Andrew Haniford v. Chelsy Lawrence (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 15 2018, 9:03 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
John S. Capper, IV Kyle D. Gobel
Capper Tulley & Reimondo Collier Gobel Homann, LLC
Crawfordsville, Indiana Crawfordsville, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andrew Haniford, March 15, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
54A01-1709-JP-2161
v. Appeal from the Montgomery
Circuit Court
Chelsy Lawrence, The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
54C01-1507-JP-153

Brown, Judge.

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[1] Andrew Haniford (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to

modify child custody. Father raises one issue which we revise and restate as

whether the trial court erred in denying his petition to modify custody. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 20, 2015, the court approved an agreed entry finding that Chelsy

Lawrence (“Mother”) and Father were the biological parents of M.H., born on

January 15, 2015, that Mother would have sole legal custody of M.H., and that

Father would have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time

Guidelines.

[3] On October 12, 2016, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a verified

petition in the Montgomery Circuit Court alleging M.H. to be a child in need of

services (“CHINS”) and that Mother was using heroin while in a sole caregiver

role to M.H.. The Petition alleged that Mother admitted on September 20,

2016, to previous drug use, she refused a drug screen, law enforcement searched

the home on October 11, 2016, and found paraphernalia, including a used

syringe in a drawer easily accessible to a toddler, M.H. had been removed from

the home with the assistance of law enforcement, and DCS had not located

Father.

[4] On March 24, 2017, Father filed a verified petition to modify custody in the

Montgomery Circuit Court based upon Mother’s lifestyle and arrest, the

CHINS action, and the placement of M.H. with Father.

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[5] On August 9, 2017, the court entered an Order Approving Permanency Plan in

the CHINS action, finding that it was most appropriate and consistent with the

best interests of M.H. to be returned to or continued in the custodial care of

Mother.

[6] The same day, the court held a hearing on Father’s petition.1 Danielle Jeanette

Long, a registered nurse and Father’s half-sister, testified that M.H. was placed

in her care on October 25, 2016 and was placed with Father on February 7,

2017. She stated that she had concerns with Mother’s ability to care for him

including Mother’s tendency to not pay attention to M.H. after an hour or two

of visitation and her inability to handle M.H. during his meltdowns. She

testified that she had concerns about Mother’s care, that there were diaper rash

issues when Mother had unsupervised visits, and that M.H. “would come home

with severe flaming red diaper rash.” Transcript Volume II at 9. She described

Father as extremely interactive with M.H. and stated that M.H. had adjusted

very well to living with Father, his fiancée, and the fiancée’s three children. On

cross-examination, Long indicated that Father did not have contact with M.H.

from his birth to October 2017, that Father has three children older than M.H.,

and that one of those children was in the care of Father’s sister.

[7] Mandy Fruits, Father’s fiancée, testified that she began her relationship with

Father in November 2015, she has three children, Father was a “very good

1
Judge Harry Siamas signed the August 9, 2017 Order Approving Permanency Plan and also conducted the
hearing on Father’s petition to modify custody.

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 dad,” M.H. adjusted to her children, and M.H. loved Father the “very first

moment he saw him.” Id. at 21. She testified that M.H. would come home

with severe diaper rash following visitation with Mother, that Father had a

structure in the house regarding bedtimes, eating, and naptime and that M.H.

adjusted well to the structure, and they moved to a four-bedroom house on

three acres. On cross-examination, Fruits testified that M.H. was not in

Father’s home from November 2015 to November 2016 and that there were

times when Father’s older children visited the house resulting in seven children

being there.

[8] Father testified that he did not receive visitation with M.H. after the August

2015 order because Mother refused visitation, that he began visiting with M.H.

when DCS became involved, and that he completed everything DCS asked him

to complete. He testified that M.H. was placed with him in February 2017 and

that it had been only a few days since M.H. was returned to Mother’s care

through the CHINS action. He stated that he has visitation with one of his

other children and pays forty dollars a week in support for that child, and that

M.H. has “done really good with” the other children in the house. Id. at 33.

[9] On cross-examination, Father clarified that he obtained custody of one of his

other children and that child lives with Father’s sister. He responded that his

other two children were in the care of their mothers but that he had parenting

time with the three children. He testified that his relationship with Mother fell

apart after M.H.’s birth and that he saw M.H. a handful of times between his

birth in January 2015 and DCS becoming involved in October 2016. When

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 asked if it was accurate to say that he saw M.H. less than ten times in that “two

year or so stretch,” Father answered: “It was probably about ten times.” Id. at

39.

[10] Mother testified that she did not try to keep M.H. from Father following M.H.’s

birth and that Father saw M.H. about three times prior to the end of their

relationship in April 2015. She stated that she had no contact with Father

between December 31, 2015, and October 2016, and that she lived in the same

place and had the same phone number during that time. She testified that she

reached out to Father to see if he could help with diapers or Tylenol, “but it was

always no and it was never how’s [M.H.] doing or can I see him or anything it

was just that was the extent of the conversation after he said no.” Id. at 45. She

testified that she had concerns with Father’s parenting time including that

M.H.’s sleep schedule was off, he had quit taking naps and was up until

midnight, M.H. told her that he would eat “always dry cereal or a Lunchables

or it’s never a meal,” and that his fingernails and toenails always had dirt caked

underneath them. Id. at 56. She also testified that M.H. had severe diaper rash

with Father. She acknowledged that M.H. was injured in her care in August

2016 when she was throwing him in the air and catching him and he just

slipped through her hands and fell onto the floor.

[11] According to Mother’s testimony, she was twenty-nine years old and her first

period of addiction was from age eighteen to twenty-three and that she was

mostly addicted to pain medicine. She went to prison when she was twenty-

three years old, was released in April 2013, maintained a period of sobriety, and

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 relapsed in September 2016 following a job loss and her car breaking down.

She went to detox the last week of September and did not use drugs for a period

of time, relapsed, and was arrested on October 11, 2016, for possession of a

syringe. She was released from jail on November 12, 2016, and immediately

began engaging in services through DCS. She last used controlled substances

on December 7, 2016, she completed an inpatient rehab, continued with

treatment following rehab, started relapse prevention and individual counseling,

and maintained employment. Mother also testified that she received drug

screens with DCS and her last positive screen was on November 29, 2016.

[12] Mother’s mother, Dora Hardacker, testified that Mother, Mother’s other child,

and M.H. live with her. She testified that she called DCS in October 2016

because she felt Mother had relapsed and that if there is an issue she is

straightforward. She stated that Mother can stay in her home as long as she

needs to and she has plenty of room.

[13] The court took judicial notice of the CHINS action and its records and

pleadings. A monthly progress report dated May 30, 2017, for Mother from

Wabash Valley Alliance states: “When scheduled for therapy, [Mother] is an

active participant in treatment, appears highly motivated to complete all DCS

requirements and maintain sobriety in order to be reunited with her son. She is

an active participant in relapse prevention group showing good insight into her

sobriety and recovery.” Appellee’s Appendix Volume 2 at 28. A document

from Wabash Valley Alliance dated May 31, 2017, indicates under the heading

“Clinical Assessment” that Mother “does a good job in engaging [M.H.]. She

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demonstrates good parenting skills with him.” Id. at 55. A monthly progress

report signed June 1, 2017, states:

Presenting Issues: [Mother] continues to go through the process
of having supervised visits with [M.H.]. She has had to
demonstrate her parenting skills in situations where [M.H.]
required some redirection or discipline. [Mother] has also had to
show that she can care for [M.H.’s] well-being.

Family Functional Strengths: [Mother] continues to demonstrate
good parenting skills. She provides food for [M.H.] at the
beginning of the visits, as he does not tend to eat breakfast before
the visit. She engages him in age-appropriate play and will play
age-appropriate cartoons on the TV. [Mother] has occasionally
had to use discipline with [M.H.] by placing him in time out for
no longer than 2 minutes. She makes sure that she talks to him
after his time out in reminding him to listen or to not tell her no,
but she also makes sure to cuddle him and reassure him of her
affection after the time out is over. [Mother] has demonstrated
that she can care for his well-being [and] is determined to show
that she is a safe and appropriate caregiver for her children.

Id. at 37-38. A document titled Child and Family Team Meeting Notes dated

July 5, 2017, states that M.H. was “conditionally safe at placement with”

Father and that current safety concerns included: “[s]till reporting that ‘daddy

does it’ with injuries,” concerns about bedtime and M.H. going to bed late,

“[s]till has a bit of a rash, possible allergy to Desitin,” and “[s]tarting to say ‘oh

shit,’ ‘god’, ‘I’m gonna slap you’ – discussed concerns about other children

saying these things.” Id. at 80. The document also states: Mother “is great at

engaging in creative, imaginative play with [M.H.]. She is passionate about her

role as a mother. [Mother] continues to push forward through barriers.” Id. at

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 81. A document titled Child and Family Team Meeting Notes dated July 7,

2017, states that Father and his fiancée had addressed safety concerns in a

timely manner and Father had completed the home-based services that DCS

requested.

[14] On August 18, 2017, the trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody.

Discussion

[15] The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Father’s petition to modify

custody. Generally, we review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion

and have a “preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in

family law matters.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002). “We set

aside judgments only when they are clearly erroneous, and will not substitute

our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial

court’s judgment.” Id. The Indiana Supreme Court explained the reason for

this deference in Kirk:

While we are not able to say the trial judge could not have found
otherwise than he did upon the evidence introduced below, this
Court as a court of review has heretofore held by a long line of
decisions that we are in a poor position to look at a cold
transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who
saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their
testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly
understand the significance of the evidence, or that he should
have found its preponderance or the inferences therefrom to be
different from what he did.

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 Id. (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)).

Therefore, “[o]n appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some

other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by

appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. “The party seeking to modify

custody bears the burden of demonstrating the existing custody should be

altered.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).

[16] Where, as here, the trial court did not make special findings, we review the trial

court’s decision as a general judgment and, without reweighing the evidence or

considering witness credibility, affirm it if sustainable upon any theory

consistent with the evidence. Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2009) (citing Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind. 2008)).

Judgments in custody matters generally turn on essential factual determinations

and will be set aside only when they are clearly erroneous. Baxendale, 878

N.E.2d at 1257. We will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or

legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 1257-1258.

[17] The child custody modification statute provides that “[t]he court may not

modify a child custody order unless: (1) modification is in the best interests of

the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors

that the court may consider under [Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2] . . . .” Ind. Code §

31-14-13-6. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2 lists the following factors:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parents.

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 (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parents;

(B) the child’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interest.

(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
parent.

[18] Father argues that M.H.’s close bond with him and his family, M.H.’s

adjustment to living with him, and Mother’s substance abuse addiction are

substantial changes to the initial paternity custody determination factors which

warrant a modification of custody. He asserts that the best interests of M.H.

would be served by modifying custody because he and his family have

committed to providing M.H. with a stable home and care, while Mother has

struggled with parenting skills and criminal behaviors.

[19] Mother argues that the court did not abuse its discretion and points out that

Father had no or limited contact with M.H. for periods of time and has three

older children of whom he does not have custody. She acknowledges that her

substance abuse and arrest were significant causes of concern, but asserts she

took all necessary steps to address her substance abuse and had been sober more

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 than seven months at the time of the modification hearing. She also points out

that the CHINS court placed M.H. back in her care.

[20] The record reveals that, while Long testified that she was concerned with

M.H.’s diaper rash issues when Mother had unsupervised visits, Mother

testified that M.H. had severe diaper rash with Father. While a CHINS action

was initiated, Father testified that M.H. was returned to Mother by the court

through the CHINS action. Indeed, in its Order Approving Permanency Plan

on August 9, 2017, the court found that it was most appropriate and consistent

with the best interests of M.H. to be returned to or continued in the custodial

care of Mother. Mother testified that she last used controlled substances on

December 7, 2016, she completed an inpatient rehab, continued with treatment

following rehab, started relapse prevention and individual counseling, and

maintained employment. The court heard Mother’s testimony regarding her

concerns with Father’s parenting. The court also heard the testimony of

Mother’s mother and was able to review the documents in the CHINS case.

We conclude that Father asks that we reweigh the evidence and judge the

credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do. See Fields v. Fields, 749 N.E.2d

100, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. We will not substitute our own

judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court’s

judgment. Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1257-1258. We cannot say that the trial

court’s judgment was clearly erroneous.

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 Conclusion

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s petition

to modify the custody of M.H.

[22] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.

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