IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0540
Filed November 18, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
ERIC D. COLEMAN,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County,
Mary Ann Brown, Judge.
The State of Iowa seeks reversal of a district court order requiring
recalculation of inmate’s earned-time credit. DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant.
Eric D. Coleman, Coralville, pro se.
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PER CURIAM.
Eric D. Coleman, an offender incarcerated under the control of the
Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC), challenges its calculation of his
earned-time credit. The same legal issue is presented in Breeden v. Iowa
Department of Corrections, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2016), decided today.
Our holding in Breeden is dispositive and requires that Coleman’s
earned-time credit be recalculated at the rate of 1.2 days for each day of
good conduct. Id. at ____.
Coleman pled guilty to second-degree robbery in violation of Iowa
Code sections 711.1 and 711.3 in August of 2009 and was sentenced to
an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed ten years. He was
age seventeen when he committed the offense. Second-degree robbery is
a crime listed in Iowa Code section 902.12 (2009), that requires offenders
to serve a mandatory minimum term of seven-tenths, or seventy percent,
of their sentence before being eligible for parole or work release. The
IDOC calculated Coleman’s accumulation of earned time according to
Iowa Code section 903A.2(1), which provides,
For purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an
inmate’s sentence may be reduced, inmates shall be grouped
into the following two sentence categories:
a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which
are not subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time
of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under
section 902.12. . . . An inmate of an institution under the
control of the department of corrections who is serving a
category “A” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence
equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate
demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in
any program or placement status identified by the director to
earn the reduction. . . .
....
b. Category “B” sentences are those sentences which
are subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of
fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under
section 902.12. An inmate under the control of the
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department of corrections who is serving a category “B”
sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to
fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of good conduct by
the inmate.
The IDOC classified Coleman’s sentence as category “B” and calculated
his earned time at a rate of fifteen eighty-fifths of a day per each day
served.
On July 21, 2014, Coleman filed a pro se motion for correction of
an illegal sentence based on State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014)
(holding automatic mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution).
On October 28, the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County
resentenced Coleman to an indeterminate term not to exceed ten years,
without the mandatory minimum. The new sentencing order stated, “The
defendant is to be given credit for time served,” but did not designate an
earned-time accumulation rate. The IDOC continued to calculate his
earned time at fifteen eighty-fifths of a day per day (category “B”), rather
than the faster 1.2 days per day served (category “A”). As such,
Coleman’s tentative discharge date (TDD), the earliest date he could
discharge his sentence, assuming he had all potential earned time,
remained at June 19, 2018. Under category “A,” Coleman’s TDD would
have been December 27, 2013.
On February 15, 2016, Coleman filed a pro se motion to enlarge
the sentencing order, claiming that the IDOC was not giving him full
credit for his time served. On March 3, the district court entered an
order stating:
It is not clear from [Coleman’s] pleadings how the
court’s order has affected the calculation of time served. By
way of this order, the court will clarify its intention as to
what he should be receiving credit for.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the record should
reflect that the sentence the defendant has been serving in
this matter has been one without a mandatory minimum
sentence applicable. Even though the court did not enter an
order until October 28, 2014, removing the mandatory
minimum portion of the defendant’s sentence, the record
should reflect that the defendant should be given credit as if
he had been serving a sentence without a mandatory
minimum sentence, for the entire period of his incarceration.
The State moved to clarify this order, explaining that Coleman was
contesting his earned-time accumulation rate and asking the court to
make a specific determination in that regard. The State argued that it
was the conviction for a crime listed in 902.12—and not the mandatory
minimum imposed by that section—that controlled the earned-time
accrual rate. In support of the motion, the State attached the district
court decisions in James v. State of Iowa, No. PCCE078233 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. Oct. 19, 2015), and Breeden v. Iowa Department of Corrections,
No. CVCV049065 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 11, 2015), which ruled that
offenders resentenced after Lyle for crimes listed in 902.12 remained at
the category “B” accumulation rate, even without a mandatory minimum
sentence.
On March 22, the district court issued a ruling that Coleman’s
entire sentence was subject to the accelerated category “A” accumulation
rate. The district court primarily relied on Lowery v. State, in which the
Governor commuted an offender’s sentence by removing the mandatory
minimum. 822 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Iowa 2012). We held removal of the
mandatory minimum changed the earned-time rate to category “A” 1 after
the commutation order. Id. at 743. The district court stated,
1We noted that “it is generally well-settled that when an inmate’s sentence is
commuted, the new sentence replaces the former sentence.” Lowery, 822 N.W.2d at
741. But because the Governor made clear in the language of the commutation that
Lowery should not be eligible for release immediately, we determined Lowery was
entitled to have earned time accrue at the accelerated rate only after the date of the
commutation order. Id. at 743. “This result,” we concluded,
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Just as with a governor commuting a sentence, [Coleman’s]
new sentence replaced the old sentence as of the day of the
sentencing, giving the defendant the same status as if the
sentence he had been serving had originally been for the
corrected sentence. If the corrected sentence was the one he
originally had begun serving, he would have been serving
what would be classified as a Category A sentence, allowing
him to earn 1.2 days for each day he demonstrated good
conduct in prison.
The district court found that Coleman qualified for immediate release
under the category “A” rate, but stayed its order to allow the State to
appeal.
On March 29, we granted the State’s request for discretionary
review and stayed the district court’s ruling. Coleman remains
incarcerated.
II. Standard of Review.
“A challenge to an illegal sentence is reviewed for correction of legal
errors.” State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Iowa 2013). To the
extent Coleman’s claim raises constitutional issues, our review is
de novo. Id.
III. Disposition.
Based on our holding today in Breeden, we affirm the district
court’s ruling requiring the IDOC to recalculate Coleman's earned time at
the category “A” rate throughout his incarceration. ___ N.W.2d at ___.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
This opinion shall not be published.
_________________________
gives effect to the governor’s intention expressed in his commutation
order . . . , but also gives effect—from the date of the commutation order
forward—to the plain language of the statute which provides that
inmates serving sentences with no mandatory minimums shall
accumulate earned time at an accelerated rate.
Id.