MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 28 2019, 9:35 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Wayne Williams Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Wayne Williams, February 28, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1620
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Clarence D.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Murray, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G02-0104-CF-80
Friedlander, Senior Judge.
[1] In this appeal, Wayne Williams contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to correct erroneous sentence. He further contends that the trial
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court erred by failing to address his argument that the prosecuting attorney
committed perjury in the allegations set forth in the charging information for his
habitual offender enhancement. For reasons we more fully explain in this
opinion, we affirm.
[2] We begin by briefly summarizing the procedural history of this case. On April
21, 2001, Williams was attending a barbecue held at the home of his wife’s
nephew, Carlos Green. An altercation ensued. Williams pulled out a gun and
fired at Green’s chest, a shot which resulted in a fatal wound. For those actions
and his other actions at that party, Williams was charged by the State with
Green’s murder, attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon against
Green’s mother, and the State subsequently alleged him to be an habitual
offender. After the conclusion of his jury trial, Williams was found guilty of
voluntary manslaughter and criminal recklessness. He admitted to the habitual
offender allegation. The trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate
sentence of seventy-seven years, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed
on direct appeal. See Williams v. State, 45A04-0305-CR-242 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov.
26, 2003), trans. denied.
[3] Next, Williams sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and claiming prosecutorial
and police misconduct. A panel of this court affirmed the post-conviction
court’s denial of relief, concluding in pertinent part that the police reports and
other evidence needed to develop his contentions of prosecutorial and police
misconduct as respects his habitual offender adjudication had been available
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throughout his trial and appeal. We concluded that his claims had been
waived. See Williams v. State, 45A03-0701-PC-8 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2007),
trans. denied.
[4] Williams then sought permission from this Court to file a Petition for
Successive Post-Conviction Relief. That request was denied by this Court by an
order issued on November 9, 2018. See Docket of Cause No. 18A-SP-2377.
[5] Williams filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence which was denied by the
trial court. Williams brings this appeal contending that the trial court erred by
denying his claims. We pause to note that this appears to be an inappropriate
attempt to circumvent the rules by seeking successive post-conviction relief
when permission for such has not been granted by this Court.
[6] Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, Section 12 (2015) provides as follows:
(a) A petitioner may request a second, or successive, Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief by completing a properly and legibly
completed Successive Post-Conviction Relief Rule 1 Petition
Form in substantial compliance with the form appended to this
Rule. Both the Successive Post-Conviction Relief Rule 1 Petition
Form and the proposed successive petition for post-conviction
relief shall be sent to the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court,
Indiana Court of Appeals, and Tax Court.
(b) The court will authorize the filing of the petition if the
petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is
entitled to post-conviction relief. In making this determination,
the court may consider applicable law, the petition, and materials
from the petitioner’s prior appellate and post-conviction
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proceedings including the record, briefs and court decisions, and
any other material the court deems relevant.
[7] Williams had the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the allegations in
the habitual offender enhancement but instead chose to admit his status after
his conviction by jury trial. He pleaded guilty to his status as an habitual
offender, and his subsequent attempts to revive these claims have already been
deemed waived prior to the current appeal. As such, his claims have been
decided against him on appellate review. “Res judicata, whether in the form of
claim preclusion or issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to
prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by
holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their
privies.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013). Williams’ appeal
could be subject to dismissal for failure to abide by the procedure for successive
petitions for post-conviction relief. See Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1257
(Ind. 2008) (petitioner must follow procedure outlined in P-C.R. 1 (12) for filing
successive petitions or face possible dismissal of claims).
[8] Nevertheless, because the trial court denied his claims without dismissing them,
we address Williams’ allegations in his motion to correct erroneous sentence.
[9] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 (1983) provides as follows about such motions:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
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be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
[10] Our Supreme Court, in Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004), held
that the purpose of the statute is to “provide prompt, direct access to an
uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal
sentence.” On review of a trial court’s denial of such a motion, we defer to the
trial court’s factual findings and review them for an abuse of discretion. Felder
v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We will find an abuse of
discretion only when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before it. Id. The trial court’s legal conclusions, on
the other hand, are reviewed de novo. Id.
[11] The Supreme Court opinion in Robinson further informs us that a motion to
correct an erroneous sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that
are clear on the face of the “judgment imposing sentence.” 805 N.E.2d at 787.
Any claims requiring consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after
the trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. Id.
[12] Here, Williams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, for which he received
a sentence of forty-five years, enhanced by thirty years due to his habitual
offender admission and adjudication. He was sentenced to two years executed
for his conviction of criminal recklessness to be served consecutively to his
enhanced sentence for voluntary manslaughter. The sentences imposed were
within the sentencing ranges for those offenses. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3
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(1997) (voluntary manslaughter); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (1995) (fixed term of 30
years with not more than 20 years added for aggravating circumstances nor
more than ten years subtracted for mitigating circumstances); Ind. Code § 35-
50-2-8 (2001) (additional fixed term of no more than thirty years for habitual
offender adjudication); Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2 (1996) (criminal recklessness);
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (1999) (fixed term for a Class D felony of one and a half
years with no more than one and a half years added for aggravating
circumstances); Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2 (1997) (considerations for consecutive
sentencing).
[13] Williams’ claims could be dismissed outright for failure to comply with the
rules for seeking successive post-conviction relief. Nonetheless, Williams
pleaded guilty to the habitual offender adjudication. There is nothing apparent
from the face of Williams’ sentence that would establish the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Further, his
claims of police and prosecutorial misconduct with respect to his habitual
offender allegation are foreclosed by res judicata.
[14] Judgment affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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