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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.R.B., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
APPEAL OF: D.B., THE FATHER OF
A.R.B.,
Appellant No. 1025 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No(s): AP 177 2014
tpr-14-177
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 8, 2016
D.B. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on June 12, 2015,
wherein the orphans’ court granted the petition filed by the Allegheny
County Office of Children, Youth and Family (“CYF”) seeking to terminate
Father’s parental rights to his daughter, A.R.B., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a) and (b). We affirm.1
The orphans’ court summarized the relevant facts and procedural
history as follows:
____________________________________________
1
The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of the birth mother,
L.S., who did not appeal.
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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A.R.B. came to the attention of the agency when she was
born positive for opiates and THC [during] May [of] 2013. See
Testimony of Transcript ("T.T."), dated June 12, 2015, at 63.
The original case was only open a month before CYF closed out,
as the parents apparently became enrolled in a drug and alcohol
treatment. Id., at 64. However, CYF reopened the case in
August after there were concerns that the parents were drinking
and “nodding off” while parenting the infant. Id. The parents
had been staying with the Paternal Grandmother, who is the
child’s pre-adoptive foster mother. Id., at 65. And so the child
was technically removed from the parents' care, but returned to
the same physical home. Id. Indeed, the child has only resided
in this home throughout her short life. Both parents stipulated
to the child’s dependency status at the adjudicatory hearing on
August 26, 2013. Id. She has never returned to either parent's
care. Id. For a time during the course of the case, Father was
incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail, at the Renewal Center
and then back at the Allegheny County Jail after he relapsed. He
had been convicted in September 2013 for the manufacture or
delivery or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a
controlled substance, for possession of marijuana and for drug
paraphernalia, among other things. Id., at 82-83. He was
ultimately released after approximately 14 months in October
2014[.] [T]he Petition to Terminate Parental Rights was filed on
October 17, 2014.
Following the dependency determination, CYF created a
Family Service Plan (“FSP”), which is designed to help the
parents achieve reunification with their child. . . . Father's
initial goals were: meet and maintain the demands of daily living
(that is, find employment and obtain housing); achieve and
maintain recovery from substance abuse; maintain contact and
cooperation with CYF; visit the child; and parenting. Id., at 76.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/4/15, at 4-5.
During the evidentiary hearing, CYF presented the testimony of
Patricia Pepe Ph.D., the court appointed evaluator and expert in child
psychology, Michelle Schultz, the CYF caseworker assigned to the family
between February 3, 2014 and October 24, 2014, and Melissa Fuchs,
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A.R.B.’s home study caseworker. CYF also called one of the pre-adoptive
foster parents (“Paternal Grandmother”) and her ex-husband (“Paternal
Grandfather”), with whom Father resided for a portion of the time relevant
herein. Father testified on his own behalf.
The CYF witnesses outlined Father’s FSP goals and testified that his
compliance was moderate. He maintained contact with A.R.B. and
participated in some parenting classes and drug treatment programs while
he was incarcerated or in alternative confinement at the Renewal Center.
Likewise, he obtained employment and eventually moved from Paternal
Grandfather’s home, albeit to a residence shared by three roommates who
had not been vetted by CYF.
Significantly, however, Father failed to adequately address his
problems with drug and alcohol abuse, which is the precise reason for
A.R.B.’s placement. Father failed to enroll in any treatment programs since
his April 2014 relapse. N.T., 6/12/15, at 78-79, 133. He missed nine drug
screens, four of which were without excuse or explanation. Id. at 129-134,
174. One of the missed screens was requested by Paternal Grandfather
after Father neglected to return home following a night out with friends. Id.
at 195-196. Additionally, Father did not obtain a sponsor through Alcoholics
Anonymous (“AA”) or attend meetings four times per week as recommended
by Dr. Pepe. Id. at 143. Father attended only one meeting per week, which
he failed to document with CYF, and he declined to engage a sponsor. Id. at
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132-33, 222. Furthermore, while Father testified that he had been sober
since his April 2014 relapse, in reality Father continued to imbibe until
approximately one month before the June 2015 hearing. Id. at 230-231.
Indeed, Father testified that he lied during the AA meetings about the extent
of his sobriety. Id. 233-234.
Notwithstanding Father’s failure to address his substance abuse, Dr.
Pepe recommended that the agency pursue subsidized permanent legal
custody (“SPLC”) in lieu of the termination of Father’s parental rights and
the adoption of A.R.B. by Paternal Grandmother and her husband
(collectively, “Foster Parents”). That recommendation was based upon two
concerns. First, Dr. Pepe was swayed by Father’s report that Paternal
Grandmother was bedridden due to a diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis (“MS”).
Second, Dr. Pepe detected a bond between A.R.B. and Father, and she was
apprehensive that Foster Parents would interfere with Father’s post-adoption
contact with his daughter.
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the orphans’ court concluded
that CYF satisfied its burden of proving the statutory grounds for involuntary
termination of parental rights outlined in § 2511(a) (2), (5), (8) and (b).
This timely appeal followed. Father complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by
filing a statement of errors complained of on appeal concurrent with his
notice of appeal.
Father raises two issues for our review:
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I. Whether the Trial Court erred and/or abused its discretion in
finding that the Office of Children, Youth and Families met their
burden of proof and proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the parental rights of D.B. should be terminated pursuant to
23 Pa[.]C.S.A. 2511(a) (2), (5), and (8).
II. Whether the Trial Court erred and /or abused its discretion in
finding that the Office of Children, Youth and Families met their
burden of proof and proved by clear and convincing evidence
that terminating the parental rights of D.B. best meets the needs
and welfare of A.R.B. pursuant to 23 Pa[.]C.S.A. § 2511(b).
Father’s brief at 1.
Our standard of review is well settled.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. As the party petitioning for
termination of parental rights, CYF “must prove the statutory criteria for that
termination by at least clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.R., 465 A.2d
642, 644 (Pa. 1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as
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“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the
trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.” Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04
(Pa. 1989).
As noted, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). We need only agree with the
orphans’ court’s decision as to one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and
(b) in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843
A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, we agree with the
orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to
subsection 2511(a)(8), which provides as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(8) The child had been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the child.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
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furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
In order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar,
CYF was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) A.R.B.
has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; (2) the conditions
which led to the child’s removal continue to exist; and (3) involuntary
termination of parental rights would best serve A.R.B.’s needs and welfare.2
See In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super.
2003). “Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an
evaluation of [Father's] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
led to placement of [his] children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
____________________________________________
2
Pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b), we must twice examine A.R.B.’s needs
and welfare. In In Re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super.
2008) (en banc), we explained “while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section
2511(b) direct us to evaluate the ‘needs and welfare of the child,’ we are
required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
addressing the ‘needs and welfare’ . . . as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as
such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before
reaching Section 2511(b).” Instantly, Father does not challenge the needs
and welfare component of § 2511(a)(8) relating to his parental deficiencies.
Accordingly, we address his argument regarding the orphans’ court’s
disregard of the beneficial relationship he shares with his daughter in the
context of § 2511(b). See C.L.G., supra, (“the analysis under Section
2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of
the parent.”).
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502, 511 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis in original).
First, we observe that A.R.B. has been in CYF’s care since August of
2013, due to concerns about Father’s drug and alcohol abuse. As CYF did
not file its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights until October 17,
2014, approximately fourteen months later, the agency satisfied the
threshold requirement of § 2511(a)(8). Next, as discussed infra, the
certified record reveals that the drug and alcohol abuse that led to A.R.B.’s
removal continued to exist as recently as one month prior to the evidentiary
hearing.
Father invokes the fact that he completed most of the goals that CYF
established in the FSP as a basis to preserve his parental rights. He
highlights that he cooperated with CYF, maintained consistent and
meaningful contact with his daughter that included periods of unsupervised
visitation, obtained employment, completed programs while incarcerated
and housed at the Renewal Center, and secured housing. He argues that he
made strides toward reunification and utilized the services available to him.
Hence, Father posits that CYF failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the conditions which led to A.R.B.’s placement continue to
exist or that Father cannot remedy the issue within a reasonable time.
In addressing this argument, the orphans’ court reasoned that Father’s
inability to remain sober under the circumstances of this case led it to
conclude that Father could not parent A.R.B. beyond limited interactions
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during visitation. The court stressed, “By his own account, Father has been
clean from alcohol for only about the month immediately preceding the TPR
hearing. Yet, he testified that he attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.”
Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/15, at 4. It continued that, despite Father’s
proffered preference of AA over Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”), he “is not
serious about addressing his drug and alcohol issues. For example, he has
yet to obtain a sponsor in either organization, [and] does not go to the
recommended [number] of meetings.” Id. Additionally, the orphans’ court
observed that Father missed several drug screens, almost one-half of those
without explanation, and “even missed a screen as late as the week before
the TPR hearing.” Id. at 6.
Finally, the orphans’ court referenced Father’s failure to obtain mental
health treatment as recommended by Dr. Pepe. It reasoned that Father’s
inaction implicated his underlying substance abuse problems and further
evinced the continued existence of the conditions which led to A.R.B.’s
removal from his care. The court concluded,
[T]his is what persuades th[e] Court that the conditions that led
to the child's removal still continue to exist, and thus that
termination is warranted. It is true that Father has been
improving since the removal of his child, but he has not
demonstrated a real intent to address his drug and alcohol
issues. He has not addressed his mental health issues. Dr. Pepe
diagnosed Father with a mood disorder and a poly-substance
dependency. Id., at 23. She recommended weekly mental
health treatment to address depression and anxiety. Id. The
concern is that Father will self-medicate or that he will become
intoxicated, exercise poor judgment and relapse. Id. 25 -26. To
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be clear, Father's poly-substance dependency means a
dependency to multiple drugs. Although he was incarcerated for
marijuana and although alcohol use was allegedly the drug that
led to the child's removal, Father's drug use history also
includes oxycodone and benzodiazepine. Id., at 76 -77. Father
has failed to remedy these conditions.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/15, at 6.
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision. First, we
observe that Father’s assertion that the record does not demonstrate that he
could not remedy his substance abuse within a reasonable amount of time is
misplaced because that is not an element of § 2511(a)(8). See In re
Adoption of R.J.S., supra at 511. Indeed, the language that Father
references relates only to the statutory grounds for termination under §
2511(a)(5).3 Thus, that argument fails.
Moreover, the certified record confirms the orphans’ court’s
determination. During the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Schultz, the former CYS
caseworker assigned to the family testified about Father’s ongoing ordeal
with substance abuse. Father admitted to smoking marijuana when the
child was removed from his and Mother’s care and tested positive for
____________________________________________
3
Section 2511(a)(5) is similar to (a)(8) except that the former requires only
six months of placement and includes the additional elements that “the
parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period
of time [and] the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent
are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child within a reasonable period of time[.]” See 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5).
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benzodiazepine and oxycodone, which were his drugs of choice. N.T.
6/12/15, at 76-77. Indeed, Father stipulated during the dependency
proceedings that his parenting deficiencies stemmed from his use of drugs
and alcohol. Id. at 76.
Ms. Schultz further explained that, approximately three months after
A.R.B.’s birth, Father was incarcerated for a collection of drug offenses,
including possession of marijuana, possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver, and possession of paraphernalia. Id. at 82-83; CYF Exhibit
2. The trial court imposed eleven and one-half to twenty-three months
imprisonment followed by four years of probation. N.T., 6/12/15, at 84, CYF
Exhibit 2. Father was released to the Renewal Center, a non-secure
residential facility, approximately two weeks after the sentence was
imposed. N.T., 6/12/15, at 78. However, following the April 2014 relapse,
Father was re-incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail until October 2014.
Id. at 79, 86. Ms. Schultz reported that, between CYF’s initial involvement
and Father’s re-incarceration, he completed a detoxification program
administered by Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic and a drug and
alcohol treatment program administered by Cove Forge. Id. at 81. She
stressed, however, that the agency did not have any documentation of
Father participating in drug and alcohol treatment since his April 2014
relapse and re-incarceration. Id. at 86.
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A.R.B.’s home study caseworker, Ms. Fuchs, testified consistently with
Ms. Schultz regarding Father’s lack of progress toward confronting his
problems with drug and alcohol abuse. She discussed Father’s drug screens
and participation in AA and NA. As it relates to the urine screens, Ms. Fuchs
stated that Father attended twenty of twenty-nine screens. Id. at 129. The
results of those tests were negative. Id. Of the nine tests that Father
missed, five were excused due to scheduling and coordination issues. Id. at
131. The remaining four were without any excuse or justification. Id. at
132. Father was aware that the agency treated the unexcused absences as
positive tests, but he failed to proffer any explanations for the missed
screens. Id. at 174.
In summarizing Father’s lack of compliance with Dr. Pepe’s
recommendation to attend four AA or NA meetings per week and to utilize a
sponsor, Ms. Fuchs testified that Father claimed that he attended one AA
meeting per week but neglected to provide the agency with any
documentation of his participation. Id. at 132-133. She relayed that Father
did not attend the NA meetings because the AA meetings were more
convenient and he felt comfortable with that community. Id. at 133. Ms.
Fuchs articulated CYF’s concern about Father’s substance abuse. She noted
that “Drug and alcohol use was one of the reasons that brought [A.R.B.] into
care” and the agency was worried that Father would make poor decisions
when he was under the influence of intoxicants. Id. at 135.
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Next, we highlight that Dr. Pepe believed that Father’s relatively recent
use of alcohol was significant in this case given his history of abuse.
Testifying within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, Dr. Pepe
indicated that imbibing is a risk factor for relapse in individuals with a history
of substance abuse, and she expressed her concern that Father could start
self-medicating to suppress his mental health issues. Id. at 27, 35, 42-43.
Notwithstanding Father’s protestations to the contrary, the foregoing
evidence sustains the orphans’ court’s determination that CYF proved by
clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s
parental rights to A.R.B. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8). The child was removed
from Father’s care for more than twelve months, the conditions that led to
her removal continue to exist, and termination would best suit A.R.B.’s
needs and welfare in relation to Father’s weaknesses. Stated plainly, Father
is not committed to his efforts to confront his substance abuse or his mental
health problems. While Father completed detox and a treatment program
during early 2014 and alleges that he currently attends one AA meeting per
week, he has not engaged in any treatment since his April 2014 relapse. He
consumed alcohol as recently as one month prior to the evidentiary hearing
and misrepresented his sobriety. Moreover, he rejected Dr. Pepe’s
recommendations that he attend four AA meetings per week, utilize NA as a
complement to the AA sessions, and secure a sponsor to assist with his
rehabilitation. Additionally, we agree with the trial court’s perspective that
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Father’s indifference to the four unexcused urine screens reveals a troubling
lack of dedication to the rehabilitation process. Accordingly, we find that the
record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that CYF satisfied the
statutory requirements to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
Next, we address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion in
finding that CYF presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights and
permanently severing the existing bond between him and A.R.B. would best
serve the child’s needs and welfare pursuant to § 2511(b). While the
Adoption Act does not mandate that the trial court consider the effect of
permanently severing parental bonds, our case law requires it where a bond
exists to some extent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993).
The extent of the orphans’ court’s bond-effect analysis depends upon
the circumstances of a particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763
(Pa.Super. 2008). We have emphasized that, while a parent’s emotional
bond with his child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the trial court
when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.-S.,
958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). Indeed, the mere existence of an
emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In
re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate
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parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
against parents’ inability to serve needs of child).
Herein, Dr. Pepe recommended neither reunification nor the
termination of parental rights. Instead, for the reasons discussed below, Dr.
Pepe recommended SPLC or an open adoption that permits continued
contact between Father and A.R.B. N.T., 6/12/15, at 31-35, 53. Father
argues that the orphans’ court erred in declining to follow Dr. Pepe’s
recommendation to forego terminating Father’s parental rights in order to
pursue SPLC. The crux of this contention is that a positive attachment exists
between A.R.B. and Father, and while that connection pales in comparison to
the bond A.R.B. shares with Foster Parents, it would be detrimental to A.R.B.
if the relationship with Father was severed.
As Father’s position is based primarily upon Dr. Pepe’s expert
perspective, we review her testimony at the outset. Dr. Pepe testified that,
A.R.B.’s attachment and bonding are very significant for her because young
children require stability and dependability from caregivers to avoid
developing attachment disorders later in their childhood. Id. at 11-12. She
also noted that a lack of stability could cause developmental issues. Id. at
12. She defined “bonding” as a collection of behaviors and “attachment” as
a psychological concept. Id. at 11.
Dr. Pepe completed a series of interactional evaluations between
A.R.B. and Father. She characterized A.R.B.’s level of bond and attachment
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to Father as a positive attachment, but not at the same level as with Foster
Parents. Id. at 17-18. When asked whether she would describe the
relationship as necessary and beneficial she explained, “Actually, yes, I
would, . . . She’s happy to see him. She responds well. He seems to know
her very well in terms of what her needs are. And I do think it’s an
important relationship for her.” Id. at 18. Hence, while A.R.B. neither
depends upon Father in the same manner as Foster Parents nor views him
as her psychological parent, the child does, in fact, exhibit some bonding
with him. As it relates to terminating Father’s parental rights, Dr. Pepe
concluded that A.R.B. would suffer harm if future contact with Father was
precluded. Id. at 35. However, she was not able to determine how
detrimental the harm would be. Id. She was concerned that, “at some
point[,] [A.R.B.] would recognize his absence [and] that would cause
difficulty in her future.” Id. at 37.
In addition to evaluating the bond between Father and A.R.B., Dr.
Pepe also performed interactional evaluations between A.R.B. and Foster
Parents. Id. at 8-9. She observed that A.R.B. had a positive primary
attachment with her Foster Parents, with whom she has lived with since
birth. Id. at 9-10. Dr. Pepe testified that Foster Parents are A.R.B.’s
psychological parents in that she consistently identifies them as her primary
caretakers. Id. at 11. She believed that removing the child from their care
would cause psychological trauma, but conceded that the degree of trauma
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would depend on the circumstances of the separation. Id. at 13.
Importantly, Foster Parents confirmed with Dr. Pepe that they are willing to
maintain post-adoption contact between A.R.B. and Father. Id. at. 14.
Ultimately, Dr. Pepe recommended SPLC or, to a lesser extent, open
adoption because she detected a positive connection between A.R.B. and
Father. Id. at 30-31. Due to Father’s lack of progress in maintaining
sobriety, she could not recommend reunification. Id. at 32. Dr. Pepe
acknowledged A.R.B.’s primary attachment with Foster Parents and noted
their clear intent to adopt the child; however, Dr. Pepe was persuaded by
Father’s insinuation that Paternal Grandmother was often bedridden by MS.
Id. at 31. She stated, “I’m concerned about the future. So I’m
recommending SPLC.” Id. As it relates to the open adoption, she
subsequently elucidated, “I discussed open adoption [with Foster
Parents]. . . . I think open adoption is an option[,] [b]ut . . . my thinking
was leaning more to SPLC.” Id. at 34.
The orphans’ court was not persuaded by Dr. Pepe’s apprehension.
The court observed that, while Dr. Pepe relied upon Father’s characterization
of Paternal Grandmother’s physical condition, the evidence adduced during
the hearing established that Paternal Grandmother was diagnosed with MS
during 1996 and that the condition is in remission. Id. at 186. Paternal
Grandmother testified that, when an intermittent relapse occurs, she
experiences weakness on one side of her body and vision problems. Id.
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She explained, “I am not bedridden from it. I will have to take . . . maybe a
day or two . . . to get my eyes refocused. I will go on steroids and I usually
bounce back.” Id. She highlighted that she continued to raise Father and
his three siblings since the diagnosis and that she and her husband have an
extensive support network, including a backup caregiver with appropriate
certifications, if an emergency should arise. Id. at 187. Upon review of
these additional facts, which Dr. Pepe apparently did not consider, we have
no basis to disturb the orphans’ court’s conclusion that Paternal
Grandmother’s diagnosis of MS should not preclude Foster Parents from
adopting A.R.B.
The certified record also supports the orphans’ court’s decision to
discount Dr. Pepe’s anxiety that Foster Parents would prevent post-adoption
contact between A.R.B. and Father. Contrary to Dr. Pepe’s perspective,
Paternal Grandmother testified that she and her husband would continue to
provide Father access to his daughter following the adoption. She stated, “I
have no problem with [Father] seeing her. . . I have no problem with him.
He’s my son. I love him. [H]e’s made some bad moves, but . . . he’s still
her father and I would not have her if it was not for him.” Id. at 189-190.
This is clear and convincing evidence that Foster Parents support Father’s
post-adoption contact with A.R.B. In contrast, nothing in the record sustains
Father’s speculation that, one day, Foster Parents will decline to sanction
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that relationship. As the record supports the trial court’s finding that Dr.
Pepe’s concerns were misplaced, Father’s assertions of error fail.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orphans’ court order
terminating Father’s parental rights to A.R.B. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and
(b).
Order affirmed.
Judge Strassburger joins this memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/8/2016
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