MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Dec 13 2016, 8:43 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael J. Williams Gregory F. Zoeller
Westville, Indiana Attorney General
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Williams, December 13, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A05-1512-CR-2344
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Evan S. Roberts,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D01-1401-FB-9
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] On April 27, 2015, Michael Williams pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a serious violent felon, a Class B felony, and possession of
marijuana, a Class D felony, pursuant to a plea agreement providing for a
sentence capped at sixteen years executed. The trial court accepted the plea
agreement, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced Williams to twenty
years in the Indiana Department of Correction, with six years suspended to
probation. Williams then filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which
the trial court denied. He now pro se appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion, raising a single issue for our review, which we restate as whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to correct an erroneous
sentence. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 13, 2014, law enforcement attempted to stop a vehicle driven by
Williams. Williams refused to pull over and a chase ensued. During the
pursuit, Williams threw a bag of marijuana out of the vehicle’s window. Once
the chase ended, law enforcement discovered a loaded shotgun in the vehicle.
[3] The State charged Williams with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
violent felon, a Class B felony (“Count I”); resisting law enforcement, a Class D
felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Class D felony; and possession of
marijuana, a Class D felony (“Count IV”). Thereafter, Williams agreed to
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plead guilty to Counts I and IV in exchange for the State dismissing the
remaining charges. Specifically, the terms and conditions of the agreement
provided Williams would serve “sixteen year executed cap . . . suspend two” on
Count I. Appellant’s Appendix at 14. As to Count IV, the agreement provided
Williams would serve an executed term of three years, to be served concurrently
with Count I. The plea agreement also provided, “[B]y pleading guilty under
this agreement, [Williams] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his
right to challenge the sentence on the basis that it is erroneous . . . .” Id. at 17.
[4] At the change of plea hearing, Williams entered a guilty plea and the trial court
took the matter under advisement. On July 20, 2015, the trial court sentenced
Williams to twenty years in the Department of Correction on Count I, with
fourteen years executed and six years suspended to probation. As to Count IV,
the trial court sentenced Williams to three years in the Department of
Correction, to be served concurrently with Count I.
[5] On November 23, 2015, Williams filed a pro se motion to correct erroneous
sentence, arguing his sentence exceeded the cap set forth in the plea agreement.
The trial court denied Williams’ motion and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Williams argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him in excess
of the cap agreed to in the plea agreement. The State counters the trial court
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properly denied his motion because a motion to correct erroneous sentence is
an improper vehicle to raise such an argument. We agree with the State.
[7] We review a decision on a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of
discretion. Fry v. State, 939 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
[8] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 provides,
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
The purpose of this statute “is to provide prompt, direct access to an
uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal
sentence.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (citation omitted).
A motion to correct erroneous sentence is appropriate only when the sentencing
error is “clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of
the statutory authority. Claims that require consideration of the proceedings
before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct
sentence.” Id. at 787. Sentencing claims not facially apparent “may be raised
only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by post-conviction
proceedings.” Id. “Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus
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be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing
judgment, and the ‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should . . . be strictly applied
. . . .” Id.
[9] Here, Williams argues the plea agreement provided he would serve a maximum
of sixteen years executed and two years of probation, totaling eighteen years. 1
Therefore, he contends the trial court sentenced him in excess of the cap when
it sentenced him to fourteen years executed and six years of probation, totaling
twenty years. Although we note there may be some merit to Williams’
argument, the State is correct in asserting Williams’ argument is a request for us
to consider information, i.e. the plea agreement, beyond the face of the
sentencing order.2 Therefore, a motion to correct erroneous sentence is an
improper vehicle for Williams’ claim and such a claim is properly asserted on
direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. 3 We conclude the trial court
1
We note the State and Williams differ in their interpretation of the language in the plea agreement.
2
The State also argues Williams has waived this claim because, by entering into the plea agreement,
Williams understood he could not seek an appeal on the basis his sentence is erroneous. Although not
necessary for the purposes of this appeal, we express concern that such a provision could bar a defendant
from seeking relief from a legally erroneous sentence. As noted above, a motion to correct erroneous
sentence allows courts to examine only the face of the sentencing order for obvious error. We are therefore
hard pressed to believe a defendant can consciously waive such a claim where the sentencing order, without
any fault attributed to the defendant, may contain a prejudicial defect of which the defendant would be
unaware when entering the plea agreement.
3
Williams also argues the trial court erred in imposing costs, fees, fines, and certain conditions of probation
because they were not a part of the plea agreement. We note the trial court entered its final judgment
sentencing Williams on July 20, 2015. Williams did not directly appeal this final judgment or file a motion
to correct error within thirty days. See Dillman v. State, 16 N.E.3d 445, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting a
defendant who challenges the imposition of fees and costs was required to file either a motion to correct error
or a notice of appeal within thirty days pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 9 in order to preserve the claim on
appeal). In addition, we are not persuaded Williams could revive the claim in a motion to correct erroneous
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did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion to correct erroneous
sentence.
Conclusion
[10] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion to
correct erroneous sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.
[11] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
sentence. Even assuming, however, Williams could revive his claim, Williams did not raise this claim in his
motion. For these reasons, Williams’ argument fails.
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