IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0870
Filed June 6, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CORION JAMAL PURSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.
Odekirk, Judge.
Corion Pursley appeals the convictions entered following his guilty pleas to
two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of third-degree burglary.
AFFIRMED.
Agnes G. Warutere of Warutere Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Clive, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Corion Pursley appeals the convictions entered following his guilty pleas to
two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of third-degree burglary. He
contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) challenge his guilty pleas to
the second-degree-burglary charges on factual-basis grounds, (2) file a motion to
suppress evidence obtained in a search of a vehicle involved in the crimes, (3) file
a motion for a bill of particulars, and (4) pursue an intoxication defense before
allowing him to plead guilty.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The following facts can be gleaned from the minutes of evidence. In the
early morning hours of December 27, 2015, Sam Roberts encountered four young
males at a gas station in Cedar Falls. At 4:48 a.m., Roberts called the police and
advised these individuals followed him home from the gas station and were
knocking on his front door. Roberts described the vehicle the subjects were driving
as a “smaller silver colored SUV, possibly a Honda Pilot that had a handicap sticker
hanging in the window.”
At 5:07 a.m., Larry and Judy Timmins contacted law enforcement and
reported they were awoken in their home when someone walked into their master
bedroom as they slept. The suspects fled when Larry directed Judy to call the
police. Larry observed the suspects fleeing in what appeared to be a “light colored
minivan.” Officers arrived and discovered a rock had been thrown through a glass
door, several drawers throughout the residence had been rummaged through, and
the doors on two refrigerators in the home were left open. However, Judy’s purse
and laptop were left untouched.
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At 6:07 a.m., Virginia Berg called the police and reported she thought
someone was in her neighbor’s residence. This residence belonged to the
Clippertons, who were out of town on the morning in question. Officers arrived at
the Clipperton residence and discovered the front door had been kicked in, the
apartment had been “ransacked,” and, again, the refrigerator door had been left
open.
At 6:27 a.m., Nikki Nielsen contacted law enforcement and advised “some
people busted down her door and entered her residence.” The subjects fled when
Nielsen confronted them. Nielsen stated the subjects were in a silver SUV and
advised one of the subjects was wearing a Bears jersey and stocking hat.
Sometime during the foregoing course of events, Margo Campbell heard pounding
on her porch door. Because she was near the door at the time, Margo opened it
and observed three males standing on her porch. The subjects were surprised
when Margo opened the door. They paused and then asked if “Jimmy” was home.
Margo advised they had the wrong house, upon which the subjects left in what
Margo described as a “white SUV.”
A short time after Nielsen’s report of an intrusion, a description of the
suspect vehicle was relayed to patrol officers. Officers subsequently initiated a
traffic stop on a silver Honda Pilot.1 The vehicle was occupied by four males, one
of whom was wearing a Bears jersey and stocking hat. The vehicle’s occupants—
the driver, Ny’Jawon Alexander; and passengers, Pursley, Jacane Campbell, and
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Around this time, another officer was reviewing video footage at the gas station where
Roberts initially encountered the subjects. At approximately 4:46 a.m., the video depicted
a silver Honda Pilot near the front doors of the gas station. The license plate on the vehicle
in the video matched the license plate of the vehicle officers stopped.
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D.C.2—were all detained separately. At the scene, Pursley advised officers the
vehicle belonged to his girlfriend. The driver of the vehicle, Alexander, provided
officers with verbal and written consent to search the vehicle. During the ensuring
search, property was discovered bearing the name of the Clippertons. Officers
decided to discontinue the search at this time and apply for a search warrant. The
vehicle was impounded and a search warrant was applied for. Sasha Nelson came
to the police station where the codefendants were being held and advised officers
the silver Honda Pilot belonged to her.
In a subsequent interview, after waiving his Miranda rights, Pursley stated
the vehicle belonged to Sasha, but made no statements related to the burglaries.
Pursley advised an officer he had smoked marijuana and “sipped” alcohol the prior
day and had taken “illegal Xanex pills” a week ago, but stated he was “sober now
though.” In their interviews, Alexander, Campbell, and D.C. denied any knowledge
of the burglaries. In a second interview two days later, Alexander admitted the
group “burglarized three or four houses.”
Pursley was charged by trial information with two counts of second-degree
burglary and one count of third-degree burglary. Pursley ultimately pled guilty as
charged. At the plea hearing, Pursley stipulated to the court’s consideration of the
minutes of evidence in determining whether factual bases supported his pleas. As
to the second-degree-burglary charges, Pursley admitted he broke into occupied
structures not open to the public with the intent to commit a theft therein and he
did not have any right, license, or privilege to do so. Pursley initially requested
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D.C. was a juvenile at the time of these events.
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immediate sentencing, but after the court advised him of his right to file a motion
in arrest of judgment to challenge his plea, he requested sentencing at a later date.
Thereafter, Pursley filed a motion in arrest of judgment, contending he “did not fully
understand the plea proceedings” and he “now wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty
and set this matter for trial.” Pursley subsequently withdrew this motion. The
district court sentenced Pursley in accordance with the parties’ plea agreement.
As noted, Pursley appeals.
II. Discussion
Pursley asserts his counsel was ineffective in a number of respects. We
review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Henderson, 908
N.W.2d 868, 874 (Iowa 2018). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Pursley “must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘(1) his
trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in
prejudice.’” State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v.
Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2017)); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We “may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of
duty first, and failure to find either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897
N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa
2015)). A failure to register meritless motions or arguments does not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d 631, 637
(Iowa 2015).
A. Factual Bases
Pursley contends his guilty pleas to the second-degree burglary charges
lacked factual bases and his counsel was therefore ineffective in allowing him to
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enter the pleas and thereafter failing to challenge them by way of a motion in arrest
of judgment. Specifically, Pursley argues there was no evidence to support a
finding that he intended to commit a theft at the Timmins or Nielsen residences.
He further argues his express admission to the court at the plea proceeding that
he broke into the occupied structures with the intent to commit a theft is not
supported by other evidence and therefore cannot provide factual bases for the
pleas.
“Defense counsel violates an essential duty when counsel permits
defendant to plead guilty . . . when there is no factual basis to support defendant’s
plea.” State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010); accord State v. Nall, 894
N.W.2d 514, 525 (Iowa 2017). Likewise, counsel violates an essential duty when
counsel fails to challenge a plea lacking a factual basis by way of motion in arrest
of judgment. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). Prejudice is
presumed under these circumstances. See Nall, 894 N.W.2d at 525. If Pursley’s
pleas were supported by factual bases, then his counsel was not ineffective.
“In deciding whether a factual basis exists, we consider the entire record
before the district court at the guilty plea hearing, including any statements made
by the defendant, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and
the presentence report,” if any. State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa
1999). “This record, as a whole, must disclose facts to satisfy the elements of the
crime.” State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001). We must only “be
satisfied that the facts support the crime, ‘not necessarily that the defendant is
guilty.’” Id. (citation omitted). Evidence that the crime was committed by the
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defendant beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary. State v. Finney, 834
N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013).
Iowa Code section 713.1 (2015) defines the act of burglary as follows: “Any
person, having the intent to commit a . . . theft therein, who, having no right, license
or privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure, such occupied structure not
being open to the public, . . . commits burglary.” Such an act amounts to burglary
in the second degree when it is perpetrated “in or upon an occupied structure in
which one or more persons are present.” Iowa Code § 713.5(1)(b).
Pursley only challenges the intent-to-commit-theft element. The court had
before it the minutes of evidence, Pursley’s statements (specifically the statement
that the crimes were committed with an intent to commit theft), and the facts related
by the prosecutor. Upon our de novo review of these materials, we are satisfied
the facts support the crime and conclude factual bases existed for both of the
challenged pleas. Counsel was therefore not ineffective in allowing Pursley to
enter the pleas or in failing to challenge the pleas by way of a motion in arrest of
judgment.
B. Motion to Suppress
Next, Pursley argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence obtained in the search of the vehicle involved in the burglary
spree. He argues the consent given by Alexander before the initial search at the
scene of the crime was invalid because Alexander had neither actual nor apparent
authority to consent to the search. He alternatively argues Alexander’s consent
was not voluntarily given. We need not address the validity of consent, as we
agree with the State’s argument that, had counsel filed a motion to suppress the
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evidence obtained in the vehicle search, the motion would have been meritless
because Pursley, as a mere passenger in a vehicle he did not own, had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and therefore no standing to
challenge the search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–50 (1978); State
v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 342–43 (Iowa 1995). In the alternative,
Alexander’s consent was not the only exception to the warrant requirement present
in this case. Specifically, the requirement of a warrant is excepted “when probable
cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time” of the search. State v. Storm,
898 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2017). “The inherent mobility of motor vehicles
satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement.” Id. The string of forced entries,
the “ransacked” status of the involved residences, and the fact that Pursley and
his cohorts generally matched the descriptions provided in all accounts provided
the police with probable cause to believe the vehicle contained stolen property.
See State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Iowa 2006) (defining probable cause).
Because we conclude a motion to suppress evidence obtained in the
vehicle search would have been meritless, counsel was not ineffective in failing to
raise it. See Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d at 637.
C. Bill of Particulars
Pursley argues the trial information under which he was charged “did not
list the occupied structures which [he] allegedly broke into” and “[w]ith the [t]rial
[i]nformation’s failure to state with particularity which residence each count related
to, [his] counsel ought to have filed a motion for bill of particulars.” The quoted
caselaw Pursley cites to support his argument provides the following:
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To avoid a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to due
process of law, an indictment or trial information and its
accompanying minutes of evidence that charges a defendant with
multiple counts of the same crime should in some manner
differentiate among the charges.
State v. See, 805 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added). Here,
the minutes of evidence expressly listed the structures Pursley allegedly entered
and unambiguously explained the second-degree-burglary charges concerned the
two occupied structures—the Timmins and Nielsen residences—while the third-
degree-burglary charge concerned the unoccupied structure—the Clipperton
residence. The trial information and minutes of evidence sufficiently provided
Pursley with the particularity he now claims he did not receive. We find counsel
was not ineffective in failing to file a motion for bill of particulars.
D. Intoxication Defense
Finally, Pursley contends his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to
plead guilty without first pursuing an intoxication defense, despite being aware of
grounds for pursuing it. Pursley forwards the conclusory statement that “[b]y
allowing [him] to plead guilty without pursuing the defense, counsel was
ineffective.” Pursley provides us with no analysis on if or why he was prejudiced
from this alleged breach of duty. When challenging a guilty plea through a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, “in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement,
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 2006). There is no
evidence in the record, and Pursley does not even argue, that, had counsel
pursued an intoxication defense, he would have forgone the guilty plea and
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insisted on proceeding to trial. Because Pursley did not meet his burden to show
prejudice, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
III. Conclusion
We find Pursley’s counsel was not ineffective as alleged. We therefore
affirm Pursley’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.