FILED
Oct 10 2018, 8:57 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Carlos I. Carrillo Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Greenwood, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of: T.T. and October 10, 2018
M.M., Children in Need of Court of Appeals Case No.
Services: 18A-JC-1216
Appeal from the Tippecanoe
C.Y. (Mother), Superior Court
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Faith A. Graham,
Judge
v. The Honorable Tricia L.
Thompson, Magistrate
The Indiana Department of Trial Court Cause Nos.
Child Services, 79D03-1708-JC-207
79D03-1708-JC-209
Appellee-Petitioner.
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JC-1216 | October 10, 2018 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] C.Y. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s determination that T.T. and
M.M. (collectively, “the Children”) are children in need of services (“CHINS”).
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss
the CHINS petitions filed by the Indiana Department of Child Services
(“DCS”), which motion was made on the ground that the factfinding hearing
was not completed within the statutorily-mandated timeframe. Because we
agree, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with
instructions to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice. 1
Facts and Procedural History
[2] DCS became involved with the Children after receiving reports that Mother had
been arrested following a domestic disturbance involving M.M.’s father. On
August 17, 2017, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children to be CHINS. The
juvenile court began a factfinding hearing on October 6, 2017. After the parties
waived the initial sixty-day time limitation set forth in Indiana Code section 31-
34-11-1(a) and consented to an additional sixty days to complete the hearing,
the factfinding hearing was continued to November 7, 2017. On November 7,
1
Mother raises numerous alternative contentions, however, because we find her contention relating to the
denial of her motion to dismiss to be dispositive, we need not consider these alternative contentions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JC-1216 | October 10, 2018 Page 2 of 5
2017, the factfinding hearing was continued at DCS’s request. The juvenile
court rescheduled the factfinding hearing for January 3, 2018.
[3] At the start of the January 3, 2018 hearing, Mother moved to dismiss the
proceedings, arguing that the factfinding hearing had not been completed
within the statutorily-mandated time following the filing of the CHINS
petitions. The juvenile court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss and completed
the factfinding hearing. On March 7, 2018, the juvenile court found the
Children to be CHINS. On April 13, 2018, the juvenile court entered a
dispositional order and parental participation decree for M.M. and dismissed
T.T.’s case.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss
pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, which provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), unless the allegations of
a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a
factfinding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a petition
alleging that a child is a child in need of services is filed in
accordance with IC 31-34-9.
(b) The juvenile court may extend the time to complete a
factfinding hearing, as described in subsection (a), for an
additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the
additional time.
****
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JC-1216 | October 10, 2018 Page 3 of 5
(d) If the factfinding hearing is not held within the time set forth
in subsection (a) or (b), upon a motion with the court, the court
shall dismiss the case without prejudice.
(Emphasis added). We recently interpreted this statute, concluding “there is no
longer any reason to believe that the General Assembly intends [the statute] to
mean anything other than what its clear language indicates, i.e., that a
factfinding hearing shall be completed within” the statutorily-mandated
timeframe and failure to do so “is grounds for dismissal.” Matter of J.R., 98
N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphases in original). We further
concluded that “if we were to allow the deadline to be ignored here, trial courts
could habitually set these matters outside the time frame and there would be no
consequence whatsoever.” Id.
[5] The parties agree that the 120-day deadline for concluding the factfinding
hearing was December 17, 2017. DCS argues, however, that dismissal was not
necessary because (1) it did not believe that Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1
created “a hard and fast deadline” and (2) Mother waived her objection by
agreeing to the continuance. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. Contrary to DCS’s argument,
we believe that the General Assembly clearly intends for the timeframe set forth
in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 to be a certain deadline. Further, while
subsection (a) provides that the parties may waive the initial 60-day deadline by
agreeing to a continuance, subsection (b) does not include any such provision.
This lack of allowance for an additional extension of time indicates that the
General Assembly intends to require that a factfinding hearing must be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JC-1216 | October 10, 2018 Page 4 of 5
completed within 120 days of the filing of a CHINS petition regardless of any
act or agreements of the parties. To allow the parties to agree to dates beyond
the maximum 120-day limit would thwart the legislative purpose of timely
rehabilitation and reunification of families that are subject to CHINS
proceedings. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and
remand with instructions to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice. 2
[6] We reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
2
Should DCS refile, it “would not be able to rely solely on the evidence that was admitted at the original
CHINS factfinding; it would have to also submit new evidence” regarding the current conditions. See Matter
of J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655 (internal quotation omitted). It seems unlikely that DCS would do so, however,
given that DCS sought to dismiss the CHINS proceedings for T.T. and DCS Family Case Manager Kourtney
Wheeler admitted during the dispositional hearing that she no longer had any concerns about M.M.’s safety
and believed that M.M. should be returned to Mother’s care.
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