FILED
Oct 12 2018, 6:59 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Amy Karozos Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Greenwood, Indiana Attorney General
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
J.S., October 12, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JV-1049
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge
Appellee-Petitioner Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D09-1711-JD-1623
49D09-1710-JD-1472
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] J.S. appeals his placement in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”)
following his admission to delinquent acts that would have amounted to level 6
felony receiving stolen auto parts, class A misdemeanor dangerous possession
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of a firearm, and class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. Finding
that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering J.S.’s placement in the
DOC, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 2017, fifteen-year-old J.S. lived with his mother in an Indianapolis
apartment. He had a history of disciplinary incidents at school, generally
involving fighting and resulting in suspension. He also used marijuana. On
October 7, 2017, he attended a party at which firearms were present.
Eyewitnesses reported seeing him fire gunshots into the air. A week later,
police discovered J.S. sleeping in the front seat of a vehicle identified as one
recently stolen in an armed carjacking. He told police that he knew that the
vehicle had been stolen and that he and two friends had driven it around,
parked it, and fallen asleep. He reported that he had won the vehicle in a dice
game, but also said that it had been given to him. Police discovered a loaded
handgun in plain view in the front passenger’s side floor area. On October 18,
2017, under cause number 49D09-1710-JD-1472 (“Cause 1472”), the State filed
a petition alleging that J.S. had committed acts amounting to level 6 felony
receiving stolen auto parts and class A misdemeanor criminal trespass if
committed by an adult. J.S. was placed on electronic monitoring pending his
adjudication.
[3] Three weeks later, police responded to a report of an armed robbery involving
two armed juvenile boys who stole a woman’s purse, cell phone, and car keys
and fled on foot to a nearby apartment. According to a predispositional report
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filed by the local probation department, a maintenance man observed the boys
as they ran and identified one of the boys as J.S. J.S. said that he was inside his
apartment when the boys (his friends) asked to enter. He allowed them to enter
and stash a firearm and other contraband inside the apartment. Police
recovered the firearm from his bedroom, and ballistics testing showed a match
with bullet casings found at the scene of the October 7 party. Under cause
number 49D09-1711-JD-1623 (“Cause 1623”), the State filed a petition alleging
that J.S. had committed acts amounting to level 3 felony armed robbery, level 6
felony pointing a firearm, class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a
license, and class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. The State
also filed a notice of electronic monitoring violation, based on J.S.’s allowing
individuals into his home and possessing a firearm.
[4] At the end of 2017, J.S.’s mother found an apartment in another school district
and enrolled J.S. for classes beginning in January 2018. During January, J.S.
was written up for skipping classes and received one disciplinary referral for
disruption on the bus.
[5] In February 2018, under cause number 49D09-1802-JD-178 (“Cause 178”),
stemming from the incident at the October 7 party, the State filed a petition
alleging that J.S. had committed acts amounting to level 5 felony criminal
recklessness, class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm, and class
A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license if committed by an adult.
The State removed J.S. from his home and placed him in pretrial detention,
during which time he accumulated several incident reports.
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[6] J.S. entered into an admission agreement, pursuant to which he admitted to
acts amounting to receiving stolen auto parts (Cause 1472), class A
misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm (Cause 1623), and class A
misdemeanor theft (Cause 1623) if committed by an adult. In exchange, the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in Causes 1472 and 1623 and all
counts in Cause 178. The agreement specified that the disposition would be left
open to the trial court’s discretion, and the trial court ordered a psychological
evaluation.
[7] At the dispositional hearing, the trial court admitted the psychologist’s report,
in which the doctor expressed concern with J.S.’s antisocial behavior, peer
associations, possession of firearms, and drug abuse. He also considered J.S.’s
risk of recidivism to be moderate to high. Notwithstanding, the doctor
recommended that if the court were to return J.S. to the community, he should
be afforded close supervision, electronic monitoring, drug abuse screening, and
frequent assessment and oversight from the probation department. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 at 154. The public defender agency submitted a proposed plan for
returning J.S. home with supervision from his mother, a neighbor, and a cousin
and for court-ordered services, monitoring, and curfew. Id. at 135-36. The
probation department submitted its predispositional report and testimony
recommending that J.S. be placed in the DOC and be subject to a no-contact
order concerning certain friends and victims. The trial court issued a
dispositional order placing J.S. in the DOC. J.S. now appeals his disposition.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] J.S. contends that the trial court abused its discretion in placing him in the
DOC. The disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter
committed to the trial court’s discretion, subject to the statutory considerations
of the child’s welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh
disposition. R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We
review a trial court’s disposition for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if its
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. In
determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh
evidence nor judge witness credibility. Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014).
[9] Juvenile court proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. T.K. v. State, 899
N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “[T]he goal of the juvenile process is
rehabilitation so that the youth will not become a criminal as an adult.” R.H.,
937 N.E.2d at 388. As such, juvenile courts have a variety of placement
choices. Id. Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 reads,
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best
interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate
setting available; and
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(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest
and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the
child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
[10] Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-9(a)(5) requires the trial court to state its reasons
for the disposition chosen. This involves the trial court’s issuance of written
findings and conclusions concerning the child’s care, treatment, rehabilitation,
or placement; parental participation in the plan; efforts made to prevent the
child’s removal from the parent; family services offered; and the court’s reasons
for its disposition. Ind. Code § 31-37-18-9(a)(1)-(5). Here, the trial court issued
findings indicating its consideration of the statutory factors and its reasons for
ordering placement in the DOC. These include the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding J.S.’s offenses, that J.S. was on electronic
monitoring when he committed the offenses in Cause 1623, that he was deemed
a moderate to high risk for continued delinquency recidivism, that he needs
services that cannot be provided in the home, and that he had an onslaught of
referrals, all of which were firearms-related. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 24-25.
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[11] J.S. challenges the trial court’s finding that “[a]ll three referrals before the court
were firearms related.” Id. at 25. He claims that the presence and/or
involvement of a firearm was factually determined only as to Cause 1623, in
which he confessed, as part of his admission agreement, to knowing that a
firearm used in an armed robbery was present in his bedroom. He therefore
maintains that the trial court could not properly consider the presence or
involvement of a firearm in the remaining referrals against him. In addressing
this argument, we first note that J.S. did not object when the prosecutor
referenced his arrest in another case involving a gun while his first gun-related
case was pending. Tr. Vol. 2 at 17-18. Nor did he object or seek a clarification
when the trial court referenced his “culture of guns,” his admission that he had
driven the stolen vehicle with a handgun located under the seat, or the presence
of guns at the October party in connection with his penchant for being around
firearms. See id. at 23-24. Instead, he now appears to assert that when a trial
court is considering placement options for a juvenile offender, it may not
consider evidence beyond that which formed the factual basis for the juvenile’s
agreed admissions. We disagree.
[12] We find juvenile dispositional proceedings such as these to be analogous to
sentencing hearings after an open plea agreement in adult court, where the trial
court considers a broad range of information in evaluating aggravating and
mitigating circumstances relevant to sentencing. In Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d
1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013), the defendant bargained for the dismissal of seven of the
nine counts against him, and the plea agreement did not limit the evidence that
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the State or the defendant could offer as aggravating or mitigating factors
during sentencing. In sentencing Bethea, the trial court cited as an aggravating
factor the injury to the victim, where the injury was an element of a burglary
charge dismissed pursuant to Bethea’s plea agreement. Id. at 1142. Although
Bethea involved a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, the claim involved counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in failing
to cogently challenge the trial court’s consideration of aggravating factors
pertaining to counts that were dismissed pursuant to Bethea’s plea agreement.
Id. at 1139, 1142. In analyzing the scope of information proper for
consideration as aggravators and mitigators, the Bethea court explained that a
plea agreement is a contract negotiated by the parties, and as such, the parties
can agree to limit or otherwise exclude what may be considered by the trial
court during sentencing. Id. at 1146. Unless the parties include language
limiting the evidence that the trial court may consider during sentencing, the
trial court may consider facts and circumstances surrounding the case, even
those pertaining to underlying charges that were dismissed. Id. at 1144-45. The
Bethea court held that the trial court did not err in giving significant
consideration to the facts relating to dismissed charges.1 Id. at 1145.
[13] Similarly, here, J.S. and the State entered into an admission agreement,
functionally analogous to a plea agreement, in which J.S.’s
1
Thus, in the context of analyzing appellate counsel’s performance, counsel could not be said to have
performed deficiently on that basis. Bethea, 983 N.E.2d at 1146.
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disposition/placement was left open to the trial court’s discretion. See
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 3-5. The agreement did not include any language
limiting the information that the State or J.S. could offer as factors relevant to
the trial court’s determination regarding placement; rather, it simply limited the
delinquent acts for which the court could enter true findings. We find Bethea
instructive and conclude that the trial court could properly consider the overall
narrative of the referrals against J.S. when evaluating what placement would
best promote community safety and J.S.’s best interests. These narratives,
memorialized and included in the probation department’s predispositional
report and incorporated by reference by the trial court, include eyewitness
accounts of J.S. firing a handgun into the air at a party, a maintenance man’s
identification of J.S. as one of the boys running from the scene of an armed
robbery with a black object in his hand, and officers’ discovery of a handgun in
plain view in a stolen vehicle which J.S. had admitted to driving. This
information implicated public safety as well as J.S.’s best interests, and the trial
court did not err in considering it.
[14] As evidence favoring family placement, J.S. cites his mother’s proactive steps in
moving him to a new high school during the pendency of the juvenile
proceedings. The record shows that in his first month at his new school, J.S.
had several disciplinary entries for skipping classes and an entry for
disruption/disrespect on the bus. The court considered the positive steps taken
by J.S.’s mother but ultimately found that the educational opportunities
available within the DOC would offer a level of structure that would better
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promote J.S.’s educational interests. We see nothing wrong with this
assessment.
[15] Finally, to the extent J.S. suggests that the trial court overlooked his lack of a
prior juvenile record and thus failed to consider the least harsh disposition
available, we disagree. The court specifically indicated its consideration of
J.S.’s lack of criminal record but went on to note the factors that militated
toward his placement in the DOC: three referrals in a month’s time, each
involving multiple counts and the presence of a firearm, his commission of the
acts in Cause 1623 while serving home detention pending trial, and his
violation of home detention rules by allowing friends in his home and having a
firearm in his bedroom. J.S.’s failure to abide by his pretrial home detention
conditions does not bode well for his long-term prospects of success in less
restrictive placements. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court
acted within its discretion in ordering J.S.’s placement in the DOC.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[16] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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