L.J. v. Carricato

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 11, 2018

2018COA3

No. 17CA0097, L.J. v. Carricato — Government — Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act — Immunity and Partial Waiver —
Actions Against Public Employees; Dependency and Neglect —
Child Protection Act of 1987

A division of the court of appeals considers whether the

Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -120,

C.R.S. 2017, bars claims against a city and a police officer for

alleged violation of the Child Protection Act of 1987 (CPA), §§ 19-3-

301 to -318, C.R.S. 2017. The division concludes that the two

statutes do not conflict. Thus, the CGIA bars the claim against the

city for alleged violation of the CPA because the claim lies or could

lie in tort. Additionally, the claim against the city for vicarious

liability must be dismissed because public entities do not waive

immunity for an employee’s willful and wanton conduct.
 The division also concludes, based on Martinez v. Estate of

Bleck, 2016 CO 58, that the claims against the police officer must

be remanded for a Trinity hearing to allow the district court to

determine whether the officer’s conduct was in fact willful and

wanton.

Finally, the division concludes that the claim for exemplary

damages against the police officer was prematurely pled.

Accordingly, the division reverses the judgment and remands

the case in part with directions.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 17CA0097
El Paso County District Court No. 15CV33722
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

L.J., individually and as surviving parent of D.J.M., deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Justin Carricato, individually and in his capacity as an officer with the City of
Colorado Springs Police Department; and the City of Colorado Springs,
Colorado,

Defendants-Appellants.

JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Freyre and Kapelke*, JJ., concur

Announced January 11, 2018

Deere Law, LLC, Joshua M. Deere, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Wynetta Massey, City Attorney, W. Erik Lamphere, Division Chief, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2017.
¶1 The City of Colorado Springs (City) and Officer Justin

Carricato appeal the district court’s partial denial of their motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the

Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -102,

C.R.S. 2017. We reverse the portions of the judgment on the claims

against the City, the vicarious liability claim, and the exemplary

damages claim. We remand the portion of the judgment relating to

the claims against Officer Carricato.

I. Background

¶2 D.J.M., age two, died on January 17, 2015, after suffering a

beating by his mother’s boyfriend, R.A. D.J.M.’s father, L.J.

(father), brought a wrongful death action against the City and

Officer Carricato, individually and in his capacity as an officer with

the City of Colorado Springs Police Department (Department).

A. Facts Alleged in Father’s Complaint

¶3 Father and M.J. (mother), D.J.M.’s mother, shared custody of

D.J.M. in accordance with a temporary parenting time order.

D.J.M. spent five days a week with mother and the other two with

father. Parenting time exchanges took place at the Department’s

Sand Creek Division (Police Station).

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¶4 In November 2014, father and his mother (grandmother) began

noticing signs of physical trauma on D.J.M. such as marks,

bruises, lacerations, and discoloration on his skin and genitalia.

D.J.M. lost weight and demonstrated signs of significant emotional

trauma. By early December, he would cry and beg to stay with

father and grandmother when he was dropped off at the Police

Station for mother’s parenting time.

¶5 On the first Saturday of December 2014, father told the Police

Station’s front desk attendant that he suspected D.J.M. was being

abused by mother or R.A. He showed the attendant the marks and

bruises on D.J.M., and said he did not want to turn D.J.M. over to

mother. The attendant told father that he had to turn D.J.M. over

to mother, or he would be arrested for refusing to obey a court

order. The attendant told father he could not make an official

police report at that time, but that he should take photographs of

D.J.M.’s injuries. Over the next three weeks, father repeatedly

showed D.J.M.’s marks and bruises and photos of the injuries to

the Police Station attendant.

¶6 When father picked D.J.M. up at the Police Station on

Christmas Day 2014, he was so concerned by D.J.M.’s condition

2
 that he insisted the police make an official report. The attendant

told father to go home and call the police and an officer would visit

them at their home. Father did so, and Officer Carricato responded

to the call.

¶7 Officer Carricato visited father’s home, where he interviewed

father, took pictures of D.J.M., and made an internal police report.

He reiterated that father must continue to abide by the court’s

parenting time order. Officer Carricato called mother from his

police cruiser on Christmas Day; this was the only phone call he

made to mother’s home. Officer Carricato did not visit mother’s

house, speak to R.A., or have further meetings with father and

D.J.M. No report was made to the El Paso County Department of

Human Services or any other state or county agencies before

D.J.M.’s death.

¶8 From December 25, 2014, to January 10, 2015, father and

grandmother continued to make the same complaints at the Police

Station when they dropped off D.J.M. On January 14, father

learned that D.J.M. had been rushed to the hospital. D.J.M. had

suffered serious injuries that were consistent with having been

thrown against a wall. He was transferred to Children’s Hospital in

3
 Denver where a portion of his skull was removed to alleviate brain

swelling. After the surgery, he remained in a coma until he died on

January 17, 2015.

¶9 The cause of death was homicide brought on by complications

from blunt-force injuries. Detectives investigating the case

determined that some of D.J.M.’s injuries were sustained weeks

before the January 14 incident. They also confirmed that in the

weeks preceding D.J.M.’s death, father had tried to bring D.J.M.’s

injuries to the attention of the Colorado Springs police.

B. Procedural History and Standard of Review

¶ 10 Father’s complaint alleges: (1) a violation of the reporting

requirement of the Child Protection Act of 1987 (CPA), §§ 19-3-301

to -318, C.R.S. 2017, by the City and Officer Carricato; (2)

negligence (wrongful death) by the City and Officer Carricato; (3)

negligence per se by the City and Officer Carricato; (4) a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (2012) claim against the City and Officer Carricato; (5)

vicarious liability against the City; and (6) an entitlement to

4
 exemplary damages under section 24-10-118(1)(c), C.R.S. 2017

against Officer Carricato.1

¶ 11 Under the CPA, certain individuals — including police officers

— are required to report known or suspected child abuse to the

county department, local law enforcement agency, or through the

child abuse hotline. § 16-2.5-101(1), C.R.S. 2017;

§ 19-3-304(1)(a)-(b)(2)(s), C.R.S. 2017. The county department or

local law enforcement agency must then submit a report to the

state department. § 19-3-307(1), C.R.S. 2017. Any person who

willfully violates the reporting mandate commits a class three

misdemeanor and “[s]hall be liable for damages proximately caused

thereby.” § 19-3-304(4)(a)-(b).

¶ 12 The City and Officer Carricato moved to dismiss the state law

claims.2 They argued that (1) father’s claims were barred by the

1 The second, third, and fourth claims are not at issue on this
appeal because the parties did not contest those portions of the
motion to dismiss.
2 Because the fourth claim raised a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claim,

the City and Officer Carricato first removed the case to the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. The federal
district court dismissed the section 1983 claim, declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and remanded
the case to the El Paso County District Court.

5
 CGIA, and (2) father failed to plead a specific factual basis showing

willful and wanton conduct by Officer Carricato.

¶ 13 The district court determined that while the negligence claims

for wrongful death and negligence per se were barred by the CGIA,

the claim for violation of the CPA was not barred because it was not

a claim based in tort. The district court allowed the claim for

vicarious liability to stand insofar as it related to the violation of the

CPA. Finally, the district court found, without conducting a hearing

under Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster,

848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993), that the complaint alleged a sufficient

factual basis to support a claim of willful and wanton behavior.

¶ 14 We review the district court’s interpretation of the CGIA de

novo. Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 2012 COA 113, ¶ 16.

II. Analysis

¶ 15 The City and Officer Carricato argue that the district court

erred because (1) the CGIA bars the claim for violation of the CPA,

and (2) father’s complaint does not allege specific facts sufficient to

support a finding that Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and

6
 wanton.3 No Colorado case discusses the intersection of the CGIA

and the CPA. We hold that the CGIA bars the claim against the City

for a violation of the CPA because the claim lies or could lie in tort.

Thus, the district court improperly denied that part of the motion to

dismiss. We remand to the district court on the claims against

Officer Carricato for a determination of whether his conduct was

willful and wanton. We conclude that the claims for vicarious

liability against the City must be dismissed. Finally, we agree that

the claim for exemplary damages against Officer Carricato was

prematurely pleaded.

A. Public Entity Immunity

¶ 16 Under the CGIA, “[a] public entity shall be immune from

liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort

regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of

relief chosen by the claimant except as provided otherwise in this

section.” § 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2017. Under the CGIA, “the state

and its subdivisions are subject to the same liability as private

3Because we decline to address the new arguments raised by the
City in its reply brief, Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co.,
252 P.3d 1182, 1187 n.3 (Colo. App. 2011), we need not strike
portions of the City’s reply brief as father requests via motion.

7
 entities, unless the General Assembly has affirmatively protected

the state from liability through immunity legislation.” C.K. v. People

in Interest of L.K., 2017CO111, ¶ 12 (citation omitted). Because the

CGIA altered the common law of negligence, we strictly construe its

grant of sovereign immunity and interpret its waiver provisions

broadly. Burnett v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2013 COA 42, ¶ 7, aff’d,

2015 CO 19; see also Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 453 (Colo.

2001); Herrera v. City & Cty. of Denver, 221 P.3d 423, 425 (Colo.

App. 2009). “Nonetheless, we interpret a statute to give words and

phrases their plain meaning in order to give effect to the intent of

the legislature.” Burnett, ¶ 7.

1. Waivers of Sovereign Immunity

¶ 17 The CGIA lists specific exceptions where sovereign immunity

for public entities is waived. § 24-10-106(1)(a)-(i). As relevant here,

sovereign immunity is waived for claims brought under a statutory

scheme that fits within one of the specific waiver provisions. See

State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220, 228 (Colo. 1992) (sustaining a

motorist’s claim against the Division of Highways for failure to

maintain fences pursuant to the Fence Law because the Fence Law

8
 fit within the statutory exception for injuries resulting from a

dangerous condition on a public highway, § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I)).

¶ 18 Additionally, sovereign immunity can be waived for claims

seeking equitable, remedial, and non-compensatory relief. City of

Colorado Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167, 1176 (Colo. 2000)

(“The CGIA’s grant of immunity does not protect public entities from

suits for non-compensatory relief de[s]igned to redress general

harms or prohibited conduct under statutes like the [Civil Rights

Act].”); Colo. City Metro. Dist. v. Graber & Son’s Inc., 897 P.2d 874,

877 (Colo. App. 1995) (holding that the CGIA does not shield public

entities from remedial provisions allowing an award of attorney fees

against a public entity that brings a frivolous claim); cf. Colo. Dep’t

of Transp. v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 182 P.3d 687, 691 (Colo. 2008)

(“[W]e have never suggested that claims for relief developed and

historically administered by courts of chancery or equity, rather

than courts of law, necessarily fall outside the coverage of the

[CGIA].”).

¶ 19 Here, the City is undisputedly a “public entity.”

§ 24-10-103(5), C.R.S. 2017; Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 13

P.3d 794, 799 (Colo. 2000) (“Cities and counties are within the

9
 definition of ‘public entity.’”). The exceptions to sovereign immunity

are not applicable here because (1) the enumerated statutory

exceptions are not at issue; (2) the CPA does not fit within any of

the statutory exceptions; and (3) father is not requesting equitable,

remedial, or non-compensatory remedies. Thus, the question is

whether father’s claims against the City lie in tort or could lie in

tort. We conclude that they do.

2. Claims that Lie in Tort or Could Lie in Tort

¶ 20 Whether a claim lies in tort or could lie in tort “depends on the

factual basis underlying the claim and, specifically, the nature of

the alleged injury.” First Nat’l Bank of Durango v. Lyons, 2015 COA

19, ¶ 13; see Brown Grp., 182 P.3d at 690 (“[T]he notion of a ‘tort’ is

notoriously difficult to define with any degree of precision[.]”). We

assess the pleadings and undisputed evidence to determine whether

“the injury arises either out of conduct that is tortious in nature or

out of the breach of a duty recognized in tort law.” Robinson v.

Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1003 (Colo. 2008). We also

consider whether the relief requested “seeks to compensate the

plaintiff for that injury.” Id.

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¶ 21 Here, father’s claims against the City lie in tort or could lie in

tort. Father argues that the duties imposed by the CPA originate

from the statute and not from a general duty of care. However, we

must look to the injury underlying the statutory claims. See Lyons,

¶¶ 13, 15; see also City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada Police Dep’t v.

Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 2017 CO 97, ¶ 39 (“The CGIA does

not, however, grant immunity to public entities for non-tort claims,

including claims based on ‘contractual relations or a distinctly

non-tortious statutorily-imposed duty.’” (quoting Brown Grp., 182

P.3d at 691)) (emphasis added).

¶ 22 In Lyons, the question was whether a bank’s claim under the

Colorado Securities Act (CSA) was a claim that lies in tort or could

lie in tort. Lyons, ¶ 1. The division concluded it was because in

essence the CSA claim was a claim for common law fraud alleging

that the bank purchased bonds in reliance on false statements or

omissions of material fact and sustained financial loss as a result.

Id. at ¶ 15. Similarly, the essence of father’s claim is that the City

breached a duty of care owed to D.J.M. which caused his death.

See Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Keefe, 900 P.2d 97, 102 (Colo. 1995)

(“The cause of action created by [the Wrongful Death Act] arises out

11
 of tortious acts which injured the decedent and resulted in the

decedent’s death; the survivors’ right of action is derivative of and

dependent upon the right of action which the decedent would have

had, had she survived her injuries.”). The civil liability the CPA

allows is rooted in traditional tort principles. § 19-3-304(4) (“Any

person who willfully violates [the reporting provisions]. . . [s]hall be

liable for damages proximately caused thereby.”) (emphasis added);

Walcott v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 964 P.2d 609, 611 (Colo. App. 1998)

(“Negligence claims cannot succeed without showing that a duty

existed and that the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of

the injuries alleged.”). Because father’s claims against the City are

rooted in the tort of negligence, the motion to dismiss this claim

was improperly denied.

3. Conflicting Statutes

¶ 23 Father argues that the CGIA and CPA conflict and thus the

CPA — the statute with the later effective date (1987 versus 1971

for the CGIA) — must prevail. § 2-4-206, C.R.S. 2017 (“If statutes

enacted at the same or different sessions of the general assembly

are irreconcilable, the statute prevails which is latest in its effective

12
 date.”). But, we are not persuaded that the CGIA and CPA are

irreconcilable.

¶ 24 When possible, “we interpret conflicting statutes in a manner

that harmonizes the statutes[.]” City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d

654, 657 (Colo. 2006). A statutory construction that would lead to

repeal by implication is not favored unless it is unavoidable. Id.

“The intent to repeal by implication ‘must appear clearly,

manifestly, and with cogent force.’” Id. (quoting Prop. Tax Adm’r v.

Prod. Geophysical Servs., 860 P.2d 514, 518 (Colo. 1993)). In

Pepper, two statutes were in clear conflict on whether a city had the

discretion to exclude volunteer reserve police officers from workers’

compensation coverage because of the statutes’ differing definitions

of “employee.” 145 P.3d at 657-58. The supreme court held that

the more recent statute manifested a clear intent by the General

Assembly to mandate workers’ compensation coverage for volunteer

reserve police officers; thus the conflicting, earlier statute was

repealed by implication. Id. at 660.

¶ 25 Here, the CPA manifests no intent to repeal the CGIA by

implication. The CPA was passed in 1987, recognizing that

“reporting of child abuse is a matter of public concern.” Ch. 138,

13
 sec. 1, § 19-3-302, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 762. Persons who

properly report information about known or suspected child abuse

are immune from liability. § 19-3-309, C.R.S. 2017 (“Any

person . . . participating in good faith in the making of a report . . .

shall be immune from any liability . . . .”). When first enacted, the

immunity provision read, “[a]ny person . . ., participating in good

faith in the making of a report . . . shall be immune from any

liability, civil or criminal, or termination of employment that

otherwise might result by reason of such reporting.” Ch. 138, sec.

1, § 19-3-309, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 770.

¶ 26 In 1989, the immunity provision was amended to include an

immunity waiver “unless a court of competent jurisdiction

determines that such person’s behavior was willful, wanton, and

malicious.” Ch. 169, sec. 7, § 19-3-309, 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws

916. Thus, persons who report child abuse under section 19-3-304

are immune from liability unless their conduct is willful, wanton,

and malicious.

¶ 27 The term “any person” is not defined in the definitions section

of the Children’s Code, which contains the CPA. See § 19-1-103,

C.R.S. 2017. To determine the meaning of “any person” we first

14
consider whether “the statutory language has a plain and

unambiguous meaning.” Bryant v. Cmty. Choice Credit Union, 160

P.3d 266, 274 (Colo. App. 2007). “The plainness or ambiguity of

statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself,

the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader

context of the statute as a whole.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil

Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). The CPA lists persons required to

report child abuse in section 19-3-304(2)(a)-(mm). All the

references are clearly to persons because they are to specific

occupations — such as physicians, dentists, or psychologists — or

employees of particular organizations — such as public or private

school employees, workers in the state department of human

services, or employees of county departments of health, human

services, or social services. § 19-3-304(2)(a), (d), (l), (p), (cc), (ll).

Nowhere does section 19-3-304(2) include a specific entity as a

mandatory reporter; only the entities’ employees are required to

report. Thus, the CPA unambiguously defines “any person” to

mean people in specific occupations or employed by certain entities

or any other individual who knows of or suspects child abuse.

§ 19-3-304(3) (“[A]ny other person may report . . . .”).

15
¶ 28 Because the CPA does not mention entities, the CGIA, which

clearly discusses public entities, controls on issues of public entity

immunity. § 24-10-106(1); see Jenkins v. Pan. Canal Ry. Co., 208

P.3d 238, 241 (Colo. 2009) (“[W]e generally only look to a statute’s

plain language . . . .”). As the statutes’ language is clear and

unambiguous, we need not look to their legislative histories. Id.

¶ 29 The CGIA clearly distinguishes between public entities and

public employees because it discusses their respective immunity in

two different sections — section 24-10-106 discusses public entity

immunity and section 24-10-118 discusses public employee

immunity. The two immunity provisions are not identical. Public

entities enjoy sovereign immunity for tort claims unless a specific

statutory exception is met. § 24-10-106(1)(a)-(i). In contrast, the

immunity provision for public employees does not contain specific

statutory exceptions. See § 24-10-118. Rather, public employees

are immune from liability for tort claims unless their act or

omission was willful and wanton. § 24-10-118(1); see also § 19-3-

309.

¶ 30 The CGIA defines public employee as “an officer, employee,

servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity, whether or not

16
 compensated, elected, or appointed . . . .” § 24-10-103(4)(a), C.R.S.

2017. Thus, where the CPA includes in its list of “any person”

persons who are public employees, their sovereign immunity is

governed by the CGIA. See Pepper, 145 P.3d at 657 (“Where

possible, we interpret conflicting statutes in a manner that

harmonizes the statutes and gives meaning to other potentially

conflicting statutes.”). The CGIA, § 24-10-118(1), and CPA, §§ 19-3-

304, -309, read together, provide that a public employee who is a

mandatory reporter is immune from liability for reporting or failing

to report child abuse unless his conduct is willful and wanton. See

Town of Minturn v. Tucker, 2013 CO 3, ¶ 27 (“[W]e presume the

General Assembly meant what it said.”). Thus, we reject father’s

argument that the two statutes are irreconcilable. Accordingly, we

now address the issue whether Officer Carricato’s conduct was

willful and wanton.

B. Public Employee Immunity

¶ 31 Because the court did not determine whether Officer

Carricato’s conduct was willful and wanton, we remand for such a

17
 determination following a Trinity hearing. Martinez v. Estate of

Bleck, 2016 CO 58, ¶ 28. 4

¶ 32 Public employees enjoy sovereign immunity for conduct which

lies in tort or could lie in tort that “arises out of injuries sustained

from an act or omission of such employee which occurred or is

alleged in the complaint to have occurred during the performance of

his duties and within the scope of his employment, unless the act

or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton.”

§ 24-10-118(1).5 “In any action in which allegations are made that

an act or omission of a public employee was willful and wanton, the

specific factual basis of such allegations shall be stated in the

complaint.” § 24-10-110(5)(a), C.R.S. 2017.

¶ 33 The CGIA does not define the phrase “willful and wanton

conduct.” Martinez, ¶ 30. Our supreme court has looked to various

4 While the City cited Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, to the
district court, it did not emphasize its holding or the importance of
a hearing under Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of
Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).
5 We note that section 24-10-118(2)(a) adds that, in addition to

waiving immunity for willful and wanton conduct, a public
employee cannot assert immunity when the public entity faces
liability under one of the section 24-10-106(1) waivers. But, those
waiver provisions are not at issue here.

18
 definitions of “willful and wanton conduct.” Id.; see, e.g., Moody v.

Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200, 205 (Colo. 1994) (looking to the definition of

“willful and wanton” in section 13-21-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 1987, to

determine exemplary damages). The supreme court has declined to

pick one single definition for willful and wanton because “they all

share a common feature — namely, a conscious disregard of the

danger.” Martinez, ¶ 30. Thus, public employees’ actions are willful

and wanton when the employees are “consciously aware that their

acts or omissions create danger or risk to the safety of others, and

they then act, or fail to act, without regard to the danger or risk.”

Gray, ¶ 39. A complaint cannot merely assert that a public

employee’s acts or omissions were willful and wanton. Id. at ¶ 40.

At a minimum, the complaint must allege “‘specific facts to support

a reasonable inference’ that the employee was consciously aware

that his or her acts or omissions created danger or risk to the safety

of others, and that he or she acted, or failed to act, without regard

to the danger or risk.” Id. (citations omitted).

¶ 34 However, it is not enough for the district court to merely

determine that the complaint adequately alleged that the conduct

was willful and wanton. Martinez, ¶ 5. The district court must

19
 determine whether the conduct was in fact willful and wanton. Id.

at ¶ 28. Immunity under the CGIA is a subject matter jurisdiction

question that is determined according to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Trinity,

848 P.2d at 924-25. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving

jurisdiction. Dennis ex rel. Heyboer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 2016

COA 140, ¶ 15. The district court “may allow limited discovery and

conduct an evidentiary hearing” — a Trinity hearing — to determine

jurisdiction. Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924. Trinity hearings now “include

all issues of immunity, including facts not directly disputed by the

parties.” Dennis ex rel. Heyboer, ¶ 2. But see Medina, 35 P.3d at

452 (“[I]f all relevant evidence is presented to the trial court, and the

underlying facts are undisputed, the trial court may decide the

jurisdictional issue as a matter of law . . . .”).

¶ 35 Here, in its order regarding the motion to dismiss, the district

court stated, “There are no facts at issue necessary for the [c]ourt to

make this determination. There is also no need for a hearing.”

Thus, the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss without

conducting a Trinity hearing. The court further concluded that the

question whether Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and

wanton was an “ultimate decision of fact for the jury.” Examination

20
 of the operative complaint and answer reveals that whether Officer

Carricato acted willfully and wantonly is disputed. In Martinez, the

supreme court determined that the district court erred in merely

determining that the complaint sufficiently pleaded that a police

officer’s conduct was willful and wanton and concluding that the

ultimate determination had to be left to trial. Martinez, ¶ 28. Thus,

we remand for the district court to determine, after a hearing,

whether Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and wanton.

C. Vicarious Liability

¶ 36 Although the parties did not brief the issue, we conclude that

the vicarious liability claims against the City must be dismissed.

¶ 37 The vicarious liability claims against the City for negligence

per se and wrongful death based on Officer Carricato’s conduct are

claims that lie in tort or could lie in tort; thus, they are barred by

the CGIA. See Lyons, ¶ 36. The City’s liability under a vicarious

liability theory is not based on the City’s own negligent acts. Id.

Rather, it is based on the City’s vicarious liability for acts taken by

Officer Carricato within the scope of his employment. Id. Thus, the

claims for vicarious liability based on negligence per se and

wrongful death sound in tort.

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¶ 38 The claim against the City for vicarious liability based on

Officer Carricato’s failure to report under the CPA must also be

dismissed. Even if Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and

wanton, “the CGIA does not provide for the waiver of the sovereign

immunity of public entities from suit based either on their own

willful and wanton acts or omissions, or their employees’ willful and

wanton acts or omissions.” Gray, ¶ 27; see § 24-10-106(1)(a)-(i)

(waiving public entity sovereign immunity for only the listed

statutory exceptions, not for willful and wanton conduct); see also §

24-10-110-(1)(a) (Public entities are liable for the costs of defending

their employees from claims arising out of “injuries sustained from

an act or omission of such employee occurring during the

performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment,

except where such act or omission is willful and wanton.”). Thus,

the vicarious liability claim against the City, based on Officer

Carricato’s failure to report under the CPA, must be dismissed.

D. Exemplary Damages

¶ 39 Officer Carricato argues briefly in a footnote that the claim for

exemplary damages cannot stand because it was improperly

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 pleaded and that exemplary damages cannot be awarded against a

police officer. We agree that the claim was improperly pleaded.

¶ 40 The CGIA allows a claim for exemplary damages against public

employees only if their conduct was willful and wanton.

§ 24-10-118(1)(c). Similarly, in an action for wrongful death,

exemplary damages may only be awarded where “the death

complained of is attended by circumstances of . . . willful and

wanton conduct . . . .” § 13-21-203(3)(a), C.R.S. 2017.

Additionally, the claim for exemplary damages may not be included

in the initial claim for relief. § 13-21-203(3)(c)(I). Exemplary

damages claims must be included in an amendment to the

pleadings at least sixty days after the exchange of initial disclosures

and “the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.”

Id. Here, father included the claim for exemplary damages in his

initial complaint; thus, the exemplary damages claim was

prematurely pleaded.

¶ 41 Once the Trinity hearing is concluded, the district court can

revisit this issue, including if necessary the availability of such

damages against a peace officer pursuant to section 13-21-203(6).

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 III. Conclusion

¶ 42 We reverse the portion of the judgment denying the motion to

dismiss the violation of the CPA claim against the City. We remand

for a hearing on the portion of the judgment concerning whether

Officer Carricato’s conduct was willful and wanton. We reverse the

portion of the judgment denying the motion to dismiss the vicarious

liability claims against the City. We reverse the portion of the

judgment allowing the claim for exemplary damages to stand as it is

currently pleaded.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE KAPELKE concur.

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