COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA136
Court of Appeals No. 14CA2254
El Paso County District Court No. 09CR4453
Honorable William B. Bain, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Aaron Michael Blackwell,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN
Miller and Navarro, JJ., concur
Announced September 22, 2016
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Kimberly Penix, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Aaron Michael Blackwell appeals the district court’s order
revoking his deferred judgment for theft from an at-risk victim after
he pleaded guilty to driving after revocation prohibited (DARP) in a
later, unrelated deferred judgment agreement. Blackwell contends
that his plea in the DARP case is not sufficient to prove that he
violated a state criminal law — a condition of his deferred judgment
in this case. Because we conclude that Blackwell’s later plea to
DARP — a state criminal offense — constitutes a conviction within
the meaning of the revocation hearing statute, § 16-11-206(3),
C.R.S. 2016, we affirm the district court’s order.
I. The Deferred Judgment
¶2 Blackwell pleaded guilty to theft from an at-risk victim, and
the district court deferred the judgment against him with the
condition that he “violate no federal, state, or local criminal law.”
¶3 In a later case, Blackwell pleaded guilty to DARP, a class one
misdemeanor. The district court also deferred the judgment against
Blackwell in the DARP case.
¶4 The prosecution then filed a motion to revoke Blackwell’s
deferred judgment in the theft case based on Blackwell being
convicted of DARP.
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¶5 After a revocation hearing, the district court found that
Blackwell’s guilty plea in the DARP case showed that he had
committed DARP in violation of the terms of his deferred judgment
in the theft case. The court subsequently revoked Blackwell’s
deferred judgment.
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 The revocation hearing statute provides that the prosecution
normally has the burden to establish by a preponderance of
evidence that a defendant violated a condition of a deferred
judgment. See § 16-11-206(3). But, if the violation of the deferred
judgment is a criminal offense, the violation “must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt unless the [defendant] has been
convicted thereof in a criminal proceeding.” Id.
¶7 We must determine whether a defendant who pleads guilty to
a state criminal offense in the course of entering into a later
deferred judgment agreement has been “convicted” within the
meaning of the revocation hearing statute. To make this
determination, we are guided by common rules of statutory
interpretation.
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¶8 When interpreting a statute, our primary task is to determine
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Esquibel v. Bd. of
Educ. Centennial Sch. Dist. R-1, 2016 COA 9, ¶ 7 (citing McKinley v.
City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126, ¶ 5). To discern
legislative intent, we look first to the statutory language, giving
words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. And, in
construing the word “conviction,” the key factor to be considered is
the legislative intent behind the use of the word in the statute
involved. Hafelfinger v. Dist. Court, 674 P.2d 375, 376-77 (Colo.
1984) (citing People v. Jacquez, 196 Colo. 569, 571 n.2, 588 P.2d
871, 873 n.2 (1979)).
¶9 The current statute that authorizes the granting of a deferred
judgment mandates that the court accept the defendant’s guilty
plea before granting a deferred judgment and sentence. § 18-1.3-
102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2016. And, section 16-7-206(3), C.R.S. 2016,
provides that the court’s acceptance of such a plea “also acts as a
conviction for the offense.” Thus, when the revocation hearing
statute is read with the statutes governing deferred judgments and
acceptance of guilty pleas, the only reasonable interpretation is that
a defendant who pleads guilty to a state criminal offense in the
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course of entering into a later deferred judgment agreement has
been “convicted” within the meaning of the revocation hearing
statute.
¶ 10 In Hafelfinger, our supreme court considered whether “a plea
of guilty upon which a deferred sentence is granted constitutes a
conviction.” 674 P.2d at 376-77. The court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling that the defendant was ineligible for a personal
recognizance bond because he had earlier pleaded guilty to
dispensing a dangerous drug in the course of entering into a
deferred judgment agreement. The court reasoned that when the
statutes governing bail bonds, deferred sentences, and pleas of
guilty are read together, that was “the only reasonable
interpretation.” Id.; see Esquibel, ¶ 17 (determining the defendant
was “convicted” after he pleaded guilty to felony drug possession
under a deferred judgment agreement).
¶ 11 We review a trial court’s decision to revoke a deferred
judgment for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d
863, 866 (Colo. 1994) (“[W]hether probation should be revoked,
once a violation is found, is within the discretion of the trial
court.”). A court abuses its discretion when its “decision is
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manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” People v. Salazar,
2012 CO 20, ¶ 13.
III. Analysis
¶ 12 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in revoking Blackwell’s deferred judgment. Blackwell pleaded guilty
to DARP, which resulted in a conviction and a violation of the terms
of his deferred judgment in the theft case. § 16-11-206(3); see
Hafelfinger, 674 P.2d at 378; Esquibel, ¶¶ 17-20.
¶ 13 Yet, Blackwell contends that a guilty plea resulting in a
deferred judgment is not a conviction based on the supreme court’s
statement in Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 19, that “[a] deferred
judgment is not a judgment of conviction or a final, appealable
judgment.” We disagree. The revocation hearing statute is based
on a defendant’s being subsequently “convicted” of a crime, not
receiving a “judgment of conviction.” § 16-11-206(3). The supreme
court has made a distinction between these two terms. See
Hafelfinger, 674 P.2d at 378 (“[A] ‘conviction’ occurs upon the
acceptance by the trial court of the defendant’s plea of guilty;
whereas, a ‘judgment of conviction’ occurs, if at all, when it is
determined that the defendant has violated the conditions of the
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deferred judgment and sentence . . . .” (citing People v. Widhalm,
642 P.2d 498, 500 (Colo. 1982))).
¶ 14 Blackwell also contends that the district court did not find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated the law. The district
court, however, did not have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Blackwell violated the law because the district court’s acceptance of
Blackwell’s guilty plea to DARP amounted to a conviction. See § 16-
11-206(3).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 15 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE MILLER and JUDGE NAVARRO concur.
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