IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0955
Filed April 27, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
WONETAH EINFELDT,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
Randy Hefner, Judge.
A defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to order a
competency hearing during trial and in excluding certain evidence.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy,
Assistant Appellate Defender, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, Wayne Reisetter, County Attorney, and Stacy L. Ritchie
and Ronald Forsell, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
2
APPEL, Justice.
This appeal involves an important intersection involving mental
illness and the criminal justice system. In this case, a criminal
defendant’s lawyer moved midtrial for a competency examination of his
client who, due to the stresses of trial was “incapable of aiding [him] in
her defense.” The record reveals that the client, among other things,
testified she suffered from paranoid schizophrenia but had stopped
taking prescribed medications due to lack of funds, stated that she
wanted to stab her lawyer in the neck and wanted to kill him, declared
that she did not know why her lawyer was sitting next to her, told the
court that she had called the FBI and was told she did nothing wrong,
and further declared that she would not write notes to her lawyer during
trial for fear the lawyer would pass the notes to the prosecution. The
district court denied the motion and the case proceeded to verdict. On
appeal, the defendant claims the district court erred in not ordering a
competency examination and in excluding evidence. For the reasons
expressed below, we reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Factual Background.
Wonetah Einfeldt and her two daughters were charged with willful
injury causing bodily injury over a physical altercation between the three
women and a fourth woman named Mulika Vinson on July 14, 2015.
The case went to trial and the defendants were tried jointly.
Prior to trial, the State sought to exclude all character evidence
about the victim, Vinson. This included evidence related to Vinson’s
prior threatening behavior and her convictions for two assaults and an
escape in Nebraska in 2001. She was fifteen or sixteen years old at the
time of the first assault and nineteen years old at the time of the second
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assault. At the time of trial, Vinson was thirty-one years old. Further,
the State sought to exclude evidence of a shooting that occurred at
Einfeldt’s apartment complex the evening of the altercation between
Einfeldt, Einfeldt’s daughters, and Vinson. The State asserted that the
police found no evidence of Vinson’s involvement in the shooting or that
the shooting was directed at Einfeldt. Finally, the State sought to
specifically exclude testimony by Lacey Chicoine about Vinson’s
reputation for violence.
Einfeldt resisted this part of the motion in limine. She argued that
this character evidence was admissible due to her self-defense
justification defense rendering Vinson’s character relevant and probative.
With respect to the shots fired the evening of the altercation, Einfeldt
argued that the evidence was relevant because it supported Einfeldt’s
belief that Vinson was a danger to her and others.
At a pretrial hearing, the district court judge reserved ruling on the
admissibility of Vinson’s prior felonies. The court sustained the part of
the State’s motion in limine with respect to the shots fired at Einfeldt’s
apartment complex, but emphasized that this was a preliminary ruling
and stated that Einfeldt could make an offer of proof at trial at which
point the court might reconsider its ruling. With respect to Chicoine’s
testimony about Vinson’s reputation, the court stressed that proper
foundation would have to be laid to show that Chicoine was aware of
Vinson’s reputation.
After jury selection, but before the presentation of evidence,
Einfeldt again raised the issue of Vinson’s prior felony convictions. The
district court found that the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice, given how long ago the
convictions happened and Vinson’s age at the time.
4
Later during trial, an attorney for one of Einfeldt’s daughters made
an offer of proof concerning Chicoine’s testimony about Vinson outside
the presence of the jury. Chicoine related that at one point she and
Vinson were dating the same man, and Vinson threatened to “kick
[Chicoine’s] ass” or “beat [her] up” if Chicoine didn’t stay away from the
man. These threats were verbally made to Chicoine over the course of
six months. Vinson never assaulted Chicoine, however. Chicoine was
not aware of Vinson ever assaulting anyone.
The district court found that Chicoine’s testimony about threats
was only marginally relevant to the issue of Vinson’s character trait of
being prone to physical aggression. The court noted that Vinson only
made threats and never assaulted Chicoine. The court thus excluded the
evidence as more prejudicial than probative.
When Einfeldt made an offer of proof about the shots-fired incident
at her apartment complex, the court ruled that evidence about the
incident was inadmissible. The court found that the victim’s character
could not be proven by a specific instance of conduct in this case or,
alternatively, that there was not clear proof that Vinson was involved in
the shooting, and so the probative value of the evidence was outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.
At the beginning of the third day of trial, Einfeldt’s attorney
advised the court that his client did not remember the events of the
previous day. He called his client to the stand to further make a record
for the purpose of seeking a competency evaluation under Iowa Code
chapter 812 (2015). When asked if she remembered the events of
yesterday, Einfeldt responded, “No, I guess not. I don’t know.” She
testified that she did not remember calling the prosecutor a liar or that
5
she slammed her hand down and was animated with her lawyer.
Further, Einfeldt volunteered, “I just want to kill you [her lawyer].”
Einfeldt testified that she thought her lawyer was taking her
written notes and giving them to the State and to other parties. 1 She
admitted that she told her lawyer that she wanted to stab him “with my
pen in your neck.” When asked if she could pay attention to the trial, be
helpful to her lawyer, and assist the court when asked to do things, she
responded, “Yeah. Yeah, I don’t know, I don’t hear any noises. It’s not
buzzing. I just really—I’m in control.” Einfeldt volunteered that someone
was “poisoning the water.” In light of this testimony, her lawyer told the
court that Einfeldt has suffered from mental health issues in the past
and that “the stress of the trial has caused her to be incapable of aiding
[him] in her defense.”
When the district court asked her if she could assist her counsel,
Einfeldt said, “I just, I believe that I don’t—I kind of don’t, really. I do,
but I don’t know who he is sometimes. Right now I don’t know why he’s
sitting by me. I don’t understand this.” Einfeldt recognized, however,
that the person sitting next to her was her attorney. When the district
court asked whether she understood the charges, she stated, “I don’t,
1A few months after trial, Einfeldt filed a pro se motion for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment. In the motion, she continued to express her belief that her lawyer
was revealing confidential communication to the prosecution. She accused the
prosecutor of engaging in prosecutorial misconduct by obtaining privileged
communication between Einfeldt and her attorney and using this information to cause
the State’s witnesses to change their testimony. She additionally argued that she
received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney disclosed confidential
information to the prosecution. In a section apparently detailing her evidence showing
that her counsel disclosed confidential communications to the prosecution, she
described statements her attorney made such as telling her of his plans to go to a
Subway after the outcome of the trial and order a Diet Coke, telling her that he finds
dance recitals boring and would rather meet with clients, and stating to her that some
evidence obtained from discovery was not admissible.
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honestly. I called the F.B.I., and they said they don’t think I did
anything wrong.”
When asked by the district court if she understood that she was
being tried for the assault of Vinson, she responded, “I guess I don’t
know what assault means, because I think that I have a right to defend
myself.” When asked if she thought she had a defense to the charge,
Einfeldt responded, “Yeah. I don’t know.”
Einfeldt told the district court that she had been diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder,
and attention deficit disorder. She stated she had prescriptions for these
disorders but had not been taking her medication for a couple of months
because she did not have the money.
The district court denied the request to suspend the proceedings
and order a chapter 812 examination. The district court concluded that
based on its observations, Einfeldt was capable of assisting counsel in
providing a defense and understood the nature of the charges against
her.
The district court revisited the question prior to sentencing. At
this juncture, the district court had the opportunity to review Einfeldt’s
medical records as well as a presentence investigation (PSI) report
prepared by the department of correctional services.
The medical records from 2013 showed a provisional diagnosis at
Broadlawns Medical Center (Broadlawns) of paranoid schizophrenia. The
records stated that Einfeldt reported leaving Minnesota because people
wanted to kill her. She further stated that the television talked to her.
Her thought processes were characterized in the records as delusional. A
regime of drug therapy was prescribed.
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The PSI report, among other things, noted that Einfeldt had been
diagnosed with “Schizo-Affective Disorder and Bipolar Depression” at
Broadlawns. She had episodes of paranoia in the past and had received
treatment for mental health issues. Based on Einfeldt’s self-report, and
corroborated in the interview, the PSI report stated that Einfeldt was
reporting “psychotic characteristics.” The PSI report recommended an
assessment by a licensed professional “to more thoroughly examine the
validity and severity of these observed features.”
The district court again declined to order a chapter 812 hearing.
The district court stressed that up until the trial, the issue of her
competency had not been presented by counsel. The district court stated
that while there had been disruptive behavior, there was no behavior
that indicated she did not understand the charge or was unable to assist
counsel with her own defense.
The district court then moved on to sentencing, and Einfeldt was
called to the stand by her attorney. In response to her attorney’s
questions, Einfeldt gave rambling, off-topic, and incoherent answers. For
example, when her attorney asked her to confirm that they were asking
the court to sentence her to probation, Einfeldt denied wanting to ask for
probation and denied that she and her attorney were trying to seek
probation. She announced that she did not care, and then she launched
into a narrative in which she said that she could not think of three
positive things about herself for the PSI report, that she was hurt by the
PSI report author thinking she would reoffend, and that she would have
lower recidivism because “[m]y prison number is 80655. You never
forget that crap.” She then explained that the first crime she committed
was theft in second grade, that her mother made her stand in the cellar
for a week as punishment, that she was made to feel ashamed in school,
8
that she is “a fighter” and no one messes with her, and that she never
wanted a jury trial but instead wanted a bench trial. She concluded by
denying that she cares about herself and stating, “I live my life every day
for death. I don’t want to be here.”
After this allocution, the district court sentenced Einfeldt to a term
of up to five years’ incarceration. Einfeldt appealed.
II. Standard of Review.
We review whether a trial court should have ordered a competency
hearing de novo. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1994); Jones
v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1991).
“Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690 (Iowa 2017); see also State v.
Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 50 (Iowa 2003). If a trial court exercises
its discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent
clearly unreasonable,” an abuse of discretion has occurred.
Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 50 (quoting State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d
234, 239 (Iowa 2001)); see also Tipton, 897 N.W.2d at 690.
III. Overview of Requirement of Evaluation of Competency to
Stand Trial.
A. Due Process. Under the United States Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court has declared that the conviction of an
incompetent defendant violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836, 838 (1966). In Dusky v. United States, a one-
page opinion, the Supreme Court declared that the test for competence to
stand trial is whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding . . . and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of
9
the proceedings against him.” 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789
(1960) (per curium).
The Supreme Court has also declared that in order to comport with
due process, there must be a procedural mechanism to determine
whether a competency evaluation should be conducted. Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2605 (1986); Pate, 383
U.S. at 387, 86 S. Ct. at 843. The Supreme Court has said that due
process requires a threshold hearing to be held to determine if there is
sufficient doubt regarding the defendant’s mental capacity to show a
need for further evaluation. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95
S. Ct. 896, 904 (1975). Further, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that a defendant cannot waive the due process right to competency.
Pate, 383 U.S. at 384, 86 S. Ct. at 841.
The constitutional commands of due process have been captured
in the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on Mental Health. Criminal
Justice Standards on Mental Health (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_
justice_standards/mental_health_standards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter Mental Health Standards]. The ABA standards generally
incorporate Dusky, noting that the test for determining a defendant’s
competency when represented by counsel should be “whether the
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with defendant’s
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and whether
the defendant “has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings.” Id. standard 7-5.2, at 43. The standards emphasize that
the question of competence may be raised “at any stage of the
proceedings.” Id. standard 7-4.4, at 32. Defense counsel may move for a
competency evaluation even if the motion is over the defendant’s
10
objection. Id. standard 7-4.3(c), at 31. If a motion for a competency
evaluation is made by a represented defendant after probable cause has
been found that a criminal violation has occurred, the court should enter
an order for an evaluation if there is “a good faith doubt” as to the
competency of the defendant. Id. standard 7-4.4(a), at 32.
B. Statutory Provisions. Iowa, like many states, has adopted a
statutory procedure to implement the federal due process requirements
as enunciated by the Supreme Court. Iowa Code section 812.3(1)
provides that “at any stage of a criminal proceeding” a competency
hearing is required when the district court finds probable cause that
there exist “specific facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a
mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the
charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the
defense.” The court may make a finding of probable cause either after
application by the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, or after holding
a probable cause hearing on its own motion. Id. Probable cause exists
for a competency hearing when a reasonable person would believe that
there is a substantial question of the defendant’s competency. State v.
Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa 1979); see also Moore v. United
States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that due process
requires that when evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s competency to stand trial, it is “substantial evidence”
requiring that a competency hearing be held under the rule of Pate).
When the district court orders an evaluation of competency, Iowa Code
section 812.4 establishes a timetable for the subsequent competency
hearing and the structure of the hearing.
We have emphasized that whether to hold a competency evaluation
presents a legal question. State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa
11
1993). As a result, “[t]he trial court’s discretion does not play a
role . . . .” Id. When a constitutional question is raised, our review of a
district court decision regarding whether to order a competency
evaluation is de novo. Id.
In connection with application of section 812.3, we have favorably
cited Griffin v. Lockhart, 935 F.2d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1991), for the
proposition that a hearing should be held when a reasonable trial judge
would experience doubt on whether the defendant was competent to
stand trial. Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 531. Griffin also stands for the
proposition that “an express doubt by the attorney for the accused is a
legitimate factor to consider.” 935 F.2d at 930.
IV. Application of Due Process and Statutory Requirements.
Einfeldt claims that her constitutional right to due process 2 as well
as her statutory rights under Iowa Code chapter 812 were violated by the
refusal of the district court to order a competency hearing in this case.
Upon review of the entire record, we conclude the district court
was presented with sufficient reason to order a competency evaluation
under Iowa Code section 812.3, which is a statutory expression of state
2Einfeldt generically refers to “due process” and does not explicitly cite the Iowa
or the United States Constitution. Under our caselaw, when a generic reference is
made to a constitutional guaranty present in both the Iowa and United States
Constitutions, the party does not offer a distinctive interpretation of the Iowa
Constitution, and the party relies primarily on cases under the Federal Constitution, we
apply the federal substantive standards, but reserve the right to apply those standards
under the Iowa Constitution in a fashion different from prevailing federal authority.
State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2015); King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa
2011). For independent state constitutional interpretations of the due process clause,
see State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 768 (2010) (“[T]he Iowa Constitution prohibits
admission of prior bad acts evidence based solely on general propensity.”); War Eagle
Village Apartments v. Plummer, 775 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Iowa 2009) (holding notice by
certified mail for forcible entry and detainer violates due process under Iowa
Constitution); and Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (“We find a
putative father of a child born into a marriage may have a right to standing to challenge
paternity under the Due Process Clause of the Iowa Constitution.”).
12
and federal due process requirements. The professional statement of
Einfeldt’s attorney regarding the difficulty of representation plays an
important role. See United States v. Sandoval, 365 F. Supp. 2d 319,
321–22, 325–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (relying heavily on the opinions of
defense counsel regarding competence); Jones v. State, 362 So. 2d 1334,
1336 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (noting role of representations of counsel in
determining competency issues); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of
Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 539,
563 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie] (“[T]he attorney is best situated to know
whether the defendant’s impairments compromise the defense of the
case.”). Her professed statements about wanting to kill her lawyer and
stab her lawyer in the neck with a pen, her statement that she did not
know why the lawyer was seated beside her, and her stated belief that
her lawyer would turn over her notes to the State gives one pause.
Einfeldt’s lack of memory about what occurred during the prior day at
trial is also troublesome.
Before the district court, Einfeldt’s lawyer made a credible initial
showing that Einfeldt could not have the kind of relationship with her
lawyer to assist in the development of her legal defense due to her mental
state. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789. Competency
evaluations include a “careful assessment of the accused’s ability to
interact with counsel.” See John T. Philipsborn, Searching for Uniformity
in Adjudications of the Accused’s Competence to Assist and Consult in
Capital Cases, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 417, 422 (2004). Certainly
competence to assist counsel includes a capacity to recognize and relate
pertinent information to counsel concerning the facts of the case.
Bonnie, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. at 561. The ABA standards stress the need
for “present ability” to consult with counsel. Mental Health Standards,
13
standards 7-4.2, -5.2, -8.7, at 30, 43, 62. The ABA standards also note
that a finding of incompetence to proceed may arise from any mental
disorder or condition “as long as it results in a defendant’s inability to
consult with defense counsel . . . .” Id. standard 7-4.1, at 30.
Further, the “rational understanding” required under Dusky means
more than being “oriented to time and place” but includes accurate
perception of reality and proper response to the world around the
defendant, not disruptive behavior and a paranoid relationship with
counsel. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1550 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789). Here, we have evidence of a
previous diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, along with
contemporaneous testimony about bizarre thoughts and behavior,
including claims of collusion between defendant’s counsel and the
prosecution. See United States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (8th
Cir. 2007) (finding defendant who suffered from intermittent periods of
delusional paranoia and whose behavior indicated distrust of his own
lawyers incompetent); United States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975, 980–81
(9th Cir 2004) (finding defendant incompetent because paranoid
schizophrenia directly prevented rational assistance in defense); United
States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding defendant
incompetent when record revealed inability to cooperate rationally in own
defense because of paranoia); Nagi v. People, 389 P.3d 875, 879 (Colo.
2017) (noting “wild accusations of collusion between his counsel and the
prosecution” a factor indicating need for competency evaluation).
When the record shows that the defendant wants to stab her
lawyer in the neck and kill him, believes her lawyer is turning written
notes over to the prosecution, recently has heard buzzing noises, claims
to have been told by the FBI she did nothing wrong, states she is worried
14
about someone poisoning the water, and has advised the court that she
has had a history of mental health issues including a diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia, yet was noncompliant with prescribed drug
therapy, a reasonable trial court should at least have some doubts as to
the defendant’s competency to effectively assist in the defense as
required by Iowa Code section 812.3(1). See Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d
561, 569–70 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding reasonable doubt of defendant’s
competence was created by defendant’s history of mental illness, refusal
to take prescribed antipsychotic medication, inability to control himself
in the courtroom, and exhibition of paranoia impairing attorney–client
relationship). Consistent with ABA Standard 7-4.1(d) related to inability
to consult with defense counsel, the Supreme Court has stated that any
one factor alone may sufficiently raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of
a reasonable trial judge. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789;
Mental Health Standards, standard 7-4.1(d), at 30.
There is, perhaps, the question of malingering. The Supreme
Court addressed malingering in the context of competency evaluations in
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996). In Cooper,
the question was whether a state could impose a heightened “clear and
convincing” standard of proof on a defendant seeking to show
incompetence. Id. at 362, 116 S. Ct. at 1380. In rejecting a higher
standard of proof, the Supreme Court looked at the consequences of
error. Id. at 362–63, 116 S. Ct. at 1381. According to the Cooper Court,
“For the defendant, the consequences of an erroneous determination of
competence are dire. Because he lacks the ability to communicate
effectively with counsel, he may be unable to exercise other ‘rights
deemed essential to a fair trial.’ ” Id. at 364, 116 S. Ct. at 1381 (quoting
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1817 (1992)
15
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). On the other hand, “[b]y comparison to the
defendant’s interest, the injury to the State of the opposite error—a
conclusion that the defendant is incompetent when he is in fact
malingering—is modest.” Id. at 365, 116 S. Ct. at 1382. The teaching of
Cooper regarding comparative interests of the state and the defendant is
particularly compelling in the context of a preliminary proceeding to
simply order a mental health evaluation.
And, it is true that Einfeldt expressed the view that trial should
continue. So did the defendant in Kempf, who declared he desired to
plead guilty and get started on prison time to “get it over with.” 282
N.W.2d at 707. Such statements did not defeat the assertion of
incompetence advanced by Kempf’s counsel. Id. at 707, 710; see also
Sandoval, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 324, 328 (finding defendant incompetent
despite defendant denying incompetence). They should not do so here.
It is important that our district court judges not put the proverbial
cart before the horse in the competency setting. The district court was
not called upon in this case to make a definitive determination of
competency. See Moore, 464 F.2d at 666; Commonwealth v. Kostka, 350
N.E.2d 444, 449 (Mass. 1976). The only question was whether the
relatively low threshold had been met to require further evaluation and a
subsequent hearing on the question of competency after a professional
evaluation. Cf. Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328, 348 (D.C. 2013)
(characterizing reasonable doubt threshold of local law on competency as
not difficult to reach by design); Bonnie, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. at 563
(characterizing the threshold for referral for further inquiry as “very low
in order to cleanse all cases of doubts about competence”). The trial
court must take care to ensure that the preliminary hearing to determine
whether there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency does
16
not turn into a substitute for the determination of competency itself.
State v. Bishop, 667 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
Here, it was not the district court but the PSI report which came to
no specific conclusion regarding Einfeldt’s mental health but, noting a
diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder, “episodes of paranoia” in the past,
and evidence of “multiple, and fairly significant, mood and/or anxiety
disorder indicators,” urged a thorough mental evaluation after
sentencing. That was a good recommendation, but under the
incompetency caselaw, this recommendation for a mental evaluation
occurred at the wrong place and at the wrong time.
The district court relied in part upon its observations at trial.
Such observations are, of course, relevant considerations. Yet, as the
Supreme Court has emphasized,
[a]lthough a defendant’s demeanor during trial may be such
as to obviate “the need for extensive reliance on psychiatric
prediction concerning his capabilities,” . . . “this reasoning
offers no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted
testimony of . . . (a) history of pronounced irrational
behavior.”
Drope, 420 U.S. at 179, 95 S. Ct. at 907 (first quoting Note, Incompetency
to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 469 (1967); then quoting Pate, 383
U.S. at 385–86, 86 S. Ct. at 842). Here, in addition to the bizarre
statements and conduct, there was evidence of a history of paranoid
schizophrenia. 3
3Of course, a past history of mental illness, without more, is insufficient to
trigger a competency hearing under Iowa Code section 812.3 or due process. Jones,
479 N.W.2d at 270; Hickey v. Dist. Ct., 174 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Iowa 1970). The question
is one of present competency, not past malady. Further, even the presence of mental
illness at trial, in and of itself, is not necessarily sufficient to trigger the requirement of
a competency hearing under Iowa Code section 812.3 and due process. See State v.
Myers, 460 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Iowa 1990); State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Iowa
1982). The present mental illness must be sufficient to give rise to a serious question
as to whether the defendant meaningfully understands the charges and is capable of
meaningfully assisting in the defense. Iowa Code § 812.3; Myers, 460 N.W.2d at 460.
17
The district court also relied on pretrial behavior of Einfeldt. But
as the Supreme Court has noted, “[e]ven when a defendant is competent
at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to
circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused
unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.” Drope, 420
U.S. at 181, 95 S. Ct. at 908.
There is a question of remedy. At this late date, the possibility of
making a meaningful determination of competency at the time of trial
given the passage of time is simply not possible. See State v. Myers, 460
N.W.2d 458, 460 (Iowa 1990) (holding failure to hold a competency
hearing not capable of cure by an ex post facto determination sometime
after trial). As a result, we reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand the case for a new trial. In any subsequent trial, the district
court should monitor the proceedings and ensure that the defendant’s
due process and statutory rights related to competency are properly
protected throughout the proceedings.
V. Evidentiary Rulings.
Einfeldt argues that the district court erred by disallowing evidence
of Vinson’s prior assault convictions, threats against Chicoine, and
involvement in the shots-fired incident at Einfeldt’s apartment complex.
Because these issues may reoccur on retrial, we address them.
A. Evidence of Violent Character of Victim. Under Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.404(a)(1), “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait
is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character or trait.” An exception to this rule is
when a defendant seeks to offer “evidence of the victim’s pertinent trait.”
Id. r. 5.404(a)(2)(A)(ii). While ordinarily evidence of a victim’s prior violent
or turbulent character is immaterial and not admissible at trial, if the
18
accused asserts he or she acted in self-defense, specific instances of the
victim’s conduct may be used to demonstrate his or her violent or
turbulent character. State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 243 (Iowa 2015);
State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Iowa 1977).
Yet, if such evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed
by danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence,” a court may exclude the evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. We
use a two-part test to determine whether evidence should be excluded
under rule 5.403. Webster, 865 N.W.2d at 242; State v. Huston, 825
N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 2013). “First, we consider the probative value of
the evidence. Second, we balance the probative value against the danger
of its prejudicial or wrongful effect upon the triers of fact.” Webster, 865
N.W.2d at 242 (quoting Huston, 825 N.W.2d at 537). In weighing the
probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, we consider,
(1) the need for the proffered evidence “in view of the issues
and other available evidence,” (2) whether there is clear proof
it occurred, (3) the “strength or weakness of the prior-acts
evidence in supporting the issue sought to be prove[d],” and
(4) the degree to which the evidence would improperly
influence the jury.
State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v.
Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Iowa 2005)). “Weighing probative value
against prejudicial effect ‘is not an exact science,’ so ‘we give a great deal
of leeway to the trial judge who must make this judgment call.’ ” State v.
Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Newell, 710
N.W.2d 6, 20–21 (Iowa 2006)).
We believe that the district court acted within its discretion when it
found that both the evidence of Vinson’s prior felonies and Chicoine’s
testimony about threats were inadmissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence
19
5.403. With respect to the prior felonies, these assaults occurred over
ten years ago, when Vinson was fifteen or sixteen and nineteen
respectively. As our juvenile sentencing caselaw emphasizes, an
adolescent’s character is frequently not formed, and such adolescents
often develop into adults with completely different characters. See State
v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 833 (Iowa 2016). Without any more recent
evidence of convictions for assaults, evidence of assault convictions
occurring during adolescence says very little about Vinson’s adult
character. The district court properly excluded this evidence as being
substantially more prejudicial than probative.
Further, we find that the district court acted within its discretion
when it excluded Chicoine’s testimony about receiving threats from
Vinson. As the district court noted, Vinson never assaulted Chicoine.
Verbal threats are not very probative on the issue of a person’s tendency
toward physical confrontations and violence.
B. Evidence of Shots Fired. We affirm the district court’s ruling
excluding evidence of the shots-fired incident at Einfeldt’s apartment
complex. There was simply not enough evidence linking Vinson with the
shooting or that Einfeldt or her daughters were the targets of the
shooting. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.403; id. r. 5.404(a)(2)(A)(ii); Martin, 704
N.W.2d at 672. The district court was within its discretion in finding
that this evidence was not relevant to Vinson’s character.
VI. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is
reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Mansfield, Waterman, and Zager, JJ.,
who concur in part and dissent in part.
20
#16–0955, State v. Einfeldt
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent in part. The majority’s reading of the record
is selective. Based on my review of the entire record, the district court
should not be reversed. Rather, its handling of the trial should be
applauded as a model of how to deal with a difficult defendant.
Wonetah Einfeldt made some bizarre statements during the trial.
But they were always out of the presence of the jury. When the jury was
present, Einfeldt’s behavior changed. She made occasional, targeted
interjections, generally to express her disagreement with unfavorable
testimony. In today’s impolite world, this hardly sets her apart.
Viewing the trial as a whole, Einfeldt showed a sophisticated
understanding of the proceedings. She ultimately worked well with her
defense counsel, heeding his undoubtedly sound advice that she not take
the stand and instead allow the defense case to be presented through the
testimony of her codefendants.
The majority opinion sets the bar too low for when a defendant can
hold up a trial by being disruptive or making bizarre remarks. I fear
today’s decision will make trial management more difficult for our trial
judges.
Like the majority, I take the issue of mental illness seriously. But I
think their opinion is naive. According to the Iowa Department of
Corrections, over half of Iowa prisoners have either a serious mental
illness or a chronic mental health diagnosis. See Iowa Dep’t of Corr.,
Mental Health Information Sharing Program 1 (Jan. 2017),
http://idph.iowa.gov/Portals/1/Meetings/MeetingFiles/OtherFiles/95/8
d8a73aa-da57-475e-b44f-77c91800cbd0.pdf. Mental illness and
criminal conduct to some extent go together. Except in exceptional cases
21
when the criteria of Iowa Code section 812.3 have been met, mental
illness is not a reason to halt a criminal trial, thereby necessitating a
later do-over.
I. The Facts Revisited.
The majority characterizes this case as a “physical altercation
between [Einfeldt and her two daughters] and a fourth woman named
Mulika Vinson on July 14, 2015.” This sanitized description of the case
does not do justice to its facts. The evidence of Einfeldt’s guilt was quite
strong.
The trial evidence showed that this was a deliberate, planned
beating of the victim (Vinson). Two bystanders saw what happened and
testified at trial. Most importantly, one of those bystanders managed to
record part of the beating on his cell phone. The video was replayed at
trial. As we know from current events, video evidence can be very
powerful. It was powerful here.
A. The Events of July 14, 2015. On July 14, 2015, Einfeldt,
accompanied by her daughters Danielle and Beatrice Abang-Ntuen,
walked up to the front door of Vinson’s home in Perry. Vinson was at
home with her five-year-old daughter and her four-year-old son. The
impetus for the visit was apparently an ongoing feud between Danielle
and Vinson over a male coworker.
Meanwhile, two individuals were putting up siding on a nearby
house. They heard the commotion and witnessed much of the
altercation. One of them later testified that Einfeldt, Danielle, and
Beatrice were coming down the street, “angry and looking for a fight.”
According to this worker, Einfeldt and her daughters yelled at Vinson to
come out of her house, which she did. This same worker testified that
Danielle initiated the altercation and Einfeldt and Danielle then grabbed
22
Vinson together and threw her to the ground. He recalled that Einfeldt
and Danielle did most of the damage to Vinson, but Beatrice also
delivered a few blows.
The other worker likewise testified that he saw the three women
walking up to Vinson’s house, yelling for Vinson to come out. He saw
Vinson standing inside the door, reluctant to come outside, although she
eventually did. According to this worker, Vinson kept telling the
defendants her children were watching. This worker then saw Einfeldt,
Danielle, and Beatrice dragging Vinson by the arms and beating her. He
recorded a portion of the altercation on his cell phone before he
intervened to stop it. The cell phone video, although only a few seconds
long, shows both Einfeldt and Danielle dragging and striking Vinson as
she lies helpless on the ground. Beatrice is standing and watching, just
a few feet away.
Once the second worker intervened, Einfeldt and her two
daughters started to walk away down the street. The worker followed
them on foot as he spoke on his cell phone with the Perry police
department. Vinson remained on the ground injured.
The police arrived soon afterward. Einfeldt and Danielle were
taken into custody. Einfeldt told the police, “I beat her mother____ ass,
now book me up.” When Einfeldt was advised that paramedics were with
Vinson, she said something to the effect that “she’s going to need them.”
Vinson was admitted to a hospital later that evening and treated for her
injuries.
B. Trial Begins. On August 5, Einfeldt and both daughters were
charged with willful injury causing bodily injury. See Iowa Code
§ 708.4(2) (2015). The defendants were tried jointly beginning on April
18, 2016.
23
Einfeldt and Danielle raised justification as a defense, while
Beatrice denied participating in the assault. All of them asserted that
Vinson had brandished a handgun in a threatening manner when she
answered the door. They admitted they didn’t see the gun after that.
Vinson denied she had a gun. No one found a gun. The
construction workers never saw a gun or heard anyone say anything
about a gun. It defies common sense that Vinson would have
brandished a gun when answering the door, then walked outside without
the gun to subject herself to the mercy of the three angry defendants.
As the trial went on, Einfeldt was disruptive at times. During the
prosecutor’s opening statement, she made interjections out loud three
times. The third time, the court took a recess. Out of the presence of
the jury, the court had a colloquy with Einfeldt. During this colloquy,
Einfeldt took the opportunity to correct a factual statement the
prosecutor had made relating to the admissibility of Vinson’s prior
convictions. Still, she agreed to keep quiet in the future. She also
explained that she has anxiety and if she starts having a panic attack, it
usually starts with coughing and she would need to leave. The court
advised her to let her attorney know “or raise your hand, and we’ll take a
recess. . . . We do want to accommodate those health issues.”
Vinson was the State’s first witness to testify. Einfeldt kept silent
throughout her testimony. One of the bystander workers testified next.
During his cross-examination, Einfeldt said “objection” one time after he
gave a harmful answer.
C. The Probable Cause Hearing. The next morning, before the
jury was summoned, Einfeldt’s counsel advised the court that Einfeldt
had told him “she did not remember the events of yesterday” and had
discussed “her current mental state” with him. He asked permission to
24
make a record as to Einfeldt’s mental condition. The district court
agreed.
When questioned by her counsel, Einfeldt said she remembered
“some” of the evidence from the previous day and “want[ed] to go
forward.” But when counsel asked Einfeldt if she thought she would be
able to pass notes to him when needed, Einfeldt answered, “No, because
I don’t want you reading my notes. I don’t know if I trust—I mean, I do.
I think you’re a good person. But I just want to kill you. I don’t know
you.” She acknowledged that the previous day she had been upset
because she thought her counsel was passing her notes to other parties.
She said she had wanted to stab her counsel with a pen in the neck,
although she didn’t. Yet she said she thought she would be able to pay
attention to the trial and was “in control.” She concluded,
I don’t want to go [to] the hospital. I don’t want to go back. I
don’t want to go to Oakdale. I just want to finish this, and
whatever happens just happens. And I want my kids to be
all right, and I just don’t know what to do. I don’t want to
answer any more questions.
Einfeldt interjected one further comment: “I think she’s poisoning the
water.”
At this point, Einfeldt’s counsel represented to the court, “I don’t
believe nor have ever felt threatened by her.” Nonetheless, he moved to
suspend the proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 812, relating to
competency to stand trial.
The State opposed the motion. It urged there had been no showing
that Einfeldt did not understand the nature of the charges and their
consequences or that she was unable to assist in her defense.
The district court questioned Einfeldt further. Einfeldt claimed she
had “a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with manic bipolar, PTSD
25
and ADD, or something like that.” She said she had prescriptions but
had not taken them for a couple of months for financial reasons.
The district court denied the motion to suspend the trial. It
explained,
Based upon my observations, not only during the first two
days of this trial, but during previous hearings, it appears to
me as if Ms. Einfeldt is capable of assisting Mr. Macro in
providing a defense.
I do believe she understands the nature of the charges.
Just the explanation of the defenses that she believes she
has, suggest to me that conversely she understands the
underlying charges.
The court added that the previous day had gone relatively smoothly and
reassured Einfeldt that if she needed to take a break, she could do so.
D. The Trial Continues. During the course of that morning’s
testimony, Einfeldt said, “Liar,” once during the testimony of a police
officer. She later blurted, “I never said that,” when another police officer
referred to a statement Einfeldt supposedly made. Later, she said, “Ha
ha ha,” and slapped the table when that officer claimed the only injury
he saw on a photograph of Danielle’s face was a mosquito bite.
After the jury had been excused for the morning, defense counsel
for Danielle and Beatrice complained that Einfeldt had been putting her
head down and pulling out tissues loudly and stuffing them back in the
box, “all disruptive behavior.” The district court denied their motion for
mistrial, although it agreed these events had occurred.
In the afternoon, Einfeldt made three brief audible comments
during the testimony of the worker who had taken a video of the
altercation. Thereafter, the State rested and the jury was excused again.
At this point, Einfeldt became a more active participant.
26
All three defense counsel argued motions for judgment of acquittal.
When they were denied, Einfeldt inquired of the district court, “Can I ask
one question off the record? Do you ever grant dismissal? I just want to
ask.” After the prosecutor later argued for the exclusion of a defense
witness, Einfeldt asked, “Why are you guys trying to hide the truth? I
can’t understand that.” When there was a discussion about whether the
defendants would testify, Einfeldt stated, “I’m telling everybody [Vinson]
drove by my house and tried to shoot us”—a reference to an incident that
had been excluded based on a motion in limine ruling. She added, “I
[will] tell everything that you guys are trying to hide, all the lies that
you’re making people tell.” Her counsel requested a break, and the jury
then returned and two defense witnesses testified without incident.
The day concluded with an offer of proof out of the jury’s presence.
As her attorney concluded his offer-of-proof examination of one witness,
Einfeldt added a suggestion that he ask the witness about having
received a controlled substance from Vinson. Later, while the prosecutor
was cross-examining this same witness during the offer of proof, Einfeldt
inquired, “Why are we redeposing her? What is going on?”
When Einfeldt’s counsel requested permission to speak privately
with Einfeldt, Einfeldt said she wanted “everything on the record,” and
“she can’t take this.” She asked generally, “Why [are] you hiding the
truth?” She added that she wanted an African-American lawyer. The
district court explained the purpose of the offer of proof to her. Einfeldt
countered,
I want to know how come everything that’s in front of the
jury has to be screened by you, but everything that she [(the
prosecutor)] put in, all the lies that she told, was not
screened by you. I don’t get it. We’re supposed to have more
rights than her.
27
The court responded that it had explained the offer of proof as best as it
could and asked Einfeldt to agree to remain quiet during the remainder
of the offer.
The next day was uneventful until the time came to make a record
on Einfeldt’s decision whether to testify or not. She indicated she wanted
to testify and continued to argue about the shooting incident that the
district court had excluded. The district court emphasized that Einfeldt
would be able to answer the questions asked and nothing more. Einfeldt
further commented that “[t]he judge is a good guy” and later added that
she wanted a trial before the judge rather than the jury.
The jury returned, and Einfeldt generally behaved well as defense
witnesses, including Danielle and Beatrice, testified. Meanwhile, Einfeldt
had changed her mind and decided not to testify on the advice of her
counsel. A record was made with the court out of the jury’s presence.
Closing arguments took place the next day, the final day of trial.
Einfeldt said nothing during the prosecutor’s initial argument or the
arguments of the other defense counsel. She corrected her counsel when
he said “Beatrice” instead of “Danielle” during closing argument and
clapped at the end of that closing. Otherwise, she was quiet. However,
during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, Einfeldt made three brief
interjections. Following the third, the district court advised her that if
she did that again, she would have to be removed from the courtroom.
At that point, Einfeldt voluntarily got up and left.
The jury returned guilty verdicts against Einfeldt and Danielle. It
found Beatrice guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault.
E. Sentencing. A presentence investigation report (PSI) was
prepared on Einfeldt. Attached to it were two records from Broadlawns
Medical Center relating to Einfeldt. In June 2013, Einfeldt appeared at
28
Broadlawns for a psychiatric evaluation complaining of “feeling stressed
out.” Einfeldt stated that she had been hospitalized at age seventeen4
and had had recurring paranoia and “exacerbations of her paranoid
symptoms” since then but no other hospitalizations. According to the
report, she believed she was “married to the devil” and was “vague about
hearing voices.” However, she “did not want to discuss past diagnoses.”
The Broadlawns report gave her a “provisional” diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia and noted “hallucinations (questionable).”
Einfeldt was prescribed one new medication and told to follow up in a
month, but she did not return.
Einfeldt next went for another psychiatric evaluation at
Broadlawns in October 2015, after she had been charged in this case.
She said she had not returned after the first visit “because upon her
leaving she saw a body bag.” She complained again of paranoia. Once
again, the same medication was prescribed, and Einfeldt was told to
follow up in one month which, again, she did not do.
The PSI recommended incarceration of Einfeldt. It further
recommended that while incarcerated, she obtain a mental health
evaluation and be screened for an assaultive behavior class or anger
management. 5
The PSI also included Einfeldt’s version of the offense. There,
Einfeldt did not mention any mental health concerns. Instead, she
provided—in her own words and handwriting—a statement that deftly
accepted a degree of responsibility. She wrote, “I am not justifying my
4Einfeldt was forty-one years old at the time of this evaluation.
5According to the PSI, Einfeldt admitted attempting suicide as a teenager, over
twenty years before. Einfeldt denied this at the sentencing hearing and denied any
suicidal ideations or attempts.
29
behavior. I take full responsibility for the fight . . . .” Yet she then
repeated her claims that Vinson had a gun and that she (Einfeldt) was
acting in self-defense. Still, she concluded, “Self-defense doesn’t
constitute beating the holy crap out of someone even if they have a gun.”
The district court began the sentencing hearing by considering
Einfeldt’s motion for new trial. That motion had, among other things,
reraised the question of competency. Concerning Einfeldt’s competency,
the court explained it had now considered the PSI and attached medical
records in addition to the trial and pretrial proceedings. It stated as
follows,
Here’s what I note regarding that issue: The trial
information in this case was filed on August 5, 2015. There
was no application for an 812 exam from that date until trial
started on April 20[, 2016]. So I infer from that, and I believe
it’s a reasonable inference, that up until the time Mr. Macro
brought this issue to my attention, there was not a concern
about Ms. Einfeldt’s legal competency.
During the trial it did appear to me as if Ms. Einfeldt
was participating in her defense. She also responded
appropriately during the colloquy regarding her decision to
not testify.
Without question, Ms. Einfeldt did engage in
disruptive behavior during the trial, but that may have been
simple disrespect. Or I think in Ms. Einfeldt’s case it was
probably spontaneous emotional outbursts. But that is
different from being legally incompetent.
I did not observe behavior that suggested Ms. Einfeldt
did not understand the charge or the proceedings or that she
was unable to assist with her own defense.
After denying the motion for new trial, the court proceeded to
sentencing. Einfeldt testified she had been diagnosed with different
mental diagnoses but did not agree with those diagnoses. She elaborated
that she was not seeing a doctor or therapist or taking any medications.
She addressed the judge and said, “I do respect you.” She added, “I do
30
respect the whole system. I believe in the law.” She went through much
of her prior life history, including past brushes with the law. She
acknowledged that “there’s a[n] appeal going to be filed in this case,” and
said she understood “what reversible error is.” She stated, “I do honestly
believe the Judge was fair,” but “[t]he rules are slanted, and they’re in
favor of [the] State.” She testified that if she were put on probation, she
would have a job and a place to live and she would comply with the
terms of probation. She made no references to any delusions or
impulses or paranoia.
The district court sentenced Einfeldt to an indeterminate term of
five years’ incarceration. See Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(e).
II. The District Court Properly Denied Einfeldt’s Motion to
Terminate the Trial for Purposes of a Competency Hearing.
The fighting issue is whether the district court erred in denying
Einfeldt’s request to suspend proceedings for a competency hearing
during the second day of trial. Had the court done so, this would of
course have necessitated a new trial at a later date.
A. The Controlling Law. Iowa Code section 812.3 governs this
issue and provides,
If at any stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney . . . alleges specific facts showing that
the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which
prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge,
understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the
defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings and
determine if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations.
Iowa Code § 812.3(1) (2016). Additionally, if the court finds probable
cause to sustain the allegations,
[T]he court shall suspend further criminal proceedings and
order the defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to
determine whether the defendant is suffering a mental
disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the
31
charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting
effectively in the defense.
Id. § 812.3(2). The psychiatric evaluation is then followed by a
competency hearing. Id. §§ 812.4–.5.
Although Iowa has long had provisions relating to mental
incompetency of the accused, this two-step process of a probable cause
hearing followed by an evaluation and a competency hearing if necessary
dates only to 2004. See 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1084, § 5 (codified at Iowa
Code § 812.3 (2005)). Here, the district court followed the correct
procedure. It suspended the proceedings briefly and temporarily so that
Einfeldt’s counsel and the court could examine her, and so the parties
could provide argument and additional information to the court. Hence,
the court conducted the clearly required probable cause hearing. But it
denied Einfeldt’s request to terminate the trial so she could undergo a
psychiatric evaluation and a full-blown competency hearing.
Under our precedent, a competency hearing should be granted
when the “record contains information from which a reasonable person
would believe a substantial question of the defendant’s competency
exists.” Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1991) (quoting State
v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa 1979)). We consider three factors:
“(1) the defendant’s irrational behavior, (2) any demeanor at the trial that
suggests a competency problem, and (3) any prior medical opinion on the
defendant’s competency to stand trial.” State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d
393, 395 (Iowa 1993).
These factors illuminate for us the ultimate question of
competency facing the judge: whether the defendant is prevented from
“appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting
effectively in the defense.” Iowa Code § 812.3(1) (2016); see also State v.
32
Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa 2010). Mental illness alone is not
sufficient to establish incompetency. See State v. Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d
149, 152–53 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lyman,
776 N.W.2d 865, 873 (Iowa 2010). Furthermore, we presume that the
defendant is competent to stand trial. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d at 874
overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d
699, 708 & n.3 (Iowa 2016).
B. Applying the Law Here. Applying each of these tests and
standards, I agree with the district court that probable cause did not
exist to stop the trial and order Einfeldt to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation and a competency hearing. There is no question that Einfeldt
understood she had been charged with assaulting and injuring Vinson
on July 14, 2015. She recognized she had been offered before trial the
opportunity to plead to two aggravated misdemeanors but without the
chance to argue for a deferred judgment. She declined this offer. She
also understood justification was her primary defense. She was able to
explain this defense to the district court during the probable cause
hearing.
Einfeldt’s comprehension of the proceedings is vividly illustrated by
her own statements, both in and out of the presence of the jury.
Typically, Einfeldt’s interjections in front of the jury were brief comments
disputing testimony or statements that she recognized were harmful to
that defense. For example: “Lie,” “No they didn’t,” “Liar,” “Ha ha ha,” “I
never said that,” “Ha.” Sadly, these kinds of courtroom disruptions are
not all that uncommon and aren’t limited to litigants suffering from
mental illness. See United States v. Clements, 522 F.3d 790, 796 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“Clements’s behavior at trial does not suggest incompetence;
33
it was merely Clements’s attempts to interject his own view of the issues
and generally frustrate the progress of the trial.”). 6
Outside the jury’s presence, Einfeldt took the opportunity to
debate legal points with the court. She questioned why her evidence had
to undergo an offer-of-proof screening process, when the State’s did not.
She threatened to circumvent the court’s ruling excluding certain
evidence by taking the stand. When the State decided to cross-examine
a witness during the defendants’ offer of proof, she asked, “Why are we
redeposing her?” At one point she told the court, “We’re supposed to
have more rights than [the prosecutor].” These comments demonstrate
Einfeldt’s savvy, not an inability to understand the proceedings. See id.
(“While Clements was at times disruptive, his objections, questions, and
suggestions were generally pertinent to the issues being addressed,
indicating that Clements was fully attentive to the proceedings and
readily offered suggestions and opinions about the evidence and his
defense.”).
The record also indicates that Einfeldt was able to assist effectively
in her defense. Despite the distrust she claimed to have for her attorney
at the beginning of the second day of trial, she communicated effectively
with him about her case through the rest of the proceedings. She did not
hesitate to direct him toward facts she believed were helpful to her. She
generally consulted off the record with him when he asked. Despite her
ebullience she ultimately accepted his recommendation not to testify.
She applauded when he completed his closing argument on her behalf.
6Other interjections just showed that she was paying careful attention. When
counsel for one of the codefendants started cross-examining a witness who had the
same last name as this counsel, Einfeldt piped up, “No relation.” Also, as noted earlier,
Einfeldt corrected her defense counsel when he inadvertently referred to the wrong
daughter in closing argument.
34
Einfeldt apparently suffers from certain mental health conditions,
and she testified that she had some disturbing impulses. But apart from
making audible editorial comments, and a few theatrical gestures, she
generally controlled those impulses in front of the jury until she walked
out just a few minutes before the prosecutor finished her rebuttal closing
argument. It is true she made some bizarre statements, but never in the
presence of the jury. And Einfeldt’s counsel made clear that he never felt
threatened by her.
Here we have the benefit of the trial court’s observations of
Einfeldt’s demeanor. See Johnson, 784 N.W.2d at 195. It concluded that
Einfeldt was actively engaged with her counsel in the defense of her case.
Nothing in the record contradicts that.
This does not mean that Einfeldt’s outbursts helped her cause.
Defendants are often their own worst enemy. Yet disruptive statements
by a defendant need to be distinguished from those matters that
ultimately tip the scales under Iowa Code section 812.3. Those matters
are whether the defendant understands the charges and the proceedings
and can effectively assist her counsel. A defendant who engages in rude
or even offensive behavior in front of the jury may still be able to
effectively assist counsel. Many cases have so found. See United States
v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in not ordering a competency
hearing before trial because the defendant chose to “act like a . . .
lunatic” during the trial but appeared lucid in other interactions
(alteration omitted)); Paul v. United States, 534 F.3d 832, 845 (8th Cir.
2008) (finding the defendant had not shown the district court would have
found him incompetent, despite the fact that his obstreperous behavior
during trial was “unwise and detrimental to him and his cause”);
35
Clements, 522 F.3d at 796 (finding the district court did not err in not
sua sponte ordering a competency hearing, despite the defendant’s
disruptive interjections throughout trial, because “his objections,
questions, and suggestions were generally pertinent to the issues being
addressed, indicating that [the defendant] was fully attentive to the
proceedings and readily offered suggestions and opinions about the
evidence and his defense”); United States v. Rivers, No. 95–1364, 1996
WL 167748, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 1996) (holding that the district court
did not err in not ordering a hearing into the defendant’s competency to
stand trial, even though the defendant’s behavior at trial was “at times
unruly,” because his interjected “remarks were generally directly
responsive to what was being discussed”); Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d
1382, 1383–86 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“reject[ing] as meritless” the
defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in not ordering a hearing on
his competency to stand trial, even though the defendant frequently
interrupted the proceedings, to the point that the judge justifiably
removed him from the courtroom); State v. Woods, 348 P.3d 583, 592–93
(Kan. 2015) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in not
ordering a reevaluation of competency because the defendant exhibited
disruptive behavior that was unrelated to what was occurring in trial but
was “isolated and could easily be attributed to an attempt to derail the
judicial process”); State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 617–20 (La. 2016)
(finding a second sanity commission was not justified, even when the
defendant was disruptive during trial, in part because he “exercised self-
control when he wanted to”); Commonwealth v. Holland, 73 N.E.3d 276,
286 (Mass. 2017) (affirming a determination of competency when at the
competency hearing the doctor noted that the defendant’s “outbursts
[and] bouts of uncooperativeness with attorneys . . . make him a
36
problematic defendant, but not an incompetent one” (alteration omitted));
Hutto v. State, 227 So. 3d 963, 976 (Miss. 2017) (finding that after a
pretrial hearing had determined competency, a subsequent midtrial
outburst did not change the determination because the defendant was
not “incoherent and deluded during trial; rather, . . . [the defendant]
actively participated in the proceedings and engaged in discussions with
his counsel”); State v. Ramirez, No. S–1–SC–34576, 2016 WL 7029226, at
*4–5 (N.M. Dec. 1, 2016) (finding there was no basis for a reevaluation of
competency, even though defendant “was labile, crying, interrupting, and
making statements contrary to his interests during trial”).
The additional information made available at the time of
sentencing did not alter the district court’s view of the matter, and does
not alter mine. According to a medical record attached to the PSI,
Einfeldt received a “provisional” diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and
“hallucinations (questionable)” in 2013. Yet she did not return for
another consultation until she had been criminally charged, more than
two years later. Then she didn’t return again.
Einfeldt’s conduct during sentencing does not suggest
incompetence. Rather, Einfeldt testified and allocuted at some length on
her own behalf. Einfeldt’s statements—and the letter she wrote to the
judge beforehand—amounted to a detailed recital of extenuating
circumstances and a plea for clemency. She artfully complimented the
trial judge on his fairness. In her only reference to mental health
conditions, she minimized them. She made no odd statements
whatsoever.
I accept as unresolved the actual status of Einfeldt’s mental
illness. The PSI appropriately recommended a formal diagnostic
assessment of the “validity and severity” of Einfeldt’s mental health
37
issues if she were sentenced to prison. However, for present purposes,
the question is whether the record establishes probable cause to believe
that Einfeldt was prevented from appreciating the charge, understanding
the proceedings, or assisting in her defense. See Iowa Code § 812.3(1),
(2). The record did not show any of these things.
Cases finding incompetency or probable cause for incompetency
correctly focus on the effects of mental illness, rather than the mere
presence of mental illness. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 569–
70, 576 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the defendant requested his attorney turn
over evidence that would be helpful to the prosecution, refused to attend
or even listen to the trial proceedings, and tried to kill himself during
trial); United States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (8th Cir. 2007)
(affirming a finding of incompetency to stand trial on a “clear error”
standard of review given the defendant’s belief that the charges against
him were part of a “wide ranging government conspiracy related to events
that occurred in the early 1990s” and the defendant’s insistence on
calling irrelevant witnesses); United States v. Friedman, 366 F.3d 975,
981 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming a finding of incompetency to stand trial
because the defendant’s “paranoid schizophrenia [was] preventing him
from working with his attorney”); Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1549,
1555 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting the defendant refused to let his attorney
present evidence and “suffered from paranoid delusions which drove his
decision in these proceedings”); United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293,
294, 296 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming a finding of incompetency to stand trial
where expert testimony indicated that defendant could maintain his
composure “only on rare, non-threatening occasions” and his own
attorney, even while opposing a finding of incompetence, “disclaimed any
view that [the defendant] could make any rational decisions regarding the
38
defense”); Nagi v. People, 389 P.3d 875, 877, 879 (Colo. 2017) (affirming
the trial judge had a “good faith basis” to hold a competency hearing in
light of defendant’s questionable decision to represent himself in a case
involving potential life sentence plus “wild accusations” and other
“aberrant behavior”).
I am convinced the district court gave the competency question the
serious attention it deserved and made an appropriate ruling that
applied the correct law to the facts. Given my agreement with the
majority’s resolution of the evidentiary issues, I would affirm Einfeldt’s
conviction and sentence.
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this concurrence in part and
dissent in part.