2016 IL App (2d) 150040
No. 2-15-0040
Opinion filed March 23, 2016
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
as Trustee, ) of Du Page County.
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 09-CH-4410
)
SYEDA NAZIA RAHMAN, )
)
)
Defendant-Appellant and Cross- )
Appellee )
)
(Edward Hines Lumber Company; Hinsdale )
Developers, Inc.; VG Masonry Company, Inc.; )
Southwest Insulation, Inc.; Complete )
Flashings, Inc.; J.J. McIlwee Company; Comex )
Construction Company; Signature Stairs of )
D and D Woodworking, Inc.; and Unknown )
Owners and Nonrecord Claimants, Defendants; )
John Baderman and Catherine Baderman, ) Honorable
Third-Party Purchasers-Appellees and ) Robert G. Gibson,
Cross-Appellants). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices McLaren and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This appeal concerns whether defendant, Syeda Nazia Rahman, was properly served and,
if she was not, whether she could obtain relief.
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
¶2 Plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), filed a complaint to foreclose a
mortgage against, inter alios, defendant. U.S. Bank issued summonses for defendant and
attempted service at two listed addresses.
¶3 After defendant did not appear, U.S. Bank moved for a default judgment. The court
granted the motion and entered a default judgment of foreclosure and sale. U.S. Bank
subsequently sold the foreclosed property at a sheriff’s sale, and the court confirmed the report of
sale.
¶4 More than two years after the sale, defendant filed a petition to quash service of process
because she had been improperly served by a special process server in Cook County in violation
of section 2-202(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)).
The court found that service had been improper under section 2-202(a), the court had lacked
personal jurisdiction over defendant, and the default judgment was void. However, it also found
that the property rights of Catherine and John Baderman, the third-party purchasers of the
property, were protected by section 2-1401(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(e) (West 2014)),
because no jurisdictional defect affirmatively appeared on the face of the record.
¶5 Defendant appeals, and the Badermans cross-appeal. We affirm.
¶6 I. BACKGROUND
¶7 U.S. Bank filed its complaint to foreclose a residential mortgage against defendant on
September 29, 2009. U.S. Bank was represented by Pierce & Associates, P.C. Defendant agreed
to the subject mortgage on July 30, 2007, and executed an accompanying note, promising to
repay $1,496,000, plus interest. The subject property was commonly known as 612 North
Jefferson Street, Hinsdale, Illinois, 60521 (Subject Property).
¶8 U.S. Bank issued four summonses for this case on September 29, 2009. The summonses
-2-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
each included a service list containing 11 addresses, 2 of which were defendant’s addresses.
Defendant’s addresses were at the Subject Property and at 827 Kensington Lane in Hanover Park
(Hanover Park Address). The second, third, and fourth summonses were identical to the first,
except that they were marked by a handwritten “duplicate 1,” “duplicate 2,” and “duplicate 3,”
respectively. The service list attached to each duplicate summons was the same as that for the
original summons, but different addresses were crossed off (but still legible) on each list.
¶9 Every address on the service lists was marked with one of the following designations:
DU, DS1, DS2, or DS3. On the service list accompanying the original summons, six addresses
were crossed off, and the remaining five addresses were marked DU. On the service list
accompanying the duplicate 1 summons, seven addresses were crossed out, and the remaining
four addresses were marked DS1. On the service list accompanying the duplicate 2 summons,
10 addresses were crossed out, and the last address was marked DS2. Following the pattern
here, on the service list for the duplicate 3 summons, 10 addresses were crossed off and the
remaining address was marked DS3.
¶ 10 Pierce & Associates employed ProVest, LLC, as a special process server. Pamela
Thornburg, a ProVest employee, averred that she served defendant at 318 Veronica Circle in
Bartlett on October 4, 2009 (Bartlett Address). Thornburg separately averred that she also
served defendant at the Hanover Park Address on October 7.
¶ 11 On December 10, 2009, U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment, a default judgment of
foreclosure and sale, and appointment of a foreclosure sale officer. Pierce & Associates certified
that it served notice of the motion on defendant via United States mail at the Subject Property
and the Hanover Park Address. The cause was continued on U.S. Bank’s request until July 13,
2010.
-3-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
¶ 12 On July 13, 2010, the court entered an order of default against, inter alios, defendant, for
failure to appear or plead. The court further entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The
Subject Property was sold via a sheriff’s sale on January 26, 2012. On February 15, 2012, the
court approved and confirmed the report of sale and ordered that the sheriff evict defendant from
the Subject Property. The Badermans eventually purchased the Subject Property, obtaining the
deed on December 27, 2012.
¶ 13 On September 4, 2014, defendant filed a petition to quash service of process pursuant to
sections 2-301 and 2-1401(f) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-1401(f) (West 2014)) and a
motion to dismiss the case under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 2007) because
U.S. Bank failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining service. U.S. Bank responded with three
arguments against the petition to quash: first, that service was proper; second, that Cook County
General Administrative Order 2007-03 (GAO 2007-03) allowed the service in that it permitted a
law firm to move for a standing order to appoint a special process server for a term of three
months, which Pierce & Associates had done; and third, that defendant failed to present any
meritorious claims or defenses and failed to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing any claim or
defense.
¶ 14 On November 24, 2014, the court held a hearing on defendant’s petition to quash service
of process. Also on November 24, 2014, counsel for the Badermans filed an appearance.
¶ 15 At the hearing, the court first summarized the proceedings. It recounted that defendant
was served twice: once at the Bartlett Address and once at the Hanover Park Address. She was
served on both occasions by Thornburg. A judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered July
13, 2010, in the amount of $1,745,283.22. The Subject Property was sold at the subsequent
sheriff’s sale for $1,112,500, creating a deficiency of more than $886,000. However, U.S. Bank
-4-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
did not seek a personal deficiency judgment, and the court entered only an in rem judgment.
¶ 16 Regarding defendant’s petition to quash service, the trial court reasoned as follows. First,
it cited section 2-202(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)), which requires that
service in Cook County be effected by the Cook County sheriff unless the plaintiff seeks leave to
appoint a special process server. Here, the sheriff did not serve defendant, nor did the court
appoint a special process server. The court noted that service by an unauthorized process server
was not good service.
¶ 17 Next, addressing U.S. Bank’s second argument, it reasoned that GAO 2007-03 was
effective in Cook County but was not binding on Du Page County courts. Addressing U.S.
Bank’s third argument, the court relied on Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d
95 (2002), and stated that an allegation of voidness made it unnecessary to allege facts
constituting a meritorious defense or due diligence. Rather, Sarkissian required strict
compliance with the statutes governing service of process before a court would acquire personal
jurisdiction over defendant. Therefore, it granted defendant’s petition to quash service.
¶ 18 Consequently, the court vacated the foreclosure judgment, the sheriff’s sale, and the order
approving the sale. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss the case for U.S. Bank’s
lack of due diligence in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b), because U.S. Bank
promptly served defendant twice and merely lacked prudence in failing to obtain the
appointment of a special process server.
¶ 19 The court continued that, where an underlying judgment is void but the lack of
jurisdiction did not affirmatively appear on the record when the judgment was entered, the
subsequent vacation of the judgment does not affect any right, title, or interest in any real
property acquired by third parties, pursuant to section 2-1401(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-
-5-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
1401(e) (West 2014)). The court reasoned that here the lack of jurisdiction did not affirmatively
appear on the record. Both the Hanover Park and Bartlett addresses, where defendant was
served, had portions in both Du Page and Cook counties. Therefore, external materials would
have been necessary to determine whether service occurred in Cook or Du Page County.
Supporting the court’s reasoning was the fact that defendant had to attach to her petition a
printout showing that the addresses where service occurred were in Cook County. Therefore, the
court did not see what defendant hoped to accomplish, because the only possible outcome was
that U.S. Bank would seek a personal deficiency judgment of around $886,000 against her.
¶ 20 Defendant filed a late notice of appeal, which we allowed on January 28, 2015.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, defendant argues that section 2-1401(e) did not apply because (1) the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record, and (2) the Badermans were
not bona fide purchasers. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 23 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 24 Defendant argues that the court lacked jurisdiction over her and that the lack of
jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record. An order, judgment, or decree entered by a
court without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties is void and may be attacked,
directly or indirectly, in any court at any time. Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 103. Personal
jurisdiction must be established with service of process or voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 18. Strict
compliance with the statutes governing service of process is necessary. Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at
109. Accordingly, a judgment rendered without voluntary submission or service of process in
strict compliance with statutory authority is void regardless of whether the defendant had actual
-6-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
knowledge of the proceedings. See State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308
(1986).
¶ 25 A petitioner may attack a judgment as void in a section 2-1401 petition. Sarkissian, 201
Ill. 2d at 105 (a petition seeking relief from a void judgment is a section 2-1401 petition).
Typically, relief under section 2-1401 requires that a petitioner file, between 30 days and 2 years
after the entry of the judgment, a petition showing: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or
claim; (2) due diligence in presenting the defense or claim; and (3) due diligence in filing the
petition. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986). However, a petition attacking a
judgment as void is not subject to those requirements. In re Estate of Barth, 339 Ill. App. 3d
651, 663 (2003); see 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2014).
¶ 26 However, even if the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, section 2-1401(e) may
protect a bona fide purchaser for value. In re Application of the County Collector, 397 Ill. App.
3d 535, 549 (2009). Section 2-1401(e) embodies the public policy respecting third-party
purchasers of property and protecting them from the effects of an order setting aside a judgment
affecting title to property. Christiansen v. Saylor, 297 Ill. App. 3d 719, 724 (1998). In
particular, section 2-1401(e) protects a bona fide purchaser’s interest in real property where the
defect in service is not apparent from the record and the bona fide purchaser was not a party to
the original action but acquired title before the filing of the petition. Id.; City of Rockford v.
Lemar, 157 Ill. App. 3d 350, 352-53 (1987).
¶ 27 In determining whether a lack of jurisdiction is apparent from the record, we look at the
whole record, including the pleadings, the return of process, and the judgment of the trial court.
Concord Air, Inc. v. Malarz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140639, ¶ 33. A lack of jurisdiction is apparent
from the record if it does not require inquiry beyond the face of the record. See Thill, 113 Ill. 2d
-7-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
at 314. Here, we review de novo defendant’s section 2-1401 claim because it is a purely legal
claim challenging a final judgment as void. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation District
v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 47.
¶ 28 Defendant argues that the lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record,
citing section 2-202(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)), which governs service
of summons. Section 2-202(a) provided, in pertinent part, that service in a county with a
population of 1 million or more required a court-appointed special process server if service was
not provided by a sheriff. 1 Id. Here, U.S. Bank served defendant via a special process server,
but the record contains no order appointing a special process server. Defendant argues that such
an order was necessary pursuant to section 2-202(a) of the Code because service occurred in
Cook County, which had a population of 1 million or more. Defendant also points to the
designations on the service lists―DU, DS1, DS2, and DS3―to argue that U.S. Bank knew that
certain addresses were outside of Du Page County. Defendant argues that DU stood for Du Page
and that DS1, DS2, and DS3 stood for addresses outside of Du Page. Therefore, defendant
asserts, the record was clear that U.S. Bank served her in Cook County in contravention of
section 2-202(a).
¶ 29 The Badermans respond that service was proper and that, in any event, the claimed
jurisdictional defect did not affirmatively appear on the face of the record. First, they argue that
service was proper because the relevant county under section 2-202(a) was the county in which
the case was pending, that is, Du Page County. They cite Schorsch v. Fireside Chrysler-
1
We note that in 2010 the legislature amended section 2-202(a) to allow special service
without a court appointment in a county with a population of less than 2 million. Pub. Act 96-
1451 § 5 (eff. Aug. 20, 2010) (amending 735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)).
-8-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
Plymouth, Mazda, Inc., 172 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996-98 (1988), and attack its holding that the
county of service, not the venue of the case, is the relevant county for purposes of section 2-
202(a). They argue that the Schorsch holding “does not necessarily follow from the authority
cited,” including historical notes and legislative debates.
¶ 30 Moreover, the Badermans refer us to the standing order, filed in Cook County chancery
court, that permitted ProVest to serve process for Pierce & Associates for a period of three
months, including October 2009. Therefore, they argue, service on defendant in Cook County
was authorized by a court order and did not violate section 2-202(a).
¶ 31 The Badermans continue that, even if there was a jurisdictional defect, it was not
apparent on the face of the record. They argue that there are two kinds of jurisdictional defects:
those apparent on the face of the record and those not apparent. They argue that an example of
an apparent defect occurred in Malarz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140639, ¶ 44, where service by
publication was improper. There, service was attempted on the wrong person at the wrong
address, with the defect evident from the materials filed along with the plaintiff’s affidavit of
nonservice. Id. However, the defect is not always apparent from the record, and section 2-
1401(e) requires that the defect “affirmatively” appear from the record. Here, the Badermans
argue that, unlike in Malarz, no defect affirmatively appeared on the face of the record. In
particular, they argue that service by a duplicate summons did not affirmatively show that
service was made in Cook County.
¶ 32 Defendant replies that section 2-202(a) of the Code was unambiguous in stating that
serving summons in a county with a population of 1 million people or more via a special process
server required leave of court, and U.S. Bank did not seek leave of court.
-9-
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
¶ 33 We agree with defendant that the service of process was improper—and that thus the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over her—but we agree with the Badermans that the lack of
jurisdiction did not affirmatively appear on the face of the record. First, the service was
improper with respect to defendant. Service was made via special process server at the Bartlett
and Hanover Park addresses. These addresses were located in Cook County, which had a
population of 1 million or more. See People ex rel. County of Du Page v. Smith, 21 Ill. 2d 572,
579 (1961) (taking judicial notice of the population of Cook County). Pursuant to section 2-
202(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)), process could be served by a special
process server, but in a county with a population of 1 million or more, the special process server
must have first been appointed by the court. See West Suburban Bank v. Advantage Financial
Partners, LLC, 2014 IL App (2d) 131146, ¶ 15. Here, U.S. Bank did not seek the appointment
of a special process server. However, the Badermans argue that service was proper because the
relevant county for purposes of section 2-202(a) is the county in which the case is pending, not
the county where service is processed.
¶ 34 We reject the Badermans’ invitation to reinterpret section 2-202(a) to hold that the
relevant county is the county in which the case is pending. The Badermans’ disagreement with
Schorsch is misplaced. Schorsch rightly held that, under the plain language of section 2-202(a),
service by a special process server was authorized without a court appointment only in a county
with a population of less than 1 million. Section 2-202(a) provided that “[i]n counties with a
population of less than 1,000,000, process may be served, without special appointment,” by
certain licensed or registered persons. 735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008). The plain language of
the statute was clearly concerned with where the service takes place—“In counties with a
population of less than 1,000,000”—not where the case is pending. There was no reference in
- 10 -
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
section 2-202(a) to the county in which the case is pending. Other appellate courts have cited
Schorsch’s interpretation approvingly. See Malarz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140639, ¶ 39;
C.T.A.S.S.&U. Federal Credit Union v. Johnson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 909, 912 (2008) (section 2-202
requires that a private detective serving process in Cook County be appointed by the trial court).
While Schorsch referenced historical notes and legislative debates outside of the language of the
statute to bolster its interpretation, these references were not essential to its holding based on the
plain language of the statute. Accordingly, we reject the Badermans’ argument that we should
revisit Schorsch and hold that the relevant county under section 2-202(a) is the county in which
the case is pending.
¶ 35 We further reject that the standing order appointing ProVest as Pierce & Associates’
special process server, issued by a Cook County circuit court pursuant to GAO 2007-03, made
service proper. The standing order appointing ProVest was for “cases filed by *** Pierce &
Associates, P.C. in the Mortgage Foreclosure Section of the Chancery Division pursuant to 735
ILCS 5/2-202.” The standing order’s clear language indicates that the order applied only to
cases filed in Cook County chancery court. This echoes the language of GAO 2007-03, which
provided that law firms handling mortgage foreclosure cases in the Cook County chancery
division may move for standing orders for the appointment of designated special process servers.
Sewickley, LLC v. Chicago Title Land Trust Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 112977, ¶ 20. GAO 2007-03
provided, in pertinent part:
“ ‘Because of the increase in mortgage foreclosure filings and insufficient resources
allocated to the Chancery Division’s Clerk’s Office, the Clerk of the Court has been
unable to process promptly Motions for Appointment of Special Process Servers and
Orders Appointing Special Process Servers.’ ” Id. (quoting GAO 2007-03).
- 11 -
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
The purpose of GAO 2007-03 was to alleviate a problem particular to Cook County—that is, the
efficient appointment of special process servers in Cook County chancery court. Therefore,
unlike section 2-202(a) as properly interpreted, GAO 2007-03 was concerned with the county in
which the case was pending: Cook County. Because this case originated in Du Page County,
GAO 2007-03 was inapplicable, and the trial court rightly found that it was not binding on the
Du Page County circuit court.
¶ 36 We conclude that service of process was improper and that therefore the trial court lacked
personal jurisdiction over defendant and the judgment was void. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d at 308.
Nevertheless, section 2-1401(e) protects third-party purchasers if the jurisdictional defect does
not affirmatively appear on the face of the record.
¶ 37 Here, defendant argues that the jurisdictional defect affirmatively appeared on the face of
the record. She argues that the summonses and accompanying service lists were sufficient to put
the Badermans on notice that service by a special process server would have required a court
order. In support, defendant references the abbreviations on the summonses: DU, DS1, DS2,
and DS3. Defendant argues that DU indicates service within Du Page County and that DS1,
DS2, and DS3 indicate service outside of Du Page County. Furthermore, defendant argues that
she was first served not at the Subject Property but instead at the Bartlett Address, which was
outside of Du Page County.
¶ 38 We disagree with defendant. A review of the summonses and their attached service lists
logically implies that DS1 stands for “duplicate summons 1,” DS2 for “duplicate summons 2,”
and DS3 for “duplicate summons 3.” The service list attached to duplicate summons 1 has all
addresses crossed off except those marked DS1. Likewise, the lists attached to duplicate
summonses 2 and 3 have all addresses crossed off except those marked DS2 and DS3,
- 12 -
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
respectively. At the very least, nothing on the summonses or the corresponding service lists
shows that DS1, DS2, and DS3 necessarily designated summonses to be served outside of Du
Page County. Therefore, we reject defendant’s argument that the summonses demonstrate that
service took place outside of Du Page County.
¶ 39 Nor do the affidavits of service affirmatively show that service took place in Cook
County. Thornburg provided affidavits of service on defendant at the Bartlett Address and the
Hanover Park Address. 2 Like with the summonses, it was impossible to determine in which
county service occurred from the face of the affidavits—outside materials were necessary.
Therefore, we cannot say that the jurisdictional defect affirmatively appeared on the face of the
record.
¶ 40 B. Bona Fide Purchasers
¶ 41 Defendant also argues that the Badermans have not proved that they were bona fide
purchasers for purposes of section 2-1401(e). Section 2-1401(e) has been interpreted by Illinois
courts as intending to protect bona fide purchasers for value. Mortgage Electronic Systems v.
Gipson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 622, 633 (2008). A purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser if he or she
had constructive notice of an outstanding title or right of another party. Bank of New York v.
Unknown Heirs & Legatees, 369 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477 (2006).
¶ 42 Here, defendant argues that, because the lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of
the record, the Badermans had constructive notice of her outstanding right and title to the Subject
2
There was also an affidavit of nonservice, provided by Michael Menichini, for
defendant at 612 N. Jefferson Street, Hinsdale, Du Page County. Service was not completed
because the home was vacant, the utilities were not on, and the white pickup truck in the
driveway had no license plates.
- 13 -
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
Property. However, we have already rejected that the lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the
face of the record. Contrary to defendant’s argument, a simple review of the record would not
have revealed a jurisdictional defect. As discussed supra, neither the service lists nor the
affidavits of service affirmatively demonstrated a lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the service lists
and affidavits of service would lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to conclude that service took
place in Du Page County, thereby permitting service by a special process server without an
appointment by the court. Accordingly, we find that there is no basis in the record to conclude
that the Badermans were anything but bona fide purchasers under section 2-1401(e). Therefore,
section 2-1401(e) protected their rights in the Subject Property despite the jurisdictional defect.
¶ 43 C. The Badermans’ Remaining Arguments
¶ 44 The Badermans argue that defendant’s petition should have been barred by laches.
Laches is an affirmative defense, equitable in nature, and it requires the party raising it to show
that there was unreasonable delay in bringing an action and that the delay caused prejudice.
Hynes v. Snyder, 355 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398 (2005). Defendant argues that laches is inapplicable
when a judgment is void, because a void judgment may be attacked at any time. Moreover, the
Badermans did not raise the issue below—although they argue that they did not have time to do
so. We need not reach these arguments. The issue is moot because we have already determined
that section 2-1401(e) of the Code protects the Badermans’ rights in the Subject Property,
regardless of defendant’s petition to quash service.
¶ 45 Likewise, we need not address the Badermans’ argument that defendant’s petition was
barred by section 30 of the Conveyances Act (765 ILCS 5/30 (West 2014)), because we have
already held that their rights in the Subject Property were protected under section 2-1401(e) of
the Code.
- 14 -
2016 IL App (2d) 150040
¶ 46 Finally, we decline the Badermans’ invitation to revisit Sarkissian and Thill in light of
Justice Birkett’s special concurrence in West Suburban Bank, 2014 IL App (2d) 131146. We are
bound to follow our supreme court’s precedent (Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
366 Ill. App. 3d 730, 734 (2006)), and, in any event, we have already ruled in the Badermans’
favor.
¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 Service of process was defective, rendering the judgment against defendant void.
Nevertheless, section 2-1401(e) protected the Badermans’ rights in the Subject Property.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Du Page County circuit court.
¶ 49 Affirmed.
- 15 -