Operton v. Labor & Industry Review Commission

2017 WI 46

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2015AP1055
COMPLETE TITLE: Lela M. Operton,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Labor and Industry Review Commission,
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner,
Walgreen Co. Illinois,
Defendant.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
369 Wis. 2d 166, 880 N.W.2d 169
(2016 WI App 37 – Published)

OPINION FILED: May 4, 2017
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: November 10, 2016

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Dane
JUDGE: John C. Albert

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs, joined by BRADLEY, A.
W., J. (opinion filed).
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (opinion filed).
BRADLEY, R. G., J. concurs, joined by GABLEMAN,
J. and KELLY, J. (opinion filed).
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there was a brief
by William Sherlin Sample and Labor & Industry Review
Commission, Madison, and oral argument by William Sherlin Sample

For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Marilyn
Townsend, and Law Offices of Marilyn Townsend, Madison, and oral
argument by Marilyn Townsend.
 For Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association,
a brief was filed by Victor Forberger, Madison.

For Amicus Curiae Wisconsin State AFL-CIO, a brief was
filed by Matthew R. Robbins, Sara J. Geenen and The Previant Law
Firm, Milwaukee.

2
 2017 WI 46
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2015AP1055
(L.C. No. 2014CV3050)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Lela M. Operton,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
FILED
Labor and Industry Review Commission, MAY 4, 2017

Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court

Walgreen Co. Illinois,

Defendant.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed and

cause remanded.

¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. This is a review of

a published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a circuit

court order that affirmed a determination by the Labor and

Industry Review Commission (LIRC).2 LIRC determined that Lela

Operton (Operton) was ineligible for unemployment benefits

because she was terminated for substantial fault.
1
Operton v. LIRC, 2016 WI App 37, 369 Wis. 2d 166, 880
N.W.2d 169.
2
The Honorable John C. Albert of Dane County presided.
 No. 2015AP1055

¶2 We conclude that LIRC incorrectly denied Operton

unemployment benefits. Operton was entitled to unemployment

benefits because her actions do not fit within the definition of

substantial fault as set forth in Wis. Stat.

§ 108.04(5g)(a)(2013-14)3. Stated more fully, Operton was

terminated for committing "One or more inadvertent errors"

during the course of her employment, and therefore pursuant to

Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., she was not terminated for

substantial fault. We further conclude that, as a matter of

law, Operton's eight accidental or careless cash-handling errors

over the course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions were

inadvertent.

¶3 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand

to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment compensation

Operton is owed.

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The following undisputed facts, unless otherwise

noted, are based on the findings of the Department of Workforce
Development's (DWD) administrative law judge (ALJ) that LIRC

adopted. From July 17, 2012 to March 24, 2014, Operton worked

as a full-time service clerk for Walgreens. Operton's

employment sometimes entailed more than one hundred cash-

handling transactions in a day during the twenty months she was

3
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

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 No. 2015AP1055

employed full-time by Walgreens. She completed an estimated

80,000 cash-handling transactions4 throughout her employment.

¶5 During her period of employment, Operton made various

cash-handling errors. First, on October 19, 2012, Operton

accepted a Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) check for $8.67

when the check should have been for $5.78. As a result,

Walgreens lost $2.89 and gave Operton a verbal warning as

punishment for her mistake.

¶6 Next, on February 12, 2013, Operton accepted a WIC

check for $14.46, but did not get the customer's signature on

the check. On March 6, 2013, she gave a $16.73 check back to a

customer, and Walgreens suffered a $16.73 monetary loss as a

result. Walgreens was unable to process these two checks and

gave Operton a written warning for these two errors.

¶7 A few months later, Operton took a WIC check for

$27.63 before the date on which it was valid. Walgreens was

unable to process the check, and Operton received a final

written warning.
¶8 On January 1, 2014, Operton returned a WIC check for

$84.95 back to a customer that the customer had tried to use to

purchase $84.95 worth of goods. Walgreens suffered a monetary

loss of $84.95 because of this error and gave Operton an

additional final written warning. And, on January 29, 2014,

Operton received another final written warning as well as a two-

4
Neither side disputes that this is roughly the number of
cash-handling transactions that Operton completed.

3
 No. 2015AP1055

day suspension after she accepted a check for $6.17 even though

it was valid for $6.00, thereby causing Walgreens to lose

seventeen cents. Soon after, a customer attempted to pay for

$9.26 worth of items using a food share debit card, but the

customer left the store without completing the transaction on

the pin pad, which caused Walgreens to suffer a monetary loss of

$9.26. Operton was issued another final written warning, which

stated that any additional cash-handling errors would lead to

her termination.

¶9 Furthermore, on March 22, 2014, Operton allowed a

customer to use a credit card to purchase $399.27 worth of

items, but did not check the customer's identification in

violation of Walgreen's policy that employees must check a

customer's identification on credit card purchases over $50. As

a result, Walgreens suffered a monetary loss of $399.27.

Walgreens later found out that the credit card was stolen when a

manager was contacted by police.

¶10 As a result, on March 24, 2014, Walgreens terminated
Operton's employment. Walgreens indicated that Operton was

terminated due to multiple cash-handling errors as well as her

inability to improve despite the accompanying warnings.

Walgreens did not contend that any of Operton's errors were

intentional or malicious.

¶11 After being terminated, Operton filed for unemployment

benefits. Walgreens contested her request and contended that

she was terminated due to an inability to perform her job. And,

4
 No. 2015AP1055

initially, the DWD denied Operton unemployment benefits based on

misconduct.

¶12 Operton appealed and an ALJ for the DWD held an

evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the ALJ concluded that

Operton was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The ALJ found

that there was "no evidence that the employee intentionally or

willfully disregarded the employer's interests by continuing to

make cash-handling errors. Additionally, her actions were not

so careless or negligent so as to manifest culpability or

wrongful intent."5 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Operton

had not committed "misconduct connected with her employment."6

¶13 However, the ALJ denied Operton unemployment benefits

and concluded that Operton was terminated for substantial fault.

The ALJ reasoned that Operton "did not dispute that the

transactions for which she was given disciplinary action

occurred, nor did she provide any testimony to establish that

she did not have reasonable control over the actions that led to

her discharge. She was aware of the employer's policies,
including the cash-handling and WIC check procedures, but

continued to make cash-handling errors resulting in actual

financial loss to the employer, after receiving multiple

warnings."7

5
In the matter of Lela Operton, Hearing No. 14001606MD
(June 4, 2014).
6
Id.
7
Id.

5
 No. 2015AP1055

¶14 On September 19, 2014, LIRC adopted the findings and

conclusions of the ALJ. Referring to the instance in which

Operton failed to check an individual's identification when

processing a credit card payment, LIRC stated: "This major

infraction, taken together with the final warning regarding

earlier cash transactions, persuades the commission that the

employee's discharge was due to substantial fault."8

¶15 The circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision. In doing

so, the circuit court deferred to LIRC in its entirety.

¶16 The court of appeals set aside LIRC's decision. The

court concluded that LIRC "erred in its construction and

application of 'substantial fault' to the facts presented."9 The

court of appeals reasoned that LIRC was owed no deference, and

therefore de novo review was appropriate. Next, the court

concluded, consistent with Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a), that an

employee's multiple errors do not automatically transform the

errors from inadvertent into intentional.10

¶17 This court granted LIRC's petition for review. We now
affirm the court of appeals and remand to LIRC to determine the

amount of unemployment compensation Operton is owed.

8
Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC,
September 19, 2014).
9
Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶1.
10
Id., ¶32.

6
 No. 2015AP1055

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶18 "When there is an appeal from a LIRC determination, we

review LIRC's decision rather than the decision of the circuit

court." Masri v. LIRC, 2014 WI 81, ¶20, 356 Wis. 2d 405, 850

N.W.2d 298. "LIRC's findings of fact are upheld if they are

supported by substantial and credible evidence." Brauneis v.

LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶14, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635 (citing

Hagen v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 23, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997)).

¶19 In contrast, this court is "not bound by an agency's

interpretation of a statute." Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196

Wis. 2d 650, 659, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995). However, "depending on

the circumstances, an agency's interpretation of a statute is

entitled to one of the following three levels of deference:

great weight deference, due weight deference or no deference."

Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶14, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759

N.W.2d 571.

¶20 "Which level is appropriate 'depends on the
comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the

court and the administrative agency.'" UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201

Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quoting State ex rel.

Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449

(1994)). "Our basis for giving even due weight deference to an

agency's statutory interpretation is bottomed on two required

assumptions: the statute is one that the agency was charged

with administering and the agency has at least some expertise in
the interpretation of the statute in question." Racine Harley-
7
 No. 2015AP1055

Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86,

¶107, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184 (Roggensack, J.,

concurring).

¶21 "In according due weight deference, we defer to an

agency's statutory interpretation only when we conclude that

another interpretation of the statute is not more reasonable

than that chosen by the agency." Id., ¶105. As such, under due

weight deference, the court is tasked with determining whether

there is a more reasonable interpretation of the statute. "In

order to decide that question, we make a comparison between the

agency's interpretation and alternate interpretations. This

comparison requires us to construe the statute ourselves." Id.

¶22 "We note here that there is little difference between

due weight deference and no deference, since both situations

require us to construe the statute ourselves. In so doing, we

employ judicial expertise in statutory construction, and we

embrace a major responsibility of the judicial branch of

government, deciding what statutes mean." Cty. of Dane, 2009 WI
9, ¶19 (internal quotations omitted).

¶23 In the present case, the level of deference we afford

LIRC is inconsequential as LIRC did not provide an articulated

interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04 in denying Operton

unemployment benefits.11 LIRC adopted the conclusions of the

11
It is not entirely clear what role the substance of an
agency's interpretation does or should play in determining the
level of deference. Many of our cases discussing the levels of
deference focus not on the presence or substance of an agency's
interpretation; rather, they focus on the institutional
(continued)
8
 No. 2015AP1055

DWD's ALJ. But the ALJ did not describe its interpretation of

the statute at issue, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a).

¶24 Specifically, there are three types of actions

exempted from the definition of substantial fault. However, the

ALJ concluded that Operton's conduct did not fall within any of

these categories without reasoning through each provision

individually. Importantly, the ALJ never examined Operton's

errors to determine if the errors were "inadvertent" under Wis.

Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2.12 The ALJ stated that "Operton was aware

of the employer's policies, including the cash-handling and WIC

check procedures, but continued to make cash-handling errors

resulting in financial loss to the employer, after receiving

capabilities of the agency as well as factors that pertain to
the nature of the legal issue before the court. For this
reason, perhaps our standard of review analysis in cases
involving an agency's interpretation of a statute should include
a threshold determination of whether the agency has articulated
its interpretation of the statute. If the agency has not
provided the court with an articulated interpretation of the
statute, then the level of deference the agency is afforded is
not at issue; we simply interpret and apply the statute.
However, if the agency provided an articulated interpretation of
the statute, we would proceed under our well-established
framework to determine the level of deference to which the
agency is entitled. Such a requirement seems intuitive.
Nevertheless, we need not address this tension for purposes of
the present case.
12
As discussed more in depth below, Wis. Stat.
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. exempts inadvertent errors by an employee from
the type of conduct included in substantial fault.

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 No. 2015AP1055

multiple warnings."13 It is unclear which prong of Wis. Stat.

§ 108.04(5g)(a) the ALJ was considering.

¶25 LIRC's decision adopting the findings and conclusions

of the ALJ provided no clarification. Importantly, LIRC also

did not discuss whether the errors that Operton committed were

inadvertent and therefore a type of error exempted from the

definition of substantial fault. LIRC merely stated:

The employee did not offer any explanation for not
checking the ID which would lead the commission to
conclude that she lacked the ability to conform her
conduct to the employer's reasonable requirement to
check ID for large credit card transactions. This
major infraction, taken together with the final
warning regarding earlier cash transactions, persuades
the commission that the employee's discharge was due
to substantial fault.[14]
Absent from this reasoning is any discussion of "inadvertent

errors" or the conduct the legislature explicitly exempted from

the definition of substantial fault.

¶26 Accordingly, LIRC did not provide an articulated

interpretation of the statute that it then applied. As such,

whether we afford LIRC due weight deference or no deference is
of no consequence. See deBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson, 2011 WI

64, ¶36, 335 Wis. 2d 599, 804 N.W.2d 658 ("However, we agree

with the court of appeals that we need not decide the applicable

13
In the matter of Lela Operton, Hearing No. 14001606MD
(June 4, 2014).
14
Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC,
September 19, 2014).

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 No. 2015AP1055

standard of review here because LIRC's statutory interpretation

and application is unreasonable, and therefore, it will not

withstand any level of deference." (citation omitted)).

Therefore, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 108.04 under well-

established principles of statutory interpretation to clearly

explain the law.

B. Statutory Interpretation, General Principles

¶27 It is axiomatic that "the purpose of statutory

interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it

may be given its full, proper, and intended effect." State ex

rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271

Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. "We assume that the legislature's

intent is expressed in the statutory language." Id. For this

reason, "statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of

the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we

ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" Id., ¶45 (quoting Seider v.

O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).

"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or

phrases are given their technical or special definitional

meaning." Id., ¶45.

¶28 "Context is important to meaning." Id., ¶46.

Accordingly, "statutory language is interpreted in the context

in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in

relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related

statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable
results." Id. (citations omitted).
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 No. 2015AP1055

¶29 Moreover, we need not consult extrinsic sources of

interpretation if there is no ambiguity in the statute. Id.

And, "a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being

understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more

senses." Id., ¶47 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28,

¶19, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656). After all, "the court is

not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the

statute." Id. (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153

N.W.2d 18 (1967)).

¶30 These principles guide our interpretation and

application of Wis. Stat. § 108.04 in the present case.

C. LIRC'S Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)

¶31 Wisconsin's unemployment compensation statutes embody

a strong public policy in favor of compensating the unemployed.

This policy is codified in Wis. Stat. § 108.01, which provides:

"In good times and in bad times unemployment is a heavy social

cost, directly affecting many thousands of wage earners. Each

employing unit in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this
social cost, connected with its own irregular operations, by

financing benefits for its own unemployed workers." Wis. Stat.

§ 108.01(1).

¶32 Consistent with this policy, Wis. Stat. ch. 108 is

"liberally construed to effect unemployment compensation

coverage for workers who are economically dependent upon others

in respect to their wage-earning status." Princess House, Inc.

v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330 N.W.2d 169 (1983).

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 No. 2015AP1055

¶33 Nevertheless, not all employees are entitled to

unemployment benefits. Under Wis. Stat. § 108.04, an individual

may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

¶34 In 2013, the legislature changed the standard an

employer must meet to disqualify an employee from receiving

benefits. The legislative amendment created a two-tier system

for determining when an employee is disqualified from receiving

unemployment benefits. See Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5) & (5g). The

first tier, disqualification for misconduct, existed prior to

these amendments and is codified in § 108.04(5). This provision

operates to prevent any employee discharged for misconduct from

obtaining unemployment benefits. The legislature defined

misconduct as:

one or more actions or conduct evincing such willful
or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is
found in deliberate violations or disregard of
standards of behavior which an employer has a right to
expect of his or her employees, or in carelessness or
negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest
culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design of equal
severity to such disregard, or to show an intentional
and substantial disregard of an employer's interests,
or an employee's duties and obligations to his or her
employer.
§ 108.04(5). The statute then provides examples of several

actions that constitute misconduct. § 108.04(5)(a)-(g). If an

employee is terminated as a result of any of the statutorily

delineated actions or under the general definition of

misconduct, then the employee's termination was for misconduct,

and the employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits.

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 No. 2015AP1055

¶35 After the legislative amendments to the unemployment

benefits statutes in 2013,15 an employee who has not committed

misconduct may nevertheless be ineligible for unemployment

compensation. Stated otherwise, when an employee's conduct does

not rise to the level of misconduct, the employee may be denied

unemployment benefits if the employee was terminated for

substantial fault. See Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g). The statute

provides:

An employee whose work is terminated by an employing
unit for substantial fault by the employee connected
with the employee's work is ineligible to receive
benefits until 7 weeks have elapsed since the end of
the week in which the termination occurs and the
employee earns wages after the week in which the
termination occurs equal to at least 14 times the
employee's weekly benefit rate under s. 108.05(1) in
employment or other work covered by the unemployment
insurance law of any state or the federal government.
For purposes of requalification, the employee's
benefit rate shall be the rate that would have been
paid had the discharge not occurred.
§ 108.04(5g)(a).

¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(5g) defines substantial fault
broadly. It includes "acts or omissions of an employee over

which the employee exercised reasonable control and which

violate reasonable requirements of the employee's employer."

Id. However, the legislature did not disqualify every employee

who commits such errors from receiving unemployment benefits.

15
Though enacted in 2013, these amendments became effective
on January 5, 2014.

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 No. 2015AP1055

¶37 Instead, the legislature provided three types of

conduct that are explicitly exempt from the definition of

substantial fault. Under the statute, substantial fault does

not include:

1. One or more minor infractions of rules unless
an infraction is repeated after the employer warns the
employee about the infraction.

2. One or more inadvertent errors made by the
employee.

3. Any failure of the employee to perform work
because of insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a). Accordingly, if an employee is

terminated for conduct that falls within any of the types of

actions described by the legislature in para. (a), an employee's

termination was not due to the "substantial fault" of the

employee. § 108.04(5g)(a)1-3.

¶38 The burden is on the employer to show that the

termination was due to the substantial fault of the employee.

This is consistent with our past cases interpreting the

unemployment benefits statutes in which we have held that "the

party (the employer here) resisting payment of benefits has the

burden of proving that the case comes within the disqualifying

provision of the law. . . ." Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, ¶22; see

also Consolidated Const. Co., Inc. v. Casey, 71 Wis. 2d 811,

820, 238 N.W.2d 758 (1976) (reasoning the burden is on the

employer to show that "some disqualifying provision . . . should

bar the employee's claim." (citing Kansas City Star Co. v. ILHR
Dep't, 60 Wis. 2d 591, 602, 211 N.W.2d 488 (1973)).

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 No. 2015AP1055

¶39 Each of the provided-for exceptions are similar in

nature insofar as they remove a type of conduct from what is

considered substantial fault. Specifically, the statute exempts

from the definition of substantial fault conduct that suggests

the employee was prone to accidental errors or simply unable to

adequately perform his or her job.

¶40 A review of the three types of actions the legislature

exempted from substantial fault gives context to the definition

of substantial fault. Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. removes

minor infractions from the type of conduct that is substantial

fault, unless the employee had previously been warned about the

infraction. An analysis of the proposed changes by the DWD

states that this exception was intended to exempt "[m]inor

violations of rules unless employee repeats the violation after

receiving a warning." Department of Workforce Development,

Analysis of Proposed UI Law Change, D12-01 (October 24, 2012).

As such, employees who are terminated for a repetitive type of

minor violation are not at substantial fault for their
termination. If, however, the employee is warned about minor

violations of an employer's rules and continues to commit the

same violation, then the employee's termination may be due to

the substantial fault of the employee.

¶41 Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)3. provides that

an employee was not at substantial fault for his or her

termination if the employee was incapable of performing the work

the employment required. By its plain language, this provision

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 No. 2015AP1055

includes employees who are terminated for a lack of skill as

well as employees who are not able to master job performance.

¶42 Operton does not contend that her conduct is exempt

from substantial fault under either Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1.

or § 108.04(5g)(a)3. Rather, Operton contends that her conduct

does not fall within the definition of substantial fault because

the errors for which she was discharged were "inadvertent"

errors.

¶43 Accordingly, at issue in the present case is LIRC's

interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., which exempts

from substantial fault, "One or more inadvertent errors made by

the employee." As discussed above, LIRC's decision contains no

articulated interpretation of this subparagraph. Accordingly,

we determine the proper meaning of the statutory provision in

order to apply the law.

¶44 Under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., an employee's

termination is not for substantial fault if the termination

resulted from one or more inadvertent errors. Inadvertence is
defined as "[a]n accidental oversight; the result of

carelessness." Inadvertence, Black's Law Dictionary, 827 (9th

ed. 2009); see also Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Kaiser, 27

Wis. 2d 571, 577, 135 N.W.2d 247 (1965) (concluding that "an

inadvertent act of omission" was only "passive negligence" or

"the failure to do something that should have been done"). The

DWD's comment about these substantial fault provisions explained

that this paragraph exempts "[u]nintentional mistakes made by
the employee" from the definition of substantial fault.
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 No. 2015AP1055

Department of Workforce Development, Analysis of Proposed UI Law

Change, D12-01 (October 24, 2012). Consequently, the words of

the statute require courts to examine the circumstances

surrounding an employee's error to determine if it was careless

or unintentional.16

¶45 It is important to view Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2.

in context to ascertain the types of conduct to which it

applies. Notably, § 108.04(5g)(a)1. makes a distinction that

§ 108.04(5g)2. does not. Specifically, § 108.04(5g)(a)1.

provides that one or more minor infractions does not constitute

substantial fault unless an infraction is repeated and the

employer has previously warned the employee about the

infraction. In contrast, § 108.04(5g)(a)2. contains a different

definition. There, an employer's warning is not dispositive of

whether errors were inadvertent under § 108.04(5g)(a)2. That is

not to say an employer's warning can never be relevant to

whether an employee's error was inadvertent. However, an

employee who is warned about an inadvertent error is not
necessarily terminated for substantial fault even if the

employee subsequently makes another error.

¶46 Finally, the statute does not state whether there is a

limitation on the number of inadvertent errors an employee may

commit before the employee's errors are no longer inadvertent.

16
This definition of inadvertent is not inconsistent with
the way in which the court of appeals defined inadvertent in
Easterling v. LIRC, 2017 WI App 18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d
___.

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 No. 2015AP1055

However, we need not determine if a numerical limit exists.

Under the facts of this case, it suffices to interpret the

statute to mean that multiple inadvertent errors, even if the

employee has been warned about the errors, does not necessarily

constitute substantial fault.

D. Application of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)

¶47 In the present case, we must determine whether

Operton's errors are exempted from the statutory definition of

substantial fault. Specifically, we must determine whether

Operton was terminated by Walgreens for "one or more inadvertent

errors" during the course of her employment. We conclude that

she was, and therefore her actions are exempted from the

definition of substantial fault, and she is entitled to

unemployment compensation.

¶48 At the outset, we note that LIRC's findings of fact

within its misconduct analysis support our conclusion. LIRC

found that none of Operton's errors was intentional or willful.

Specifically, LIRC found that "there is no evidence that the
employee intentionally or willfully disregarded the employer's

interests by continuing to make cash handling errors."17

Moreover, LIRC also found that Operton's "actions were not so

careless or negligent so as to manifest culpability or wrongful

intent."18 As discussed below, there is nothing in the record
17
Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC,
September 19, 2014) (adopting DWD administrative law judge's
findings).
18
Id.

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 No. 2015AP1055

that suggests these findings are erroneous. Accordingly, LIRC's

factual findings support our conclusion that Operton's conduct

falls within the "one or more inadvertent errors" provision, and

therefore was the type of conduct the legislature exempted from

the definition of substantial fault.

¶49 However, despite these findings, LIRC concluded that

Operton was not entitled to unemployment compensation because

she was terminated from Walgreens for substantial fault.19 LIRC

cited Operton's eight cash-handling errors and reasoned that she

was aware of Walgreen's procedures but continued to make errors.

¶50 However, Operton's eight cash-handling errors were not

so egregious as to warrant the conclusion that the errors were

transformed from inadvertent to reckless or intentional under

the facts of this case. Her errors occurred over a 21-month

time period when Operton completed approximately 80,000 cash-

handling transactions. Accordingly, we conclude that Operton's

eight accidental or careless errors were, as a matter of law,

"inadvertent errors" because Operton made these errors over the
course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions during a 21-month

period.

¶51 The length of time between Operton's errors supports

this conclusion. Operton went months without making an error.

19
We agree with LIRC that Operton's actions fall within the
general definition of substantial fault before the exceptions
are considered. Operton exercised reasonable control over the
cash-handling transaction, and Walgreens' expectation that she
handle such transactions properly was reasonable.

20
 No. 2015AP1055

For example, after Operton's cash-handling error on October 19,

2012, she did not commit another error until February 12, 2013.

Likewise, after her cash-handling error on July 26, 2013, she

did not commit another error until January 1, 2014. Therefore,

there were substantial periods of time in which Operton

performed the duties of her job error-free.

¶52 Moreover, Operton was not repeatedly making the same

error.20 Yes, the errors were similar in nature; all of the

errors were cash-handling mistakes. Yet, for the most part,

Operton violated different rules or procedures each time.

Operton's first error occurred when she accepted a WIC check for

$8.67 worth of items even though the check was worth only $5.78.

Operton committed a different type of error when she accidently

gave a check back to a customer who had made a purchase for

which the check was to serve as payment. This was the only time

during her employment when she made this type of error. And, on

a different occasion, a customer left without finishing the

transaction on the pin pad. Again, this was not an error
Operton made more than once. Finally, the error that she was

ultimately terminated for——not checking identification of an

individual using a credit card for a purchase over $50——was a

different type of error than those she had previously made.

20
It is worth noting that LIRC found that Operton was a
conscientious employee, and her supervisor offered to serve as a
reference for her following her termination from Walgreens.

21
 No. 2015AP1055

¶53 Accordingly, the length of Operton's employment, the

number of transactions Operton handled throughout her

employment, and the variety of the errors she committed compels

the conclusion that she was not terminated from Walgreens for

substantial fault. While all of the errors fell within the same

general cash-handling duties of her employment, the errors were,

nevertheless, inadvertent.

¶54 Consequently, as a matter of law, Operton's errors are

the type of conduct the legislature intended to exempt from

substantial fault.21 And, as a result, the LIRC improperly

denied Operton unemployment benefits.

III. CONCLUSION

¶55 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that LIRC

incorrectly denied Operton unemployment benefits. Operton was

entitled to unemployment benefits because her actions did not

fit within the definition of substantial fault as set forth in

Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g). Stated more fully, Operton was

terminated for committing "One or more inadvertent errors"
during the course of her employment, and therefore pursuant to

Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., she was not terminated for

substantial fault. We further conclude that, as a matter of

law, Operton's eight accidental or careless cash-handling errors

21
We leave open whether there is a point at which the
number of errors that seem inadvertent in isolation cease to be
inadvertent when viewed in their totality. Because we conclude
that, under the facts of this case, Operton's eight errors were
inadvertent, we need not reach this issue.

22
 No. 2015AP1055

over the course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions were

inadvertent.

¶56 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand

to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment compensation

Operton is owed.

By the Court.—The court of appeals is affirmed, and the

cause is remanded to the Labor and Industry Review Commission.

23
 No. 2015AP1055.ssa

¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). Wisconsin

was the first state in the nation to have an unemployment

compensation law.1 We should get this decision right.

¶58 I agree with the court's mandate. The employer has

the burden of proving that Lela Operton is not eligible for

unemployment benefits. It has not met this burden. Lela

Operton wins.

¶59 I do not join the majority opinion for two principal

reasons: (1) This is a "no deference" case.2 (2) The majority

opinion injects extra-statutory considerations into its analysis

of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2.

(1)

¶60 This is a "no deference" case. The court of appeals

got it right: De novo review is appropriate because LIRC "is

applying a new statute to a new concept." Operton v. LIRC, 2016

WI App 37, ¶20, 369 Wis. 2d 166, 880 N.W.2d 169.3 This court

1
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wisconsin State AFL-CIO; Brief
of Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association.
2
I have difficulty with footnote 12 of the majority
opinion. I do not understand the nature and scope of the
majority opinion's reference to the "facts that pertain to the
nature of the legal issue" or to the "substance of an agency's
interpretation," which it refers to as a "threshold question."
Nothing suggestive of this remark has been raised or briefed in
the instant case.
3
See also Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State, Div. of
Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶20, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 565–66,
717 N.W.2d 184 (footnotes omitted):

Thus, due weight deference and no deference to an
agency's interpretation of a statute are similar.
(continued)
1
 No. 2015AP1055.ssa

independently decides how to interpret Wis. Stat.

§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. Regardless of the deference issue, LIRC

erred.

(2)

¶61 The majority opinion's analysis of Wis. Stat.

§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. significantly strays from the statutory text.

It injects two extra-statutory considerations into its analysis

of § 108.04(5g)(a)2.

¶62 The first statutory misstep is that the majority

opinion adds the idea of a "warning" to Wis. Stat.

§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. The court of appeals got it right, concluding

that "[t]he ALJ and LIRC erred in merging the 'warning'

component set forth in the 'infraction' exception in

§ 108.04(5g)(a)1. with the 'inadvertent error' exception in

§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. . . . Inadvertent errors, warnings or no

warnings, never meet the statutory definition of substantial

fault." Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶¶24, 28.

Under both due weight deference and no deference, the
reviewing court may adopt, without regard for the
agency's interpretation, what it views as the most
reasonable interpretation of the statute. When due
weight deference is accorded an agency, however, a
reviewing court will not reverse the agency's
statutory interpretation when an alternative
interpretation is equally reasonable. In contrast, in
a no deference review of an agency's statutory
interpretation, the reviewing court merely benefits
from the agency's determination and may reverse the
agency's interpretation even when an alternative
statutory interpretation is equally reasonable to the
interpretation of the agency.

2
 No. 2015AP1055.ssa

¶63 Although the majority opinion concedes that the

"inadvertent errors" language in § 108.04(5g)(a)2. (in contrast

with the language in § 108.04(5g)(a)1.)4 contains no language

regarding warnings to employees, the majority opinion tells

readers, with a straight face, that "an employer's warnings" are

"relevant" in § 108.04(5g)(a)2. Majority op., ¶45.

¶64 I agree with Judge Lundsten's concurrence in the court

of appeals: "Warnings are not relevant under the 'inadvertent

errors' alternative." Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶45 (Lundsten,

J., concurring).

¶65 The second statutory misstep occurs when the majority

opinion "leave[s] open whether there is a point at which the

number of errors that seem inadvertent in isolation cease to be

inadvertent when viewed in their totality. . . . " Majority

op., ¶54 n.21. By reserving this question, and thus including

this extra-statutory consideration in its analysis, see majority

op., ¶¶51-53, the majority opinion once again performs a

statutory analysis that is not tethered to the statutory
language.

4
Compare Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. (Substantial fault
does not include "[o]ne or more minor infractions of rules
unless an infraction is repeated after the employer warns the
employee about the infraction.") (emphasis added) with
§ 108.04(5g)(a)2. (Substantial fault does not include "[o]ne or
more inadvertent errors made by the employee."). See also
Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶45 (Lundsten, J., concurring) ("This
omission [of warnings], on the heels of express warning language
in the rules infractions alternative, supports the conclusion
that warnings are not relevant under the 'inadvertent errors'
"alternative.").

3
 No. 2015AP1055.ssa

¶66 The statutory language provides that substantial fault

does not include "one or more inadvertent errors . . . ." Wis.

Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. According to this text, the

"inadvertent errors" analysis contains no numerical limits.

¶67 I agree with Judge Lundsten's concurrence in the court

of appeals: "[T]he statute tells us that, if all we have is

repeated . . . 'inadvertent errors,' we do not have 'substantial

fault.'"5

¶68 These missteps demonstrate that the majority opinion

does not apply the rule that the unemployment compensation law

is to be "liberally construed to effect unemployment

compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent

upon others in respect to their wage-earning status." Princess

House, Inc. v. DILHR, 111 Wis. 2d 46, 62, 330 N.W.2d 169 (1983).

¶69 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that Lela

Operton prevails, but I do not join the majority opinion.

¶70 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH

BRADLEY joins this opinion.

5
Operton, 369 Wis. 2d 166, ¶43 (Lundsten, J., concurring).

4
 No. 2015AP1055.akz

¶71 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (concurring). I join

the court's opinion. I write separately to make a brief

observation about agency deference. While the subject of agency

deference may currently be a "hot button" issue, the law in

Wisconsin on the subject is well-established: under proper

circumstances this court will defer, to varying degrees, to an

agency's interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Wisconsin

Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶¶47-50, 311

Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95. The parties in this case did not

ask the court to address whether changes to that approach are

warranted. There is little doubt that ending the court's

practice of according deference to agency interpretations of

statutes would constitute a sea change in Wisconsin law, and

many interested parties would likely wish to weigh in.

Consequently, I would want to see the issue set forth, briefed,

and argued before expressing an opinion on the merits of such a

change.

¶72 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

1
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¶73 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (concurring). Although I

join the majority opinion, I write separately to question

whether this court's practice of deferring to agency

interpretations of statutes comports with the Wisconsin

Constitution, which vests judicial power in this court——not

administrative agencies. The Labor and Industry Review

Commission (LIRC) asks this court to give "great weight"

deference to its interpretation of the term "substantial fault"

in Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a) (2013-14). Because "LIRC did not

provide an articulated interpretation of § 108.04 in denying

Operton unemployment benefits," the majority properly conducts

an independent interpretation of § 108.04 without giving

deference to LIRC. Majority op., ¶¶23-26. The doctrine of

deference to agencies' statutory interpretation is a judicial

creation that circumvents the court's duty to say what the law

is and risks perpetuating erroneous declarations of the law.

Because the court in this case fulfills its interpretive duty, I

join the majority opinion but urge the court to reconsider its
decades-long abdication of this core judicial function.

¶74 This court's current deference framework arises out of

two cases from the mid-1990s. In Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC,

196 Wis. 2d 650, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), the court identified

"three distinct levels of deference to agency interpretations:

great weight, due weight and de novo review." Id. at 659-60

(citing Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 485 N.W.2d 256

(1992)). "Great weight" deference applies when four conditions
are met:

1
 No. 2015AP1055.rgb

(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the
duty of administering the statute; (2) [] the
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing;
(3) [] the agency employed its expertise or
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation;
and (4) [] the agency's interpretation will provide
uniformity and consistency in the application of the
statute.
Id. at 660 (citing Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493

N.W.2d 14 (1992)). If an agency's interpretation of a statute

qualifies for great weight deference, then the "interpretation

must [] merely be reasonable for it to be sustained," and an
interpretation is unreasonable only "if it directly contravenes

the words of the statute, [] is clearly contrary to legislative

intent or [] is without rational basis." Id. at 661-62.

¶75 In UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 548 N.W.2d 57

(1996), this court elaborated on the "due weight" deference

standard. "Under the due weight standard, 'a court need not

defer to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is

not the interpretation which the court considers best and most

reasonable.'" Id. at 286 (quoting Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at

660 n.4). Courts give due weight deference when an agency has

"some experience" interpreting a statute but not so much as to

"develop[] the expertise which necessarily places it in a better

position" than a court "to make judgments regarding the

interpretation." Id. An agency lacking special knowledge or

expertise nevertheless might receive some deference if "the

legislature has charged the agency with the enforcement of the

statute in question." Id. A court giving due weight deference
to an agency interpretation "will not overturn a reasonable

agency decision that comports with the purpose of the statute
2
 No. 2015AP1055.rgb

unless the court determines that there is a more reasonable

interpretation available." Id. at 286-87.

¶76 Examination of the pre-Harnischfeger standard for

reviewing agency interpretations of statutes suggests that the

Harnischfeger court did not simply apply existing law——it recast

it.1 Before Harnischfeger, this court often articulated a

slightly different standard of review: "[I]t is a well-

established principle of statutory construction that the

construction and interpretation of a statute adopted by an

administrative agency charged with the duty of applying the law

is entitled to great weight." Schwartz v. DILHR, 72

Wis. 2d 217, 221, 240 N.W.2d 173 (1976). Tracing that

principle's development in Wisconsin law backwards from

Harnischfeger leads to its source: Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis.

43 (1871).2

¶77 Harrington presented this court with a dispute over

the interpretation of a statute. Observing that "[t]he statute

1
For a more complete evaluation of the court's
characterization of existing law in Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC,
196 Wis. 2d 650, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), see Patience Drake
Roggensack, Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance
Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of
Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541, 548-61 (2006).
2
See, e.g., Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505-06, 493
N.W.2d 14 (1992); West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1,
12, 357 N.W.2d 534 (1984); Pigeon v. DILHR, 109 Wis. 2d 519,
524-25, 326 N.W.2d 752 (1982); Schwartz v. DILHR, 72
Wis. 2d 217, 221, 240 N.W.2d 173 (1976); City of Milwaukee v.
WERC, 43 Wis. 2d 596, 599-601, 168 N.W.2d 809 (1969); Mednis v.
Indus. Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 439, 444, 134 N.W.2d 416 (1965);
Trczyniewski v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 236, 240, 112
N.W.2d 725 (1961).

3
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in question was enacted and has been continuously interpreted,

understood and acted upon by the executive department of the

government, the officers appointed by law to carry its

provisions into effect, . . . for a period of over twenty-one

years, and during twelve successive administrations of the

state," the court concluded that "[g]reat weight is undoubtedly

to be attached to a construction which has thus been given."

Id. at 68-69. Accordingly, the Harrington court explained:

"Long and uninterrupted practice under a statute, especially by

the officers whose duty it was to execute it, is good evidence

of its construction, and such practical construction will be

adhered to, even though, were it res integra,[3] it might be

difficult to maintain it." Harrington, 28 Wis. at 68. In

support of that proposition, this court cited, among other

authorities, Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206

(1827), which stated that, "[i]n the construction of a doubtful

and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who

were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to
carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great

respect." Id. at 210.4

3
Latin for "an entire thing," as a legal term res integra
refers to an "undecided question of law" or a "case of first
impression." Res Integra, Black's Law Dictionary 1503 (10th ed.
2014) (citing Res Nova, id. at 1504).
4
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court also cited
Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827), among
many other cases, when constructing the two-step framework that
has become the cornerstone of judicial review of agency
determinations at the federal level. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844
(continued)
4
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¶78 By recognizing the value of executive interpretations

without entirely ceding interpretive authority to the executive,

these older cases reflect a more nuanced appreciation for

judicial interaction with agency interpretation than this

court's post-Harnischfeger deference standards permit. The

prevailing scheme of deference hamstrings a court of last

resort——with self-imposed shackles——from independently

interpreting the law, thereby thwarting the constitutional

structure of dispersing power among the three branches of

government. Because this structure has long been recognized as

the essential safeguard of individual rights and liberty,5 this

n.14. Although I will not, in this writing, endeavor to conduct
a comprehensive review comparing federal agency deference to
Wisconsin law, it suffices for now to note that federal
administrative deference under Chevron seems to raise separation
of powers concerns under the United States Constitution similar
to those I identify in Wisconsin. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that transferring "ultimate interpretive authority" to the
Executive "is in tension with Article III's Vesting Clause,
which vests the judicial power exclusively in Article III
courts, not administrative agencies"); City of Arlington v. FCC,
133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It
would be a bit much to describe the result as 'the very
definition of tyranny,' but the danger posed by the growing
power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed."); see
also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Transferring the job of saying
what the law is from the judiciary to the executive
unsurprisingly invites the very sort of due process (fair
notice) and equal protection concerns the framers knew would
arise if the political branches intruded on judicial
functions.").
5
"In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
(continued)
5
 No. 2015AP1055.rgb

court should reinforce that structure as a check against the

concentration of power in the executive branch. "The doctrine

of separation of powers, a fundamental principle of American

constitutional government, is embodied in the clauses of the

Wisconsin Constitution providing that the legislative power

shall be vested in a senate and assembly, the executive power in

a governor . . . , and the judicial power in the courts." State

v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 816, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978)

(citations omitted). No less than in the federal system, in

Wisconsin "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is." State v. Williams,

2012 WI 59, ¶36 n.13, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460 (quoting

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also

State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436-37,

424 N.W.2d 385 (1988).

¶79 Acknowledging respect for a longstanding

interpretation of a statute is a far cry from a judicial

doctrine of "great weight" deference that relinquishes the
court's responsibility to independently interpret statutes.

Equally troubling is the possibility that seven elected

justices——or, indeed, any elected judge accountable to the

people of Wisconsin——might give "great weight" deference to an

agency decision by a single, unelected administrative law judge

or hearing examiner against whom the people have no recourse.

Administrative rulemaking already shifts some lawmaking power to

security arises to the rights of the people." The Federalist
No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

6
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unelected officials and away from the processes of passage and

presentment contemplated by our constitution. Judicial

deference to executive interpretations further widens the gap

between the people and the laws that govern them.

¶80 The framers of our constitutions chose to disperse

authority within the federal Republic and our state because they

recognized that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,

executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be

pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist

No. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). As this

court has recognized since Harrington, no harm comes to that

separation when the judicial branch treats a well-developed

executive interpretation of a statute as "some evidence of what

the law is." Harrington, 28 Wis. at 69. But when the

legislature delegates broad authority to an executive agency,

which in turn interprets and enforces that delegated authority,

the judiciary risks the liberty of all citizens if it abdicates

its constitutional responsibility to check executive
interpretations of the law. Because no such abdication occurs

here, I join the majority opinion and respectfully concur.

¶81 I am authorized to state that Justices MICHAEL J.

GABLEMAN and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence.

7
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1