that Supreme Court of Illinois
doctrine requires us to determine whether an otherwise moot
appeal comes within an established exception to the mootness
doctrine. For the following reasons, we conclude that this
appeal does not.
B. Exception to the Mootness Doctrine As Applied in This Case
1. The Public-Interest Exception
In this case, respondent challenges only (1) the
sufficiency of the evidence presented to warrant his involuntary
admission and (2) whether his hospitalization was the least-
restrictive treatment alternative. The answer to either chal-
lenge in this particular case does not constitute a question of
public importance. Nor would either answer provide an authorita-
- 4 -
tive determination to guide public officers in the performance of
their duties in mental-health cases. That is because orders
involving involuntary admissions of other respondents undoubtedly
will be entered and challenged based on the particular facts
presented in such cases. In other words, resolving routine
sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments will rarely have
precedential value. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent has
failed to clearly establish the criteria necessary to satisfy the
public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
2. The Capable-of-Repetition Exception
As earlier stated, the challenged involuntary admission
order in this case, entered by the trial court on May 11, 2007,
was limited to 90 days. Because this challenged order was of
such short duration, it could not have been fully litigated prior
to its cessation. Thus, the first criterion of the capable-of-
repetition exception has been established. However, respondent
has failed to clearly establish the second criterion--namely,
that a reasonable expectation exists that respondent will be
subject to the same action again.
Although respondent has a history of mental illness and
his psychiatrist had previously treated him on several occasions
during hospitalizations, nothing in the record shows that his
prior hospitalizations were as a result of petitions for
involuntary admission. More importantly, even if another
- 5 -
petition for involuntary admission were filed as to respondent,
he would not be subject to the exact same action. Instead, any
future involuntary-admission petition would involve the same
party but a different action under different circumstances. In
particular, the evidence presented in support of a future
petition would be different than the evidence presented in
support of the petition in this case. Accordingly, we conclude
that respondent has failed to clearly establish the second
criterion necessary to satisfy the capable-of-repetition
exception to the mootness doctrine.
In so concluding, we recognize that this court
previously has addressed issues raised in mental-health cases
based on "collateral legal consequences" that survive the
expiration of the order under review. See In re Meek, 131 Ill.
App. 3d 742, 744, 476 N.E.2d 65, 67 (1985) (in which this court
noted that "an adjudication could return to plague a respondent
in some future proceedings and could affect other aspects of the
respondent's life"). We now believe that the collateral-legal-
consequences exception to the mootness doctrine has no place in
determining whether an issue is moot in a mental-health case.
Regardless of whether a previous involuntary-admission order as
to a particular respondent is upheld or reversed on appeal, that
respondent's history of mental illness and involuntary treatment
will continue to exist, and will be a factor that treating
- 6 -
medical personnel may consider. It is that history that will
possibly follow the respondent, not the fact of an adjudication.
Accordingly, we hold that we will no longer adhere to that
portion of Meek or other cases in which this court utilized the
collateral-legal-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine
in mental-health cases.
In so holding, we note that our supreme court has
addressed collateral legal consequences as an exception to the
mootness doctrine only in the context of criminal proceedings.
See People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 267, 830 N.E.2d 541, 547-48
(2005) (noting that "the probability that a criminal defendant
may suffer collateral legal consequences from a sentence already
served precludes a finding of mootness"); People v. Jordan, 218
Ill. 2d 255, 264, 843 N.E.2d 870, 876 (2006) (holding that "a
[criminal] defendant subject to an order of supervision may
suffer collateral legal consequences as a result of that
disposition"; thus, the court concluded that the appeal before it
was not moot).
Because neither the public-interest exception nor the
capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness doctrine are
present in this case, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we dismiss this appeal as moot.
Appeal dismissed.
- 7 -
MYERSCOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.
- 8 -