FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, C. J.,
RAY, P. J., and SELF, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
August 11, 2017
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A1050. COTMAN v. THE STATE.
A17A1051. WILLIAMSON v. THE STATE.
DILLARD, Chief Judge.
In 2010, Governor Sonny Perdue ordered a special investigation into the nearly
decade-long suspicions that administrators, principals, and teachers in the Atlanta
Public Schools System (“APS”) had engaged in widespread cheating on standardized
tests used to assess the progress of elementary and middle-school students in Georgia.
After the conclusion of that investigation, the State indicted thirty-five APS
administrators, principals, and teachers for crimes ranging from altering State
documents, providing false statements to law-enforcement officials, and conspiring
to violate the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act.
Ultimately, the State jointly tried 12 defendants, including School Reform Team
Executive Director Tamara Cotman and elementary school teacher Angela
Williamson. Then, following a six-month trial, a jury convicted 11 of the defendants,
specifically convicting Cotman and Williamson of conspiring to violate RICO and
also convicting Williamson on two counts of making false writings and two counts
of false swearing.
In separate appeals, which we have consolidated for review at the parties’
request, Cotman and Williamson contend that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that it could find that they violated either of the two subsections of the RICO
statute despite the indictment charging the violation in the conjunctive, failing to find
that this instruction created a fatal variance, and sentencing the defendants under the
RICO statute rather than the general conspiracy statute. Cotman further contends that
the trial court erred in denying her plea in bar of double jeopardy. Nevertheless, for
the reasons set forth infra, we affirm the convictions of both Cotman and Williamson.
APS, Academic Targets, and Adequate Yearly Progress
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,1 the record shows that
on July 1, 1999, Dr. Beverly Hall became the superintendent of Atlanta Public
Schools. Dr. Hall’s administrative staff included Sharon Pitts (who worked as Hall’s
1
See, e.g., Powell v. State, 310 Ga. App. 144, 144 (712 SE2d 139) (2011).
2
Chief of Staff), Colinda Howard (who oversaw the Office of Internal Resolution
(“OIR”) and was tasked with investigating employee misconduct), Millicent Few
(who worked as the APS Director of Human Resources), and Veleter Mazyck (legal
counsel). Additionally, under Dr. Hall, APS was organized into four School Reform
Teams (“SRT”), which were specific geographic regions of metropolitan Atlanta and
more specifically the elementary and middle schools within those regions. During Dr.
Hall’s tenure, Tamara Cotman served as the Executive Director of SRT-4, and as with
all of the directors, her responsibilities included providing supervisory guidance to
the principals and schools within her region.
Immediately after Dr. Hall was hired as superintendent, she began working
with professional education consultants to devise a means by which to measure and
improve APS students’ academic progress. Then, after those consultations, Dr. Hall
established a system requiring students at all APS elementary and middle schools to
be tested so as to determine the numbers of students who “met academic
expectations” and the numbers who “exceeded” such expectations. Importantly, every
school in APS was required to meet a “Target” number—i.e., a percentage of students
in both of these categories, and Dr. Hall mandated that these Target numbers be
raised every year.
3
In January 2002, around the same time that Dr. Hall began implementing her
Targets system for APS, the federal government enacted the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001. Under this legislation, the State of Georgia received federal funding to
assist low-income school districts and, inter alia, was required to report whether its
schools were making what was termed “Adequate Yearly Progress” (“AYP”), which
was measured by students’ performance on the annually administered Criterion-
Referenced Competency Test (“CRCT”). Schools failing to achieve AYP received
additional federal funding to assist teachers and struggling students.
Although inextricably linked, the Targets established by Dr. Hall were separate
from the requirements for AYP and, in fact, were more stringent. But in addition to
the stated objective of being a means by which to measure students’ academic
progress during Dr. Hall’s tenure, Targets quickly became the primary means by
which to measure teachers and administrators’ performance. For instance, the SRT
Executive Directors, including Cotman, received salary raises if their schools made
Targets and AYP, and employees at individual schools would similarly receive
bonuses if their schools achieved their Target numbers. Indeed, Dr. Hall’s own
employment contracts also provided significant salary bonuses that were contingent
upon APS achieving its academic progress Targets.
4
The failure to make Targets, however, often resulted in negative consequences
for APS employees. Specifically, teachers and administrators whose students and
schools failed to meet Targets could be demoted (resulting in a decreased salary),
transferred (also resulting in a decreased salary), or placed on what was termed a
Professional Development Plan (“PDP”), which was often a precursor to the
termination of one’s employment contract with APS. Unsurprisingly, the pressure
placed on administrators and teachers to make Targets became intense and was
exacerbated by the fact that many at APS believed the Targets to be patently
unreasonable. Despite such concerns, Dr. Hall was uncompromising in her stance that
Targets be met, informing one principal upon his termination for failing to meet
Targets, despite his school’s academic progress, that she “had no time for incremental
gains.”
Evidence of Cheating Throughout APS
Within a few years of Dr. Hall’s hiring as APS superintendent, large
improvements in APS students’ test scores led to suspicions that such gains may have
been the result of cheating. Initially, little in the way of concrete evidence
demonstrated widespread abuses. But in March 2005, a teacher at Parks Middle
School informed the Executive Director of SRT-2 that the newly hired principal was
5
explicitly promoting cheating on the CRCT. And when it appeared that the Director
would not be taking any action, the teacher sent anonymous letters directly to Dr. Hall
to inform her of what was taking place at the school. Shortly thereafter, the SRT-2
Director attended a staff meeting at Parks Middle School, acknowledged the
anonymous letters, but ordered that they cease, stating that the principal had the
backing of Dr. Hall and would not be leaving. Nevertheless, APS directed Reginald
Dukes, a private investigator who had worked with APS in the past, to investigate the
allegations. On June 30, 2006, after interviewing teachers, including the teacher who
first reported the issue, Dukes submitted a report to Dr. Hall, in which he concluded
that cheating had occurred at Parks Middle School. But Dr. Hall took no action as a
result of the report, and APS never hired Dukes again.
In July 2008, a summer re-test of the CRCT for students from several different
APS schools was conducted at Deerwood Academy. During that re-test, several
teachers collaborated to erase students’ incorrect answers and change them to the
correct ones, and as a result, Deerwood met its AYP target for that year. A few
months later, in October 2008, Kathleen Mathers became the executive director of the
Governor’s Office of Student Achievement (“GOSA”), an agency tasked with
providing data analysis on various education programs in the State. And in reviewing
6
data related to the CRCT, Mathers noticed abnormally dramatic increases in student
achievement within APS, including at Deerwood Academy, in comparison to scores
statewide. In addition, her office and the Assessment Division of the Georgia
Department of Education were receiving numerous anonymous complaints from
parents and teachers of cheating at APS schools. Around this same time, the Atlanta
Journal Constitution (“AJC”) published an article regarding the unusual gains in test
scores within APS, in which they quoted an expert in the field of psychometrics,2 who
stated that the gains were as “extraordinary as a snowstorm in July” and warranted
further investigation.
Based on her own suspicions and the AJC’s article, Mathers decided to conduct
a statewide erasure analysis on all of the 2008 CRCT summer re-tests. In essence,
such an analysis entailed scanning the tests with an Optical Mark Recognition
machine that determines if answer bubbles, in addition to the one ultimately filled,
also contain residual amounts of pencil graphite, indicating that the bubble had been
filled but later erased. The analysis was completed in April 2009, and based on the
results, which showed that 11 Deerwood students had significantly high instances of
2
Psychometrics is a field of study concerned primarily with developing and
evaluating the effectiveness of educational testing.
7
erasing a wrong answer and changing it to a correct one (i.e., wrong-to-right
erasures), as well as an additional investigation, GOSA concluded that cheating had
occurred at Deerwood Academy during the 2008 summer re-test. Thereafter, Mathers
attempted to schedule a meeting with Dr. Hall to discuss the erasure analysis, but
after being unable to do so, she had a copy of the report hand-delivered to Dr. Hall
at a local conference the superintendent was attending.
On June 23, 2009, Mathers met with APS OIR director Howard and Penn
Payne, an external investigator, who APS hired to look into the cheating allegations,
and informed them of GOSA’s findings. Following this meeting, on July 6, 2009, Dr.
Hall emailed Mathers to inform her that APS and Payne had completed investigations
and determined that there was no evidence cheating had occurred at Deerwood
Academy. Then, on August 21, 2009, APS released Payne’s report regarding
Deerwood, which found no evidence of cheating. Ultimately, however, Mathers
learned that the statements in Dr. Hall’s email and the conclusions in the Payne report
were false. In fact, APS had not conducted an internal investigation and, in a draft
report that Dr. Hall ordered Few and Howard to destroy, Payne actually concluded
that cheating probably occurred at Deerwood during the 2008 summer re-test.
8
Unsatisfied with APS and Dr. Hall’s response to her concerns, in the autumn
of 2009, Mathers decided to conduct a statewide erasure analysis for the 2009 CRCT
administered the previous spring. The analysis was conducted by CTB/McGraw Hill,
and on January 22, 2010, it released its report, which included the number of wrong-
to-right erasures in each school in the state (and in each classroom of every school),
and flagged those schools with the highest numbers of wrong-to-right erasures. The
report flagged 58 APS schools as having moderate to severe wrong-to-right erasures.
Consequently, in February 2010, GOSA ordered APS, as well as other flagged
districts, to conduct an internal investigation into the suspected cheating and report
its findings by April of that same year. In light of this directive, Dr. Hall assembled
a Blue Ribbon Commission (“BRC”) to conduct APS’s investigation. The BRC then
hired KPMG and tasked its investigators with interviewing APS teachers and
administrators. But additionally, despite Mathers cautioning APS against questioning
the erasure analysis, the BRC hired a private company to conduct another such
analysis. And on August 2, 2010, based on the second erasure analysis and KPMG
investigators’ interviews of APS teachers and administrators, the BRC submitted its
report to GOSA, in which it found no evidence of cheating. Unconvinced, Mathers
rejected the BRC’s findings.
9
The Governor’s Special Investigation into APS
Following her rejection of the BRC’s report, on August 26, 2010, Mathers
requested that Governor Perdue order a special independent investigation into the
suspected cheating on the CRCT within APS. Governor Perdue agreed and appointed
former Attorney General Michael Bowers, former DeKalb County District Attorney
Robert Wilson, and investigator Richard Hyde, with assistance from the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation, to investigate the matter. Subsequently, the special
investigators went to CBT/McGraw Hill’s headquarters in Indianapolis, Indiana, to
replicate and, therefore, verify GOSA’s previous erasure analyses of the 2008 and
2009 CRCTs. As a result, the investigators determined that the previous erasure
analyses may have even under-reported the numbers of wrong-to-right erasures on
those two tests. In addition, from October 2010 through May 2011, the special
investigators and GBI agents conducted over 2,100 interviews of APS teachers and
administrators employed throughout 55 schools. And despite APS leadership being
uncooperative and many teachers lying during interviews, eventually 82 teachers and
administrators admitted to cheating during the 2009 CRCT, with many further
admitting that such cheating had been occurring at numerous APS schools for years.
10
On June 30, 2011, the special investigators released their report, concluding
that widespread cheating on the 2009 CRCT had occurred within 44 APS schools.
Specifically, the special investigators’ report found that teachers and administrators
had cheated by numerous means, including violating testing security and storage
protocols, changing students’ answers after the tests were completed, providing
students with correct answers while the tests were being administered, and copying
the tests and reviewing the correct answers with students prior to the tests being
administered. In addition, the special investigators found that testing irregularities
were witnessed but not reported as required by testing protocols, and that testing
coordinators and administrators signed documents stating that protocols were
followed despite being well aware that those averments were not true. The report also
found that the reasons provided by teachers and administrators for why they cheated
were myriad. Many witnesses explained that if they made Targets and AYP (which
they claimed was difficult to do without cheating), they received bonus money and
their schools’ achievement would be publicly recognized at APS’s annual year-end
convocation. But many more witnesses stated that they engaged in cheating or failed
to report cheating they witnessed because of APS’s culture of obsession with Targets
11
and AYP and of punishing anyone who spoke out with demotions or terminations of
employment.
Tamara Cotman and Cheating within SRT-4
As previously noted, from 2004 through 2011, Cotman served as the Executive
Director of SRT-4 within APS. In August 2007, Patricia Wells, the principal of Ben
Carson Middle School, who began working there the previous year, became
concerned that many of her students’ academic performance did not correlate with
their elementary school CRCT scores and, therefore, she asked some of the students
to explain the discrepancy. The students responded that their elementary school
teachers had provided them with the answers to the CRCT. And because Ben Carson
Middle School was within SRT-4, Principal Wells immediately reported the
information to Cotman. But Cotman did not report Wells’s allegations to OIR and
took no action to investigate them. Then, at the end of month, Cotman gave Wells a
negative performance evaluation. By October 2007, Cotman placed Wells on a PDP,
and in December 2007, Cotman informed Wells that for the next school year she
could either accept a demotion to an assistant principal position at a different school
or resign. Wells opted to resign.
12
Similarly, in the spring of 2007, just before the CRCT, the principal of Scott
Elementary called a staff meeting, during which the teachers were shown methods for
cheating on the upcoming test. Tonette Hunter, a paraprofessional at the school, was
alarmed by the discussion and, thus, reported the incident directly to Cotman. To
Hunter’s surprise, Cotman advised her that the issue was none of her business and
that she needed to cease discussing it if she wanted to keep her job. A few days before
the end of that school year, Cotman terminated Hunter’s employment.
That same school year, Michael Milstead was hired as the principal for Harper-
Archer Middle School, and immediately, he began noticing a significant discrepancy
between many of his students’ poor academic performance and their high 5th grade
CRCT scores. Milstead alerted Cotman regarding this discrepancy, but she did not
investigate and, in fact, informed Milstead that other principals did not appreciate him
raising this issue. In addition, Cotman continued to place a significant emphasis on
making AYP and placed Milstead on PDPs on two occasions when his school failed
to meet the goals. Later, Cotman told Milstead that he should resign, as she would not
be renewing his contract, and Milstead did so in 2009. Just prior to his resignation,
Milstead observed that the previous year’s CRCT scores were significantly higher
than the year before, but he had no faith that those scores were legitimate.
13
In yet another similar incident, Monica Hooker began working as a teacher at
Best Academy in its inaugural year (2007-2008), and she was given the added
responsibility of collecting testing data for the school. Hooker reported to her
principal that the students’ academic performance did not correlate with their high
CRCT scores from the previous spring. Cotman responded to Hooker’s report by
demoting her and transferring her to another school, complaining to Hooker that she
was not playing for the right team. Given Cotman’s constant focus on test scores,
Hooker understood her demotion to be a result of her refusal to cheat on the CRCT.
In the spring of 2008, D. C., a third-grade student at Blalock Elementary (a
school also within SRT-4), told his mother that his teacher had given students the
answers during the recent CRCT. The mother, who had recently heard a similar story
from her young niece, then reported her son’s revelation to the school’s principal and
Cotman. But rather than investigating or reporting the complaint to OIR, Cotman told
the mother that her son was lying. Unpersuaded, the mother filed a complaint with
APS’s central office. Subsequently, an investigator with OIR interviewed D. C. and
his mother, but no further action was taken. And on September 12, 2008, the mother
received a letter from Dr. Hall, stating that there was no evidence that cheating had
occurred at Blalock Elementary.
14
In the spring of 2009, Mary Gordon, a teacher at Turner Middle School,
received the answers to the Common Assessment test and students’ answer sheets.
But Gordon refused to cheat on the test, and, in fact, reported the incident to Cotman,
who refused to investigate the matter. Instead, Cotman advised Gordon: “They just
do things like that at Turner.” Later, Gordon was placed on a PDP, and she eventually
resigned due to the stress caused by her work environment.
Caitlin Sims was the principal of Grove Park Elementary during the 2008-2009
school year, and she noted that under Cotman, Targets were the number one priority.
Indeed, Cotman constantly ranked schools against each other and used PDPs as
punishment. Sims also recalled an instance when Cotman gave the principals empty
frames and told them to put a picture in the frame of something important, such as a
mortgage or car note as motivation for improving their schools’ CRCT scores. After
the BRC began its investigation into the cheating allegations, Cotman asked Sims to
explain to the commission how the school’s education strategies had resulted in the
gains, but Sims refused, explaining that she was uncomfortable doing so based on the
fact that the high number of wrong-to-right erasures at Grove Park were difficult to
reconcile. Shortly after Sims’s refusal, Cotman placed her on a PDP.
15
Angela Williamson and Cheating at Dobbs Elementary
Angela Williamson was a well-respected 4th grade teacher at Dobbs
Elementary, which is within SRT-2. As with most other schools within APS, the
pressure to meet Targets at Dobbs was tremendous, and the principal would stress at
every staff meeting that Targets had to be met by any means necessary. In fact, the
principal was so adamant about meeting these goals that she would tell Dobbs’s
teachers that they should find new professions if they were unable to make Targets.
In 2007, during CRCT testing, the assistant principal brought the completed
tests into a teachers’ meeting at the end of the day and instructed the teachers to
“clean up” the tests. When a few of the newer teachers looked confused as to the
meaning of this comment, Williamson explained: “If you want to keep your jobs, you
better clean these tests up.” Williamson then demonstrated how to use the high
achieving students’ tests as a guide for changing the answers on the lower achieving
students’ tests.
Several of Williamson’s former students revealed that during the CRCT testing,
she would walk around the classroom and provide students with the correct answers
if they appeared to be answering questions incorrectly. All of these students further
stated that Williamson admonished them not to tell anyone, often stating that “what
16
happened in her class, stayed in her class.” Nevertheless, a few of the students told
other teachers about Williamson’s actions. In addition, a paraprofessional, who
proctored the CRCT in Williamson’s class, observed her providing students with
answers, thus corroborating the students’ accounts of such instances. Moreover,
GOSA’s erasure analyses in both 2008 and 2009 showed that numerous students in
Williamson’s class had statistically significant high wrong-to-right erasures.
Procedural Background
On March 29, 2013, following the conclusion of the Governor’s Special
Investigation, the State charged Dr. Hall, Cotman, Williamson, and 32 other APS
administrators, principals, and teachers, via an indictment filed in the Superior Court
of Fulton County, with numerous crimes relating to the widespread cheating within
APS, including conspiring to violate the Georgia RICO Act, providing false
statements to law-enforcement officials, theft by taking, influencing witnesses, and
false swearing. More specifically, the State charged Cotman with one count of
conspiring to violate the RICO Act and one count of influencing a witness, and it
charged Williamson with one count of conspiring to violate the RICO Act, two counts
of providing false statements, and two counts of false swearing.
17
On May 14, 2013, Cotman filed a special demurrer seeking to quash Count 4
of the indictment, which charged her with the offense of influencing a witness.
Specifically, Cotman argued that the allegation that she “did intimidate [principal]
Jimmye Hawkins” in an effort to hinder communication with the GBI was too vague.
Shortly thereafter, the State re-indicted Cotman solely on the charge of influencing
a witness, and then it filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter an order of
nolle prosequi as to Count 4 in the original indictment and join the new indictment
with the original for trial purposes. But Cotman filed a response objecting to joinder
and a motion demanding a speedy trial on the new indictment.
Subsequently, Cotman was tried separately on the sole charge in the new
indictment of influencing a witness, and on September 12, 2013, at the conclusion of
that trial, the jury found her not guilty. One month later, Cotman filed a plea in bar
of former jeopardy, arguing that the State was barred from trying her on either the
RICO or influencing-a-witness charges in the original indictment. The State filed a
response, and following a hearing, the trial court denied Cotman’s plea in bar as to
the RICO charge but granted it as to the influencing-a-witness charge. Cotman
appealed the denial of her plea in bar on the RICO charge, but this Court affirmed the
trial court’s ruling, concluding “that Cotman, having opposed the State’s invitation
18
to join the two indictments for a single trial, faces subsequent prosecution because of
her own election and thereby waived the protections against subsequent prosecutions
afforded by OCGA § 16-1-8 (b).”3
On September 29, 2014, after months of discovery, pre-trial motions, and 21
defendants electing to plead guilty, the trial for 12 of the indicted defendants,
including Cotman and Williamson, commenced.4 During the six-month trial,
numerous witnesses, including 14 of the defendants who had opted to plead guilty,
testified as to the evidence discussed supra. The State rested its case on February 11,
2015, and, thereafter, the defendants presented their respective cases over the course
of the following six weeks. Finally, on April 1, 2015, after nearly a week of
deliberation, the jury found Cotman and Williamson guilty on the charge of
conspiracy to violate the RICO Act and further found Williamson guilty on the two
charges of providing false statements and the two charges of false swearing. Both
Cotman and Williamson waived motions for new trial, and these appeals follow.
3
Cotman v. State, 328 Ga. App. 822, 826 (1) (762 SE2d 824) (2014).
4
By the time the trial commenced, Dr. Hall was gravely ill and, therefore, was
not tried with the aforementioned defendants.
19
Analysis
1. Cotman and Williamson contend that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury that it could convict the defendants if it found that they violated either subsection
(a) or subsection (b) of the RICO Act despite the indictment charging the defendants
with conspiring or endeavoring to violate subsections (a) and (b), conjunctively. We
disagree that this instruction constituted error.
At the outset, we note that a trial court’s duty in delivering charges to the jury
is to “tailor those charges not only to the indictment but also adjust them to the
evidence at trial.”5 In doing so, a trial court should tailor its charges to “match the
allegations of indictments, either by charging only the relevant portions of the
applicable Code sections or by giving a limiting instruction that directs the jury to
consider only whether the crimes were committed in the manner alleged in the
indictment.”6 And importantly, “in reviewing an allegedly erroneous jury instruction,
5
Palencia-Barron v. State, 318 Ga. App. 301, 306 (3) (733 SE2d 824) (2012)
(punctuation omitted); accord Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 863 (2) (778 SE2d 785)
(2015).
6
Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 53 (31) (572 SE2d 583) (2002); accord Wheeler
v. State, 327 Ga. App. 313, 318 (3) (758 SE2d 840) (2014); see Holman v. State, 329
Ga. App. 393, 401 (2) (b) (ii) (765 SE2d 614) (2014) (holding that the instructions
from the trial court must “sufficiently limit the jury’s consideration to the allegations
and elements of the offense as charged in the indictment” (punctuation omitted)).
20
we apply the plain legal error standard of review.”7 Bearing these guiding principles
in mind, we turn now to the defendants’ specific claim of error.
At the time the indictment in this case issued,8 OCGA § 16-14-4 (a) of the
Georgia RICO Act provided: “It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of
racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal
property of any nature, including money.” OCGA § 16-14-4 (b) provided: “It is
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or
participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.” And subsection (c) of the Act provided: “It is unlawful for any person to
conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this
Code section.”
7
Wheeler, 327 Ga. App. at 318 (3) (punctuation omitted); see Hartzler v. State,
332 Ga. App. 674, 680 (3) (774 SE2d 738) (2015) (noting that appellate review of a
jury charge is de novo).
8
In 2015, the RICO Act was amended in several minor respects, but those
amendments did not become effective until July 1, 2015, and have no bearing on
these appeals. See Ga. L. 2015, Act 98, § 2-25.
21
In Count 1 of the indictment in this matter, the State charged all of the
defendants with violating OCGA § 16-14-4 (c) of the RICO Act in that
said accused . . . unlawfully conspired and endeavored to acquire and
maintain, directly and indirectly, an interest in and control of U.S.
Currency, the property of the Atlanta Public School System (“APS”) and
the Georgia Department of Education (“GaDOE”) as further specified
below, through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of OCGA
§ 16-14-4 (a), and while employed by and associated with APS,
unlawfully conspired and endeavored to conduct and participate in,
directly and indirectly, APS through a pattern of racketeering activity,
in violation of OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), as described below and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein; contrary to the laws
of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof . . . .
During the charge conference, the State requested that the court instruct the jury that
the State only had to prove that the defendants conspired to violate subsection (a) or
subsection (b), even though the indictment stated that the defendants had violated
both subsections, conjunctively. Over the defendants’ objection, the court agreed.
And indeed, after it instructed the jury on the State’s burden of proof and the law
pertaining to the RICO Act and conspiracy, the trial court instructed the jury
specifically regarding Count 1 of the indictment as follows:
22
Some crimes, such as those charged in the indictment, may be
committed in more than one way. Each defendant may only be convicted
of the alleged charge in the specific manner that the defendant has been
charged in this indictment.
I charge you that, whereas in Count 1 of the indictment, the State
alleges that the defendant committed a crime in more than one way, the
State need not prove that the defendant committed the crime in each way
charged.
Rather, it is sufficient if you, the jury, should find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime in at least one
way, one of the ways alleged.
As previously noted, Cotman and Williamson contend that the trial court erred
in essentially instructing the jury that it could convict the defendants of violating
OCGA § 16-14-4 (c) disjunctively, i.e., by finding that the defendants committed the
crime in at least one of the two ways charged, even though the indictment charged the
offenses conjunctively. But it is well settled that
when a defendant is charged, as in this case, with the violation of a
criminal statute containing disjunctively several ways or methods a
crime may be committed, proof of any one of which is sufficient to
constitute the crime, the indictment, in order to be good as against a
23
special demurrer, must charge such ways or methods conjunctively if it
charges more than one of them.9
And at trial, it is sufficient for the State to show that “it was committed in any one of
the separate ways listed in the indictment, even if the indictment uses the conjunctive
rather than disjunctive form.”10 Moreover, as noted supra, the trial court here also
charged the jury that the burden was on the State “to prove every material allegation
of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that
the State could prove that the defendants conspired to violate the RICO Act in at least
one way of the two ways alleged.11
9
Cash, 297 Ga. at 862 (2) (punctuation omitted); see also Young v. State, 226
Ga. 553, 554 (1) (176 SE2d 52) (1970) (“As a general rule, where a statute specifies
several means or ways in which an offense may be committed in the alternative, it is
bad pleading to allege such means or ways in the alternative; the proper way is to
connect the various allegations in the accusing pleading with the conjunctive term
‘and’ and not with the word ‘or.’” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
10
Cash, 297 Ga. at 862 (2) (punctuation omitted); accord Graham v. State, 337
Ga. App. 193, 197-98 (2) (786 SE2d 857) (2016); Gipson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 309,
317 (5) (786 SE2d 857) (2015).
11
See Cash, 297 Ga. at 862-63 (2) (holding that when a criminal statute
contains disjunctive ways a crime can be committed, the State can show it was
committed in any one of the ways listed in the indictment even if the indictment uses
conjunctive language); Graham, 337 Ga. App. at 196-97 (2) (holding that trial court
24
In her reply brief, Cotman cites to United States v. Gipson12 and proffers the
novel contention that the trial court’s challenged instruction constituted error because
it allowed the jury to render a non-unanimous verdict as to Count 1. But pretermitting
whether Cotman has waived this contention, given that she failed to specifically
object to the trial court’s instruction on this ground,13 failed to object to the verdict
did not err by instructing the jury that the State did not have to prove all of the acts
listed in each count of the indictment because “[i]f a crime may be committed in more
than one way, it is sufficient for the State to show that it was committed in any one
of the separate ways listed in the indictment, even if the indictment uses the
conjunctive rather than disjunctive form” (punctuation omitted)); Gipson, 332 Ga.
App. at 317-18 (5) (holding that court’s charge was not error because the State may
show that a crime was committed in any one of the separate ways listed in the
indictment, even if the indictment uses the conjunctive rather than disjunctive form
and because the court further instructed that the burden was on the State to prove
every material allegation of the indictment and every material element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt).
12
553 F2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
13
See Graham, 337 Ga. App. at 197 (2) (noting that because the defendant
failed to lodge any specific objection to the jury instruction he now challenges, we
review the instruction to determine whether it constitutes plain error which affects
substantial rights of the parties under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b)).
25
form,14 and, as noted, raised this issue for the first time in her reply brief,15 it
nevertheless lacks merit.
In Gipson, the defendant was charged with one count of transporting a stolen
vehicle in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 USC § 2312, and one count of
selling or receiving a stolen vehicle moving in interstate commerce, in violation of
18 USC § 2313.16 Not long after beginning deliberations, the jury requested additional
instructions from the court via a note that read, “In Count Two, will he be guilty of
all counts or will it be broken down?”17 Perceiving that the question could be
interpreted several ways, the trial court gave instructions responsive to each
interpretation.18 In response to its third interpretation of the jury’s question, the court
charged the jury as follows:
14
See Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 860 (7) (a) (622 SE2d 1) (2005) (holding
that because defendant did not raise any objection to the form of the verdict below,
he waived any right to assert error in that regard on appeal).
15
See Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 271 (3) (793 SE2d 156) (2016)
(declining to consider argument made for first time in reply brief that was beyond
scope of enumerated error).
16
Gipson, 553 F2d at 455 (I).
17
Id.
18
Id.
26
A third question that may be the one that the jury is really asking is,
must there be an agreement by all twelve jurors as to which act of those
several charged in Count Two, that the defendant did. For example,
would it be possible for one juror to believe that the Defendant had
stored property, and another juror to believe that he had received
property, and so on. If all twelve agreed that he had done some one of
those acts, but there was not agreement that he had done the same act,
would that support a conviction? The answer is yes. If each of you is
satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that he did any one of those acts
charged, and did it with the requisite state of mind, then there would be
a unanimous verdict, and there could be a return of guilty under Count
Two of the indictment, even though there may have been disagreement
within the jury as to whether it was receiving or storing or what.19
Subsequently, the defendant objected, but the trial court overruled the objection.20
And at the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on Count One but
convicted him on Count Two.21 But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court’s instruction
authorized the jury to return a guilty verdict despite the fact that some
jurors may have believed that [the defendant] engaged in conduct only
19
Id. at 455-56 (I).
20
Id. at 456 (I).
21
Id. at 455 (I).
27
characterizable as receiving, concealing, or storing while other jurors
were convinced that he committed acts only constituting bartering,
selling, or disposing. Thus, under the instruction, the jury was permitted
to convict [the defendant] even though there may have been significant
disagreement among the jurors as to what he did.22
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the instruction was “violative of [the
defendant’s] right to a unanimous jury verdict.”23
Nevertheless, in this matter, Cotman’s argument that the trial court’s
instruction similarly sanctioned a non-unanimous verdict strains credulity given that
the two cases are in no way factually analogous. Indeed, unlike the instruction at issue
in Gipson,24 the trial court in this matter did not instruct the jury that it could convict
the defendants if some of the jurors found that the defendants conspired to violate
subsection (a) of the RICO Act while others found that they conspired to violate
subsection (b). Rather here, in stark contrast to Gipson, the trial court concluded its
instructions by directing that “[w]hatever your verdict is, it must be unanimous; that
means agreed by all.”
22
Id. at 458-59 (II).
23
Id. at 459 (II).
24
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
28
Moreover, recognizing that Gipson in essence concerned verdict specificity and
unanimity problems in situations involving alternative theories of actus rea under a
criminal statute, the Supreme Court of the United States in Schad v. Arizona,25 found
the Fifth Circuit’s approach wanting, specifically noting,
[w]e are not persuaded that the Gipson approach really answers the
question, however. Although the classification of alternatives into
‘distinct conceptual groupings’ is a way to express a judgment about the
limits of permissible alternatives, the notion is too indeterminate to
provide concrete guidance to courts faced with verdict specificity
questions.26
Following on the heels of Schad, the Supreme Court of the United States reiterated
in Griffin v. United States,27 that “a general jury verdict was valid so long as it was
legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds—even though that gave no
assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for
the jury’s action.”28 Given the foregoing and the particular circumstances presented
25
501 U.S. 624 (111 SCt 2491, 115 LE2d 555) (1991).
26
Id. at 635 (II) (A).
27
502 U.S. 46 (112 SCt 466, 116 LE2d 371) (1991) (Scalia, J.).
28
Id. at 49 (II); accord Jones v. State, ___ Ga. ___, Slip op. at 4 (1) (Case No.
S17A0301; decided May 1, 2017) (2017 WL 1548564).
29
in the case sub judice, Cotman’s additional contention that the trial court’s instruction
as to Count 1 constituted error because it allowed the jury to render a non-unanimous
verdict is without merit.
2. Cotman and Williamson also contend that the trial court erred in failing to
find that the challenged jury instruction resulted in a fatal variance between the
indictment and the evidence proven at trial. Again, we disagree.
We first note that the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that
[o]ur courts no longer employ an overly technical application of the fatal
variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. The true inquiry,
therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether
there has been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the
accused. It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served:
1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges
against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be
taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the
accused against another prosecution for the same offense. Only if the
allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance fatal.29
Here, in Count 1 of the indictment, the State charged all of the defendants in
considerable detail, as previously discussed, with violating OCGA § 16-14-4 (c) of
29
Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 396 (3) (627 SE2d 579) (2006); accord
Jarrett v. State, 299 Ga. App. 525, 529 (4) (683 SE2d 116) (2009).
30
the RICO Act by conspiring and endeavoring to engage in racketeering in violation
of OCGA § 16-14-4 (a) and by conspiring and endeavoring to engage in racketeering
in violation of OCGA § 16-14-4 (b). But in their appellate briefs, Cotman and
Williamson do not argue that these allegations failed to inform them of the charges,
took them by surprise, or failed to protect them against an additional prosecution for
the same offense. Rather, the defendants argue—similarly to their first claim of
error—that a fatal variance resulted when the indictment charged a violation of
OCGA § 16-14-4 (c) in two ways conjunctively, but the court instructed the jury that
the State could prove a violation in either of the ways charged disjunctively. But we
reiterate that “[when] a person is charged in an indictment with a crime in two ways
by using the conjunctive ‘and’ but [when] the statute contains ‘or,’ if it is proven that
the defendant violated the statute in either way he may be convicted.”30 And in such
30
Jarrett, 299 Ga. App. at 530 (6) (punctuation omitted); see Stone v. State,
229 Ga. App. 367, 370 (1) (b) (494 SE2d 48) (1997) (noting that if a crime may be
committed in more than one way, it is sufficient for the State to show that it was
committed in any one of the separate ways listed in the indictment, even if the
indictment uses the conjunctive rather than disjunctive form).
31
circumstances, there is “no fatal variance between the court’s charge and the
indictment.”31
Furthermore, although even the most generous reading of the defendants’ briefs
gleans no contention on their part that a fatal variance occurred because the State
failed to sufficiently prove that the defendants violated OCGA § 16-14-4 (c) in either
of the ways alleged in the indictment, the record, nevertheless, demonstrates that the
State presented sufficient evidence that Cotman and Williamson conspired to violate
OCGA § 16-14-4 (a) and (b).
A person participates in a “pattern of racketeering activity” when he or she
engages “in at least two acts of racketeering activity in furtherance of one or more
incidents, schemes, or transactions that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents.”32 Additionally, under
the statute, the term “‘[r]acketeering activity’ means to commit” a number of crimes
31
Jarrett, 299 Ga. App. at 530 (6); see Thomas v. State, 192 Ga. App. 427, 427-
28 (385 SE2d 310) (1989) (holding that variation between indictment, which charged
defendant with receiving “and” retaining stolen property, and receiving stolen
property statute that trial court read to jury, which defined offense as receipt,
disposition “or” retention of such property, was not error).
32
See former OCGA § 16-14-3 (8) (A) (2011).
32
chargeable by indictment under the laws of Georgia, as set forth in OCGA § 16-14-3
(9) (A) (i) – (xxxvii), including the crimes of theft and those relating to perjury and
other falsifications.33 And under Georgia law, a person may be found guilty of a
RICO conspiracy “if they knowingly and willfully join a conspiracy which itself
contains a common plan or purpose to commit two or more predicate acts.”34
Here, as recounted in detail supra, the evidence showed that APS
administrators and teachers, including Dr. Hall, Cotman, and Williamson, received
bonuses and increases in their salaries if Targets and AYP were met and that those
goals were often met as a direct result of cheating on the CRCT. The evidence also
showed that, on several occasions, Cotman was informed regarding instances of
cheating but took no action to investigate such and, in fact, punished those who
reported cheating with demotions or terminations of employment. In addition, the
evidence showed that Williamson cheated on the CRCT, a State document, by
improperly providing students with correct answers and by changing wrong answers
to correct ones on tests that had been completed. The evidence further showed that
33
See former OCGA § 16-14-3 (9) (A) (ix), (xv) (2011).
34
Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 817 FSupp2d 1357, 1382 (II) (G) (N.D. Ga.
2011) (applying the Georgia RICO Act); accord Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161,
165 (1) (746 SE2d 689) (2013) (physical precedent only).
33
Williamson lied to law enforcement when confronted with claims that she cheated.
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants’ convictions,35 and any
fatal variance claim in this regard lacks merit.
3. Cotman and Williamson further contend that the trial court erred in
sentencing them under the RICO Act rather than the general conspiracy statute,
arguing that sentencing them under the former violated the rule of lenity. Yet again,
we disagree.
As discussed at length, supra, Cotman and Williamson were charged and
convicted of conspiracy to violate the RICO Act under OCGA § 16-14-4 (c). And
OCGA § 16-14-5 (a), the sentencing section of the RICO Act, provides that “[a]ny
person convicted of the offense of engaging in activity in violation of Code Section
16-14-4 shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by not less than five nor
35
See Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 540 (2) (b) (615 SE2d 512) (2005) (holding
that evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant, as county sheriff, acquired
property and money through a pattern of racketeering, thus supporting his conviction
under the RICO Act); Brown v. State, 321 Ga. App. 198, 204 (4) (739 SE2d 118)
(2013) (holding that the evidence that defendant conspired with other employees to
falsify overtime records in exchange for payment was sufficient to support
defendant’s RICO conviction); Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 489-90 (5) (376
SE2d 888) (1988) (finding that evidence was sufficient to show that three attorneys
were part of RICO enterprise which engaged in ticket-fixing of alcohol-related
charges by removing files relating to charges from county solicitor’s office); see also
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt. 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
34
more than 20 years’ imprisonment or the fine specified in subsection (b) of this Code
section, or both.”
In this matter, after conducting a hearing, the trial court sentenced Cotman to
twenty years, with seven years to serve in incarceration, and sentenced Williamson
to five years, with two years to serve in incarceration. And although these sentences
were within the range provided in OCGA § 16-14-5 (a), the defendants argue that
they should have been sentenced under the general conspiracy statute, which
provides:
A person convicted of the offense of criminal conspiracy to commit a
felony shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor
more than one-half the maximum period of time for which he could have
been sentenced if he had been convicted of the crime conspired to have
been committed, by one-half the maximum fine to which he could have
been subjected if he had been convicted of such crime, or both.36
Specifically, they argue that because the general conspiracy statute requires a trial
court to impose a sentence that is not more than one-half the maximum period of time
for which defendants could have been sentenced if they had been convicted of the
36
OCGA § 16-4-8.
35
crime conspired to have been committed,37 sentencing them under the RICO Act
violated the rule of lenity.
As we have previously explained, the rule of lenity “ensures that if and when
an ambiguity exists in one or more statutes, such that the law exacts varying degrees
of punishment for the same offense, the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of a
defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment.”38 But the rule of lenity
comes into play only to “resolve ambiguities that remain after applying all other tools
of statutory construction.”39 Importantly, when “there is a specific and a general
criminal statute, the rule of lenity is not implicated, and a specific statute will prevail
37
See id.
38
Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 634 (780 SE2d 376) (2015) (punctuation
omitted); see McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 (745 SE2d 646) (2013) (noting that
the rule of lenity provides that statutory ambiguity is resolved in favor of the
defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment); Issa v. State, 340 Ga. App.
327, 341 (7) (796 SE2d 725) (2017) (same); Mathis v. State, 336 Ga. App. 257, 260
(784 SE2d 98) (2016) (same).
39
State v. Nankervis, 295 Ga. 406, 409 (2) (761 SE2d 1) (2014) (punctuation
omitted); see Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 31 (3) (608 SE2d 631) (2005) (holding that
when a crime is penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code
are not applicable); McWhorter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 624, 629 (2) (621 SE2d 571)
(2005) (same).
36
over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative [directive].”40
And here, the clear language of OCGA § 16-14-5 (a) demonstrates that it is a specific
law criminalizing a violation of any part of OCGA § 16-14-4.41 Consequently, the
trial court did not err in sentencing Cotman and Williamson under the specific
provisions of OCGA § 16-14-5 (a).42
4. Finally, Cotman contends that the trial court erred in denying her plea in bar
of double jeopardy. Once again, we disagree.
40
Nankervis, 295 Ga. at 409 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Woods v. State, 279
Ga. 28, 31 (3) (608 SE2d 631) (2005) (holding that when “a crime is penalized by a
special law, the general provisions of the penal code are not applicable”).
41
See OCGA § 16-14-5 (a).
42
See Nankervis, 295 Ga. at 409-10 (2) (holding that the rule of lenity did not
apply in prosecution for methamphetamine trafficking and, thus, trial court was
precluded from sentencing defendant for manufacturing a controlled substance given
that methamphetamine trafficking statute was more specific than general statutory
provisions for manufacturing controlled substances); Woods, 279 Ga. at 30-31 (3)
(holding that trial court did not err in sentencing defendant under OCGA § 16-13-33,
rather than the general “attempt” statute (OCGA § 16-4-6), because “the two
sentencing statutes are mutually exclusive and there is no uncertainty as to which
applies—OCGA § 16-13-33 renders OCGA § 16-4-6 inapplicable in prosecutions
under the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.”); McWhorter, 275 Ga. App. at 629-30
(2) (finding that general statute limiting sentece for conspiracy to one-half maximum
sentence for substantive crime did not apply when imposing sentence for offense of
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine because Controlled Substances Act
specifically allowed imposition of maximum sentence for substantive crime when
imposing sentence for conspiracy to commit crime).
37
As discussed supra, in Count 4 of the original indictment, the State charged
Cotman with the offense of influencing a witness, specifically alleging that she “did
intimidate [principal] Jimmye Hawkins.” Cotman filed a special demurrer, which
prompted the State to re-indict her solely on the same charge of influencing Hawkins
but with additional details specifying the nature of the intimidation. The State then
filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter an order of nolle prosequi as to
Count 4 in the original indictment and join the new indictment with the original for
trial purposes. But Cotman objected to joinder, demanded a speedy trial on the new
indictment, and, at the conclusion of that trial, was acquitted.
Cotman then filed a plea in bar of former jeopardy, arguing that the State was
precluded from trying her on either the RICO or influencing-a-witness charges in the
original indictment. Subsequently, the trial court granted Cotman’s plea in bar as to
the influencing-a-witness charge but denied it as to the RICO charge. On appeal, we
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, concluding “that Cotman, having opposed the State’s
invitation to join the two indictments for a single trial, faces subsequent prosecution
because of her own election and thereby waived the protections against subsequent
prosecutions afforded by OCGA § 16-1-8 (b).”43 But in that same opinion, we also
43
Cotman, 328 Ga. App. at 826 (1).
38
noted that “Cotman [did] not argue substantive double jeopardy for purposes of the
appeal.”44 Thus, in this appeal, Cotman now contends that the trial court erred in
denying her plea in bar because the subsequent prosecution on the RICO charge was
barred by substantive double jeopardy.
It is well established that the prohibition against double jeopardy in both the
United States Constitution45 and the Georgia Constitution46 protects our citizens from,
inter alia, being prosecuted a second time for the same offense after an acquittal or
conviction.47 More specifically, double jeopardy protects against three types of
44
Id. at 825 (1) n.5.
45
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“. . . nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .”); see also Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (II) (97 SCt 2221, 53 LE2d 187) (1977) (“Because it was
designed originally to embody the protection of the common-law pleas of former
jeopardy, the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a
restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has
acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and
prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one
trial.” (citation and footnote omitted)).
46
See GA. CONST. Art. 1, § 1, ¶ XVIII (“No person shall be put in jeopardy
of life or liberty more than once for the same offense except when a new trial has
been granted after conviction or in case of a mistrial.”).
47
See Phillips v. State, 298 Ga. App. 520, 521 (1) (680 SE2d 424) (2009) (“The
prohibition against double jeopardy in both the United States and Georgia
39
abuses: “(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense.”48 And the standard of review of a “grant or denial of a double
jeopardy plea in bar is whether, after reviewing the trial court’s oral and written
rulings as a whole, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion.”49 Bearing these
guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Cotman’s specific claim.
The well established test for determining whether two offenses are sufficiently
distinguishable to avoid the prohibition against double jeopardy and, thereby, permit
the imposition of cumulative punishment, was delineated in Blockburger v. United
States,50 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held: “[t]he applicable rule
is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
Constitutions, among other things, protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal or conviction.”).
48
Garrett v. State, 306 Ga. App. 429, 430 (702 SE2d 470) (2010), citing North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (89 SCt 2072, 23 LE2d 656) (1969).
49
Johns v. State, 319 Ga. App. 718, 719 (738 SE2d 304) (2013) (punctuation
omitted).
50
284 U.S. 299 (52 S.Ct. 180, 76 LEd. 306) (1932).
40
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.”51 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States has also “recognized that
the Blockburger test focuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements
of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence to be presented at trial.”52
Accordingly, if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not, the offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test.53
As previously noted, in her earlier trial, Cotman was acquitted on the charge
of influencing a witness under OCGA § 16-10-93 (b) (1) (C), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to use intimidation,
physical force, or threats; to persuade another person by means of
corruption or to attempt to do so; or to engage in misleading conduct
toward another person with intent to . . . [h]inder, delay, or prevent the
51
Id. at 304; accord Garrett, 306 Ga. App. at 430. This constitutional test is
also codified under OCGA § 16-1-8 (b). See McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515, 519,
315 SE2d 413 (1984). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Georgia specifically adopted
the “required evidence” test under Blockburger for determining when one crime is
“included in” another under OCGA §§ 16-1-6 and 16-1-7 (a) (1). Drinkard v. Walker,
281 Ga. 211, 216 (636 SE2d 530) (2006).
52
Garrett, 306 Ga. App. at 431 (punctuation omitted), citing Illinois v. Vitale,
447 U.S. 410, 416 (100 SCt 2260, 65 LE2d 228) (1980).
53
See Garrett, 306 Ga. App. at 431 (punctuation omitted); see also Ledford v.
State, 289 Ga. 70, 71 (1) (709 SE2d 239) (2011) (applying “required evidence” test
for determining whether one offense is included in another).
41
communication to a law enforcement officer, prosecuting attorney, or
judge of this state of information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a criminal offense or a violation of conditions of
probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings.
But racketeering is “a special type of compound offense, not simply a more serious
grade of forgery, robbery, homicide, or any of the other offenses specified in the Act
as predicate offenses.”54 And although influencing a witness can be a predicate
offense supporting a RICO charge,55 it is certainly not a necessary element of such a
charge. More importantly, it was not a predicate offense in Cotman’s RICO trial. In
fact, the amended indictment did not allege that Cotman engaged in influencing a
witness, either as a predicate act of the RICO charge or as a separate charge, and the
State presented no evidence during the trial pertaining to the charge for which
Cotman was acquitted in her first trial—i.e., her alleged attempt to intimidate
Principal Hawkins from speaking with the GBI. Furthermore, while Cotman is correct
that many of the same witnesses who testified during her first trial also testified
during her RICO trial, none of those witnesses testified regarding the specific meeting
54
Redford v. State, 309 Ga. App. 118, 122 (710 SE2d 197) (2011).
55
See former OCGA § 16-14-3 (9) (A) (xiv) (2011).
42
with Principal Hawkins that resulted in the influencing-a-witness charge. Regardless,
Cotman’s focus on such witness overlap in the two trials is misplaced given, as
discussed supra, that “the Blockburger test focuses on the proof necessary to prove
the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence to be
presented at trial.”56 Accordingly, Cotman’s prosecution on the RICO charge after
she was acquitted on the influencing-a-witness charge was not barred by substantive
double jeopardy.57
For all these reasons, we affirm Cotman and Williamson’s convictions in both
Case No. A17A1050 and Case No. A17A1051.
Judgment affirmed in both cases. Ray, P. J., and Self, J., concur.
56
See supra note 51 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
57
See Stepp v. State, 286 Ga. 556, 558-59 (690 SE2d 161) (2010) (holding that
defendant’s conviction in recorder’s court for violation of county ordinance
regulating her responsibilities as pet owner did not bar, on double jeopardy grounds,
subsequent prosecution in state court for misdemeanor reckless conduct, as violation
of county ordinance required proof of ownership of animal, whereas reckless conduct
statute did not, and violation of reckless conduct statute required proof of actual
bodily harm being caused, which ordinance did not); Southwell v. State, 320 Ga. App.
763, 763-65 (1) (740 SE2d 725) (2013) (holding that defendant’s separate convictions
for robbery by intimidation and felony theft by taking did not violate prohibition
against double jeopardy because robbery by intimidation was based on defendant’s
act of threatening victim with knife to obtain money, while theft was based on
stealing victim’s car and did not require proof that taking was by intimidation).
43