State of Maine v. J.R.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2018 ME 117
Docket: Som-17-489
Argued: June 13, 2018
Decided: August 14, 2018

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Concurrence: SAUFLEY, C.J., and GORMAN and JABAR, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

J.R.

MEAD, J.

[¶1] J.R. appeals from the judgment of the District Court

(Skowhegan, Benson, J.), sitting as the juvenile court, that adjudicated him of

having committed two counts of criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 806(1)(A) (2017), and three counts of theft (Class E), 17-A M.R.S.

§§ 353(1)(A), 359(1)(A) (2017). The court ordered that J.R. be committed to

the Long Creek Youth Development Center (Long Creek) for an indeterminate

period not to exceed his eighteenth birthday. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3313(1)-(2),

3314(1), 3316(2) (2017). J.R. contends that the court abused its discretion or

otherwise erred when it determined that commitment to a secure juvenile

correctional institution was the least restrictive dispositional alternative
2

available without explicitly finding that J.R.’s commitment was necessary to

protect the public.1 He further contends that his indeterminate commitment

until age eighteen is disproportionate punishment because it potentially

incarcerates him for a longer term than the maximum length of a sentence for

an adult convicted of similar misdemeanor crimes. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] J.R. was born on March 3, 2001. He was fifteen when the State filed,

on January 13, 2017, the first of the three juvenile petitions that are the subject

of this appeal. In docket number SKODC-JV-17-0005 (17-0005), the State

alleged that, on November 15, 2016, J.R. “receive[d], retain[ed], or dispose[d] of

a scooter, . . . knowing it had been stolen, or believing probably that it had been

stolen, with the intent to deprive [the owner] of the property,” and that he

damaged the scooter by “painting” the number “420” on it. The petition in

17-0005 charged J.R. with theft by receiving stolen property (Class E),

17-A M.R.S. § 359(1)(A), and criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 806(1)(A).

1 The American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation (MCLU) submitted an amicus curiae

brief and has joined all of J.R.’s arguments and assertions. MCLU further argues that juvenile
commitments to Long Creek constitute cruel and unusual punishment because of purported
conditions and alleged deficiencies at that institution.
 3

[¶3] On February 27, 2017, J.R. appeared at an initial hearing and denied

both charges. The court ordered his release on the conditions that he

(1) refrain from any illegal acts, including the use of alcohol or illegal drugs;

(2) remain under house arrest when not at school, travelling to or from school,

or under the supervision of his parents or someone approved by his Juvenile

Community Corrections Officer (JCCO); (3) have no contact with the owner of

the scooter or the juveniles involved in its theft or reporting it stolen to the

police; and (4) report regularly to his JCCO. The court set the matter for an

adjudicatory hearing on April 10, 2017.

[¶4] Before that next hearing occurred, however, the State filed a second

petition, which was entered in docket number SKODC-JV-17-0021 (17-0021).

The petition charged J.R. with aggravated criminal mischief (Class C),

17-A M.R.S. § 805(1)(A) (2017), alleging that on February 19, 2017, he “did

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly damage or destroy windows, doors and

surveillance cameras,” causing in excess of $2,000 in damage at a public school.

On April 10, 2017, at the time the court had previously set for the adjudicatory

hearing in 17-0005, J.R. initially appeared and denied the aggravated criminal

mischief charge. The court released J.R. under the same conditions it had

previously imposed, with the added requirements that J.R. (1) submit to
4

searches or tests for possession or use of drugs or alcohol, (2) set up case

management services, and (3) attend individual counseling. The court

(Mathews, J.) continued the adjudicatory hearing in both matters to

June 12, 2017. The State agreed to conditions of release and to a two-month

continuance of the adjudicatory hearing in docket number 17-0005 to “try and

treat [J.R.] in the community,” with the understanding that “if he attended and

participated in . . . counseling, then [it] would [have] recommend[ed] . . . a

probation[ary] sentence and . . . restitution.”

[¶5] In the period following the continuance, however, J.R. did not

meaningfully participate in services. He attended only a few brief counseling

sessions, which the counselor then discontinued due to J.R.’s lack of

engagement. When J.R. failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing on June 12,

the court ordered a warrant for his arrest and subsequent detention, which

issued later that month. While J.R.’s whereabouts were unknown, the State filed

a third petition against him. That petition, entered in SKODC-JV-17-0034

(17-0034), charged J.R. with burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(4)

(2017), and two counts of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class E),

17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A). The State alleged that on June 8, 2017, J.R. broke

through the front door of his brother’s apartment and stole a safe containing
 5

money, marijuana, and documents belonging to his brother and the brother’s

roommate. On July 25, 2017, a second arrest warrant issued for J.R.

[¶6] On October 12, 2017, law enforcement took J.R. into custody and,

after a hearing the next day, the court (Benson, J.) ordered him to remain

detained until the adjudicatory hearing later in the month. See 15 M.R.S.

§ 3203-A(5) (2017). At the adjudicatory hearing, the parties informed the court

that J.R. intended to withdraw his previous pleas and tender an “open plea”

admitting to the criminal mischief and theft charges in 17-0005 and to a drug

paraphernalia charge, which is not a subject of this appeal.2 In exchange, the

State declined to proceed on the aggravated criminal mischief or burglary

charges against J.R.; it amended the aggravated criminal mischief charge in

17-0021 to simple criminal mischief and dismissed the burglary charge in

17-0034, leaving only misdemeanor charges in those dockets.

[¶7] After J.R. admitted to the offenses of receiving stolen property and

criminal mischief in 17-0005 and the amended charges of unauthorized taking

in 17-0034 and criminal mischief in 17-0021, the court found, based upon a

thorough colloquy with J.R., that “his admissions [were] knowing and

voluntary.” The court then proceeded to determine an appropriate disposition.

2 The drug paraphernalia case carried with it no possibility of incarceration, and no appeal was

taken. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1111-A (2017).
6

[¶8] Regarding the disposition of J.R.’s case, the court and the State

expressed that their ultimate objective was “rehabilitation of the juvenile.” The

court further explained that, to fulfill the overarching intent of the Maine

Juvenile Code, “the Court is bound to impose the least restrictive dispositional

alternative.” The court rejected the possibility of a straight probationary

disposition, stating “there’s just no indication that . . . if I were to [order

probation] . . . that [it] would succeed.” The court was apparently—and

appropriately—frustrated by a lack of suitable alternatives for treating J.R. in

the community: “Looking at [the factors for withholding an institutional

disposition], everyone up to this point has bent over backwards in order to

impose the least restrictive alternative so that you could try to succeed . . . . And

up to this point, you just haven’t justified the confidence.”

[¶9] The court ordered that J.R. be committed to an approved juvenile

detention facility for an indeterminate period not to exceed his eighteenth

birthday. J.R. timely appealed. 15 M.R.S. §§ 3402-3403 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2B.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶10] J.R. argues that the court abused its discretion and otherwise

erred3 when it determined that a disposition committing him to Long Creek was

3 We decline to reach the arguments advanced principally by MCLU, and to a lesser extent by J.R.,

that attack the court’s disposition as an abuse of discretion or cruel and unusual punishment solely
 7

the least restrictive alternative, absent any explicit finding that his commitment

was necessary to protect the public. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3002(1)(A), 3313-3314

(2017). J.R. also argues that his commitment to Long Creek offends

constitutional principles of proportional punishment. Pursuant to 15 M.R.S.

§§ 3401(2) and 3402(1)(B) (2017), we review a juvenile disposition for an

abuse of discretion and “errors in the application and interpretation of law,”

“[t]o [e]nsure substantial uniformity of treatment to persons in like situations,”

and “so that the legislatively defined purposes of the juvenile justice system as

a whole are realized.” See State v. G.F., 2015 ME 90, ¶¶ 2-3, 119 A.3d 743. We

begin by reviewing the purposes behind juvenile dispositions and comparing

those purposes to the notably different objectives for the sentencing of adult

defendants. We then separately address the arguments regarding the least

restrictive alternative and proportionality.

A. The Maine Juvenile Code

[¶11] The juvenile court correctly noted the Maine Juvenile Code’s stated

preference for keeping juveniles in the home, whenever possible, and its

on the grounds of alleged deficiencies and conditions claimed to exist at the Long Creek Youth
Development Center. J.R. did not raise these arguments to the court at its adjudicatory proceeding,
and the record contains no competent evidence to support such arguments here. See State v. Cote,
2017 ME 73, ¶ 25, 159 A.3d 831 (assigning to appellant the “burden of demonstrating error”); State
v. Dominique, 2008 ME 180, ¶ 25, 960 A.2d 1160.
8

emphasis upon rehabilitation. Title 15 M.R.S. § 3002(1) (2017) provides the

purposes of the Juvenile Code:

A. To secure for each juvenile subject to these provisions such care
and guidance, preferably in the juvenile’s own home, as will best
serve the juvenile’s welfare and the interests of society;

B. To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible,
including improvement of home environment;

C. To remove a juvenile from the custody of the juvenile’s parents
only when the juvenile’s welfare and safety or the protection of the
public would otherwise be endangered or, when necessary, to
punish a child adjudicated, pursuant to chapter 507, as having
committed a juvenile crime;

D. To secure for any juvenile removed from the custody of the
juvenile’s parents the necessary treatment, care, guidance and
discipline to assist that juvenile in becoming a responsible and
productive member of society;

E. To provide procedures through which the provisions of the law
are executed and enforced and that ensure that the parties receive
fair hearings at which their rights as citizens are recognized and
protected; and

F. To provide consequences, which may include those of a punitive
nature, for repeated serious criminal behavior or repeated
violations of probation conditions.

Rehabilitation remains among the goals even in situations requiring the

removal of a juvenile from the custody of his parents: when “confinement is

necessary for protection of the public” because it will (1) prevent the juvenile

from committing another crime, (2) most effectively provide correctional
 9

treatment to the juvenile, or (3) avoid “depreciat[ing] the seriousness of the

juvenile’s conduct.” 15 M.R.S. §§ 3002(1)(C), 3313(1)(A)-(C) (2017).

[¶12] Commentary from the 1979 amendment to sections 3002 and

3313 also evinces the Legislature’s preference for treatment in the community.

The 1979 commentary states that the intent of those sections is “to give priority

to the least restrictive . . . disposition (section 3313) that is appropriate.”

See 1979 Commentary at 398, 479, included with 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 3002, 3313

(2003). Further emphasizing the Juvenile Code’s intent to avoid the

institutional commitment of a juvenile when possible, 15 M.R.S. § 3313(2) lists

several factors weighing against an institutional disposition, and the very next

section of the statute affords the juvenile court various alternatives to consider

before ordering an institutional disposition, 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)-(2) (2017).

By contrast, the Legislature has established sentencing objectives for adults

that reflect notably different priorities.4

4 § 1151. Purposes

The general purposes of the provisions of this part are:

1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the rehabilitation of
convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons when required in the interest
of public safety;

2. To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can be compensated and
other purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served.

3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further criminality;
10

[¶13] An argument akin to those advanced by J.R. has been presented to

us previously. Nearly forty years ago, we upheld the constitutionality of the

Maine Juvenile Code against a fourteen-year-old’s equal protection and due

process challenge to his indeterminate commitment for a “possible

seven[-]year term [that was] on its face longer than the five[-]year term [that]

4. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on the
conviction of a crime;

5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate
criminological goals;

6. To encourage differentiation among offenders with a view to a just
individualization of sentences;

7. To promote the development of correctional programs that elicit the cooperation
of convicted persons;

8. To permit sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses, with reference
to the factors, among others, of:

A. The age of the victim, particularly of a victim of an advanced age or of a
young age who has a reduced ability to self-protect or who suffers more
significant harm due to age; and

B. The selection by the defendant of the person against whom the crime was
committed or of the property that was damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime because of the race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin,
physical or mental disability, sexual orientation or homelessness of that
person or of the owner or occupant of that property; and

9. To recognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual and
society and to recognize batterers’ intervention programs certified pursuant to
Title 19-A, section 4014 as the most appropriate and effective community intervention
in cases involving domestic violence.

17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2017). The Legislature amended section 1151 after the court’s adjudicatory
hearing in this case, but not in a way that alters the analysis here. See P.L. 2017, ch. 105, §§ 1-3
(effective Nov. 1, 2017).
 11

might have been imposed upon an adult convicted of a similar offense.” State

v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 586 (Me. 1979). We held then that the Juvenile Code’s

“goals of rehabilitation and treatment, now in large degree eschewed by the

sentencing provisions of the Maine Criminal Code, justif[ied] longer

indeterminate sentences for juveniles” because those features of the juvenile

system were a rational basis for sentencing young offenders differently.5 Id.

[¶14] Today, the goal of rehabilitation clearly remains at the heart of the

Juvenile Code. In the years following our decision in Gleason, the Legislature

has enacted only minor changes to the express purposes of the Juvenile Code

and the criteria for withholding an institutional disposition. See Historical and

Statutory Notes at 399, 479, included with 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 3002, 3313 (2003).6

We turn now to J.R.’s argument that the court should have ordered a less

restrictive disposition.

5 The U.S. Supreme Court, in dicta, has more recently observed a similarly persistent distinction

between the federal criminal code and the juvenile justice statute. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291,
298 n.2 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“While it is true that some rehabilitative tools were removed from
the juvenile penalty scheme in 1984, . . . ([such as] parole . . .), the [current statute] does not
completely reject rehabilitative objectives.”).

6 Since 1979, the Legislature has only twice amended 15 M.R.S. §§ 3002 and 3313 (2017).

See P.L. 1979, ch. 663, § 113 (effective Mar. 28, 1980) (amending sections 3002 and 3313); P.L. 1995,
ch. 690, § 5 (effective July 4, 1996) (amending section 3313); P.L. 1997, ch. 645, § 1 (effective
June 30, 1998) (amending section 3002). During that same time frame, 15 M.R.S. § 3314 (2017) has
undergone numerous substantive amendments, many of which expanded the number and type of
alternative dispositions that a court may impose. See Historical and Statutory Notes at 484-87,
included with 15 M.R.S.A. § 3314 (2003). None of the amendments altered these sections’ explicit
focus on rehabilitation as the desired outcome.
12

1. The Least Restrictive Dispositional Alternative

[¶15] Despite the predominantly rehabilitative purposes behind the

Juvenile Code generally, and the criteria for institutional dispositions more

specifically, J.R. asserts that commitment to Long Creek is not rehabilitative but

punitive. J.R. argues in the alternative that even if such commitments can serve

the objective of rehabilitation, the court nonetheless abused its discretion

because committing him for an indeterminate period was not the least

restrictive disposition.

[¶16] As J.R. notes, section 3314 provides for various dispositional

alternatives, such as probation, that are less restrictive than commitment.

See 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)(E), (H), (2) (2017). In the circumstances presented

here, the only meaningful less restrictive alternative to commitment was to

place J.R. on probation. The court recognized as much during the hearing. What

J.R. fails to convincingly argue, however, is that any of those alternatives would

have effectively protected the public and provided meaningful and effective

rehabilitation resources for him. See id. § 3313(1). The record belies J.R.’s

suggestion that a disposition placing him on probation would have been

effective to (1) mitigate the “undue risk that, during the period of a suspended

sentence or probation, [J.R. would] commit another crime”; (2) provide J.R. with
 13

the “correctional treatment” he needs; and (3) avoid “depreciat[ing] the

seriousness” of his repeated criminal conduct. Id. § 3313(1)(A)-(C).

[¶17] Although the court did not expressly identify those concerns as the

grounds for its disposition, “[w]e have never required the sentencing judge to

address each of the factors set out [in the sentencing statute] and explicitly

negate them.” State v. Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 22, 852 A.2d 70. In arriving at

the disposition here, it is clear that the court took the factors in section 3313

into account. The court specifically referred to “a number of factors that I am

supposed to look at in determining whether . . . to withhold an institutional

disposition.” We therefore infer from the record that the court appropriately

considered the factors in section 3313. Id.

[¶18] Against those controlling factors that persuaded the court that

J.R.’s commitment was necessary to protect the public, J.R. counters that he did

not contemplate or cause any harm by his conduct and had no prior

adjudicatory record. See 15 M.R.S. § 3313(2)(A)-(B), (G) (2017). The additional

considerations J.R. offers, although they do weigh against an institutional

disposition pursuant to the statute, do little to overtake each of the controlling

factors in subsection 3313(1) that are all applicable here for a number of

reasons.
14

[¶19] First, J.R. was escalating the seriousness of his criminal conduct in

relatively short order. His later offenses occurred after he had been released

on then-pending juvenile petitions. The trajectory of his behaviors clearly

portends future crimes. Second, J.R. failed to meaningfully engage in counseling

when given the opportunity to do so in the community, he disregarded his court

date, and he violated the conditions of his release by committing additional

crimes. The court was entitled to conclude that J.R.’s refusal to participate and

meaningfully engage in voluntary counseling effectively negated the likelihood

of success in any community-based counseling program. Lastly, there is no

competent evidence in the record suggesting that conditions of probation

would have been at all effective in curbing J.R.’s continued criminal behavior.

In fact, the opposite conclusion is supported by J.R.’s choices not to appear at

his court date and to violate his conditions of release. The court did not err in

its application of the law or otherwise abuse its discretion; the indeterminate

commitment ordered was the least restrictive disposition available to the court

that could appropriately address J.R.’s needs pursuant to sections 3313(1) and

3314(2).
 15

2. The Proportionality of J.R.’s Indeterminate Commitment

[¶20] We turn next to J.R.’s argument that his indeterminate

commitment is unconstitutionally disproportionate to his juvenile crimes

because it potentially incarcerates him for a longer term than the sentences for

adults convicted of similar property crimes.7 See U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV

(prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); Me. Const. art. I, § 9 (“[A]ll

penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense; . . . nor [shall]

cruel [or] unusual punishments [be] inflicted.”). As noted above, our decision

in Gleason has addressed and rejected a similar argument, see supra ¶ 13, but

J.R. asks us to overrule Gleason as anachronistic in light of the U.S. Supreme

Court’s and science’s increasing understanding that “children are

constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing.” Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 489 (2012) (declaring unconstitutional the

mandatory sentencing of any juvenile offender to life without parole). Because

J.R. failed to preserve these arguments, as he did not raise them in the

dispositional proceeding, we review the proportionality of the court’s

7 Although J.R. does argue that his commitment, which potentially extends until he is eighteen, is

“unusual” and “rare,” he does not argue that his disposition “offends prevailing notions of decency.”
State v. Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 15 & n.3, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted). As such, our review
properly focuses on the proportionality of J.R.’s disposition compared to the nature of his offenses.
See id.; State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23 & n.11, 993 A.2d 14.
16

disposition for obvious errors in the application of law, uniformity of treatment

for like persons, and the fulfilment of the purposes of the Juvenile Code, as set

out in 15 M.R.S. §§ 3401(2), 3402(2). See State v. Butsitsi, 2015 ME 74, ¶¶ 19,

22, 118 A.3d 222.

[¶21] We first must recognize that “[c]ourts rarely find sentences

disproportionate pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, except in cases involving the death penalty or juvenile

defendants.” State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 26, 65 A.3d 1242. As J.R. appears

to concede, his case is immediately distinguishable from the U.S. Supreme

Court’s line of Eighth Amendment cases regarding juvenile defendants tried as

adults for the most serious types of crimes and subjected to the harshest of

sentences.8 “However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the

Maine Constitution anticipates a broader proportionality review than the

Eighth Amendment.” Id. We review the proportionality of a sentence,

according to article I, section 9 of the Maine Constitution, by employing a

two-part test. Id. ¶ 29. “First, we compare the gravity of the offense with the

8 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465-69 (2012) (regarding two fourteen-year-olds tried as

adults, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison, one for felony murder and aggravated robbery, the
other for murder in the course of arson); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52-58 (2010) (involving the
life sentence without parole of a sixteen-year-old charged as an adult for armed burglary with assault
or battery, armed robbery, multiple attempted armed robberies, and fleeing law enforcement); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-57 (2005) (concerning a seventeen-year-old charged with burglary,
kidnapping, stealing, and first-degree murder; tried as an adult; and sentenced to death).
 17

severity of the sentence. Second, if this comparison results in an inference of

gross disproportionality we then compare the defendant’s sentence with the

sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation

marks omitted).

[¶22] J.R.’s argument, requesting that we overrule Gleason and

determine that his disposition is disproportionate punishment, does not square

with the statutory mandates applicable to his case. The Juvenile Code in Maine

continues to treat juveniles differently from adult offenders, see 15 M.R.S.

§§ 3002, 3313-3314; Gleason, 404 A.2d at 579-80, 586, as the U.S. Supreme

Court has done in the very different context of juveniles tried as adults for

crimes that potentiate sentences of death or life imprisonment, see, e.g., Miller,

567 U.S. at 465-69. A comparison of the purposes behind the Juvenile Code and

its sections concerning dispositions with the analogous provisions of the Maine

Criminal Code underscores the importance that the Juvenile Code places upon

rehabilitation. Compare 15 M.R.S. §§ 3002, 3313-3314, with 17-A M.R.S.

§§ 1151-1152 (2017). The U.S. Supreme Court cases cited by J.R. do nothing to

change the continued consistency between Maine’s current Juvenile Code and

our holding in Gleason, both of which confirm the overarching goals of

rehabilitating and treating juvenile offenders.
18

[¶23] In citing Gleason, we confirm that, despite the apparent disparity

in J.R.’s disposition and the statutory limits on misdemeanor sentences for adult

offenders, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(D)-(E) (2017), the goals of rehabilitation

and treatment can sometimes “justify longer indeterminate sentences for

juveniles.” 404 A.2d at 586. As a result, we discern no inference of gross

disproportionality here. In comparing the gravity of the offense with the

sentence’s severity, we consider (1) the disposition imposed compared to the

statutorily permitted alternatives and (2) the particular facts of J.R.’s case “in

conjunction with the commonly accepted goals of punishment.” State v. Lopez,

2018 ME 59, ¶ 16, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted).

[¶24] J.R. was adjudged to have committed two counts of criminal

mischief (Class D) and three counts of theft (Class E) in four different instances

of criminal conduct increasing in seriousness over time. The length of the

institutional disposition ordered by the court was mandated by statute as an

indeterminate period not to exceed J.R.’s eighteenth birthday. See 15 M.R.S.

§ 3316(2)(A) (2017). Due to J.R.’s age at the time of the disposition, he will

spend up to eighteen months incarcerated.

[¶25] Militating against an inference that J.R.’s sentence is grossly

disproportionate is J.R.’s need for substance abuse rehabilitation and his
 19

potential to spend only as much time as it takes to complete the rehabilitation

program. All agreed at the dispositional hearing that J.R. needs “real

treatment,” and all agree on appeal that J.R.’s substance abuse was a significant

factor in the court’s disposition. Ultimately, as the court impressed upon J.R.

after announcing its disposition, the length of J.R.’s time at Long Creek will, in

large part, be determined by whether he “do[es] everything [that he is]

supposed to do.”

[¶26] We need not, and do not, reach the second step of the

proportionality analysis because J.R.’s disposition leads to no inference of gross

disproportionality. See Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 29, 65 A.3d 1242. We note,

however, that comparing the length of J.R.’s disposition with that of sentences

imposed upon adults, even those convicted of similar crimes, would be inapt.9

The different purposes of the criminal sentencing statutes and those governing

the disposition of juvenile crimes are too great to support an effective

comparison. See Gleason, 404 A.2d at 580-81, 586.

9 The MCLU suggests that we look to the sentences imposed against adults convicted of similar

misdemeanor crimes as a reference point for our proportionality analysis. That analysis would
require a mixed application of the very different statutory and constitutional constructs governing
adult sentencing and juvenile dispositions, one which cannot withstand scrutiny. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has concluded in several contexts, “the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979); see also United States v. Rene E., 583
F.3d 8, 13-16 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2009). We decline to engage in an analysis here that would, in essence,
equate the rights of juvenile and adult offenders with respect to the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Maine Constitution.
20

[¶27] In conclusion, we note the gaps in the continuum of care that are

exemplified by J.R.’s case. In such a case, where the juvenile is unable to engage

meaningfully in rehabilitation services in an unsecured setting, Long Creek’s

secure facility often remains the least restrictive and only choice to undertake

the process of substance abuse and correctional treatment for a youth

adjudicated of having committed juvenile crimes. The court is not a provider

of social services, and judges’ options for the disposition of cases are limited to

existing programs and services. Resources for intervention that have been

established by the Legislature, communities, and public and private entities are

simply too few and far apart to provide judges with creative alternatives. By

imposing the minimum term permissible for an indeterminate commitment to

Long Creek, the court acted within its discretion and did not err in applying the

mandates of section 3313 to J.R.’s specific needs. We, therefore, affirm.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

_____________________________

 21

SAUFLEY, C.J., with whom GORMAN and JABAR, JJ., join, concurring.

[¶28] I concur completely in the thoughtful and thorough analysis of the

Court. This youth was spiraling out of control, leaving the parties and the court

with very few options.

[¶29] I write separately, however, to address the unfortunate gap in

services and placements available to Maine’s children and youth who, as with

J.R., have found themselves in trouble with the law.

[¶30] The Legislature has been very clear regarding the purposes of the

Maine Juvenile Code. See 15 M.R.S. § 3002(1) (2017). The parties have spent

much time discussing the rehabilitative nature of the Juvenile Code. Regarding

the availability of alternatives for treatment and rehabilitation, the Legislature

explicitly provided this guidance:

1. Purposes. The purposes of this part are:

. . . .

D. To secure for any juvenile removed from the custody of
the juvenile’s parents the necessary treatment, care,
guidance, and discipline to assist that juvenile in becoming a
responsible and productive member of society.

Id. § 3002(1)(D). If we are all to pursue the Legislature’s goals in juvenile

proceedings, a much greater range of “treatment, care, guidance, and discipline”
22

options must be available to address the individualized needs and challenges of

each child and youth.

[¶31] As the Court notes cogently, “In the circumstances presented here,

the only meaningful less restrictive alternative to commitment was to place J.R.

on probation.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 16. In this context, where J.R.’s behavior was

escalating consistently despite the resources that had been provided, despite

parental efforts, and despite the adults’ forewarning of potential consequences

of his errant behavior, “[t]he trajectory of his behaviors clearly portends future

crime.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 19. In the absence of a resource that was capable of

interrupting the escalation of his unacceptable behavior, J.R. would very likely

have gone on to commit more serious crimes, possibly harming other members

of the public and certainly harming his own potential. Accordingly, the State’s

position and the court’s decision were appropriate and within reason given

their alternatives.

[¶32] Nonetheless, the fact that the court was left with two stark

alternatives—probation, which would almost certainly fail, or incarceration,

which has its own substantial negative repercussions10—is a tragedy. While the

10 To be clear, it is the actual incarceration of the youth, with its life-long stigma and emotional

ramifications, to which I refer here. I do not intend this reference as a criticism of the staff at Long
Creek. In a recent report, the Center for Children’s Law & Policy praised the “dedicated professionals
at Long Creek who are committed to tackling long-standing problems and improving conditions,
 23

lack of alternatives available today may not be directly contrary to the

strictures of Maine law or the Constitutions, we can and must do better for

Maine’s youth.

[¶33] The lack of alternatives available to the court, to the youth and his

family, and to the attorneys attempting to carry out the Legislature’s mandate

for rehabilitation of a youth who is out of control, is both shortsighted and

fraught with potential long-term consequences. We, in government, must find

additional alternatives for our children and youth. That continuum of care

should include both well-proven and promising innovative programs, including

such options as evidence-based behavioral modification programs, residential

treatment facilities, enhanced mental health treatment services, and even

group homes with structure and oversight, within or near the communities of

their families.

policies, and practices at the facility.” Center for Children’s Law & Policy, Long Creek Youth Dev. Ctr.
Conditions Assessment Narrative Report, at 4 (September 2017). At the same time, the report
identified several critical shortcomings, including:

the incarceration of many youth at Long Creek for low-risk offenses, the high rate of
referrals of youth to Long Creek from mental health placements, the limited number
of community-based mental health services for Maine’s adolescent population,
questions about the quality and effectiveness of existing community-based mental
health services, the high cost of keeping a youth at the facility ($250,000 per year per
youth), and the availability of federal funds (e.g., through Medicaid) to support
community-based programs but not institutional care.

Id. at 73.
24

[¶34] As we plan for the future of this great State, it is my hope that new

and effective alternatives will be available for our children and youth who are

in need of individualized services.

Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Tina Heather Nadeau,
PLLC, Portland, for Appellant J.R.

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Carie James, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally),
Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Emma E. Bond, Esq., Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Meagan S. Sway, Esq.,
American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, Portland, for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation

Skowhegan District Court docket numbers JV-2017-05, JV-2017-21, JV-2017-34
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY