J-S13015-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CRAWFORD COUNTY CHILDREN AND IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
YOUTH SERVICES PENNSYLVANIA
v.
J.B.W.
v.
C.G.
Appellant No. 1106 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order June 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Domestic Relations at No(s): DR 2014-296
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 11, 2016
Appellant, C.G., who claims to be the natural father of B.G. (child),
appeals from the June 23, 2015 order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Crawford County. That order stated the presumption of paternity was
irrebuttable and Mother’s husband, J.B.W., was the presumptive father.
C.G. challenges the court’s finding that there was an intact family; he also
challenges the constitutionality of the presumption on equal protection
grounds. After our review, we affirm.
Crawford County Children and Youth Services (CCCYS) filed a support
action against J.B.W. with respect to two children in placement, J.W., Jr.,
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and B.G. C.G. sought to intervene, claiming he was the biological father of
B.G. C.G. requested a hearing, claiming that there was no intact family and
thus the presumption of paternity was rebuttable. The Honorable Anthony J.
Vardaro held a hearing on December 3, 2014. The court determined that
C.G. did not meet his burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence, and found that J.B.W. was married to Mother at the
time of conception and birth and that they remained in an intact
relationship. The court concluded, therefore, that the presumption was
irrebuttable. The court entered an order finding J.B.W. was the presumptive
father, and C.G. appealed. C.G. raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did mother and her husband and the child have an intact
family, which precluded natural father from being
permitted to rebut the presumption of paternity?
2. Is the presumption of paternity unconstitutional in that it
deprives a child born to a married woman of its father
while allowing a child born to a single woman to have its
father?
3. Is the presumption of paternity unconstitutional in that it
deprives a child born to a married woman of its father
while allowing a child born to a married man to have its
father?
4. Is the presumption of paternity unconstitutional in that it
deprives a man of his paternity based on the marital status
of the mother while allowing a mother to have her
maternity regardless of the marital status of the father?
We first point out our standard of review. We will not disturb the trial
court's order unless there has been an abuse of discretion. See Doran v.
Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden or
misapplied the law, or if there is insufficient evidence to sustain
the order. Moreover, resolution of factual issues is for the trial
court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's
findings if they are supported by competent evidence. It is not
enough that we, if sitting as a trial court, may have made a
different finding.
Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
In Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997) (plurality opinion), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the presumption of paternity as
follows:
[G]enerally, a child conceived or born during the marriage is
presumed to be the child of the marriage; this presumption is
one of the strongest presumptions of the law of Pennsylvania;
and the presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence that the presumptive father had no access to the
mother or the presumptive father was physically incapable of
procreation at the time of conception. However, the presumption
is irrebuttable when a third party seeks to assert his own
paternity as against the husband in an intact marriage.
[Emphasis added.]
Id. at 179 (emphasis added). The preservation of marriages is the purpose
of the presumption of paternity. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723
(Pa. 1999). The presumption renders blood test results irrelevant unless and
until the presumption is overcome. See Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052,
1054 (Pa. 1999). “[T]he presumption is irrebuttable when a third party
seeks to assert his own paternity as against the husband in an intact
marriage.” C.W. v. L.V., 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2001) (emphasis
added). The relevant time to examine whether the marriage is intact is at
the time of the challenge to a husband’s paternity, Vargo v. Schwartz, 940
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A.2d 459, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007), and this is a question solely for the trial
court sitting as fact-finder. Id. at 467.
The disposition of this matter turns on whether Mother and her
husband, J.B.W., had an intact marriage at the time of C.G.’s challenge to
J.B.W.’s paternity. C.G. was the only witness to testify at the hearing. He
testified that he and Mother had an on and off relationship, and that at the
time of B.G.’s conception, Mother and J.B.W. were separated and that
Mother spent some time with him (C.G.), and some time with her mother.
B.G. was conceived in February or March of 2013; C.G. testified that during
this time Mother “stayed with me a couple nights[.] . . . I can’t be exact, 100
percent certain, but right around that time.” N.T. Paternity Hearing,
6/15/15, at 15. At the time of B.G.’s birth, Mother and J.B.W. were back
together, and when Mother brought B.G. home from the hospital, she
brought her to her residence with her husband, J.B.W. Id. at 8. C.G.
acknowledged that at the time of the hearing, the child was living with
Mother and J.B.W. Id. at 13. Thus, the court found that Mother and J.B.W.
were married before the birth of B.G., were married at the time of B.G.’s
conception, and, as of the time of C.G.’s challenge and the paternity
hearing, remained married. The court also found that C.G. had failed to
prove by any quantum of evidence that J.B.W. had no access to Mother or
was impotent. (Trial Court Opinion, 7/21/14 at 10–11.) As a result, the
presumption of paternity is irrebuttable. Vargo, 940 A.2d at 463.
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Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. We find
no abuse of discretion. Doran, supra. Even if the presumption were
rebuttable, C.G. failed to rebut the presumption. The presumption may be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence that either of the following
circumstances was true at the time of conception: the presumptive father
was physically incapable of procreation because of impotency or sterility or
the presumptive father had no access to wife. As stated above, C.G. failed
to present any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, of either
circumstance. The law is clear that, absent such circumstances, the
presumption of paternity continues to apply. Vargo, supra. See also
B.S. and R.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2001) (although
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of husband's
non-access, impotency, or sterility, presumption is irrebuttable where
mother, child, and husband live together as intact family and husband
assumes parental responsibility for the child).
C.G. also challenges the presumption of paternity on equal protection
grounds.1 He argues the presumption of paternity is unconstitutional in that
it deprives a man of his paternity based on the marital status of the mother
while allowing a mother to have her maternity regardless of the marital
status of the father.
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1
We need not address issues 2 or 3 because C.G. has no standing to raise
equal protection on behalf of a child.
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C.G. does have not standing to assert an equal protection claim
grounded on paternity. Due process and equal protection principles confer
standing on C.G. to rebut the presumption of paternity; however, having
failed to do so, there has been no legal determination of his paternity.
Therefore, C.G. has no constitutionally protected interest. See Fausey v.
Hiller, 851 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. 2004), citing Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (right of parents to
make decisions about upbringing of their children is fundamental right).
We also point out that there are other interests at stake in this case
besides those of C.G, the putative father and intervenor, and J.B.W., the
presumptive father. Our Supreme Court has stated:
Obviously, the needs and interests of the Child are of paramount
concern, and the needs and interests of [Mother] are on a par
with the “putative” and “presumptive” fathers. There is, in short,
a family involved here. A woman and a man who have married
and lived together as husband and wife, giving birth to and
raising [a child], have obvious interests in protecting their family
from the unwanted intrusions of outsiders (even ones who have
had serious relationships with the mother, father or children).
The Commonwealth recognizes and seeks to protect this basic
and foundational unit of society, the family, by the presumption
that a child born to a woman while she is married is a child of
the marriage.
John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (Pa. 1990), citing
Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 136 A.2d 451 (Pa. 1957).
“Whatever interests the putative father may claim, they pale in comparison
to the overriding interests of the presumed father, the marital institution and
the interests of this Commonwealth in the family unit. These interests are
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the cornerstone of the age-old presumption and remain protected by the
Commonwealth today.” John M., 571 A.2d at 1388-89 (Nix, C.J.,
concurring).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/11/2016
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