FILED
Mar 10 2017, 9:10 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James E. Manley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James E. Manley, March 10, 2017
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
33A05-1608-MI-1865
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
Keith Butts, The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C02-1604-MI-37
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] James E. Manley (“Manley”), pro se, appeals the Henry Circuit Court’s order
dismissing his petition for writ of state habeas corpus as an unauthorized
successive petition for post-conviction relief. Manley contends that his petition
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was not an unauthorized successive petition for post-conviction relief and that,
even if it were, the Henry Circuit Court should have transferred it to his court of
conviction in Monroe County. Because Manley’s habeas petition is challenging
the validity of his convictions and sentence and because Indiana Post-
Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) requires that, under such circumstances, a trial court is
required to transfer the petition to the court where the petitioner was convicted,
we reverse the Henry Circuit Court’s dismissal of Manley’s petition and instruct
the trial court to transfer the petition to Manley’s conviction court, the Monroe
Circuit Court, where it shall be treated as a post-conviction petition.1
[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.
Issue
Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Manley’s state habeas
corpus petition as an unauthorized successive petition for post-
conviction relief.
Facts
[3] In 1997, Manley was convicted, in Monroe County, of two counts of Class A
felony child molesting and two counts of Class B felony child molesting for acts
committed against his daughter. The Monroe Circuit Court sentenced Manley
1
Upon receiving Manley’s habeas corpus petition and treating it as a post-conviction petition, Manley’s
conviction court, the Monroe Circuit Court, may apply Post-Conviction Rule 1(12), which governs
successive petitions for post-conviction relief.
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to an aggregate term of fifty-five (55) years in the Indiana Department of
Correction.
[4] Thereafter, Manley filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his convictions
in a memorandum opinion in 1999. See Manley v. State, 53A04-9806-CR-333
(Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 18. 1999). He then appealed from the denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief in 2001, and we affirmed that judgment as well. See
Manley v. State, 53A01-0103-PC-107 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2001) (holding, in
part, that Manley had waived his constitutional challenges to the child
molesting statute because he had failed to raise the issue in a motion to dismiss
prior to trial).
[5] In 2004 and again in 2006, Manley filed, with this Court, petitions seeking
permission to file a successive post-conviction petition, and our Court denied
both of his requests. In 2007, he appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion
to modify his sentence, and we affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Manley
v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[6] A few years later, in 2014, Manley appealed from the denial of a motion for
relief from judgment that he had filed in the Monroe Circuit Court. After
noting that Manley had already litigated a petition for post-conviction relief,
that he had failed to follow the procedure set forth in Indiana Post-Conviction
Rule 1(12), and that his motion equated to an unauthorized successive petition
for post-conviction relief, we dismissed his appeal. See Manley v. State, No.
53A01-1407-CR-317 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2015), trans. denied, cert. dismissed.
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[7] Subsequently, in December 2015, Manley filed, with this Court, a petition
seeking permission to file a successive post-conviction petition. Our Court
denied his request in February 2016.
[8] Thereafter, on April 11, 2016, Manley filed a pro se petition for writ of state
habeas corpus in Henry Circuit Court, which is the county where he is
incarcerated. In his petition, he argued, in part, that the child molesting statute
was unconstitutional, that he did not have a fair and impartial judge or
appellate tribunal, and that he was “erroneously sentenced[.]” (App. 9). In his
memorandum attached to his habeas petition, Manley acknowledged that he
had already had a post-conviction proceeding. Additionally, shortly after he
filed his habeas petition, Manley sent a letter to the Henry Circuit Court. In his
letter, Manley stated that the Henry Circuit Court could not transfer his motion
to the Monroe Circuit Court under Post-Conviction Rule 1 because the Court of
Appeals had already declined to authorize him to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief in February 2016.
[9] On May 20, 2016, the Henry Circuit Court directed the trial clerk to forward a
copy of Manley’s petition to the Indiana Attorney General’s Office (“the
Attorney General”) and instructed the Attorney General to file a response
within thirty days.
[10] When the Attorney General filed its response, it requested that the Henry
Circuit Court dismiss Manley’s petition, arguing that it was an unauthorized
collateral attack on his convictions and sentence. The Attorney General
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acknowledged that, under Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c), Manley’s habeas
petition challenging his convictions and sentence should be transferred to the
conviction court and treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. The
Attorney General also acknowledged that, upon such a transfer, the conviction
court could dismiss Manley’s petition because he did not have permission to file
a successive post-conviction petition pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(12).
Nevertheless, the Attorney General argued that—given Manley’s prior post-
conviction petition and the repeated lack of authorization from the Court of
Appeals to file a successive post-conviction petition—the Henry Circuit Court
should dismiss Manley’s petition because it was an unauthorized successive
petition for post-conviction relief. In other words, the Attorney General argued
that the Henry Circuit Court should disregard Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c)
because “[t]ransferring the case would merely waste resources.” (App. 32).
[11] On June 20, 2016, the Henry Circuit Court entered an order dismissing
Manley’s petition, concluding that the petition equated to an unauthorized
successive petition for post-conviction relief.2 Manley then filed a motion to
correct error, which the Henry Circuit Court denied. Manley now appeals.
2
As a secondary reason for dismissal, the Henry Circuit Court stated that the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because it “lacked the jurisdiction to review the judgment of another trial court[.]” (App. 5).
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Decision
[12] Manley contends that the Henry Circuit Court erred by dismissing his petition
for writ of state habeas corpus. Specifically, he contends that his petition was
not an unauthorized successive petition for post-conviction relief.
Alternatively, he asserts that, even if it were an unauthorized successive
petition, the Henry Circuit Court should have transferred it to his court of
conviction, the Monroe Circuit Court.
[13] INDIANA CODE § 34-25.5-1-1 provides that “[e]very person whose liberty is
restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus
to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the
restraint if the restraint is illegal.” “The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to bring the person in custody before the court for inquiry into the cause of
restraint.” Partlow v. Superintendent, Miami Correctional Facility, 756 N.E.2d 978,
980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Paul v.
State, 888 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “One is entitled to
habeas corpus only if he is entitled to his immediate release from unlawful
custody.” Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 139, 374 N.E.2d 496,
498 (1978)). “[A] petitioner may not file a writ of habeas corpus to attack his
conviction or sentence.” Id. We review the trial court’s habeas decision for an
abuse of discretion. Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[14] Here, it is apparent from Manley’s habeas petition, that he is challenging the
validity of his convictions and sentence. However, “a petitioner may not file a
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writ of habeas corpus to attack his conviction or sentence.” Partlow, 756
N.E.2d at 980. Instead, a petitioner attacking the validity of his conviction or
sentence must file a petition for post-conviction relief in the court of conviction
and not in the court of incarceration. Id.
[15] However, where, as here, a petitioner files a habeas corpus petition challenging
the validity of his conviction or sentence in the county of incarceration, Indiana
Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) provides that such habeas corpus petition is to be
transferred to the court of conviction and then treated as a petition for post-
conviction relief. Specifically, Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) provides as
follows:
This Rule does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but if a
person applies for a writ of habeas corpus in the county where
the person is incarcerated and challenges the validity of his
conviction or sentence, that court shall transfer the cause to the
court in which the conviction took place, and the latter court
shall treat it as a petition for relief under this Rule.
(Emphasis added).
[16] Thus, pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c), the Henry Circuit Court was
required to transfer Manley’s petition to the conviction court, the Monroe
Circuit Court. See, e.g., Miller v. Lowrance, 629 N.E.2d 846, 847 (Ind. 1994)
(explaining that a petitioner’s habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of
his conviction and sentence fell within the parameters of Post-Conviction Rule
1(1)(c), which required the trial court to transfer the petition to court where he
was convicted and sentenced), reh’g denied; Martin v. State, 901 N.E.2d 645, 647
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition that
challenged his convictions and sentence was required to be transferred to the
court where he was convicted and sentenced). See also Lash v. Wright, 287
N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (explaining that transfer of a habeas
petition under Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) was “mandatory” and was to be
done “without delay”).
[17] The State acknowledges that Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) “requires a
mislabeled habeas petition to be transferred to the court of conviction[.]”
(State’s Br. 17). Nevertheless, the State contends that there is, in essence, an
exception to Rule 1(1)(c) and that “transfer is required only when the petition is
properly ‘a petition for relief under’ Post-Conviction Rule 1.” (State’s Br. 17).
It asserts that Manley’s petition—which was an unauthorized successive
petition for post-conviction relief—was “by definition not ‘a petition for relief
under’ Post-Conviction Rule 1” and, as a result, the Henry Circuit Court was
not required to transfer the petition to the conviction court. (State’s Br. 17).
[18] It seems that the State is putting the cart before the horse. The plain language
of Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) rule provides that a trial court, upon receiving a
habeas petition challenging a conviction or sentence, “shall transfer the cause to
the court in which the conviction took place[.]” P-C.R. 1(1)(c). Thereafter,
when the conviction court receives the petition, that court “shall treat it as a
petition for relief under [Post-Conviction Rule 1].” Id. Thus, it is up to the
conviction court—not the habeas court—to apply Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) to
the petition and make a determination of its applicability. See Martin, 901
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N.E.2d at 647 n.2 (noting that, where the petitioner’s habeas petition indicated
that he had already filed a post-conviction petition, “the court where [the
petitioner] was convicted and sentenced may ultimately determine that Ind.
Post-Conviction Rule 1(12), which governs successive petitions for post-
conviction relief, is applicable”). Accordingly, we reverse the Henry Circuit
Court and remand with instructions to transfer Manley’s petition to the Monroe
Circuit Court.
[19] Reversed and remanded.3
Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
3
We decline to review Manley’s arguments regarding the merits of his petition. We also decline the State’s
request to impose a $250 sanction and to impose filing restrictions.
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