J-S48044-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.-F., a/k/a IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A.M.-F., a Minor Adjudicated Child PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.M., Natural Mother No. 292 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order entered February 1, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Domestic Relations, at No.: 64 of 2015
BEFORE: BOWES, DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016
A.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the permanency review Order, issued in
response to a request by the Erie County Office of Children and Youth
(“OCY”), changing the permanency goal for her daughter, A.M.-F. (“Child”)
(born in October 2014), to adoption, pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6301, et seq. (“the Act”). We affirm.
The juvenile court set forth the factual background and procedural
history of this appeal in its March 11, 2016 Opinion (regarding Mother), which
we incorporate herein. See Juvenile Court Opinion (Mother), 3/11/16, at 1-5.
On February 25, 2016, Mother timely filed a Notice of Appeal along with a
Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In response, the juvenile court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) Opinion.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
J-S48044-16
1. Did the Juvenile Court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it determined that the concurrent placement
goal of reunification/adoption was no longer feasible[;] dispensed
with the concurrent placement goal of reunification, after only ten
months[;] and directed [OCY] to provide no further services
and[/]or visitation to [Mother]?
2. Did the Juvenile Court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it failed to acknowledge that [OCY] had failed to
conduct an appropriate individualized analysis of the family
support services needed by [Mother] and acted solely on its
assumptions about [Mother’s] disability?
3. Did the Juvenile Court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it failed to acknowledge that the lack of
progress and “minimal compliance” made by [Mother] were the
direct result of her disability and that [Mother] should have been
offered specialized services by [OCY,] which would have permitted
her to demonstrate and/or acquire appropriate parenting skills?
Mother’s Brief at 5.1
We first note our standard of review:
When we review a [juvenile] court’s order to change the
placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is
abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the [juvenile] court
abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s
judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not
apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound
by the [juvenile] court’s findings of fact that have support in the
record. The [juvenile] court, not the appellate court, is charged
with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses
and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these
responsibilities, the [juvenile] court is free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence. When the [juvenile] court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if
the record could also support an opposite result.
In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 532-33 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
1
Mother stated her issues somewhat differently in her Concise Statement;
nevertheless, we find the issues preserved for review.
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When considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child under
the Act, the juvenile court considers
the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan
developed for the child; the extent of progress made
towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
the original placement; the appropriateness and feasibility
of the current placement goal for the child; and, a likely
date by which the goal for the child might be achieved.
Id. at 533 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)). Moreover, “in matters of
placement for a dependent child, the [juvenile] court must be guided by the
best interests of the child--not those of his or her parents.” In re A.K., 936
A.2d at 533.
Additionally, Section 6351(f.1) of the Act requires the juvenile court to
make a determination regarding the child’s placement goal:
(f.1) Additional determination.— Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
determine one of the following:
* * *
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and
the county agency will file for termination of parental
rights in cases where return to the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian is not best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(2). Section 6351(f) sets forth several matters that
a juvenile court shall determine at a permanency hearing, including, inter
alia, “(9) [whether] the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last
22 months ….” Id. § 6351(f)(9). Upon finding that the fifteen-month
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prerequisite is satisfied, the juvenile court must determine “whether the
county agency has filed … a petition to terminate parental rights and to
identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the child ….”
Id.2
We will address Mother’s issues simultaneously, as they are related.
Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by changing
Child’s permanency goal to adoption where (1) Child had been in placement
for only ten months, which is “far short of the 15[-]month statutory
guidepost”; (2) OCY failed to develop and implement a treatment plan
tailored to Mother’s significant cognitive limitations and special needs; and (3)
the juvenile court did not consider the protections that Mother was entitled to
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, et
seq., as a disabled person who should have been provided an individualized
2
Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the significance of section
6351(f)(9) as follows: “the statutory language ensures that termination
petitions are timely filed. Specifically, if a child has been in custody for 15 of
the last 22 months, the court must inquire as to whether a termination
petition has been filed, absent the listed exceptions of subsections (i)-(iii),
including whether the parents have been provided necessary services.” In re
D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 674 (Pa. 2014); see also id. at 674-75 (stating that
“[r]equiring a court to inquire whether an agency has filed for termination
promotes timely permanency for children rather than subjecting them to
foster care drift[,]” i.e., where children languish in the foster care system
while their parents unsuccessfully attempt to regain custody). Additionally,
our Supreme Court has stated that section 6351(f)(9) does not establish a
litmus test that requires a juvenile court to alter the course of reunification
due simply to the amount of time a child has been in placement. In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
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treatment plan that “might assist her in overcoming her disability.” See
Mother’s Brief at 8, 9-14.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the juvenile court aptly discussed the
applicable law in addressing Mother’s claims, and determined that (1) her
claims did not establish any abuse of discretion; (2) the conditions that led to
the placement of Child would not or could not be remedied by Mother, even if
OCY were to provide her with further services; and (3) continued, indefinite
placement is contrary to Child’s best interests. See Juvenile Court Opinion
(Mother), 3/11/16, at 5-8. The juvenile court’s reasoning and determination
is supported by the law and the record, and we thus affirm on this basis with
regard to Mother’s issues on appeal. See id. Accordingly, we discern no
abuse of discretion by the juvenile court, and affirm its Order changing Child’s
permanency goal to adoption.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/2016
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Circulated 07/28/2016 12:33 PM
IN THE INTEREST OF: 4. u.«. l IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
.•-""'""'"' ........... ~a/~a OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
L 23 IT YE Illlll 7377 JC, JUVENILE DIVISION
A minor adjudicated dependent NO. 64 of 2015
1925(a) OPINION (APPEAL OF MOTHER)
On January 29, 2016, an order was entered in a dependency case changing the goal to
adoption for the child, A.F. The mother of A.F .• •••••••· now challenges the order
contending this court erred in several respects when it eliminated reunification as a goal.' The
record supports the finding the change of goal to adoption was established by clear and
convincing evidence and is in the best interest of the child. It is therefore requested the Superior
Court affirm the order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant's primary issue raised on appeal is as follows: that the Juvenile Court
...
committed an abuse of discretion/error of law when it determined the concurrent permanency
goal of reunification/adoption was no longer feasible and changed the goal to adoption after the
child had only been in care for ten and a half months. Appellant alleges additional time should
have been given for her to receive continued treatment and for OCY to comply with various
portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
In March 2015, the child was removed from the Appellant's care because of Appellant's
significant cognitive limitations that prevented her from parenting the child safely. Specifically,
Appellant failed to "demonstrate a basic understanding of the child's needs" and required regular
"instruction regarding feedings and hygienic needs for the child." Court Summary, 7/6/15, p. l.
On March 25, 2015, the child was adjudicated dependent. The Appellant stipulated to the facts
1
Father has also appealed the termination order. That appeal is docketed at 340 WDA 2016. The issues he raised
are addressed in a separate opinion.
1
underlying the basis for adjudication. Court Summary, 716115, p.1. A dispositional hearing took
place on April 22, 2015.
A permanency review hearing followed on July 6, 2015. At the time of this hearing,
Appellant was participating in services with Healthy Families of America, the Motherhood
Initiative, and a parenting program at her high school. However, she demonstrated minimal
understanding of the skills she was learning while visiting with her child. Appellant required
regular prompting during visits with her daughter to care for her and interact with her. Court
Summary, 7/6115, p.S, 7.
Appellant was also instructed to work with a developmental disabilities coordinator
through Erie County Care Management, and, while she did appear to be assessed for services,
she did not return to avai I herself of those services. At the time of this hearing, Appellant resided
with an indicated perpetrator of sexual abuse and had been for some time before the hearing.
Court Summary, 716/15, p.6, 7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered the child
remain in foster care. The goal of reunification remained unchanged. Permanency Review
Order, 7/8/15, p. 2.
A second review hearing was held on October 21, 2015. The caseworker testified that
though the Appellant had been compliant with her treatment, she made only minimal progress in
developing parenting skills with Healthy Families of America and the life and parenting skills
program at her school. The Appellant was still unable to meet her own needs without the
assistance of others. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10121/15, p.8-9.
Workers pointed to Appellant's limited ability to retain information as the cause of her
minimal progress. The caseworker stated that though Appellant made an effort at meetings, she
still relied heavily on the assistance of agency staff during visitation and continued to require
2
redirection on implementing "basic skills such as feeding and holding techniques." She
frequently did not or refused to give the child the proper amount of formula, despite guidance
given to help her. It was unclear whether Appellant's inability to feed the child properly was due
to an inability to read the formula container. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10/21115,
p. 32-33.
The agency worker opined that at no point in the foreseeable future would Appellant be
able to successfully and safely parent the child without assistance. Permanency Review Hearing
Transcript, 10/21/15, p.8-9. Any other programs offered might have benefitted the Appellant
for life skills purposes, but would not have benefited her with respect to reunification with her
child. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 10/21115, p.14.
Appellant continued to live with a perpetrator of sexual abuse. She also failed to follow
through with treatment by Erie County Care Management. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court ordered a concurrent goal of adoption be added to the plan. Permanency Review Hearing
Transcript, 10/21/15, p. 8; See also Court Summary, 10/21I 15, p. 5, 6.
A third review hearing took place on January 25, 2016. All court summaries and
attachments were admitted into evidence without objection. OCY requested the goal be changed
to adoption.
The testimony of agency case workers showed the Appellant had been receiving services
before her child was born through the parenting program at her school and from the Erie Family
Center as early as May and October, 2014. A case was not open with OCY at the time these
services began, but was opened shortly after the birth of the child based on a referral by the
worker at the Erie Family Center. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 1125116, p. 7-8.
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Both the caseworker from the Erie Family Center and the caseworker from Appellant's
school program shared similar concerns regarding Appellant's ability to parent and were often
present together at visitation between Appellant and child. Permanency Review Hearing
Transcript, 1 /25116, p. 29. They were primarily concerned with Appellant's ability to remember
to feed the baby, feed the baby the proper amount of formula, and remember to pay attention to
the child. Services were focused to address those concerns. Appellant once more continued to
reside with an indicated perpetrator of abuse. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 1125/16,
p.8, 29.
Though the caseworkers worked with Appellant for over a year and a half, they testified
she made no progress and was in no better position to parent the child in January. Giving her
additional time will not change the circumstances. Even when visitation was shortened to thirty
minutes due to Appellant's school schedule, Appellant still lost focus and needed constant
redirection regarding proper interaction and safety of the child. Permanency Review Hearing
Transcript, 1/25/ 16, p.12. She needed frequent instruction on feeding and how to appropriately
interact with the infant. She could not remember how to care for the child between visits. This
was attributed to Appellant's severe cognitive limitations. According to Appellant's educational
records, she has an IQ of 55, and while she made progress with personal life skills through
school, still she was unable to independently care for herself and had not progressed at all with
regard to her parenting skills. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript, 1/26116, p. 33, 37,51.
Because of the amount of time the child had been in placement, her need for permanency
and stability, and Appellant's inability to remedy any of the conditions that led to her placement,
the agency's request to change the goal to adoption was granted. A written order was entered
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January 29, 2016. Services to both parents were terminated. The child was placed in a pre-
adoptive home. Permanency Review Order, 1/29/16, p.2.
This timely appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an appeal from a decree changing a permanency goal, an appellate court
accepts the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the lower court if they are supported
by the record. In re R.J. T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). An abuse of discretion standard is used
by the appellate court.
An abuse of discretion is not found if the lower court's judgment was reasonable, the
court applied the law, and the court's action was not a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error oflaw, or insufficient evidentiary support for the
lower court's decision, the decree must stand. In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2007). In
a change of goal proceeding, the lower court must focus on the child's best interests, and not the
interests of the parents. Id. The Agency has the burden of proving the change in goal would be in
the child's best interests. In re MB., 674 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa.Super. 1996).
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Act generally requires the Office of Children and Youth ("OCY") to request
a goal change when the child has been in placement for fifteen out of twenty-two months. 42
Pa.C.S. §6351 (f)(9). The Appellant primarily asserts the court committed abuse of discretion
and/or error of law when it ordered the goal changed to adoption after the child had been in care
for ten and one half months and did not require OCY to consider any ADA mandates regarding
treatment.
5
There is nothing in the Juvenile Act, case law, or rules of procedure that prevent an
agency from requesting a goal change sooner than the prescribed fifteen out of twenty-two
month demarcation, nor is there law in Pennsylvania prohibiting the court from ordering the
agency to change the permanency goal at any time it is clear reunification is not viable and
another permanency goal for the child is more appropriate. For example, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed several lower court orders changing the permanency goal to adoption at
the dispositional phase. See In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221 (Pa.Super. 2009); In re MS., 980 A.2d
612 (Pa.Super. 2009).
The Superior Court has also held the underlying policy of the Juvenile Act is to curb an
inappropriate focus on protecting the rights of the parents when there is a risk of subjecting
children to indefinite foster care or returning them to abusive homes. In re CB., 861 A2d. 287,
295 (Pa.Super. 2004). Moreover, to accept a party's assertion the courts ought to consider the
ADA mandates within the purview of the Juvenile Act would "require the trial court" and the
Superior Court "to ignore the best interests of the child and focus instead on the needs of the
Mother." In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375, 379 (Pa. Super. 1999).
Previously, the Superior Court has shown an unwillingness to shift focus from child to
parent. Id. The safety, permanency, and the well-being of the child must take precedence over
all other considerations, including the rights of the parents. In re CB., 861 A.2d 287, 29 5 (Pa.
Super. 2004). "Once a child is adjudicated dependent, the issues of custody and continuation of
foster care are determined according to the child's best interests." In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375, 379
(Pa. Super. 1999).
Even if the Appellant qualified as an individual with a disability under the ADA, the next
relevant question would become whether OCY "provided her with reasonable acconunodations
6
to allow her to participate and receive benefits from services offered on an equal footing with
persons who are not disabled." Id. Not only has OCY provided all the support available to
enable Appellant to participate in services with them as any other person would be able to do, the
workers also explained other available programs through institutions like the Barber Center
would be geared towards helping Appellant develop additional life skills that would not be
focused on parent-child bonding or reunification. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript,
10/21/15, p. 14. Appellant already participates in school-based life skills training with a focus
on parental duties and participates with Healthy Families of America through the Erie Family
Center.
Mandating OCY to provide any additional life-skills centered programs to Appellant,
especially given her history of failure in similar programs, takes the focus off the child and shifts
the focus to the Appellant. In the context of the Juvenile Act, it is improper to change the focus
in such a way, and the Superior Court has gone as far as to say it will decline extending the ADA
to change obligations imposed by unrelated statutes, and does not believe it was the intent of
Congress to do so. In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375, 379 (Pa. Super. 1999). The portion of Appellant's
-Hi"'t
claim"OCY failed to provide her a "true opportunity" to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills
or with additional programs or services under the ADA is therefore without merit.
Appellant's contention this court committed abuse of discretion when it changed the goal
to adoption after ten and one half months is likewise without merit. It is clear reunification in this
case is not possible. Though Appellant loves her child and might make every effort to comply
with her treatment plan, it does not change the extent of her cognitive disabilities, nor the fact
she has been unable to succeed in successfully parenting because of her permanent cognitive
limitations.
7
Caseworkers testified several times Appellant needed to be reminded to give attention to
the child, and shown how to properly hold, feed, and change the baby at each visit. Workers
were also doubtful a bond had actually been established between Appellant and child. To subject
the child to continued placement and deny her the safety and stability she deserves is not in her
best interests. Given the Appellant's limited abilities, affording her additional time with services
will not change the circumstances. Permanency Review Hearing Transcript,1/25/16, p. 2. There
is no way to reasonably expect the Appellant will be able to successfully or independently parent
the child. It is therefore in the child's best interests the goal be changed to adoption.
CONCLUSION
Though the Appellant has admittedly put forth effort in order to successfully parent her
child, it is clear her cognitive limitations prevent her from doing so. Clear and convincing
evidence exists to show that subjecting the child to continued, indefinite placement is contrary to
her best interests. Her interests are best served by eliminating reunification as a goal and
allowing OCY to proceed to adoption. It is therefore respectfully requested the Superior Court
affirm the January 29, 2016 Permanency Review Order.
Dated this~
tA day of March, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
-RO-~_..~-=-R-T_(jA_~-A-M-i--#--0-A-K-, JR-. __ J.
cc: Kevin C. Jennings, Esq. (OCY)
Patricia Ambrose, Esq. (GAL)
Charles Sacco, Esq. (Attorney for Mother)
Elizabeth Brew Walbridge, Esq. (Attorney for Father)
8