Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 23, 2019
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 50856-7-II
S.B.,
Petitioner. PUBLISHED OPINION
LEE, A.C.J. — S.B. appeals the superior court’s order granting the State’s petition for 180-
day involuntary commitment. S.B. argues that the trial court erred by not considering her voluntary
treatment status when it entered the 180-day commitment order. Because the statute authorizing
180-day commitment, RCW 71.05.280,1 does not require the superior court to consider voluntary
treatment status when determining continued commitment, the superior court did not err.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Following S.B.’s initial involuntary commitment to mental health treatment under RCW
71.05.230, the superior court held a hearing to determine whether to order a further 180-day
involuntary commitment for S.B. under RCW 71.05.280. At the hearing, S.B. informed the trial
court that she wanted to introduce evidence of her voluntary treatment status. The State argued
that voluntary treatment status was not an issue for the purpose of extending involuntary
1
Because the order was entered in August 2017, former RCW 71.05.280 (2016) was effective at
the time. However, the subsequent changes to the statute do not have any substantive effect on
the issue before us. Therefore, we use the current version of the statute.
No. 50856-7-II
commitment under RCW 71.05.280. The superior court agreed with the State and did not consider
S.B.’s asserted voluntary treatment status.
The superior court found that S.B. was gravely disabled. Because S.B. was gravely
disabled, the superior court ordered an additional 180-day commitment for S.B under RCW
71.05.280(4). S.B. appeals.
ANALYSIS
S.B. argues that the superior court was required to consider her voluntary treatment status
at the 180-day commitment hearing.2 We disagree because the relevant statute, RCW 71.05.280,
does not require consideration of voluntary treatment status.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Derenoff, 182 Wn.
App. 458, 463, 332 P.3d 1001 (2014). The primary objective in statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. We begin with the plain language of the statute. Id. “Where
the meaning of statutory language is plain on its face, we must give effect to that plain meaning as
an expression of legislative intent.” State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345 (2008).
RCW 71.05.280 states,
At the expiration of the fourteen-day period of intensive treatment, a person may
be committed for further treatment pursuant to RCW 71.05.320 if:
(1) Such person after having been taken into custody for evaluation and
treatment has threatened, attempted, or inflicted: (a) Physical harm upon the person
of another or himself or herself, or substantial damage upon the property of another,
and (b) as a result of mental disorder or substance use disorder presents a likelihood
of serious harm; or
2
The superior court’s 180-day commitment order has expired. However, our review of this
expired commitment order is not moot because commitment orders have continuing effect as they
are considered at future commitment hearings. In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 625-26,
629-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). Accordingly, we consider S.B.’s appeal.
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No. 50856-7-II
(2) Such person was taken into custody as a result of conduct in which he
or she attempted or inflicted physical harm upon the person of another or himself
or herself, or substantial damage upon the property of others, and continues to
present, as a result of mental disorder or substance use disorder, a likelihood of
serious harm; or
(3) Such person has been determined to be incompetent and criminal
charges have been dismissed pursuant to RCW 10.77.086(4), and has committed
acts constituting a felony, and as a result of a mental disorder, presents a substantial
likelihood of repeating similar acts.
(a) In any proceeding pursuant to this subsection it shall not be
necessary to show intent, willfulness, or state of mind as an element of the crime;
(b) For any person subject to commitment under this subsection
where the charge underlying the finding of incompetence is for a felony classified
as violent under RCW 9.94A.030, the court shall determine whether the acts the
person committed constitute a violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030; or
(4) Such person is gravely disabled; or
(5) Such person is in need of assisted outpatient behavioral health treatment.
The plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The only requirement to order
further treatment is the superior court’s finding that the person subject to commitment meets one
of the five enumerated requirements—one of which is that the person is gravely disabled. RCW
71.05.280(4). In contrast, the legislature specifically requires a finding that the person has not in
good faith volunteered for treatment before ordering initial involuntary commitment. RCW
71.05.230(2). Under the statutory construction rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we
consider the legislature’s decision to omit the good faith volunteer requirement from RCW
71.05.280 to be intentional. See State v. Bacon, 190 Wn.2d 458, 466-67, 415 P.3d 207 (2018).
The plain language of the statute makes it clear that the legislature did not intend for the superior
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No. 50856-7-II
court to consider voluntary treatment status as a requirement for ordering additional involuntary
commitment.
Here, the superior court complied with the plain language of RCW 71.05.280 when it found
that S.B. was gravely disabled and ordered an additional 180-day commitment. S.B. does not
challenge the superior court’s finding that she was gravely disabled. Therefore, the superior court
complied with the plain language of RCW 71.05.280. The superior court was not required to
consider S.B.’s voluntary treatment status when making a determination regarding commitment
for further treatment under RCW 71.05.280. Accordingly, we affirm.
Lee, A.C.J.
We concur:
Worswick, J.
Sutton, J.
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