In the Matter of: T.T. and M.M., Children in Need of Services: C.Y. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services

FILED
Oct 10 2018, 8:57 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Carlos I. Carrillo Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Greenwood, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of: T.T. and October 10, 2018
M.M., Children in Need of Court of Appeals Case No.
Services: 18A-JC-1216
Appeal from the Tippecanoe
C.Y. (Mother), Superior Court
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Faith A. Graham,
Judge
v. The Honorable Tricia L.
Thompson, Magistrate
The Indiana Department of Trial Court Cause Nos.
Child Services, 79D03-1708-JC-207
79D03-1708-JC-209
Appellee-Petitioner.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JC-1216 | October 10, 2018 Page 1 of 5
 Case Summary
[1] C.Y. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s determination that T.T. and

M.M. (collectively, “the Children”) are children in need of services (“CHINS”).

Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss

the CHINS petitions filed by the Indiana Department of Child Services

(“DCS”), which motion was made on the ground that the factfinding hearing

was not completed within the statutorily-mandated timeframe. Because we

agree, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with

instructions to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice. 1

Facts and Procedural History
[2] DCS became involved with the Children after receiving reports that Mother had

been arrested following a domestic disturbance involving M.M.’s father. On

August 17, 2017, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children to be CHINS. The

juvenile court began a factfinding hearing on October 6, 2017. After the parties

waived the initial sixty-day time limitation set forth in Indiana Code section 31-

34-11-1(a) and consented to an additional sixty days to complete the hearing,

the factfinding hearing was continued to November 7, 2017. On November 7,

1
Mother raises numerous alternative contentions, however, because we find her contention relating to the
denial of her motion to dismiss to be dispositive, we need not consider these alternative contentions.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JC-1216 | October 10, 2018 Page 2 of 5
 2017, the factfinding hearing was continued at DCS’s request. The juvenile

court rescheduled the factfinding hearing for January 3, 2018.

[3] At the start of the January 3, 2018 hearing, Mother moved to dismiss the

proceedings, arguing that the factfinding hearing had not been completed

within the statutorily-mandated time following the filing of the CHINS

petitions. The juvenile court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss and completed

the factfinding hearing. On March 7, 2018, the juvenile court found the

Children to be CHINS. On April 13, 2018, the juvenile court entered a

dispositional order and parental participation decree for M.M. and dismissed

T.T.’s case.

Discussion and Decision
[4] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to dismiss

pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1, which provides, in relevant part,

as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), unless the allegations of
a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a
factfinding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a petition
alleging that a child is a child in need of services is filed in
accordance with IC 31-34-9.
(b) The juvenile court may extend the time to complete a
factfinding hearing, as described in subsection (a), for an
additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the
additional time.
****

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 (d) If the factfinding hearing is not held within the time set forth
in subsection (a) or (b), upon a motion with the court, the court
shall dismiss the case without prejudice.

(Emphasis added). We recently interpreted this statute, concluding “there is no

longer any reason to believe that the General Assembly intends [the statute] to

mean anything other than what its clear language indicates, i.e., that a

factfinding hearing shall be completed within” the statutorily-mandated

timeframe and failure to do so “is grounds for dismissal.” Matter of J.R., 98

N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphases in original). We further

concluded that “if we were to allow the deadline to be ignored here, trial courts

could habitually set these matters outside the time frame and there would be no

consequence whatsoever.” Id.

[5] The parties agree that the 120-day deadline for concluding the factfinding

hearing was December 17, 2017. DCS argues, however, that dismissal was not

necessary because (1) it did not believe that Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1

created “a hard and fast deadline” and (2) Mother waived her objection by

agreeing to the continuance. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. Contrary to DCS’s argument,

we believe that the General Assembly clearly intends for the timeframe set forth

in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1 to be a certain deadline. Further, while

subsection (a) provides that the parties may waive the initial 60-day deadline by

agreeing to a continuance, subsection (b) does not include any such provision.

This lack of allowance for an additional extension of time indicates that the

General Assembly intends to require that a factfinding hearing must be

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 completed within 120 days of the filing of a CHINS petition regardless of any

act or agreements of the parties. To allow the parties to agree to dates beyond

the maximum 120-day limit would thwart the legislative purpose of timely

rehabilitation and reunification of families that are subject to CHINS

proceedings. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and

remand with instructions to dismiss the CHINS petitions without prejudice. 2

[6] We reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand with instructions.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

2
Should DCS refile, it “would not be able to rely solely on the evidence that was admitted at the original
CHINS factfinding; it would have to also submit new evidence” regarding the current conditions. See Matter
of J.R., 98 N.E.3d at 655 (internal quotation omitted). It seems unlikely that DCS would do so, however,
given that DCS sought to dismiss the CHINS proceedings for T.T. and DCS Family Case Manager Kourtney
Wheeler admitted during the dispositional hearing that she no longer had any concerns about M.M.’s safety
and believed that M.M. should be returned to Mother’s care.

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