NUMBER 13-18-00576-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF S.S.R., E.L.R. JR., AND Z.N.R., CHILDREN
On appeal from the 25th District Court
of Lavaca County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellants C.A.F. (“Mother”) and E.L.R. Sr. (“Father”) appeal the termination of
their parental rights to S.S.R, E.L.R. Jr., and Z.N.R., minors. 1 By three issues, Mother
and Father claim that: (1) the referring trial court erred by denying their request for de
novo review of the associate judge’s report; (2) the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support termination under family code section 161.001(b)(1); and (3) the
1To protect the identity of the children, we refer to the children and their parents using aliases. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that it is in
the best interests of the children to terminate the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1), (2), 201.015 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). We
reverse and remand for a de novo hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 24, 2017, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
(“the Department”) filed its original petition for protection of S.S.R, E.L.R. Jr., and Z.N.R.,
for conservatorship, and for termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother
and Father and the children. The petition alleged numerous statutory violations
supporting termination.
On August 14, 2018, September 5, 2018, and September 17, 2018, a bench trial
was held before an associate judge concerning the termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights. On September 28, 2018, Mother and Father were e-mailed the associate
judge’s report. See id. § 201.011 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) (“The associate
judge’s report may contain the associate judge’s findings, conclusions, or
recommendations and may be in the form of a proposed order.”). In its report to the
referring court, the associate judge found that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
should be terminated under family code section161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). See id.
§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). The associate judge also found that termination was
in the best interests of the children. See id. §§ 161.001(b)(2).
On October 3, 2018, both Mother and Father filed a request for a de novo hearing
of the associate judge’s report. They each requested a de novo hearing on “all issues of
fact and findings of law” related to: (1) termination of their parent-child relationship; (2)
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the associate judge’s finding that termination would be in the children’s best interests;
and (3) the associate judge’s naming of the Department as the permanent managing
conservator of the children. On October 9, 2018, the associate judge signed the formal
order of termination. On October 10, 2018, the district judge of the referring court denied
Mother’s and Father’s request for a de novo hearing, finding that the parents “failed to
specify the issues that would be presented to the referring court as required by [Texas
Family Code] Sec. 201.015(b).” See id. § 201.015(b). This appeal ensued.
II. DE NOVO HEARING IN TERMINATION CASES
In their first issue, Mother and Father argue that the trial court reversibly erred by
denying their motion for de novo review of the associate judge’s statutory and best interest
findings. The State has not filed an appellate brief.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Section 201.015 of the Texas Family Code states:
a) A party may request a de novo hearing before the referring court by filing
with the clerk of the referring court a written request not later than the
third working day after the date the party receives notice of:
1) the substance of the associate judge's report as provided
by Section 201.011; or
2) the rendering of the temporary order, if the request concerns a
temporary order rendered by an associate judge under Section
201.007(a)(14)(C).
b) A request for a de novo hearing under this section must specify the
issues that will be presented to the referring court.
c) In the de novo hearing before the referring court, the parties may present
witnesses on the issues specified in the request for hearing. The
referring court may also consider the record from the hearing before the
associate judge, including the charge to and verdict returned by a jury.
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d) Notice of a request for a de novo hearing before the referring court shall
be given to the opposing attorney under Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
e) If a request for a de novo hearing before the referring court is filed by a
party, any other party may file a request for a de novo hearing before
the referring court not later than the third working day after the date the
initial request was filed.
f) The referring court, after notice to the parties, shall hold a de novo
hearing not later than the 30th day after the date on which the initial
request for a de novo hearing was filed with the clerk of the referring
court.
See id. § 201.015.
A party who timely appeals the associate judge’s report is entitled to a de novo
hearing before the referring court. See In re A.M., 418 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, no pet.); Harrell v. Harrell, 986 S.W.2d 629, 630–31 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1998, no pet.) (citing State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1995)); see also
In Interest of A.A.T., No. 13-16-00269-CV, 2016 WL 8188946, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
B. Discussion
The record in this case shows that Mother and Father timely filed an appeal of the
associate judge’s report and that they each unambiguously requested a de novo hearing
on “[a]ll issues of fact and findings of law related to” the termination of their parental rights
and the associate judge’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Mother and Father requested a de novo hearing on October 3, 2018, which was within
three working days of receiving notice of the substance of the associate judge’s report.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(a). Their request clearly specified which findings
and conclusions of the associate judge that Mother and Father objected to. See id.
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§ 201.015(b). Therefore, Mother and Father argue that they were entitled to a de novo
hearing before the referring court. We agree.
Once Mother and Father timely filed their request to the referring court for a de
novo hearing on the associate judge’s report, “[they] completed the prerequisites
necessary to entitle [them] to have a de novo hearing.” Harrell, 986 S.W.2d at 631; see
In re A.M., 418 S.W.3d at 835; see also In Interest of A.A.T., 2016 WL 8188946, at *2.
Mother and Father were entitled to a de novo hearing before the referring court on all
issues of fact and findings of law related to the termination of their parental rights,
including the statutory findings under section 161.001(b)(1) and the finding that
termination was in the best interest of the children. We sustain Mother’s and Father’s first
issue. Because we sustain their first issue, we need not address their second and third
issues challenging the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P.
47.1.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
21st day of March, 2019.
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